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Summary
This thesis sets out to provide a systematic examination of post-acquisition
management in the United Kingdom. In particular we are concerned to know what
changes take place in acquired companies after acquisition and to examine whether
there are significant and robust differences between post-acquisition styles in terms of
the type and volume, of changes made, and their timing. We also examine the patterns
exhibited by different types of managing executive taking charge and seek to link
executive type, volume and timing of change with different post-acquisition styles.
The thesis uses a hybrid method to achieve a cross sectional view of acquisitions in
the UK with in-depth explanation. The responding sample from our survey was
allocated to the different acquisition types of Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991)
typology and the change data allowed us to test whether the framework is
representative and robust.
The first Chapter of the thesis observes that many acquisitions fail and that greater
attention should be paid to the post-acquisition phase, although, as Chapter two
shows, the post-acquisition literature is highly fragmented. Only Haspeslagh and
Jemison's (1991) typology attempts a unified view although it has limitations. We
draw upon related areas of research to enrich and extend their framework. In Chapter
three we show how data was collected and applied to the framework, and Chapter four
shows the big picture of acquisition types in the UK and their associations with
success. Chapter five uses functional change data to test the framework and interview
material to provide a level of explanation for changes made. The reasons for each type
of acquisition are explored in Chapter six and in Chapter seven we examine the
association between managing executive type and acquisition style. Chapter eight
introduces a time component and looks at the patterns of change for each acquisition
type. The chapter aims to integrate earlier findings and provide an integrated view of
post acquisition change.
xi
The final chapter concludes that for acquisitions in the UK, there are significant
differences in post acquisition styles, in terms of nature and timing of change, and
there are clear associations with different management types.
xii
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1.1 Introduction
Acquisitions are an increasingly important area of UK corporate activity.
Acquirers however appear not to benefit as fully or as often as one would expect
from the recorded levels of take-overs. This chapter will show how considerable
research effort has attempted to explain these short comings by seeking to link
acquisition performance with pre-acquisition characteristics. It will also show
that growing and widespread dissatisfaction with this approach has led attention
to focus upon the mitigating effects of the post-acquisition phase.
This thesis will contribute to this focus upon the post-acquisition phase by
examining the initiation of post-acquisition changes in companies acquired in the
UK. This perspective is also consistent with the general trend in strategic
management towards the issue of implementation.
1.2 The importance of acquisitions
Acquisitions have long been a distinctive and increasingly important feature of
business in the UK. In the last ten years, 1988 to 1997, the UK has seen 10,679
acquisitions' valued at £280bn (Acquisitions Monthly, 1998). Figure 1.1 shows
the ten years spans the end of one wave of activity and the beginning of another,
with volume and value declining in the late eighties, a nadir in the early nineties
and a resurgence of activity in 1994 - 5.
Figure 1.1: Corporate Acquisitions in the UK by value and number
1988	 1989
	
1990
	 1991
	
1992	 1993
	
1934
	
1935	 1996	 1997
Year
Source: Acquisitions Monthly (March 1998)
1 These figures are for acquisitions of PLCs, private companies and MBOs
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Acquisitions represent an enormous redistribution of resources and this has
ensured intensive media coverage. In the UK the growing numbers and size of
deals has been a source of concern to academics, business and political leaders
alike as they strive to decide whether this is a desirable trend for national and
regional economies. At the regional level the closure of a major manufacturing
concern such as a ship builder, car manufacturer or TV centre, such as the shut
down of Central TV studios in Birmingham by Carlton PLC, can have
significant regional consequences for economies, unemployment levels, local
prosperity and pride. Hughes (1993: 72 - 74) in a survey of the empirical
evidence cites several studies (Massey and Meegan, 1978, Leigh and North,
1978, Millward and McQueeney, 1981) which show that post-merger
restructuring can weaken regional growth prospects. Low level management
activities remained in the area but head office functions were frequently
relocated outside the region. A more recent study of the regional effects of
external take-overs focused upon the Scottish economy from 1965 - 1989.
Ashcroft and Love (1993) examined 395 external take-overs of manufacturing
companies with assets in excess of Elm (1975 prices). They show that the
regional effects of acquisition were negative in the short term as acquired
companies, particularly the larger ones, reduced their organisational functions
and local linkages (Ashcroft and Love, 1993: 107).
Mergers and acquisitions are the only way for rapidly restructuring an industry
by increasing its concentration. The accountancy profession has been through a
wave of mergers resulting in the 'Big Six' and pundits are now watching both
the accountancy and legal professions in anticipation of further take-overs as
operating on a global basis becomes increasingly attractive. Whilst acquisitions
occur in waves (Golbe and White, 1988, Ravenscraft, 1988), and have been
popularly characterised as driven by diversification in the 1960s, break ups and
restructuring in the 1980s to correct the mistakes of the earlier conglomerate
boom (Browne and Rosengren, 1988, Shleifer and Vishny, 1991: 54) and
perhaps are now 'reminiscent of a wave in the late 19th century that created
corporate behemoths' (Wall Street Journal, 26.02.97), for the mid 1990s,
explanations for these waves have been hard to substantiate. Ravenscraft (1988),
for the US, argues against fluctuations in cyclical variables such as low interest
rates and high share prices and points to the deregulation of certain industries
and less restrictive anti-trust enforcement. In the UK there is currently a great
deal of recent de-regulation in the energy, utilities, transport and finance sectors
and attention is now focused upon the impending building society privatisations
which may result in several major acquisitions.
Acquisitions are occurring in increasingly large volumes in the UK with wide
ranging implications for national and regional economies, industry structures
and firm stakeholders. However, as the next section will show, many
acquisitions are deemed to be failures. Given the magnitude of the phenomena,
it is important that we should achieve a better understanding of acquisitions so
that we may improve the chances of success.
1.3 Acquirers lose out
With such a volume of acquisition activity one would expect that, by and large,
there would be substantial evidence that acquisitions are successful. However,
the evidence cited below shows that a high portion of acquisitions fail.
Performance studies have examined the issue of success and concluded that
where there are benefits these generally accrue to the acquired company rather
than the acquirer. This raises the question of why firms continue to acquire
when they do not appear to benefit. We suggest that this is due to an
underestimation of the important mediating influence of the post-acquisition
phase.
The acquisition literature abounds with statistics of failure, the most often cited
studies being Kitching (1974 b) stating that 47 0 0 of acquisitions in the UK failed
or were not worth making, Hunt, Lees, Grumbar and Vivian (1987) suggesting a
failure rate of 45°0 and Coopers and Lybrand's survey (1992) showing that
540 0 of acquisitions fail.
There is a substantial literature which seeks to evaluate the performance of
acquisitions. Its findings vary as different disciplines have led to different
performance related questions, levels and methods of analysis.
Two main schools 2 of thought on whether acquisitions are successful (Browne
and Rosengren, 1988: 1-2), are i) financial  and ii) industrial economists. These
schools are distinguished by different measurement approaches with the former
relying upon short event windows and the stock market as accurate reflection of
company value, and the latter eschewing these indicators and adopting product
and accountancy based measures as performance indicators.
i) Financial economists generally seek to examine whether acquisitions create
value and for whom. Their work3 takes as a sign of wealth creation, any
immediate increase in market value at, or in anticipation of, acquisition4.
Examples of studies on the returns to bidder and target shareholders are shown
in table 1.1.
Table 1.1	 Abnormal returns to shareholders
Authors Date Event'
window
Period and
sample
Gains to bidder
shareholders %
Gains to target
shareholders
00
Jensen and Ruback 1983 Various Summarised
13 event
studies in US
0 -4 20 - 30
Jarrell and Poulsen 1989 30 days 526 exchange
listed targets
in US
1 29
2 These two groups are described as the Capital Markets school by Haspeslagh and Jemison
(1991: 293)
3 Based upon efficient market theory: the market value of a firm's stock price is an accurate
reflection of the present value of all expected future benefits.
4 After allowing for normal market fluctuations.
5 Event Studies, or abnormal returns methodology, are characteristic of this school. It
compares the returns to shareholders of both bidders and targets during a period surrounding
the take-over announcement, to 'normal' returns from a period unaffected by the 'event'.
These event 'windows' are often short, ranging from a few days to a month.
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Table 1.1 cont
Franks, Broyles
and Hecht
1977 1 month 70 mergers
1955 - 1972
in UK
-0 26
Franks and Harris 1989 1 month 1,445 targets 0 22
1955- 1985
in UK
Sudarsanam, Holl
and Salami
1993 10 days 171 targets in
the UK
-2.0 21
Financial economists seem to agree that acquisitions create wealth but the
benefit is for acquired firm shareholders rather than acquiring firm shareholders.
Finance scholars, with deep reservations about the use of short event windows,
have argued that acquisitions are in fact more attractive for acquirers than has
been suggested. They have attempted to examine acquisitions over longer time
periods and argue that this leads to different conclusions about wealth creation
for acquirers. Table 1.2 shows studies using performance data for just the
acquirer.
Table 1.2	 Acquirer's performance post-merger
Authors Date Acquirers Data Performance
period
Return
Franks and
Harris
1986 1,048 in the
UK
1955 - 1985 2 years -12.6
Limmack 1991 448 in the
UK
1977 - 1986 2 years -4.5
Reviewing the evidence from the UK and US, Sudarsanam (1995: 227) remarks
that there is consensus that target shareholders gain wealth from mergers but
that evidence of wealth gains to acquiring company shareholders and improved
post-acquisition performance is not conclusive. The question for these two
schools of thought therefore, is 'why do firms continue to acquire when they do
not appear to benefit?'
A number of suggestions have been put forward to solve this riddle apart from
the inadequacies of methodologies to reveal benefits. These include managers
making mistakes in estimating the value of the proposed acquisition (Lubatkin,
1983) and, accepting the efficient market hypothesis, that bidders presume their
valuations to be correct and so over valuations persist, described as a "Hubris
Hypothesis" (Roll, 1986). In line with agency theory, managers may also be
aiming to maximise their own wealth at the expense of shareholders (Lubatkin,
1983). Larger companies are associated with improved benefits and greater
power for managers, a stepping stone to personal rewards and advancement as
well as a device to enhance their own reputations (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986:
110). Trautwein (1990: 292) in a survey of seven areas of merger explanations
concludes that managerial empire-building has a high degree of plausibility. In
addition there may be an advantage to managers increasing the size of their
companies because the ability of shareholders to monitor them decreases as the
organisation becomes larger and more complex (Wiedenbaum and Vogt, 1987).
A further suggestion is that there may be a cost in unforeseen administrative
problems (Lubatkin, 1983) which acknowledges the important influence of the
post-acquisition period upon acquisition success. We will argue that the post-
acquisition phase is critical to acquisition outcome and shall return to this issue
in section 1.5.
ii) Industrial economists are less willing to accept the view that event studies
are a valid way of measuring wealth creation and that the stock market is
efficient in accurately valuing companies. Instead they have used product-
market and accounting based measures of profitability to assess post-acquisition
performance of the acquiring firm. Their evidence is that acquisitions do not
increase the profitability of the acquiring firm. In the eyes of industrial
economists, 'most acquisitions are unsuccessful in terms of increasing
profitability and market share; transaction costs tend to reduce hoped-for gains'
(Browne and Rosengren, 1988: 2).
Using accounting measures, industrial economists argue that longer time based
findings throw doubt on whether acquisitions are on average efficiency -
enhancing6. Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) examined the long-run profitability
of 5,822 acquisitions in the US from 1950-1977. Their findings were that 'on
6 Essentially reported post-acquisition profits are compared to the weighted average of the pre-
bid profits of the acquired and acquiring firms and calculated relative to the performance of
the companies own industries or the performance of a sample of non-acquiring firms
(Sudarsanam, 1995: 219). If acquisitions lead to economies of scale or scope, post merger
profits should rise relative to pre-merger profits and peer industry averages. Difficulties with
the method include variations in accounting practice, the way the acquired company is
consolidated and acquisition accounting which may depress profits.
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average, profitability declines and efficiency losses resulted from mergers of the
1960s and early 1970s' (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987: 211-212). In terms of
the acquired company, 'seven or eight years on average following merger,
acquired units' profitability7
 had declined sharply relative to pre-merger levels'
(Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1989: 115). Other studies by Meeks (1977), Kumar
(1984) and Herman and Lowenstein (1988: 231) also found significant declines
in acquirers profitability. In Herman and Lowenstein's words (1988: 231) the
1980s bidders 'suffered an immediate and sharp decline in profitability' .
In his review of the literature, Hughes (3993) concludes that 'then is not ynDth
support here for the view that merger raises relative profitability 8
 . The clear
impression is of a small, variable, but negative impact' (Hughes, 1993: 62)9.
Industrial economists have also looked to the impact of acquisitions upon the
subsequent market share of the combined firms, as market share is positively
related to profitability and a frequently cited objective of corporate management
(Mueller, 1985: 259). Mueller (1985) used market share data for the 1,000
largest companies of 1950 and 1972 and computed market shares for
conglomerate and horizontal acquisitions. Controlling for other factors unrelated
to acquisitions by comparison with a sample of un-acquired firms, Mueller
7 Operating profits
8 Hughes (1993) cites a number of studies compensating for any accounting bias (i.e. Singh,
1971).
Researchers aware of the limitations imposed by accounting rules, have used operating cash
flows as a profit measure (see Healy, Palepu and Ruback, 1992, Manson, Stark and Thomas,
1994). Their results on operating cashflows may paint acquisitions in a more positive light
but for the moment, more evidence is required on large samples and there are questions over
the particular measure of cash flow used (Sudarsanam, 1995: 220-221).
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shows that acquired companies experience substantial losses in market share
relative to control companies (Mueller, 1985: 259). His data implies that an un-
acquired business on average retained 88% of its 1950s market share in 1972
whereas an acquired one retained only 18%. The size of the reduction in market
shares leaves little doubt that significant declines in market shares followed
changes in control (Caves, 1988: 158).
Despite the qualifications stated by Mueller (1985: 264), in particular that
horizontal mergers will see some market share given up in exploiting market
power, 'the dramatic size of the share declines seems blatantly inconsistent with
any persistent efficiency gains from mergers' (Caves, 1988: 158). 'No support
was found for the hypothesis that mergers improve efficiency by consolidating
the sales of the acquired companies on their most efficient product lines'
(Mueller, 1985: 266). This again raises the issue of management in the post-
acquisition phase as a major influence upon performance.
Further evidence of poor acquisition performance has been seen in high rates of
divestiture. After all, if an acquisition was succeeding, why would a firm sell it?
Porter (1987) studied the diversification track record of 33 large US companies
from 1950 - 1986 and found that of the 2,021 acquisitions made, 58.5°0 made by
1975 had been divested. 61.5°0 of acquisitions in new fields and 74.4°0 of
unrelated acquisitions were subsequently divested. This result has been
supported by Caves and Barton (1988) who found a negative relationship
between technical efficiency and the extent of corporate diversification. They
attribute this result to the difficulties of managing disparate lines of business and
sees this as supporting the argument that diversifying acquisitions in particular
are unproductive. Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) have also suggested the
'lemon' problem and mention that opportunity costs of managerial effort was
high and figured as strongly in the divestment decision as the opportunity cost
of funds.
However it should be noted that the notion of divestitures as a clear indicator of
acquisition failure does have its critics. Weston (1994) suggests that there are
flaws in Porter's methodology and also interprets divestitures as a healthy sign
of dynamic companies readily adapting to changing environments rather than
companies selling because their acquisitions have under performed. This may
well have implications for the way in which acquisitions are managed. The
literature tends to assume that acquisitions are integrated with the acquirer but
Weston's (1994) line of argument would seem to suggest that they may well be
held more at arms length than has hitherto be supposed. This line of argument
will be explored later in the thesis.
1.4 Pre-acquisition explanations
The evidence presented above has examined the broad issue of whether
acquisitions are successful. Their general conclusions are that a high percentage
of acquisitions fail. In order to discover reasons for this poor performance,
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considerable research effort has been directed towards pre-acquisition
characteristics on the assumption that they are directly linked with post-
acquisition performance. The two main schools of thought in this area are i) the
financial economists and ii) the strategic performance school. However, as the
following discussion will show, they have not been very successful in
explaining post-acquisition performance by using pre-acquisition characteristics.
1.4.1 Financial economists
The financial economists have focused upon how acquisitions are funded and
whether take-overs are contested or friendly. In terms of how acquisitions are
funded, whilst practitioners make a great deal of the complexities of financing
take-overs (see Harrison and Collier, 1989), the academic evidence suggests that
the way acquisitions are funded makes little difference to the acquiring company
shareholders in the UK (Franks, Harris and Meyer, 1988, Salami, 1994 (cited in
Sudarsanam 1995: 193). In terms of whether outcome is affected by the take-
over being friendly or hostile, Browne and Rosengren (1988) observed benefits
accruing to the target shareholders are as least as good for hostile take-overs as
for other acquisitions. Jarrell and Poulsen (1994: 292) examined 450 tender
offers between 1963 - 1986 and suggest that, just for the 1980s, where
competition for the target company increases, returns to acquirers are lower due
to increased litigation and being forced to pay higher premiums. Their limited
time frame and definition of hostile as contested bids means they may just be
commenting upon bargaining rather than really testing hostile versus friendly. It
is uncertain therefore whether an acquisition is hostile or friendly will determine
outcome.
1.4.2 Strategic Performance School
The 'Strategic Performance School' has examined firm-specific characteristics
such as relatedness, relative size, market share, pre-acquisition profitability,
growth and experience to understand why acquisitions fail. Kitching's (1967)
classic paper investigated the views of twenty five top level executives, on
acquisitions where two to seven years had elapsed. The focus of the interviews
was the explanation of executives for their most successful and least successful
acquisitions. These views were then cross checked by comparing pre-acquisition
financial forecasts with post-acquisition results. From this investigation,
Kitching (1967: 41) concluded that acquisitions, where the acquired firms had
pre-acquisition sales of less than 2° o of the acquirer, experienced a failure m rate
of 84°0. In a later paper, Kitching (1974) focused his attentions upon US
multinationals acquiring in Europe. After interviewing ninety five top - level
executives, about their views on the success and failure of four hundred and
seven acquisitions made between 1965 - 1970, Kitching (1974a: 124) concluded
that profitability, size and market share of the acquired companies were critical
to success. In a survey of 145 British acquisitions, Kitching (1974b) noted that
10 Success and failure in all Kitching's studies is a retrospective judgement placed on a -5 - +5
scale.
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where the acquired company had a poor pre-acquisition track record, the
acquisitions subsequently failed in 42.8% of cases, with a further 19.1% of cases
being perceived as not worth doing. Pre-acquisition 'high fliers' on the other
hand, failed in just 27.8% of occasions (Kitching, 1974b: 84). The issues of
relative size and pre-acquisition performance have been born out by later studies
(Kusewitt, 1985, Shanley, 1987) whereas the ideas of market share and pre-
acquisition experience have proved more elusive.
Kitching's (1967, 1974a, b) studies all investigate whether the degree of
relatedness, between target and parent companies, is linked to acquisition
outcome. The concept of relatedness has attracted a great deal of attention in the
Strategic performance school, particularly through studies on corporate
diversification (see Ramanujam and Varadaraj an, 1989 for a review). However
there is no common acceptance of the relationship between diversification and
firm outcomes (Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson and Moesel, 1993). Although
Hoskisson et al. (1993) help to support the robustness of Rumelt's (1982)
classification scheme, acquisition studies have found the link with performance
to be elusive.
Kitching's work (1974a), concluded that related acquisitions out performed
unrelated acquisitions. Chatterjee (1986) concluded that targets in unrelated
mergers performed better than those in related mergers. Singh and Montgomery
(1987) in an event study of 203 target firms, 1970 - 1978, reported higher
abnormal returns for related target and this finding is supported by Shelton
(1988) who studied 218 acquisitions from 1962 - 1983. Lubatkin (1983)
however, in a sample of 340 target firms between 1948 and 1975 concluded that
related mergers do not create more value than unrelated ones.
The confusion over the nature of the diversification - performance relationship
(Reed and Luffman, 1986) may be in part due to methodology (Venkatraman
and Grant, 1986) such as sampling biases and problems of measurement. In
particular important variables may not be controlled for, such as
internationalisation or the mis-application of Rumelt's (1982) categories. A
more critical interpretation however would suggest that the phenomenon is more
complex than this type of analysis allows for. In particular, these studies assume
that pre-deal formulations will be directly linked to post-acquisition results. In
adopting this approach, they ignore the issue of post- acquisition
implementation which can significantly influence acquisition outcomes (Datta
and Grant, 1990). As we shall argue in the next section, effective
implementation is very important in achieving post-acquisition success.
Overall then the Strategic Performance School has helped to furnish us with a
few insights in terms of variables associated with performance but as the above
debate on relatedness shows, we still seem a long way from arriving at a
complete explanation for poor performance. This strongly suggests that we need
to re-focus our attention upon the post-acquisition phase as this clearly mediates
as between pre-acquisition characteristics and post-acquisition performance.
1.5 The post-acquisition focus
The growing dissatisfaction of pre-acquisition factors as explicators of
acquisition outcome has led to increased research efforts on the post-acquisition
phase as the key determinant of acquisition outcome. As a harbinger of this
increased attention, Kitching (1973) observed that, 'one third of all merger
failures are caused by faulty integration'. The importance of the post-
acquisition phase in affecting acquisition outcome is well illustrated in a key
study by Souder and Chakrabarti (1984) of sixteen acquisitions by eight firms.
From their top executive interviews, they show that most of their ten acquisition
motives did not correlate significantly with post-acquisition performance, and
indeed those that were correlated, were negatively related. Souder and
Chakrabarti (1984: 46) suggest that the post-acquisition phase is a longer and
more substantial task than hitherto realised and that greater success can be
achieved by a 'patient partnership' mentality where both parties work together
once the deal is concluded.
Shanley (1987), in a study of fifty one firms by structured questionnaire and two
dozen follow up interviews, has also examined the link between pre-acquisition
factors and post-acquisition variations. He found that the variations were not
well explained by pre-acquisition factors and argues for a weak-linkage model
of iterative change rather than a strong linkage model based on pre-acquisition
planning. Angwin, Wensley and Ernst and Young (1995) also observed the gap
between pre-acquisition planning and post-acquisition implementation. They
carried out forty nine semi-structured in-depth interviews with top executives in
seven companies to establish whether there was a coherent picture of the
acquisition process. Whilst there were different perceptions of aspects of the
acquisition process, based upon executive responsibilities, there was a clear
agreement upon the dis-connectedness between the pre and post-acquisition
phases.
Organisation researchers point to the implementation phase as a key success
factor. Potential synergies will result in superior performance only if these can
be realised though effective post-acquisition implementation (Olie, 1994). Many
scholars would now accept that the value from acquisitions is created or
destroyed once the acquisition has been made (Deiser, 1994: 360 - 1). 'The
integration process is the key to making acquisitions work. Not until the two
firms come together and begin to work toward the acquisition's purpose can
value be created' (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991: 105).
The implementation phase is clearly problematic. One of the manifestations of
these difficulties is evident in human factors. There is a large body of literature
on this issue from the Organisational behaviour school. The human
consequences of acquisitions are a very visible 'fall out' from take-over activity.
They are evident as strikes, redundancy and even sabotage (Buono and
Bowditch, 1989, Mirvis and Marks, 1992). Such dysfunctional activity can
clearly disrupt the best laid plans and indeed Walters (1985) has estimated that
such cultural factors can cost as much as 25°0 - 30 0 o in lost performance. The
visibility of culture collision (Buono and Bowditch, 1989) has led to researchers
concentrating upon cultural fit or compatibility between organisations
(Cartwright and Cooper, 1992, 1996).
On a broader front there is the issue of organisational fit, 'a necessary condition
for the effective realisation of the potential synergies' (David and Singh, 1994).
An example of this approach is by Schweiger, Csciszar and Napier (1994) who
examine different activities in the value chain as a basis for examining the fit
between two organisations. The assumption is that the combination of
independent value chains will imply different types and degrees of technical
configuration changes depending upon what is needed to capture synergies. The
only quantitative empirical contribution appears to be Chakrabarti (1990) who
relates organisational fit to performance. He found that the state of collaboration
between organisational units was strongly related with the performance of the
acquired division. In addition he reinforced the view held above that strategic
objectives and relatedness did not correlate with post-acquisition performance.
The post-acquisition phase clearly interferes with the link between pre-
acquisition characteristics and post-acquisition performance. It is where the
value from an acquisition is won or lost. However research into this area has
been heavily weighted towards organisational behaviour issues. There is a need
for further strategic enquiry into changes that affect all aspects of the
organisation, rather than just focusing upon the human impact. This change of
emphasis, from pre-acquisition issues to the post-acquisition phase, is consistent
with current trends in strategic management in general.
1.6 Trends in strategic management
The focus upon the post-acquisition phase has echoed the trends in the
development of strategic management. The orientation of the Strategic
performance studies, focusing upon pre-acquisition characteristics, harked back
to the Classical view (Whittington, 1993: 11) or Planning school (McKiernan,
1997: xix), that strategy could be formulated in a deliberate manner and
implementation would follow. 'Objectives were thereby achieved and the
strategy realised' (McKieman, 1997: xix). This view assumed that strategy
formation is a controlled conscious process and that implementation is a distinct
phase (Mintzberg, 1990). In McKiernan's (1997: xvii) view, this 'division
between formulation and implementation has left permanent and indelible
scars'.
The failure in the strategic planning approach, or Design School, was
highlighted by Mintzberg's critique of the formulation - implementation
dichotomy (Mintzberg, 1990). Companies became disenchanted with the
approach as few intended strategies were successfully realised. Fortune (cited in
Mintzberg, 1990), suggested that 'fewer than 10 0 0 of American corporations
implemented their intended strategies', which Tom Peters regarded as a 'wildly
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inflated' estimate. 'A decade of empirical investigation confirmed what most
suspected, i.e. that perfect and deliberate strategies are rare' (McKiernan, 1997:
xxii).
In the context of acquisitions, we have seen in section 1.4 that there has been
considerable effort aimed at trying to link pre-acquisition factors to post-
acquisition outcome. Implicit in this has been the notion of strategy as 'grand
plan' (Whittington, 1993), where effort is put into the planning, design and
decision surrounding an acquisition, from which results are then assumed to
flow. This assumption suggests that' the carrying out of orders is relatively
unproblematic, a sured by military discipline and obedience' (Whittington,
1993: 17). However the poor record of acquisition success suggests that the
'planning' approach to acquisitions is insufficient in itself as the implementation
phase plays a crucial inter-mediating role.
In the strategic management literature, the strategic planning approach was
heavily criticised by the Processual school (Mintzberg, 1987, 1990, 1994,
Pettigrew, 1985). They downgraded the importance of rational analysis and
directed attention to the internal complexities of the organisation which had
served to confound grand strategic plans. For the Processualists the separation of
formulation and implementation is artificial, 'a self-serving top management
myth' (Whittington, 1993: 27), as the two are inextricably entangled.
Fundamental to the Processualists are the issues of 'bounded rationality' (Cyert
and March, 1963) and the micro-politics of organisations (Pettigrew, 1985). In
the acquisition literature these perspectives have tended to result in greater
attention to the complexities of the post-acquisition phase, in particular, human
issues, such as psychological difficulties, cultural differences, with some
emphasis upon middle management rather than the top management of the
Classical school.
A recent development within the Processual School has been to focus upon
internal complexities as a source of organisational advantage. Now more
formally described as the Resource Based View, there is a deliberate attempt to
link internal capabilities and competencies with sustaining competitive
advantage (Collis and Montgomery, 1995). This shift from a purely inward
focus upon internal resources, towards linking them with an external advantage,
is of considerable value in an acquisition context. Rather than just observing the
problematic of acquisitions, in terms of their internal complexities and
resistance to change, there is now a move to consider how the core
competencies of acquisitions can sustain, or add to, the new organisation's
competitive advantage. This may be achieved by widening the pool of core
competencies available and perhaps allowing new complex assets to be
constructed. This has implications for the way in which acquisitions are viewed,
as they may increase the stock of unique resources (Grant 1991) and be
opportunities to transfer resources between companies to create value
(Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). The Resource Based View of the firm appears
to have a great deal to offer in terms of identifying core competencies and core
capabilities which can be transferred or constructed between firms to build
competitive advantage.
A revisionist perspective upon the Processualist approach suggests that by
focusing upon process issues, we have a rather stunted model of strategy which
'omits the vital stage of action' (Eccles, 1993: 321). By becoming so immersed
in the complexities of the organisation, it feels as though there is a paralysis or
'viscosity' in this view. This has led Eccles (1994) to question whether these
complexities in implementation are more apparent than real. In other words,
does implementation really needs to be so slow? 'Is (the organisation) prancing
through waves or wading through treacle?' (Eccles, 1994: 15)
Putting this into context Whittington (1996) suggests a new direction of
'strategy as social practice'. He contrasts the large body of strategic
management literature which deals with essentially directional or 'Classical'
issues of 'where' strategies should go, with the notion of 'how' to get there, or
the more 'implementational' view and sets these against organisational and
managerial levels of concern. The resultant perspectives, shown below, show
the gap of strategy as practice.
Policy Planning
How
Source: Whittington (1996)
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Figure 1.2: Four perspectives on strategic management
The Strategy as practice approach shifts concern from the core competence of
the organisation to the manager as strategist. There are clear links here with the
older planning school but rather than just the broad setting of strategic direction,
attention here is shifted downwards to how managers actually 'do strategy'
(Whittington, 1996). This involves not just inspiration but a goodly portion of
perspiration, the 'nitty-gritty of tiresome and repetitive work' (Whittington,
1996).
The general trend in strategic management is towards strategic implementation
issues. The Processual school is currently dominant in this area, and the focus is
predominantly at the organisational level. However, there have been recent calls
for more attention to be paid to action and move focus from the organisational
level to the managerial.
The approach of this thesis is utterly consistent with prevailing trends in
Strategic Management in focusing upon post-acquisition change. It fits within
the Process school, by examining the changes that occur in newly acquired
companies and adopts an organisational perspective. It differs from a Process
approach by adopting a managing executive perspective, which is more
commonly associated with a Classical view and, to an extent, heeds Eccles
(1993, 1994) call for more attention to action, by seeking to identify post-
acquisition changes.
1.7 Conclusion
This thesis recognises that pre-acquisition explanations for acquisition success
have, to date, been rather un-satisfying. Whilst efforts continue to refine and
explore pre-acquisition measures, there is substantial awareness that the post-
acquisition phase has a powerful mitigating effect upon acquisition outcome.
For this reason, the focus of this thesis is upon gaining a better understanding of
the post-acquisition phase.
This orientation mirrors developments in Strategic Management, where the
planning approach has been severely criticised and the processual view, which
concentrates upon the internal complexities of organisations, has become
dominant. By adopting an organisational perspective upon post-acquisition
change this thesis is consistent with the process perspective.
The post-acquisition phase is important and complex. However, as reflected in a
very fragmented literature (see Chapter two), it is poorly understood. This thesis
will seek to improve our understanding of the post-acquisition phase by
providing a systematic examination of post-acquisition management in the
United Kingdom. In particular we are concerned to know what changes take
place in acquired companies after acquisition and to examine whether there are
significant and robust differences between post-acquisition styles in terms of the
type, volume and timing of change. In addition we shall also seek to link
changes and po t-acquisition styles with different managing executive types.
In the next chapter we shall review the extensive post-acquisition literature and
observe that it lacks focus. However there is an important attempt at providing
a unifying framework by Ha pe lagh and Jemison (1991). Despite significant
limitations with their work, this thesis will seek to build upon their contribution
by testing their typology and exploring ways in which it can be extended and
improved in a UK context.
In Chapter three we shall justify our choice of a hybrid methodology, enabling
both cross sectional survey work and in-depth key respondent interviews. This
empirical data will then be applied to Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991)
framework in Chapter four to create the big picture of acquisition types in the
UK and examine whether some acquisition types are more associated with
success than others.
To determine whether there are significant differences between acquisition
types, Chapter five will use functional change data from the survey to test the
framework and key respondent interview material to provide a level of
explanation for the changes made. In Chapter six we shall then explore the
reasons behind the use of different types of post-acquisition style.
Chapter seven looks specifically at the different types of managing executive
involved in taking charge of the post-acquisition phase. In terms of the amount
and types of change that have taken place, we shall look for associations
between managing executive type and different post-acquisition styles. In
Chapter eight we shall introduce the issue of the timing of changes. We will
examine patterns of change for each acquisition type and aim to draw together
our earlier finding to provide an integrated view of post acquisition
management.
The final chapter will conclude that for acquisitions in the UK, there are
significant differences in post acquisition styles, in terms of nature and timing of
change, and there are clear associations with different management types.
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2.1 Introduction
The previous chapter has shown that research attention is now being directed at
the post-acquisition phase to help understand why many acquisitions fail to
perform. In particular the issues of implementation and process are perceived to
be of key significance (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986). These are explicitly
recognised in the dominant framework, by Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991), in
the post-acquisition literature. This contingency model for acquisition
management represents an important advance over other typologies in our
understanding of the acquisition process.
Distribution of
acquisition activity
and success
Post-acquisition
change
We will begin this chapter by revisiting briefly the post-acquisition typologies
extant in the literature to illustrate the advance achieved by Haspeslagh and
Jemison (1991). After a critical review of their contribution, we shall show that
there are several aspects of their work that should be extended. In particular,
Haspeslagh & Jemison's four integration styles have not been tested; they
concentrate upon some integration styles at the expense of others on the implicit
grounds that these styles are more successful; their processual orientation tends
to focus upon the facilitators and inhibitors of change rather than the actual
changes themselves; and they pay little attention to the timing of changes.
We shall address these limitations in the following order;
Section	 Theme Content
4
.	 2.4
......
2.5
We will argue that their emphasis on
certain integration styles is mis-placed
both in terms of actual distribution of
acquisition activity and its association
with measures of success
We will seek to build upon their work by
examining actual changes and also use
this as a way of testing their framework
Managing
Executives and
change
The importance of the Managing
Executive has been ignored. We shall
examine their association with post-
acquisition change.
2.6
2.7
	
Timing of changes	 We will extend their work by examining
the timing of post-acquisition change.
It is in the area of specific changes that we hope to extend Haspeslagh and
Jemison's (1991) work. To assist in our efforts to uncover changes for each
integration type we will draw upon the post-acquisition literature. We recognise
that this literature does not cover changes in a systematic or comprehensive way
and indeed that these items are rarely tested. As this might lead to inaccuracies,
we shall also draw upon related literature for further insights. In particular we
will argue that acquisitions are analogous to turnarounds as they are both
examples of organisations in crisis, intending to improve performance. On this
basis the analogy is apposite and the turnaround literature can provide us with
more sophisticated methods for looking at changes and suggest important
avenues for further investigation in an acquisition context.
We shall also be referring to the "taking-charge" literature which focuses upon
the role of the chief executive in assuming new positions. This perspective
clearly resonates with both the acquisition and turnaround literature as in times
of crisis the role of the chief executive becomes of great significance. The
"taking-charge" literature adopts a different emphasis on the areas of change,
which can be added to the perspectives mentioned above, but its main
contribution is in terms of looking at change over time. We shall adopt a model
by Gabarro (1987) as a way of examining change over time in an acquisition
context.
Firstly however we will begin by arguing for the importance of Haspeslagh and
Jemison's (1991) contingency framework in the context of other acquisition
typologies.
2.2 Acquisition typologies
There are a large number of acquisition typologies but there is no centrality or
coherence to the approaches. Larsson (1990) suggests that acquisition typologies
fall into two main groups. 'Combination' typologies categorise mergers and
acquisitions according to their business relationship at the time of the
combination. 'Integration process' typologies examine the integration after the
legal combination (Larsson 1990: 204). To appreciate Haspeslagh & Jemison's
(1991) contribution we will need to briefly review Larsson's (1990)
'combination' typologies before turning our attention to the post acquisition
phase.
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2.2.1 Combination typologies
Larsson' s 'combination' typologies are largely based upon the most widely used
classification from the FTC (Federal Trade Commission) which hinges upon
whether the Markets or Products of the acquired company are the same or
different (Ansoff 1965). Examples of such "strategic-fit" typologies include
Kitching (1967), Salter and Weinhold (1981), Lubatkin (1983), Shelton (1988).
Larsson (1990) has suggested a refined framework for these 'combination
typologies', which specifically recognises vertical acquisitions. See Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1 A systematic framework for the FTC typology of M & A
Market Relation 
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Source: Larsson (1990: 206) - derived from the text
As we observed in chapter one, linking these strategic combination typologies to
performance has been difficult. As Larsson (1990: 44) comments, 'the variety of
findings on M & A performance indicates that there are no automatic
performance effects. There should be no doubt that the relationships between
combinations and their performance are mediated by the integration process'.
This poor link between strategic combinations has also been observed by
Haspeslagh and Farquhar (1994: 436) who found that their 'a priori categories
of horizontal, related and unrelated acquisitions could not be associated with
different levels of performance'. Larsson points to the organisational M & A
literature as the mediator or 'Samson between the pillars of combination
motives and performance' (Larsson, 1990: 45).
Porter (1987) has developed our understanding of different strategies for
acquisitions by suggesting ways in which value may be added. These four
concepts of strategy - portfolio management, restructuring, transferring skills
and sharing practices, suggest different approaches to the way in which
acquisitions should be handled to create shareholder value. Although this takes
us forwards in terms of linking post-acquisition organisational combination with
hypothesised performance outcome, Porter (1987) does not relate these
combination types to pre-acquisition typologies' , and as noted previously (1-
12) may have a flawed outcome variable which means the performance link can
only be suggested. Nevertheless, this typology suggests that researchers can
1 Porter (1987) just focuses upon whether acquisitions were related or un-
related.
look beyond the product / market fit towards a more capabilities based view on
how value may be created.
2.2.2 Integration process typologies
The integration process typologies have generated a rich set of descriptive labels
for organisational fit such as 'pillage and plunder, one night stand, courtship/just
good friends, love and marriage' (Siehl and Smith, 1990). Most have
concentrated upon human resource implications of acquisitions 2 (Buono and
Bowditch, 1989, Napier, 1989). However, as Larsson (1990) observes, whilst
they condense the rich variety of integration issues into a few relatively
powerful dimensions; degree of integration, manner timing, reactions,
symmetry, 'the inconsistent use of dimension, confusing labels and lack of
mutual exclusiveness and exhaustiveness have compromised the classificatory
schemes to the extent that they hardly can be deemed as adequate
systematisations of integration processes' (Larsson, 1990: 250).
2 There has been a recent study looking at changes in the value chain
(Schweiger, Csiszar and Napier, 1994).
2.2.3 Acquisition process typologies
The acquisition typologies described above have tended to concentrate upon the
issues of strategic fit or organisational fit. There have been some notional
attempts at linking the FTC classification to post-acquisition integration issues
but these have been largely descriptive in nature and not very successful (Siehl,
Ledford, Silverman and Fay, 1988).
Porter's (1987) contribution has been to move the debate towards examining
how value is created. Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) have followed in these
steps by specifically marrying strategic needs with the post-acquisition issues of
organisational fit through a process approach. Although this appears to be a
successful attempt to unify the issues of pre-acquisition strategic fit with post-
acquisition organisational fit, the achievement is perhaps a little more focused.
By concentrating upon strategic needs rather than the issue of strategic fit, they
move the debate away from applying the FTC classification towards the issue of
which synergies are to be realised. These areas of benefit are clearly associated
with pre-acquisition strategy and from this point of view they have succeeded in
producing an over-arching framework.
However it should be noted that this does not take us as far as a clear association
of acquisition management style with strategic fit typologies. Although they pay
lip service to the FTC classification with a simplified version of their own,
characterised as domain strengthening, domain extension and domain
exploration, distinctions in the FTC classification become blurred in their own
typology of acquisition management. Table 2.1 tries to show this difficulty.
Table 2. 1 Haspeslagh and Jemison domains versus FTC categories
Domains Horizontal Market Product Conglomerate
extension extension
Strengthening V V V
Extension V V
Exploration J
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) concentrate upon the notion of interdependence
rather than strategic notions of relatedness and this makes it impossible to
specifically relate their integration styles to a strategic fit typology. Their
attention to core capabilities cuts across the FTC classification so that, for
example, domain strengthening can be portrayed as a horizontal, market
extension or product extension acquisition.
However there are two areas where there appears to be a clear association
between their typology and the FTC classification, namely domain exploration
with conglomerate acquisition and domain strengthening with horizontal
acquisition.
2.3 Haspeslagh and Jemison's contingency framework
Haspeslagh and Jemison's book, Managing Acquisitions (1991), is currently the
dominant work in the area. It integrates the observations that the acquisition
process itself is a potentially important determinant of acquisition outcome
(Jemison and Sitkin, 1986) with a contingency view that matches strategic needs
to organisational task requirements (Haspeslagh and Farquhar, 1987).
The acquisition framework rests upon three main dimensions:
i. the vital significance of strategic capability transfer, a concept from the
Resource-based theory of the firm,
ii. the key role of autonomy, a major issue drawn from organisational fit
literature,
iii. the issue of process in terms of the facilitators and impediments to change - a
perspective from the Processualist school.
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) show these dimensions as two orthogonal axes:
strategic interdependence reflecting capability transfer, and level of autonomy.
The process perspective is represented by level of 'need'. Their framework is
shown in figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.2: Types of Acquisition Integration Approaches
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Source: Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991: 145)
Before we examine the four acquisition styles that result, we will look at the
underlying dimensions in more detail.
2.3.1 Capability transfer
Capability transfer is the concept underlying the 'strategic interdependence'
label applied by Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) to the vertical axis of their
integration framework. They state that the nature of strategic interdependence
depends upon how value will be created. The mechanism by which value is
created is capability transfer (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991: 139-140).
This concept of capability transfer was anticipated by Porter (1987), describing
the transfer of skills as a way of creating value in acquisitions, and is drawn
directly from the Resource-Based View of the firm which suggests that
companies have unique and embedded configurations of assets which are its
distinctive competence (Grant 1991). Acquisitions may serve to renew, enhance
or create such complex assets and the value so created may indeed justify the
acquisition premiums paid. Various labels have been applied to these unique
resources such as core-competencies (Prahalad and Hamel, 1989, 1990) and
capabilities (Stalk, Evans and Shulman, 1992). The concept of resources
however has 'remained rather amorphous and rarely operationally defined or
tested' (Miller and Shamsie, 1996). We shall return to the issue of what
capability transfer consists in section 2.4.1.
2.3.2 Autonomy
'Organisational autonomy need' is the label applied by Haspeslagh and Jemison
(1991) to the horizontal axis of their integration framework.
Autonomy is a key concept in the organisational fit literature which has tended
to examine issues of cultural fit and boundary permeability (Hayes and Hoag,
1974, Manzini and Gridley, 1986, Buono and Bowditch, 1989, Siehl and Smith,
1990, Datta, Grant and Rajagopalan, 1991). A company's culture is closely
associated with autonomy so that if autonomy is weakened, then the company's
culture is perceived to be under threat. Where acquirers adopt the 'conquering
army' approach, the loss of autonomy can be devastating from the perspective
of acquired firm executives; it can result in reduced commitment and motivation
and in the extreme, anger, resentment and hostility (Buono and Bowditch,
1989). This culture clash can be very disruptive and indeed destroy the rationale
behind the original take-over. Walter (1985) suggests that cultural disturbances
in mergers and acquisitions can cost as much as 25% - 30% in lost performance.
The level of autonomy is therefore a crucial factor in post-acquisition
management. However there is a paradox in that autonomy is vital for the
preservation of strategic capability but the pursuit of capability transfer may
destroy the competence of the acquired company3.
2.3.3 Process
Haspeslagh and Jemison are clear that each of their axes reflects a 'need'.
This is based on the assessment of integration setting, the planned integration
approach after acquisition and the actual integration at the time of their research
(Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991: 164 - 165). In their eyes 'in all high performing
acquisitions, there was high degree of consistency between these assessments'
3 Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991: 142) give as an example the build up to 'Big
Bang' in 1986 where many key employees left acquired firms as value had
been destroyed for them.
and 'in acquisitions with poor performance, these assessments were
inconsistent' (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991: 165, Haspeslagh and Farquhar,
1994). In other words 'the need' in the best acquisitions is constant rather than
changing4 . On this basis we may conclude that the acquisition categories are
reasonably robust5.
Angwin and Wensley (1996) have also interviewed executives on their
consistency of approach in the post-acquisition period and have shown that
acquisitions are remarkably robust in terms of their perception of the transfer of
resources. However autonomy is a difficult dimension for executives to control.
4There is the question that if there is consistency between acquirer's assessments
throughout the process, then we would expect a far better performance from
the strategic management school unless the advantage of Haspeslagh and
Jemison's framework is the explicit adoption of organisational fit issues. We
might also review Haspeslagh and Jemison's method which suggests that
although interviews were conducted at different stages in the acquisition
process, they reflected acquisitions which were between 2 and 15 years old
with one exception where one year had elapsed (see: Haspeslagh and Jemison,
1991: 278). On this basis one could argue that they are really only arguing for
consistency of approach well after the acquisition has taken place and there
must be an element of the interviewee making sense of the past. Whilst they
also made use of pre-acquisition documents as comparators, we would
question how useful this is as the information in such documents is largely
strategic whereas the concerns post-acquisition tend to be operational
(Hrebiniak and Joyce, 1984). There is little detail on this issue although their
main argument is for consistency of approach throughout the process.5 There has been one study which suggests that acquisitions do move between
boxes. Baden-Fuller and Boschetti (1996: 93) suggest that the, albeit flexible
and dynamic, determination of categories as alternatives can in fact be seen as
part of a continuum, 'a clear time path that firms are likely to follow', moving
in a sequence from Preservation to Absorption to Symbiosis.
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Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) bring together the issues of capability transfer
(as indicative of strategic interdependence) autonomy and need in their
acquisition integration framework. The result is the creation of four distinct
types of acquisition integration approach. These are described below.
2.3.4 Acquisition types
Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991) framework, shown in figure 2.2, results in
four types of acquisition which they label as Preservation, Absorption,
Symbiotic and Holding.
Preservation acquisitions have a high organisational autonomy need and a low
density of interdependence. These acquisitions are managed at arm's length as
the concern is to 'preserve' the core capabilities of the acquired firm. Parental
incursions will be minimal with only finance risk sharing or perhaps some
general management systems implementation.
Absorption acquisitions have a high need for strategic interdependence and a
low need for autonomy. The objective here is for a full consolidation that
dissolves the boundary between the two companies. 'The strategic task should
be pursued without consideration for cultural preservation beyond that of clear
communications to ease transition (Haspeslagh and Farquhar, 1994: 432-433).
The acquiring company needs the courage of its convictions to impose change.
Symbiotic acquisitions require high autonomy and have a high need for strategic
interdependence. The aim is for each firm to take on the qualities of the other by
moving from co-existence to interdependence. 'There is an inherent tension
between boundary maintenance and effective strategic capability transfer'
(Haspeslagh and Farquhar, 1994: 433). Managerial skills are seen as vital in
allowing iterative adjustments to take place.
Holding acquisitions have a low autonomy need and a low need for strategic
interdependence. These companies are examples of value capture and are held in
a trading sense. Haspeslagh and Farquahar (1994) and Haspeslagh and Jemison
(1991) record no examples of Holding acquisitions.
2.4 Distribution of acquisition activity and success
2.4.1 Distribution of acquisition types in the UK
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) have put forward a comprehensive typology of
acquisition integration. However they studied just seven acquisitions among
twelve firms (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991: 275) which they admit is
inappropriate for representing a population (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991
Appendix A, Note 1: 367). As a consequence it is not possible from their work
to know to what extent their theory is representative of acquisition activity in
general. In addition five of their firms are located in the US and two in Japan
which does not engender confidence in the representativeness of their styles for
a particular country. Furthermore these acquisitions were thinly spread across
six industry sectors (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991 Appendix A: 275).
In particular Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) concentrate upon strategic
acquisitions; 'the firms had to represent strategic capability transfer in related
business acquisitions' (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991 Appendix A: 274).
'Situations were chosen where the avowed purpose of the acquisition in public
documents was the transfer of capabilities between firms' (Haspeslagh and
Jemison, 1991 Appendix A: 274). The underlying rationale for this position
harks back to the Resource-Based View, that value creation is only brought
about by capabilities transfer; the sample firms made acquisitions 'in hopes of
gaining a competitive advantage' (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991 Appendix A:
274). For acquisition premiums to be realised firms need to transfer resources to
create value. Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) therefore concentrate upon the
acquisition types where there is capabilities transfer, namely Absorption and
Symbiotic acquisitions. They do recognise that Preservation acquisitions exist
although they clearly believe that over time these will begin to show the
characteristics of Symbiotic acquisitions; 'the repertoire involved in successful
preservation..., is key in the early stages of many other acquisitions"
(Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991: 221).
It is noticeable that although they posit the existence of Holding acquisitions
they did not encounter any such acquisitions in their work. Their explanation is
that they were looking specifically at strategic acquirers where there would be a
transfer of capabilities between firms during integration (Haspeslagh and
Jemison, 1991, Appendix A: 274 - 5). They also find it difficult to explain the
reason why Holding acquisitions may exist. Their framework suggests little or
no resource transfer, value is captured rather than created and there is little
autonomy so that the core capabilities of the acquired firm are unlikely to
remain. Their only suggestions are that such companies may be traded
(Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991: 147). This seems rather curious as one would
expect the parent company of an acquisition being 'held' for trading, to wish to
preserve the acquisition's core capabilities rather than undermine them. This
raises questions over the validity of this category.
Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991) strong emphasis upon the importance of value
creation through capabilities transfer leads us to expect that most acquisitions
would be Absorption or Symbiotic types. Their recognition of the existence of
Preservation acquisitions, where the transfer of resources is limited and value is
captured rather than created, suggests that there will be examples of this type
although perhaps to a lesser extent than the other integration types.
As mentioned in section 2.2.3, Haspeslagh and Jemison have not characterised
their typology in terms of relatedness or unrelatedness. However, in their
discussion of autonomy they concede that some acquisitions are made precisely
because the firms are different from the parent (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991:
143) and would describe these firms as being examples of 'domain exploration'
(Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991: 154). Such acquisitions are likely to be
unrelated and would require considerable autonomy. This observation is
supported by Datta and Grant (1990) who have related the concept of autonomy
to type of acquisition. In their study of 129 acquisitions during 1980 - 1984 in
the US manufacturing sector, they concluded that acquiring firms give greater
autonomy to unrelated acquisitions than related acquisitions. This result was
significant at the 1 0 0 leve16. We would also expect to find that there is less
capability transfer where the acquired company is unrelated as this would be
necessary to preserve the acquired company 's core competencies. On this basis
we would expect to find a preponderance of unrelated acquisitions categorised
as Preservation acquisitions.
This observation is important as unrelated acquisitions have been shown to be a
sizeable percentage of total acquisition activity. In Datta and Grant's (1990)
study, 54 0 0 were related acquisitions and 46°0 were unrelated 7 . Other studies
ascribe a similar importance to unrelated acquisitions: Kitching (1967: 43)
shows 450, and Hughes (1993: 27) draws upon the Office of Fair Trading
6 They also found a negative relationship between autonomy and related
acquisitions but the result was not significant.
7 Relatedness was measured along multiple manufacturing R & D and
marketing activities. The activities were drawn from Howell (1970) and Salter
and Weinhold (1979) and the scales had high reliability (Cronbach-a values
of 0.900 and 0.973)
reports to suggest that diversifying mergers have increased in importance in the
UK from 23% of numbers and 27% of assets in 1970 to 37% of numbers and
53% of assets in 1989. On this basis we might venture that rather than being a
minor part of acquisition activity, there are likely to be significant numbers of
Preservation acquisitions.
Propositions 1.: Compared with Haspeslagh and Jemison's
Absorption and Symbiotic integration styles,
Preservation Acquisitions will account for a
significant number of acquisitions in the UK.
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) did not find any Holding acquisitions and
suggest this acquisition type is unimportant. We believe however, that
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) under-represent the importance of Holding
acquisitions. If we accept their explanation, that Holding acquisitions are
companies being held for trading, then it is well known that there are many
conglomerate style acquisitions, by historically avid acquirers such as Hanson
plc and BTR plc, where the autonomy of the acquired company is often greatly
reduced without substantial resource transfer. The logic behind many of these
take-overs is that the acquired company is under-performing and that greater
8 Propositions have been used rather than hypotheses as they are more general in
nature (cf. Grinyer and McKiernan, 1990) and demand less rigour.
accountability through more stringent financial reporting can greatly improve
performance. We could extend this argument to suggest that turnaround
situations may well fall into the Holding category. The low autonomy would
correspond with the imposition of stricter controls from the new parent whilst
low resource transfer may well be an unwillingness to commit resources to a
faltering business, or risk contamination of the acquirer. The attraction of such
acquisitions to acquirers is the potential for very substantial gain. We therefore
cannot accept Haspeslagh and Jemison's neglect of Holding acquisitions and
feel their focus upon the transfer of strategic capabilities has caused them to
overlook this category.
Proposition 2.: Compared with Haspeslagh and Jemison's
Absorption, Symbiotic and Preservation styles,
Holding Acquisitions will represent a significant
portion of take-over activity in the UK.
2.4.1.1 Summary
In broad terms we are arguing that Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) are
understating the importance of value capture acquisitions in their effort to make
a case for the significance of value creation acquisitions. Whilst this has been
theoretically driven, the case has not been empirically verified on the basis of
actual acquisition activity. The following section examines the further
assumption that value creating acquisitions will necessarily be positively
associated with post-acquisition performance.
2.4.2 Acquisition integration types and success
Chapter one has shown that despite sophisticated techniques, attempts to ascribe
success to different acquisition types based upon pre-acquisition factors have
been largely unsuccessful. With regard to post-acquisition studies, the vast
majority have tended to focus upon human resource issues, in particular the
negative aspects, and rely upon the implicit assumption that upheavals are bad.
However despite the vivid portrayals of sackings, strikes and even sabotage,
there is a paucity of empirical studies relating post-acquisition management to
measures of success. Those that do exist do not adopt a typology of post-
acquisition management but instead adopt a thematic approach. For instance
Datta's (1991) study examines issues in organisational fit and finds that
differences in top management style correlate with performance. Chatterjee,
Lubatkin, Schweiger and Weber (1992) examine the relationship between
perceptions of cultural differences and shareholder gains to find that the
relationship is negative. Datta and Puia (1995) also examine cultural fit and
shareholder value for cross-border acquisitions and also find cultural distance
associated with negative returns.
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One of the few studies which explicitly seeks to address pre- and post-
acquisition factors is the previously cited study by Datta and Grant (1990). Their
results show that the autonomy of unrelated acquisitions is positively associated
with success but they could not find significant results for related acquisitions.
There is clearly room for more work in terms of relating pre- and post-
acquisition factors with issues of success and in particular being more sensitive
to different post-acquisition integration styles.
2.4.2.1 Hasp eslagh and Jemison's contingency framework and success
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) have provided us with a stepping stone with
their contingency framework. Although they have not tested their model of four
distinct types of acquisition integration, they strongly suggest that successful
acquisitions are those which create value. 'The true measure of success is the
notion of creating value through acquisition rather than capturing it'
(Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). Central to this argument is that value is
created by capability transfer. However as noted above, autonomy clearly has a
relationship with success and this factor may moderate the effect of capability
transfer.
2.4.2.2 Capability transfer and success
Following Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991) view, that creating value is
achieved by capability transfer, we can infer that those acquisition types which
experience capability transfer are likely to be more successful than those which
are based upon value capture. On this basis we would expect Absorption and
Symbiotic acquisitions to be more successful than Preservation and Holding
acquisitions.
However we should be cautious about assuming that capability transfer will
automatically lead to success. We might suggest that the transfer of capabilities
may indeed offer the pro pect of creating value but, as Haspeslagh and Jemison
(1991) observe, thi can also destroy capabilities as there is an associated
increase in the complexity of task which will give rise to additional managerial
costs. These additional costs might well out-weigh the benefits of value
creation.
Apart from the benefits of capability transfer being more difficult to realise than
expected, there is also the case that acquisitions which experience low capability
transfer may in fact be perceived to be successful. In a study of 21 successful
acquirers who made a total of 829 acquisitions, Anslinger and Copeland (1996)
argue for the success of non-synergistic deals. Their study found 'sustained
returns of 18% to 35% per year' 9 (Anslinger and Copeland, 1996: 126). In
consequence they advocate an arms length approach by financial management
of the acquired company and a carrot and stick approach for the incumbent chief
executive.
The difficulties experienced by researchers in ascribing success to acquisition
type, whether it is based upon pre- or post-acquisition characteristics or a
combination of the two, should make us wary of a simple relationship between
capability transfer and success. The issue of success may therefore be more
complex than just capability transfer.
Proposition 3.: Absorption and Symbiotic acquisitions will not be
perceived to be significantly more successful than
acquisitions experiencing low capability transfer.
2.4.2.3 Knowledge transfer and success
Whilst we have suggested above that the issue of capability transfer and success
may be more complex than Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) infer, it is
9 Their sample was split between financial acquirers, who exhibited the higher
returns, and public corporations with lower returns. The public corporations
returns averaged 18° o in the US (S & P 500 was 14.3°0) and in the UK
averaged 11°0 (MSCI index 5.4° o)
reasonable to consider that some capability transfers may have a stronger
association with success than others. At the moment, the Resource-Based school
is emphasising the importance of knowledge as a key resource. 'The process by
which knowledge is created and utilised in organisations may be the key
inimical resource'(Schendel, 1996: 3).
Following on from Drucker's (1993: 6) observation that knowledge is the only
meaningful resource today - 'knowledge has become the resource, not a
resource' - other authors have amplified the importance of knowledge in
achieving competitive advantage. Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) use an explicit
treatment of knowledge in an uncertain and volatile world to explain the rise of
Japanese industry to world dominance. This link between the importance of
knowledge and volatile environments has been supported by Miller and
Shamsie's (1996) study of Hollywood film studios from 1936 to 1965. They
observe that in more uncertain, changing environments, knowledge-based
resources boost financial performance.
Hamel and Prahalad (1994) argue for the importance of leveraging core
resources, in particular knowledge and learning. They believe practices such as
benchmarlcing are just playing catch up: 'One doesn't get to the future first by
letting someone else blaze the trail' (Hamel and Prahalad 1994: 22). They
believe companies have to create the future and it is through knowledge and
learning that companies will be successful. This is supported by Hamel's
(1990) work on strategic alliances, where the motivation was not just to gain
access to skills but actually to internalise them (Hamel, 1990: 84). Failure to
'out-learn' one's partner could render a firm first dependent and then redundant
within the partnership and competitively vulnerable outside it (Hamel and
Prahalad, 1989). This 'hollowed-out' fear may have been present at Rover
during its alliance with Honda.
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995: 11) argue that knowledge is not just learnt or like
the `best practice, benchmarking practices prevalent in the US, described by
Milliken as SIS, or 'steal ideas shamelessly", but is built and requires laborious
interactions among members. Although they were referring to inter-company
learning, of 'developing ways to harness the "wisdom of the anthill" (Hamel and
Prahalad, 1989: 75), Hedlund (1994) has identified four levels of carrier;
individual; group; organisational; inter-organisational. In addition he
`dynamizes' the issue of knowledge transfer; `Much of the literature speaks
primarily of storage of information, and only secondarily about its transfer'
(Hedlund, 1994: 76). Hedlund (1994) seizes upon the important distinction
made by Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) of tacit and explicit knowledge and
whilst associating Japanese corporate success with the use of tacit knowledge
and its transfer at all four levels of carrier, points out that Western organisations
have a much more tightly specified and articulated system of knowledge and are
to a large extent 'articulation machines' built around explicit, codified practices
(Hedlund, 1994). Western organisations only recognise explicit knowledge and
lack the mechanism for the important use and transfer of tacit knowledge. Their
strength is 'the allowance of radical novelty', and expertise in handling mergers
and acquisitions allow quantum jumps in the reservoir of capabilities' (Hedlund,
1994: 79). The Western system specialises in radical innovation, and large firms
are the instruments more of exploiting such innovations than of generating them
(Hedlund, 1994: 78). In essence then the Western approach is to acquire
competencies and innovations rather than build them internally.
Spender and Grant (1997) have focused upon the issue of knowledge transfer.
'If knowledge is the primary resource upon which competitive advantage is
founded, then its transferability determines the period over which its possessor
can earn rents from it' (Spender and Grant, 1997: 7). In an acquisition context
the transfer of knowledge is particularly relevant. Almeida's (1996) analysis of
patent citations relating to patent innovations in the semi-conductor industry
shows that foreign direct investment is used as a means of accessing technical
knowledge in overseas countries rather than as a vehicle to exploit firm specific
knowledge developed in their home base. Whilst acknowledging that patent
citations are just one manifestation of knowledge within a firm, this raises the
question of the ease with which knowledge is transferable within the firm.
Szulanski (1996: 37) examined 122 best-practice transfers in eight companies
and concluded that internal stickiness of transfer is due to the recipient's lack of
absorptive capacity, causal ambiguity and the arduousness of the relationship
between source and recipient. She raises the puzzle that whilst best practices are
'recommended by superior and emulated by peers, those practices do not spread
inside firms' (Szulanski, 1996: 38) and indeed cites Porter (1985: 352) 'the mere
hope that one business unit might learn something useful from another is
frequently a hope not realised'. This difficulty of transferring knowledge within
a company can only be greater in an acquisition situation and impede attempts at
value creation.
Another context where one would expect explicit attempts to transfer knowledge
between firms is that of strategic alliances. However Mowery, Oxley and
Silverman (1996: 89) comment that 'the effects of alliance activity has
proceeded in a virtual empirical vacuum'. They seek to redress this by tracking
the effects of alliance activity on inter-firm knowledge transfer for 792 strategic
alliances. Mowery, Oxley and Silverman (1996: 83) focus upon cross-citation
rates for partners in bilateral alliances and acknowledge that this is codified
knowledge rather than tacit knowledge, the flow of which they assume is
closely linked. They conclude that 'there is no consistently positive pattern of
inter-firm learning in our overall alliance sample' (Mowery, Oxley and
Silverman, 1996: 87). They then identify convergent and divergent sub-sets of
alliances and for the latter suggest that some alliances are vehicles for accessing
rather than acquiring capabilities.
Whilst the forgoing discussion has clearly suggested that knowledge is the
firm's key competitive advantage there is a general awareness that the greatest
Proposition 4.: Knowledge transfer will be associated with
perceptions of acquisition success
value lies in tacit rather than explicit knowledge which the Western firm is
poorly equipped to handle. To compensate for this, Western firms have a
predilection for acquiring reservoirs of capabilities. However this does not
overcome the critical issue of knowledge transfer within the firm and between
firms. This is clearly far more problematic than hitherto realised. We might
suggest therefore that whilst knowledge is perceived to be the source of
competitive advantage, its transfer is far from automatic and indeed may be very
problematical. On this basis whilst we anticipate knowledge transfer to be
associated with perceptions of success, we should bear in mind that respondents
are undoubtedly commenting upon the transfer of explicit knowledge. In
addition, based upon the difficulties noted above, we should not be surprised if
fewer firms than expected experience high levels of knowledge transfer.
2.4.2.4 The mitigating effect of autonomy
Datta and Grant's (1990) study referred to above shows that the autonomy of
unrelated acquisitions is positively associated with success. Although they could
not find a similar association between related acquisitions, autonomy and
acquisition performance, there is clearly evidence that autonomy can influence
success.
The importance of organisational autonomy is implicit in the organisational fit
literature, mentioned in section 2.3.2, where loss of autonomy is perceived as
being of devastating consequence to the acquired company with the implication
that in such circumstances the health of the acquisition will suffer. Haspeslagh
and Jemison (1991: 142) are mindful of the importance of autonomy which they
see as essential to preserving the capabilities of the acquired company.
However, to transfer capabilities causes this autonomy to be threatened. The
pursuit of interdependence benefits frequently impairs or destroys their very
source' (Haspeslagh and Farquhar, 1994: 430). There is then an inherent conflict
between transferring resources and preserving organisational autonomy in the
acquired company (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991, Appendix A: 287).
On this basis we might be able to suggest that Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991)
acquisition types form a hierarchy in terms of success. Symbiotic acquisitions
should be the most successful as they experience high resource transfer, which
is necessary for value creation, and high autonomy, which means minimum
disruption. Absorption acquisitions will come next with high resource transfer
allowing value creation but with low autonomy which may lead to disruption in
the acquired company and a potential deterioration in performance. Preservation
acquisitions will follow with low resource transfer presenting little opportunity
to create value, but with high autonomy permitting a continuation of
performance levels. Finally there are Holding acquisitions which should be the
least successful as they experience low resource transfer permitting little
opportunity for value creation and also low autonomy which can lead to a
deterioration in the acquired company's performance.
Proposition 5.: There will be an order to Haspeslagh and Jemison's
acquisition types, in terms of perceived success,
from Symbiotic as most successful, through
Absorption, Preservation to Holding.
2.4.3 Review of acquisition activity and success
This section has identified two major limitations in Haspeslagh and Jemison's
work. The first is that they have chosen to concentrate upon one type of
acquisition whilst suggesting a comprehensive typology. The second underlies
their decision to concentrate upon value creating acquisitions, which is their
assumption that such acquisitions are more successful than value capture ones.
To address these two issues, propositions one and two are targeted at the actual
distribution of acquisition activity in the UK, whilst propositions three to five
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examine the argument that certain types of acquisition are more successful than
others. The results for these propositions are contained in Chapter four.
2.5 Post-acquisition change
This section takes us beyond the broad picture of the distribution and success of
acquisition types, into the realm of post-acquisition change. We begin with a
general view of the levels of change associated with the axes of Haspeslagh and
Jemison's (1991), namely autonomy and resource transfer. From this we look to
see whether we can identify a hierarchy of change amongst the four acquisition
types.
We then observe that Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) have chosen to focus upon
the process of change, in just three of their acquisition types, rather than the
changes themselves. For further guidance on the sorts of char= we might find
in the post-acquisition phase of all of their acquisition styles we turn to the post-
acquisition literature. However this is rather disappointing as it is neither
comprehensive nor coherent. We therefore generate a number of propositions
derived from this fragmented post-acquisition literature and then later group
these around the larger theme of this section.
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For further insight into the sorts of changes we might find in the post-
acquisition phase of the four acquisition types, we then refer to the turnaround
literature which has many important parallels with managing acquisitions.
2.5.1 Capabilities transfer and aggregate change
The Resource-based school has seen few attempts to derive resource
categorisation schemes for the complex resources which confer unique
competitive advantage. Barney (1991) suggested groupings of physical, human
and capital resources to which Grant (1991) added technological and
reputational resources. Leonard-Barton (1992) has added to these items in her
work on managing new product development and R & D, by observing that a
core capability is an interrelated interdependent knowledge system bound
together by values and norms. Complex assets therefore are not just clusters of
tangible assets but also the managerial processes needed in their creation, a
'dynamic wealth creating aspect of managerial activity' (Baden-Fuller and
Boschetti, 1996: 95). These items are evident within Haspeslagh and Jemison's
own categorisation described below.
2.5.1.1 Haspeslagh and Jemison's capability transfer criteria
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) developed their own capability transfer criteria
out of their earlier work in Haspeslagh (1986) and Haspeslagh and Jemison
(1987). This was in preference to existing categorisations as they believed that
the organisation theory literature did not take both inter- and intra-dependence
into account; a feature which they saw as unique to acquisitions (Haspeslagh
and Jemison (1991, Appendix A, Note 8: 368).
Their capability transfer axis consists of four items; operational resource
sharing, transfer of functional skills, general management skills transfer and
combination benefits. The first three actually involve strategic capability
transfer and the fourth, combination benefits refers to a number of advantages,
such as increased purchasing power, that may be present but do not require
capability transfer (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991: 28 -29)
In some ways the inclusion of the fourth category is rather surprising as
Haspeslagh and Jemison are looking at capability transfer and the managerial
implications of this. As they themselves state: 'Combination benefits have one
aspect in common - they do not require a managerial process to transfer
capabilities between the organisations. While they play a major role in some
acquisitions, combination benefits are not at the heart of value creation in truly
strategic acquisitions. It is in the three categories of resource sharing and the
transfer of functional and general management skills that capability transfer
takes place in value creating acquisitions' (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991: 29).
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) point out that the transfer of capabilities
disturbs the acquired company and if not carefully managed can have very
deleterious results. We would therefore expect resource transfer, the vertical
axis of their framework, to be positively associated with the volume of change
experienced by the acquired company.
Level of autonomy, the horizontal axis of Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991)
framework, has long been associated with change in the organisational fit
literature. We would expect acquisitions with a high level of autonomy to
experience little change whereas those with low autonomy would suffer the
reverse. As we have seen, Datta and Grant's (1990) study offers some
explanation by observing that unrelated acquisitions experience greater
autonomy than related acquisitions and it is likely that a parent company is less
likely to change an unfamiliar business than a familiar one.
Based upon the above and inferring from Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991) text,
we can suggest that the level of aggregate change experienced by acquisition
type will run from Preservation acquisitions, with the lowest level of change,
through Holding, Symbiotic and finally Absorption acquisitions with the highest
level of change.
Proposition 6.: The level of aggregate change will increase from
Preservation acquisitions, through Holding,
Symbiotic to Absorption acquisitions.
2.5.2 Changes by Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) acquisition type
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) do not provide us with a great deal of
information regarding actual acquisition integration changes. However they do
suggest that there are some changes which are generic and occur at the outset of
the post-acquisition phase. 'Every acquisition, after the agreement, involves a
transition period before the actual integration of the two companies begins. We
call this period the stage setting phase' (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991: 169).
We will review the changes they suggest for the stage setting phase and then
look at changes specific to each integration type.
2.5.2.1 The stage setting phase
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991: 173) suggest that successful acquirers pursue
seven key tasks. We have set these task recommendations against the changes
suggested in Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991: 169 - 188) text.
Table 2.2 Key tasks and changes in the stage setting stage
Key tasks Actual changes mentioned
1. Establishing interface management Set up gatekeeping structure
2. Putting operations on an even keel Provide performance targets
3. Instilling a new sense of purpose A mission statement
4. Taking stock and establishing control Introduce parent corporate control system
5. Strengthening the acquired organisation Improve staffing
6. Developing mutual understanding A communication programme
7. Building credibility up and down
Whilst Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991) text is full of recommendations for
each of the seven task areas identified above, we can see that there are very few
suggestions as to the actual changes which might be made to acquisitions. In
keeping with their Processualist viewpoint, there is a much greater sense of what
is necessary to facilitate change rather than actually what the change is. There is
considerable emphasis for instance upon the importance of communications at
all levels but few clues as to what should be v..ommuMeaked. knothet example is
the establishing of interface management either to protect a Preservation
acquisition or to implement an absorption process. Whilst this clearly impacts
upon the amount of change in the acquired company, it does not suggest what
changes that interface management will make.
2.5.2.2 Changes by acquisition type
The following reviews Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991) integration types and
highlights the changes they mention. After this review we will seek to develop
this enquiry further by drawing upon further suggestions from the post-
acquisition and related literature.
1) Absorption acquisitions
'Absorption is the integration approach that most naturally comes to mind for
managers - two firms truly consolidating' (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991: 189).
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) suggest that this form of integration is most
appropriate when the benefits from the acquisition come from a high
interdependence between the firms and there is a low concern for the autonomy
of the acquired firm. In their view, this is 'probably the most prevalent form of
integration' (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991: 189). To illustrate this type of
integration they cite the example of Electrolux's acquisition of Zanussi.
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991: 189 - 208) characterise successful Absorption
acquisitions as carrying out four tasks: i) drawing up a blueprint for
consolidation ii) managing the rationalisation iii) moving to best practice iv)
harnessing the complementarity between the two firms. The main changes are
identified overleaf
Table 2.3 Changes in Absorption acquisitions
Change issue Absorption Acquisitions
i.	 Choose a leader V
ii. Choose management team V
iii. Communicate V
iv. Set up task forces V
v. Rationalise V
vi. Reduce costs V
vii.Develop differences Invest V
viii.Lose identity V
2)	 Preservation acquisitions
Preservation acquisitions are often of the domain exploration type which begin
as small, platform acquisitions. Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) use the example
of BP Nutrition's acquisition of Hendrix to illustrate the Preservation approach.
This was characterised in the comments of the head of BP Nutrition as follows.
'Hendrix's external board members always urge us to break the shell of acquired
companies and integrate them into the existing business structure. But we saw
that breaking that shell is too risky in terms of dampening the motivation of
their managers and undermining their reasons for success' (Haspeslagh and
Jemison 1991: 217)
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991: 209 - 211) identified four main tasks for these
acquisitions. i) establishing a gate-keeping role to protect the acquired
company's boundary ii) nurturing the acquired company, in terms of resources
and management skills, to allow accelerated development iii) the parent
company should accumulate learning about the new business domain iv) the
domain should champion increased resource commitment.
The changes they identify (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991: 211- 221) associated
with these tasks are as follows:
1. Gate keeping role to protect boundaries: this is described as 'fighting the
corporate immune system' and implies a resistance to planning and control
forms.
2. Nurturing to accelerate business development: The general suggestion is that
funding is provided but in their example, Hendrix generated their own
resources to finance growth and development. However there was evidence
that the horizons of mangers were lifted and there was some practical support
in an informal way of management expertise particularly in terms of helping
Hendrix with selling investment to BP management and with financial
evaluations.
3. Accumulating learning: this did not result in changes to the acquired
company
4. Organisational championing: the ability of acquired companies to influence
the parent organisation was influenced by the projection of strong leadership
showing control over operations, an ability to communicate with corporate
planners and maintaining good relationships with corporate staff. However
there was a negative side to this approach which led to most managers
emphasising short term operating results at the expense of investment. In
addition there was evidence of organisational champions trying to cast their
companies in inappropriate corporate planning language.
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The changes issues mentioned are summarised below.
Table 2.4 Changes in Preservation acquisitions
Change issue Preservation
Acquisitions
Lose identity x
'Fight the corporate immune system' (:215)
and resist change
V
Raise acquired management sights ../
Providing support - management expertise nothing formal
Providing support	 - financial evaluation V
Invest x
Quite clearly the emphasis here is upon resisting change rather than
experiencing it. Whilst they suggest that 'nurturing' is an important part of
Preservation acquisitions and that they would expect to see investment from the
parent, in their case example it is clear that this has not happened and that any
investment in fact comes from the acquired company's own cash generation.
There may be some support in informal management terms and rather more
formally there may be financial evaluation.
3)	 Symbiotic acquisitions
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) regard Symbiotic acquisitions as the most
substantial management challenge due to the twin needs of preserving the
acquired company's culture and encouraging interdependence between the two
firms by resource transfer. They quote an executive in the ICI-Beatrice
acquisition as saying 'We knew from day one that they had to retain their
entrepreneurial, market oriented culture and be run at arm's length. Yet at the
same time, we had to find ways to get the synergy' (Haspeslagh and Jemison,
1991: 222).
Four stages can be recognised in the Symbiotic process i) start with preservation
of the acquired company; ii) acquired company reaches out rather than visa
versa; iii) both company trade responsibility for strategic control; iv) the
organisations are amalgamated (Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991: 222). The sorts
of changes that we might expect are as follows (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991:
224 - 235).
The acquired company will be protected from uncontrolled interventions
(indeed change may well happen in the acquiring company to ensure
compatibility). At the operating level the firms remain distinct and the acquiring
firm may have the use of some people from the acquirer to point out
opportunities. To achieve further integration managers may take on double
roles, individuals may be regrouped and there may be new investment in
buildings. The key however is the quality of the interface team.
Whilst Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) convey the sense in which a Symbiotic
acquisition would work, their description is very vague about what changes
would take place apart from setting up an interface or gatekeeping structure and
a gradual move towards integration through regrouping individuals and some
new investment.
4)	 Holding acquisitions
Haspeslagh and Jemison did not find an example of a Holding acquisition and
so do not comment upon the sorts of changes that such an acquisition would
experience. However they do make the comment that these companies are likely
to be held to be traded. This value capture approach tends to suggest that there
will be minimal interference with the acquired company and indeed Holding
acquisitions experience very low levels of resource transfer. However we should
be mindful that they also have a low autonomy and we have already suggested
that autonomy is negatively associated with change. We should not be surprised
therefore if Holding acquisitions do experience change although we have no
guidance as to where that change might occur.
2.5.2.3 Summary of changes by acquisition type
The following table attempts to summarise the changes identified by Haspeslagh
and Jemison (1991) by their integration types.
Table 2.5 Summary of changes by integration type
Stage Change issue Absorption Symbiotic Holding Preservation
setting
V Financial controls V V V V
V Gatekeeping structure V V (V) (V)
V Communication V V V V
Choose a leader V
Choose management team V
Set up task forces V
Rationalise V
Reduce costs V
Develop differences Inve t V (V) x
Lose identity V x
Resist change V V
Provide support (V) (V)
In terms of change, the main detail is focused upon significant amounts of
change in Absorption acquisitions and very low amounts of change in
Preservation acquisitions. For the other two types of acquisition there are
precious few indicators of what changes are made or areas that should stay the
same. For instance, Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) suggest that the use of task
forces is very important in Absorption acquisitions. These teams often run in
parallel with the line managers 'to study, identify issues and make
recommendations' (McCann and Gilkey, 1988: 154). However are we to assume
that lack of mention elsewhere means that they are not employed in other
acquisition types?
2.5.3 Haspeslagh and Jemison post-acquisition change critique
We can see from the review above that Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) do not
give much detail of the changes we might expect to see in each integration type.
The few clues they do provide are not dealt with consistently and this prevents
us from perceiving how different areas of change relate to each of their four
acquisition management approaches. In addition they have not tested the
robustness of their framework in terms of changes made.
For further ideas of what changes may occur in a target company we shall firstly
consider the post-acquisition change literature. Although this will suggest a
number of additional areas of change to examine, this will be insufficient for our
purposes. Despite the large volume of writings on the post-acquisition period,
which largely consists of attention to human resource issues, there is a paucity
of research into what changes are actually made. For instance on just a
functional level there is very little on marketing, operational and information
technology changes. This is also a reflection of the dominant trend in the post-
acquisition literature, which has been processual in nature, focusing upon the
facilitators and implementors of change rather than the actual changes
themselves.
Where there are studies of actual changes, they generally attempt to provide
broad prescriptive advice which ignores large variations in acquisition styles.
Most of these studies are not systematic, comprehensive or tested and may result
in inaccuracies. Due to the lack of a refined instrument for assessing change in
the post-acquisition period, we will not constrain our research with the
acquisition literature but will also refer to the analogous area of turnarounds, in
particular a study of sharpbenders, and the "taking-charge" literature.
2.5.4 Post acquisition literature
Case study evidence indicates that the period after an acquisition is marked by
great uncertainty and upheaval in the target company (Buono, Bowditch and
Lewis, 1985, Sales and Mirvis, 1984, Mirvis, 1985, Mirvis and Marks, 1992). It
is clearly a time of tremendous change and indeed 'the acquirer must effect
changes if value is to be realised' (Shanley, 1994: 392). Despite the recognition
of this upheaval, 'little attention is devoted to what happens in firms after
changes in ownership' (Shanley and Correa, 1992, Shanley, 1994).
2.5.4.1 Generic areas of post-acquisition change
There are very few studies which attempt a comprehensive coverage of change
in acquired companies. Their rarity may be due to the complexity of the issue
for, as Searby (1969: 6) states, even a modest integration 'may involve 2,000
changes' and gives the example of a critical path program used by the
Pennsylvania and New York Central railroads where 400 steps were needed just
to consolidate their equipment maintenance functions. Perhaps for this reason
the few articles on post-acquisition change can seem to be a list of rather general
categories.
A classic study which identifies key areas of change is by Kitching (1967) who
interviewed the top executives in 22 firms about 69 acquisitions. Although he
was seeking to relate pre-acquisition factors to post-acquisition outcome, he
observed that producing change to realise synergies is extremely difficult.
'Don't think its hard to realise synergy; its not. It's damn near impossible'. 'It
requires stock incentives in front and a red hot poker behind' to produce change
(Kitching 1967). Kitching believes that the keys to success are: i) good change
oriented top management; ii) good reporting; iii) installing a system of controls
with a major emphasis upon information reporting rather than budgets - as one
of his executives puts it 'suddenly our biggest product is paper reports'
(Kitching, 1967)
Other researchers have also commented upon the generic importance of: 1) top
management (McCann and Gilkey, 1988, Siehl and Smith, 1990, Cannella and
Hambrick, 1993); 2) financial controls (McCann and Gilkey, 1988, Jones,
1985a); and 3) communications (Leighton and Tod, 1969, Bastien and Van de
ven, 1986, Prichett, 1985, Schweiger and Denisi, 1987 , DeNoble, Gustafson
and Hergert, 1988, Napier, Simmons and Stratton, 1989). These generic issues
are echoed in Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991) stage setting phase with setting
up a gate keeping structure, the imposition of financial controls and targets and
communication. We will discuss the similarities and differences in the sections
below.
1.	 Top management
Many studies above have pointed to the importance of senior management in
acquisitions (Kitching, 1967, McCann and Gilkey, 1988, Siehl and Smith, 1990,
Cannella and Hambrick, 1993). Clearly this poses the question of whether the
senior management of the target company should stay or go. 'Comprehensive
changes in top management are often crucial for acquisition success' (McCann
and Gilkey, 1988).
Several post-acquisition studies address the issue of senior executive retention.
In his study of 200 acquisitions by Fortune 500 members, Hayes (1979)
recorded that only 42° o of top managers remained with their company five years
after acquisition. A more recent study of major acquisitions in the US found that
67% of all acquired senior executives had left within four years (Cannella and
Hambrick, 1993) and amongst the 100 largest acquisitions in the UK 1990 -
1994, 570 0 of chief executives were no longer in their positions two years after
the deal (Angwin, 1996).
Walsh (1988) examined 55 acquired companies and 30 control companies to
demonstrate that top management turnover was significantly higher for the
acquired companies than the control companies. In a later study of 102 target
companies, 77 parent companies and 75 control companies, Walsh and Ellwood
(1991) showed that turnover was higher in the two years after a merger than for
other companies.
The evidence appears to suggest that there is significantly higher turnover
amongst the top management of acquired companies than non-acquired
companies. This seems to support the theory of corporate control, that
alternative management teams compete for the right to manage corporate
resources (Jensen, 1988), where acquired managers are perceived to be inferior
to acquiring managers and are therefore replaced. Being acquired therefore is a
sign that the incumbent management is sub-optimal and change will enable
improved corporate performance.
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Franks and Mayer (1996) have sought to test this notion by examining 58
hostile take-overs in the UK in 1985 and 1986. 'If- hostile take-overs perform a
disciplinary role, we should see a high level of managerial turnover' (Franks and
Mayer, 1996: 166). Their findings show that 90% of directors resign after
hostile bids whereas 50% resign after accepted bids I °. Franks and Mayer (1996:
166) do not find this 'sufficient condition for take-overs to be disciplinary
because it could reflect disagreement over a strategic re-deployment of assets'.
They therefore test for post-acquisition restructuring based upon asset disposals
as well as poor pre-acquisition performance. They find that hostile acquisitions
are associated with restructuring but that there is little evidence to support the
notion of poor pre-acquisition performance. They conclude therefore that whilst
hostile acquisitions are associated with high levels of boardroom changes, these
reflected disagreement over asset re-deployment rather than pre-acquisition
performance. On this basis they do not see hostile acquisitions as a discipline on
management.
Whilst Franks and Mayer (1996) have cast doubt upon the issue of corporate
control as a reason for top management turnover they appear to have overlooked
other issues. A successful target top team may not want to work for the acquirer
- there is some evidence that large acquirers are worse performers than the
companies they take-over. In contrast, the acquirers may wish to change the
target top management as a signal to stakeholders that there will be change. This
I ° Significant at the 1% level.
may be a recognition of the influence of the top management as an impediment
to change or simply using them as a scape-goat for the loss of their company's
independence.
With the exception of Franks and Mayer (1996), most studies of top
management change following take-over tend to examine a few broad
characteristics of acquisitions rather than adopting a typology. Walsh (1989)
identified relative size as an important issue with which turnover was positively
associated and Cannella and Hambrick (1993) did not find a simple correlation
between relative size and turnover but found a negative association with the
degree of friendliness, pre-acquisition performance and relative performance.
None of these studies looks at the turnover of senior management in the context
of different integration styles and the few associations above do not give any
clues as to what one might expect. One study by Hayes and Hoag (1984)
suggests that turnover is negatively related to the degree of autonomy but there
is no evidence that statistical tests were performed. We might pursue this line in
the context of Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991) framework and suggest that
those styles with greater autonomy are likely to retain their senior management
whereas those styles with low autonomy will lose them.
We might also bear in mind that the transfer of resources may lead to greater
changes in the target company and this is inimitable to the preservation of
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Proposition 7.: Preservation acquisitions will retain more senior
executives than Absorption acquisitions
competencies. We may conclude therefore that the greater the degree of resource
transfer, the less likely it is for senior executives to be retained.
On this basis it is clear that in Preservation cases, we would expect incumbent
executives to remain with the target company and with Absorption acquisitions,
the incumbent executives are likely to depart. The other two acquisition types
beg the question as to which of the two dimensions is the more dominant -
autonomy or resource transfer.
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) do not focus upon the issue of top management
directly but identify the generic issue of gatekeeping structures. A key member
of this structure is the Managing Executive" of the acquired company. He is
only mentioned in terms of choosing a leader for Absorption acquisitions which
implies a change. Clearly there is an important issue here of whether the
Managing Executive remains post-acquisition which leads us directly into a
"Throughout the thesis the term Managing Executive will be used to denote the
most senior executive director of the acquired company. Terms such as chief
executive or managing director were not used due to the confusion
surrounding titles post-acquisition.
discussion upon the merits of Insiders versus Outsiders. This is the subject of a
separate section (see section 2.6) and will not be pursued here.
2.	 Financial controls
There is considerable evidence from the post-acquisition literature that the
imposition of financial controls at the outset of the post-acquisition phase is
widespread. 'There seemed to be no question that the control system of the
acquirer had to be adopted' (Business International, 1992: 71). Acquired
executives perceived acquiring companies as omnipotent in this area and
although the acquired company's system was sometimes out of date there was
evidence that it was just not understood by the acquirer and that the 'HQ
expects to rule'. The financial area is always the first and most important areas
to integrate (Business International, 1992: 64). This concords with McCann and
Gilkey's (1988) view that finance teams are the 'shock troops' of the
acquisition, 'charged with gaining control of cash, other liquid assets and the
financial reporting system' (McCann and Gilkey, 1988: 155).
In a study of management accounting techniques (MATs) in acquisitions by
thirty large UK predominantly manufacturing companies, Jones (1985a) has
shown that all techniques used were of significantly greater importance (at the
1°0 level) in the two years following acquisition than before the acquisition. The
techniques that became most important were monthly accounts and reports,
budgeting in operating companies and formalised capital expenditure. Jones
perceives these techniques as 'important devices for establishing post-
acquisition control' (Jones, 1985a: 184).
Jones then related MATs to different types of acquisition. His findings were that
the changes in MATs for each acquisition type were remarkably similar leading
him to conclude that either there is a similar need in all acquisition
circumstances, such as the need for integration, motivation control or 'that
acquirer's were not discriminating in the changes made to MATs and therefore
failed to optimise any benefits that the selective use of MATs might confer'
(Jones, 1985a: 185). 'The changes introduced in MAT suggest that acquiring
companies were inclined to extend bureaucratic or mechanistic forms to
acquired companies'. This inclination towards more rigid organisational forms
occurred despite the professed desire of many acquirers to 'encourage
autonomy' (Jones, 1985a: 190).
In a later study, Jones explicitly related his 'universalistic' findings in the
application of MAT to a contingency model of acquisitions. Overall he found
that 'MAT tended to bear the characteristics of the universalistic theory of MAT
with a substantial degree of carry-over from one organisation to another,
regardless of organisational differences and contingent variables were explicitly
recognised to only a modest extent' (Jones, 1985b: 321).
Wilson (1992) suggests that financial changes can be used not just in its
historical role of providing information and guidelines for decision making, but
as 'a force for shaping organisational change' (Wilson, 1992: 65). In particular
managers can use 'financial data to support their cause or to refute the
countervailing claims of others' (Hickson et al, 1986 in Wilson, 1992: 66).
Three effects of using accounting data noted by Wilson are the foreshortening of
time horizons, suppression of innovation and decision making constraints on
senior managers. Auditing measures of performance 'sets powerful boundaries
around strategic action' (Wilson, 1992: 67). Although this statement is meant in
relation to stock market indices one could easily see that this might also be
appropriate in an acquisition context of performance measures from head office.
The imposition of financial controls therefore can been seen to receive
widespread acknowledgement and support and we would expect all our
integration types to experience the imposition of financial controls.
3.	 Communications
One of the main causes of merger failure is the 'merger syndrome' (Mirvis and
Marks, 1985) where mistrust and alienation can lead to the complete disruption
of the acquisition. Left uncontrolled, information about the acquisitions will
circulate throughout the organisation's rumour mill, heightening employee's
fears and anxieties (Buono and Bowditch, 1989).
Researchers in the human resources field point to communications as vital to
post-acquisition success (Leighton and Tod, 1969). Good communications
reduce the anxiety and uncertainty surrounding the acquisition (Prichett, 1985)
and motivates the target company for the future. 'The challenge facing
management is how to walk the fine line between making operating changes and
alienating employees. This will never be an easy task, but the best chance for
success is to engage in open communications with all employees' (De Noble,
Gustafson and Hergert, 1988). There is a symbolic dimension to these
communications as it signals to employees that management cares (Schweiger
and DeNisi, 1987).
Less often mentioned is the importance of two way communications.
'Establishing effective two-way communication systems early in the merger-
acquisition process is of paramount importance' (McCann and Gilkey, 1988:
151). 'Communication is crucial, somebody has to be aware of every detail. If
the location of the drinking fountains is important to employees, someone has to
be prepared to deal with that issue. If information like that isn't communicated,
you can't be sensitive to the subtle and symbolic concerns that can make or
break you during the transition process' (chief executive of a firm in one of the
largest take-overs in 1985, in McCann and Gilkey, 1991: 151). The opportunity
for employees to express their concerns and receive relevant information is an
important issue (Buono and Bowditch, 1989, Schweiger and DeNisi, 1987).
Schweiger and Walsh (1990) in their inter-disciplinary review of the literature
cite many studies that have tried to asses the impact of communications upon
organisational performance. Their conclusion is that there is no unambiguous
relationship between communication and organisational performance but that
the longitudinal study by Schweiger and DeNisi (1987) which compared a light
manufacturing plant which received communications during a merger
(experimental plant) with employees in a plant that did not (control plant)
showed that communication does play an important role in minimising
uncertainty and damage.
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) see communications as a vital part of the stage
setting phase as it minimises the negative aspects of change. However,
presented in a generic way, as shown above in Table 2.5, communications are
portrayed as equally important for all integration types. We might suggest
however that if there is little change, then communications will be of much less
significance than where there is a lot of change. We would expect
communications then to be positively associated with the amount of post-
acquisition change. Based upon the assumption in proposition 6, that the amount
of change will increase from Preservation, through Holding, Symbiotic to
Absorption acquisitions, we would expect changes in communications to mirror
this pattern.
Proposition 8.: Changes in communication will be positively
associated with the level of change in the acquired
company
A study by Napier, Simmons and Stratton (1989) of two merging banks, draws a
distinction in terms of the type of communications employed. They discovered
that employees in both banks relied on different media. Employees in the
acquiring banks relied upon formal channels such as memos, letters, newsletters
and meetings with top management, whereas employees in the acquired bank
relied heavily upon informal sources. Although their overall observation is that
formal communications are more important than informal ones, in their
historical and longitudinal study of eight mergers, Bastien and Van de Ven
(1986) concluded that initially uncertainty appears to be inversely related to the
quantity of formal communication from the acquiring company management to
the acquired organisation. 'In the longer term however, uncertainty appeared to
be inversely related to the quantity of interpersonal communication between
acquiring and acquired company managers' (Bastien and Van de Ven, 1986:
34). Although they develop a typology of different types of acquisition, they
comment that 'communication and honesty' are central to minimise disruption.
Proposition 9.: Informal communications will be positively
associated with change in acquired companies.
There may well be a parallel here with Kotter's work on the General Managers 
(1988) where he observes that when a general manager takes charge, the use of
informal communications is far more effective in terms of learning about the
organisation and bringing about change than formal approaches. We might
conclude therefore that where acquired companies experience significant
change, informal communications will be important.
It is also worth noting that communications studies in an acquisition context
have focused almost entirely upon internal issues and have therefore ignored
external stakeholders. Clearly customers and suppliers play a vital role in the
success of an organisation and their concerns over an acquisition can have dire
consequences. An acquisition can lead to a complete change in identity and this
involves transformations in every key stakeholder relationship' (Kanter, Stein
and Jick, 1992: 212). One might suggest that the extent to which an acquired
company experiences changes will be related to the importance placed upon
external communications as efforts will be made to assure external stakeholders
that their interests will be safeguarded.
Function
Production: Economies of scale
Technology: Sharing R & D and
processes
Marketing: 2 products through 1
channel
Organisation: Eliminate
duplication
Finance: Increased borrowing
capability etc.
Synergy
potential
High
'1"
T
T
Low
Actual	 Ease of synergy
payoff
	
release* 
Low	 Low
4/ 4/
4/ 4/
4/ 4/
High	 High
2.5.4.2 Functional areas of post-acquisition change
The post-acquisition literature tends to focus upon functional areas of change.
Kitching's (1967) classic study highlighted a number of such functional changes
when he contrasted areas of highest synergy potential and related them to the
actual payoff. Figure 2.3 shows this comparison which suggests that some areas
might be more prone to change than others. For instance, although there are low
synergies to be had in finance, the payoff is high.
Figure 2.3 Areas of synergy potential*
Kitching (1967)
*Constructed from the text: 50-52
**The order for Production and Technology are in fact reversed, albeit by a very
small margin, but shown in this manner for ease of presentation.
Kitching (1967) goes on to say that the payoff may be related to the ease with
which the synergies can be achieved and the speed they can be delivered. Figure
2.3 above is taken from Kitching's (1967) text and juxtaposes payoff with ease
to find a similar pattern through the functions. This perhaps gives a rationale for
the studies cited earlier that change is frequent and widespread in the finance
area.
Searby (1969) complements Kitching's (1967) paper by suggesting some 28
areas of decision regarding changes that might be made. His groups are similar
to Kitching's (1967) except that he emphasises the personnel aspect whereas
Kitching identifies production. Searby's (1969) areas of change are in terms of
finance, corporate organisation, marketing, technology, personnel and public
relations.
A practitioners perspective is presented by Yunker (1983) who focuses upon
financial systems and computer integration, personnel and benefit policies,
marketing and sales interface, technology and manufacturing. His prescriptive
advice strikes a chord with Kitching's (1967) observations regarding payoff as
he emphasises the parental wish to have its own more sophisticated financial
systems, its preference for uniform personnel policies, and minimal interference
in operations. In addition, Yunker (1983) points out the difficulties of
integrating computers.
One of the few more rigorous studies of change in the post-acquisition phase is
by Shanley (1987). He moves away from a more functional perspective and
adopts five general categories of change which have both task and human
resource implications. Shanley (1987) sees the task element as being the primary
management action whereas the human resources element is the implication or
consequence of those management actions. 'Although the literature is sparse on
the range of actions employed by acquirers, five general areas in which newly
acquired firm could be changed are apparent: formal structure, decision making,
controls, top management, compensation and benefits' (Shanley, 1987: 55-56).
Whilst these areas add a dimension to the earlier works above, there is no sense
of 'completeness' about his selection.
Table 2.6 Post-acquisition areas of change
Area of change Kitching
1967
Searby
1969
Yunker
1983
Shanley
1987
Baden-
Fuller
and
Boschetti
1996
Finance
- controls
- performance
- external relationships
V
V
V
V
V
V*
V
V
Corporate Organisation
- Top executives
- Profit centres
- Organisational
structure
- Areas of authority
- Central services (PR,
legal)
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
Table 2.6 (contd) Post-acquisition areas of change
Sales and Marketing
- distribution
- product lines
- advertising
- sales forces
- marketing forces
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V V
Production
- purchasing
- scheduling
- facilities planning
- quality
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V V
Technology
- R & D processes V V
V V
Personnel
- redundancy
- recruitment
- benefits
- development
programmes
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
Information technology V
Communications
- reporting relationships V V V
Method
22 interviews
on 69
acquisitions
Unknown Practitioner'
s experience
Questionnaire
returns for
51
acquisitions +
22 interviews
Case study of 2
mergers
*Where the broad function is mentioned without specific detail
One of the most recent studies on post-acquisition change has reverted to a
straight forward functional typology. By taking a Resource-Based View and
claiming that many strategic assets lie inside functions, Baden-Fuller and
Boschetti focus upon individual functions of the firm (Baden-Fuller and
Boschetti, 1996: 97).
Other studies have tended to focus upon a particular area of change without a
consideration of the broader picture. The majority of these studies tend to focus
upon a functional area and are very fragmented in nature leaving clear gaps in
the literature. We shall now review these studies.
• Information technology / information systems
The few studies existing in this area are making claims for the general
importance of information technology information systems in all acquisition
situations on the basis that Information technology is an increasingly important
aspect of modern organisations. 'It is the means through which control,
planning, financial, operating and management information systems are
achieved' (Merali and McKiernan, 1993: 108). However very little indeed has
been written on the issue of information technology and information systems in
an acquisition context. 'Both the anecdotal and the academic literature in this
field are sparse' (Merali and McKiernan, 1993: 107). One of the few papers by
Merali and McKiernan (1993) points to the 'huge capital costs of integrating I.T.
systems' and 'a void in defining the types of information systems that are
necessary' (Merali and McKiernan, 1993: 107). Buck-Lew, Pliskin, Shaked and
Wardle (1992) also point to the expense of integration where there is an
incompatible technological environment and suggest that although operational
dependence on information technology is increasing, the corporate strategy of
many companies is not critically dependent upon information technology
performance. As a result its consideration is often omitted from strategic
evaluation of acquisitions.
Merali and McKiernan (1993) use the Haspeslagh and Jemison integration
framework to suggest where information technology/information systems issues
are likely to be most important. 'The Preservation and Holding categories
exhibit a low level of strategic linkage, so information systems infrastructure
can, more or less, be left intact. It is the Absorption and Symbiotic acquisitions,
where strategic interdependence is high, that pose the greater difficulty of post-
acquisition integration of the information systems infrastructure' (Merali and
McKiernan, 1993: 55). Despite the suggestion that information
systems information technology might be important in Symbiotic acquisitions,
they also suggest that it could remain separate. In other words it is only in
Absorption acquisitions that they clearly expect information
systems information technology changes to occur. They cite a study by Ball
(1988) which estimates that 70 0 0 of merged companies combine information
systems operations immediately after the merger transaction whilst 90° o
eventually combine them within one year.
Merali and McKiernan (1993) do not test their assumptions regarding the
importance of information systems/information technology for each acquisition
type and prefer to concentrate upon Absorption and Symbiotic acquisitions.
Whilst their inference regarding the association of information
systems/information technology's importance with integration may be correct,
this may not be a clear indicator of whether change takes place in the other
acquisition types. Nevertheless, we can test their assumption that changes in
information systems information technology are more pronounced in
acquisitions exhibiting high capability transfer than those with low capability
transfer.
Proposition 10.: Absorption and Symbiotic acquisitions will
exhibit more change in information systems /
information technology than Holding and
Preservation acquisitions.
Merali and McKiernan (1993) generally talk about information
systems information technology in the same breath, although one might believe
that changes in one are more likely than in the other. For instance, information
systems may be changed more often if the existing technology is capable of
accommodating it. On this basis we might also look out for more changes in
information systems than information technology.
• Human Resource issues
We have already examined change in top management in section 2.5.4.1 and
pointed to the important issue of retaining the Managing Executive to which we
will return in section 2.6. In addition we have also raised the little explored issue
of middle management change.
Whilst there were a number of cross-sectional quantitative studies in the area of
changing management, the rest of the huge literature on human resource issues
consists almost entirely of rich individual case studies concentrating upon the
psychological impacts upon employees as well as the facilitating and resisting
conditions of change. For instance, Schweiger, Ivancevich and Power (1987)
stress employee concerns, and look at the characteristics of what constitutes
effective management action, namely commitment, honesty, understanding.
Regarding the changes themselves, they just list a range of some nine changes
which may or may not occur in other acquisitions and indeed may occur under
normal operating conditions such as changes in jobs, job losses, changes in
status. In other words the human resource literature rarely comments upon the
changes themselves and of course when they do the observations are very case
specific.
One of the few studies which seeks to look at changes across several
acquisitions is by Schweiger and Weber (1989). They examined the pattern of
integration between personnel policies and systems in 80 related M & As. They
found that in 50% of cases, the acquired firm adopted the policies of the new
parent, in 30% of cases the policies remained separate and in only 3% of cases
were the acquired firm policies adopted 12 . Although the target company in a
related acquisition is more than likely to experience change in its personnel
policies and systems, in some ways it is surprising that the change is not more
prevalent.
Haspeslagh & Jemison's (1991) typology is only loosely associated with the
relatedness concept and so we might fruitfully examine changes in personnel
policies and systems in their context. We would expect to see greater change
where there is more interdependence between the two firms.
Proposition 11.: Absorption and Symbiotic acquisitions will exhibit
more change in personnel policies than Holding
and Preservation acquisitions.
Napier (1989: 274) acknowledges that there is little description of actual
changes in the Human Resource area, little recognition of whether changes by
type of merger or degree of integration, and which actions occur when. She
12 The remaining cases consisted of 8°0 being the development of new policies
and in 9 0 0 of cases the policies were the same pre-acquisition.
proposes a framework of acquisition types against which she relates certain
human resource changes. These types might be loosely related to the Haspeslagh
and Jemison framework. Firstly in 'extension' acquisitions or conglomerate
mergers, which we might associate with Preservation and Holding acquisitions,
she suggests that the 'hands-off policy' will result in little change to human
resource issues. Even when the acquired company is in poor shape,
independence will be maintained and she cites Seafirst, an acquisition by Bank
of America, as an example of low intervention. For 'collaborative' acquisitions,
which appear similar to Symbiotic acquisitions, there may be extensive change
but in terms of policies and practices developing out of existing ones. For
'redesign' mergers which appear akin to Absorption acquisitions, as the
acquired company is related and has changes imposed by the acquirer to mould
it in its own image, changes are likely to be the most extensive. The following
figure illustrates the areas where Napier identifies change.
Figure 2.4 Types of Human Resource change by acquisition type
Change issue Redesign Collaborative Extension
Absorption* Symbiotic* Preservation*
•	 Human
resource
planning
Wide ranging
replacements
Creating new
teams
Reduction in
staff
No change
•	 Selection Top team
turnover
Top team
turnover
No change
•	 Compensation
and
performance
appraisal
Change
compensation
and benefits
policies
(not specified) No change
•	 Development
and employee
relations
Considerable
communications
Considerable
training
Considerable
communications
Considerable
training
Limited
communications
Napier (1989) (constructed from text)
* Suggested Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) types
Napier's acquisition styles may well be analogous to those of Haspeslagh and
Jemison (1991) and so we could look for similar associations in the latter's
typology. We have already dealt with the issue of top team change and also
communications. However the issue of compensation and benefit policies is
interesting as it might well be a differentiating issue for the three acquisition
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types mentioned above. Compensation and benefit policies might well show
change in terms of economies of streamlining systems but as the psychology
literature suggests, it can be used to reinforce approved behaviour. We might
therefore expect that this area will change in acquired companies where they are
absorbed, as these items are likely to be standardised, developed in Symbiotic
acquisitions and left alone in Preservation acquisitions. In addition the issue of
training may also be perceived along the same lines.
Proposition 12.: Different acquisition types will exhibit significant
differences in changes to compensation and
benefits.
2.5.5 The 'Turnaround' literature
We can see from the above that the post-acquisition literature is very fragmented
in nature and gives uneven suggestions for the sorts of changes that we might
expect to encounter within Haspeslagh & Jemison's (1991) typology. To assist
us in this endeavour, we can turn to a related literature on turnarounds. These
studies offer more comprehensive guidance for changes that might take place in
the post-acquisition phase. The following section argues for the analogy
between acquisitions and turnarounds.
2.5.5.1 The Turnaround acquisition analogy
There are clear parallels between post-acquisition management and corporate
turnarounds. Indeed S latter remarked upon this himself in his opening chapter
on corporate recovery (Slatter, 1984: 13). The parallels would seem to be that
the companies in both situations are experiencing a crisis and that there is a need
to make changes to achieve sustained improvement (c.f.Eccles, 1993).
Being acquired can be seen as an external trigger for change and is evidence of
an organisation in crisis 13 . Very often the acquisition is a result of the acquired
company either experiencing or anticipating a threat from competitive or
environmental variables. This alone is a crisis and similar to turnarounds, but in
addition, the acquired firm experiences a change in ownership which leads to
tremendous uncertainty throughout the firm from the strategic level of 'what
will happen to the business' down to the individual level of 'will I have a job?'
In many cases acquired companies are fully aware of a need to change and the
13 The assumption here is that a firm is in crisis if it is acquired. There are two
parts to this statement; the first is that firms for acquisition are experiencing
or anticipating a crisis, and secondly that the act of being acquired is in itself
a crisis. We would argue that if firms are doing well then they would not
allow themselves willingly to be acquired. If they are acquired then they must
feel that there are weaknesses that need to be tackled which could not be done
with their own resources. For those firms who repel acquisition, hostile
acquisition is undoubtedly a crisis. The act of being acquired raises
tremendous uncertainties which will also serve to enforce a sense of crisis.
act of being taken over is simply evidence of this need. However the visibility of
acquisition crystallises the need to change and this expectation only adds to the
sense of crisis. In both turnarounds and acquisitions therefore there is a crisis
which needs to be addressed by change. The crisis literature describes this as
second order or metamorphic change where rapid discontinuous change is
expected (Meyer, Brooks & Goes, 1990). Turnarounds clearly show substantial
and frame breaking changes to reverse unhealthy performance (S latter, 1984)
and this change can take place independently of environmental change.
It is important to note that although the term "turnaround" immediately evokes
images of companies on the verge of bankruptcy, it is also applicable to firms
which may well be stable at the current time but exhibiting the symptoms of
decline and failure. Similarly with acquisitions, only a minority are in a perilous
condition whereas the vast majority are experiencing or anticipating severe
competitive or environmental threat. Through acquisition, it is intended to
overcome the crisis and realise greater value from the acquired company than its
cost. The parallel with turnarounds is that changes are made not only to avert the
immediate crisis but also to launch the company upon a path of sustainable
recovery. Grinyer, Mayes and McKiernan (1988) characterise this as a
`sharpbend', 'companies which have been in decline relative to their
competitors, which have then exhibited a marked and often dramatic,
improvement in performance' (Grinyer, Mayes and McKiernan, 1988: 2- 3). If
we refer to their diagram of a sharpbend, later modified by McKiernan (see
figure 2.5), we suggest that post-acquisition management is attempting to
achieve similar aims to sharpbenders in terms of recovering from a crisis and
achieving a sustained recovery (see part B)
Figure 2. 5 Stages of a turnaround
Sharpbend
Performance
Sustained
Recovery
A
Trigger/'' Changes
Time
Sharpb end
Source: Grinyer et al. (1988) - modified by McKiernan (1993)
The value of referring to the turnaround literature is that it is a rich source on the
types and timing of change. It examines the steps taken by businesses wishing to
reverse a real or anticipated process of decline and if our suggestion of close
parallels between post-acquisition management and turnarounds is apposite,
then the changes made during a turnaround may well be present during the post-
acquisition phase.
It is worth pointing out that the turnaround literature does have a limitation in
that it only focuses upon generic change and does not consider that there may be
different types of turnaround.
2.5.5.2 Turnaround areas of change
The Turnaround literature has drawn attention to a number of important areas of
change to enable improved performance. Slatter's (1984) classic work on
corporate recovery suggests that asset reduction, change of management,
improved financial controls, and cost reduction (although for this issue, less than
in unsuccessful recoveries) are characteristic of successful turnarounds. Two
other items of importance appear to be debt restructuring and organisational
changes.
Grinyer, Mayes and McKieman's (1988) work on Sharpbenders shows many
similarities with Slatter's (1984) study. In particular both works emphasise
major changes in management, stronger financial controls, and intensive efforts
to reduce production costs with attention to debt also being cited as important.
The occurrence of many items in both studies is interesting as there are
important differences between the two studies. Slatter's (1984) work
concentrates upon turnarounds; 'companies whose financial performance
indicates that the firm will fail in the foreseeable future unless short term
corrective action is taken' (Slatter 1984: 14) whereas Grinyer, Mayes and
McKiernan (1988) study of Sharpbenders focuses upon companies that 'achieve
a sharp and sustained improvement in performance' (Grinyer, Mayes and
McKiernan, 1988: 9). In the latter case there were examples of companies that
were not likely to fail in the short term and so it would not be surprising to find
differences in the areas of change identified. In addition the comparators are
different as Slatter (1984) contrasts successful and unsuccessful turnarounds
whereas Grinyer, Mayes and McKiernan (1988) compare sharpbenders with
control companies. The studies also took place at different time periods.
Despite the differences we find many similarities in their results which strongly
suggests that similar changes are made in times of crisis to achieve marked
improvements in performance. If there are parallels between post-acquisition
management and turnarounds as we have suggested above, then we would
expect to see the changes highlighted above to assume importance in post-
acquisition situations as well.
The sharpbenders study chooses to focuses upon companies that are exhibiting
marked change rather than those that are in a financially challenged situation.
This is more closely akin to acquisitions as most acquired companies are not at
the point of failure. However upon acquisition there are clear efforts to realise
the premiums paid by making changes to achieve superior performance. In this
sense we would expect to see the changes identified in sharpbenders to be
present in post-acquisition management.
• Sharpbender areas of change
The main areas of change identified by the sharpbenders, where these
companies differed substantially from their control companies, are as follows.
- Top management change
In essence the Sharpbenders study reinforces the suggestions in the acquisition
literature of the importance of major change in management as this occurred in
85 °0 of successful cases. However, sharpbenders places particular emphasis
upon the critical importance of the chief executive. We will revisit this issue in
the following section (section 2.6).
- Financial control change
800 0 of sharpbenders adopted stronger financial controls. The importance of this
area has already been noted in the acquisition literature.
- Marketing change
'Turnaround firms characterised by poor management rarely - if ever - have a
well executed marketing plan' (Slatter, 1984: 93). 75% of sharpbenders made
changes to their marketing whereas only 30% of control companies made
changes. 'Whilst the precise emphasis of the marketing changes made by our
sharpbenders varied according to the nature of their business, there can be no
doubt of the importance that most of them attach to marketing' (Grinyer, Mayes
and McKiernan, 1988: 91). It would be surprising therefore if the post-
acquisition phase did not see a similar attention to improving marketing.
Although Slatter highlights changes in selling, pricing, distribution channels and
promotion, the main area of change for sharpbenders was stressing getting
closer to the customer, in line with Peters 'obsession with customers' (Peters,
1986). Grinyer, Mayes and McKieman (1988) explored this mentalite and found
that nearly half deliberately tried to develop close relations with their customers
as part of the sharpbend (Grinyer, Mayes and McKiernan, 1988: 89). 'High
pressure forced companies closer to their customers' (Grinyer, Mayes and
McKiernan, 1988: 91).
- Production cost reduction
80% of sharpbenders reduce production costs and 50°0 of them took at least four
steps in this category. 'Reduction in costs clearly play a central role in the
achievement of a successful sharpbend' (Grinyer, Mayes and McKieman, 1988:
91). Grinyer, Mayes and McKiernan (1988: 91), also point out that high costs
are also clearly evident as a cause of relative decline in 65% of cases. They feel
that 'attention to costs is a major response to pressure' (Grinyer, Mayes and
McKieman, 1988: 91).
- Reduced debt
Debt reduction was more common amongst sharpbenders (80% of cases) than
amongst control companies (50°0 of cases). However Grinyer, Mayes and
McKiernan (1988) make the distinction that asset sell offs by sharpbenders are
often to allow further investment rather than just a reduction in debt. They are
also likely to dispose of non revenue generating overheads and give the example
of the sale by Collins, the book publishers, of its prestigious headquarters. In
addition they will sell off loss making activities. In other words sharpbenders
basic viability is not normally in question so their attention is upon financing
operations without resorting to emergency measures.
The following table sets out the key changes observed in the Sharpbender study
which set them apart from their control companies and are relevant to
acquisitions.
Table 2. 7 Adopted Sharpbender steps
% of firms citing this factor
Sharpbenders %
difference
from
controls
1 Major changes in management 85 55
2 Stronger financial controls 80 10
3 New product market focus 80 0
6 Improved quality and service 55 5
7 Improved marketing 75 45
8 Intensive efforts to reduce production costs 80 50
10 Reduced debt 50 (30)
11 Windfalls 85 15
Source: Sharpbenders; Grinyer, Mayes, McKiernan (1988)
2.5.6 The `Taking-charge' literature
This literature in large part stems from the streams of research into the
importance of the chief executive (Carlson, 1962, IIelmich and Brown, 1972,
Kotter 1982) and the nature of managerial work (Stewart, 1967, Mintzberg,
1973). The latter stream seeks to characterise the nature of the manager's job
which they frame in terms of variety and fragmentation and in terms of
communications (Mintzberg, 1973). Kotter's (1982, 1990) work turned attention
towards what the general manager actually does, and the "taking-charge"
literature has adopted both the top manager perspective and the focus upon
action in the context of executives taking charge of a company.
The turnaround literature has already suggested the key importance of the chief
executive in bringing about change and so the taking charge literature which
emphasises this role is clearly appropriate. We will look specifically at the role
of the chief executive in the next section (see section 2.6). However we will first
look at the changes that this literature mentions.
Gabarro (1985, 1987) examined 17 executive successions, four of which were
longitudinal field studies over a three year period. Whilst he generated a range
of change issues, in particular detail upon management systems and
communications, he concentrated upon structural and personnel change. Other
issues were disregarded on the grounds that there was little documentary
evidence or that the item did not satisfy his common metric. The structural
changes were based on major and minor sub-units, organisation wide change
and the creation of new sub-units or functions. The personnel changes covered
the hiring and firing of personnel, searching for new personnel and reassigning
management. The advantage of this narrow focus and standardisation is that
Gabbaro (1987) has been able to show change over time and we shall return to
this issue in section 2.7. However, apart from drawing our attention to issues of
structural change, his other observations merely reinforce issues previously
mentioned in terms of changes in communications and management systems.
2.5.7 Review of post-acquisition change
Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991) framework is based upon a process
perspective which understates the changes that take place in their acquisition
types. Apart from just focusing upon certain types, they have not tested their
framework and their handling of change is partial and thin. By concentrating
upon the actual changes that take place in each of their acquisition types we can
test the robustness of their framework and provide a comprehensive and
systematic approach to post-acquisition change in the four acquisition styles.
We referred to the post-acquisition literature for guidance on this issue but
found a large number of fragmented studies. From these we extracted a number
of propositions which could be tested. However, as we show in table 2.8,
underlying most of the propositions is the driving concept of change being
associated with resource transfer and or autonomy.
Table 2.8
	 Propositions on post-acquisition change and themes
No Proposition Theme
6 The level of aggregate change will
increase from Preservation acquisitions,
through Holding, Symbiotic to
Absorption acquisitions.
7 Preservation acquisitions will retain Level of change against
more senior executives than Absorption resource transfer and
acquisitions autonomy
8 Changes in communication will be
positively associated with the level of
change in the acquired company
9 Informal communications will be Type of communication
positively associated with change in
acquired companies.
against amount of change*
10 Absorption and Symbiotic acquisitions
will exhibit more change in information
systems information technology than
Holding and Preservation acquisitions. Change against resource
11 Absorption and Symbiotic acquisition
will exhibit more change in personnel
policies than Holding and Preservation
acquisitions.
transfer
12 Different acquisition types will exhibit A discriminator of
significant differences in changes to
compensation and benefits.
acquisition type
* This is an interesting extension of the communications literature in a post-
acquisition setting, but takes us away from the bigger picture. It will therefore
not be pursued.
From this point of view, we do not propose to pursue each proposition but rather
concentrate upon change being associated with resource transfer and / or
autonomy at the aggregate level and for items such as change in senior
management. Had we pursued the individual propositions, we would not escape
the problem of fragmentation.
To overcome the fragmentation issue, we turned to the turnaround literature for
a more coherent approach and as a provider of further insight into change during
a crisis. By using their constructs we hope to piece together a more systematic
treatment of change across the four acquisition styles. The results from this
treatment are contained in Chapter five.
2.6 Managing Executives and change
Shrivastava (1986) sees a crucial task of post merger integration to be the re-
establishment of strategic leadership in the acquired organisation. This tends to
suggest that the chief executive has an important role to play in the post-
acquisition period. We might also be justified in looking specifically at the chief
executive as he has been characterised as 'a breed apart' from the top
management team with strong support for his distinctiveness in the area of
corporate influence (Norburn, 1989: 12).
There are a number of studies that seek to show that the chief executive does
make a difference to the fortunes of a company. Beatty and Zajac (1987) show
that share prices often react negatively when a chief executive is changed. Other
studies have linked the performance of acquired companies to the departure of
chief executives and show that when these executives leave, company
performance can be affected (Cannella and Hambrick, 1993). An explanation for
this may be the loss of valuable expertise (Walsh, 1988).
In a broader context the question is whether leaders can influence performance
outcomes or whether they are constrained by internal and external resource
exchanges and the power of institutionalised norms and values. Romanelli and
Tushman (1988) argue that, when environments are changing and or
performance outcomes are low or declining, leadership's primary task is to
intervene. In their discussion of the metamorphosis model they discuss how
major changes in environmental conditions or sustained poor performance can
disrupt ongoing relationships and lead to major reorientations and radical
changes. In their view, leaders have their most profound and important influence
on organisational outcomes where pressure for change emerges. Virany,
Tushman and Romanelli (1992) observed that the majority of organisational
transformations occurred after the succession of a chief executive and this
finding has received support from Romanelli and Tushman (1994: 1158) who
found that the succession of a chief executive significantly and positively
influenced revolutionary transformation.
Clearly pressure for change is evident in turnaround situations and here we find
that the chief executive is of considerable importance in determining corporate
performance. 'Most turnaround situations require new chief executives, since
inadequate top management is the single most important factor leading to
decline and stagnation' (Slatter 1984). 'New top managers were required in 73%
of Bibeault's (1982) successful turnarounds, by 87% of Slatter's (1984) and by
65°0 of Grinyer et al.'s (1988). Often managers recruited from outside the
organisation are necessary to achieve the changes required for a turnaround, as
insiders are reluctant to impose radical changes' (Whittington, 1993: 122).
The implication here is that the chief executive does make a difference and in
Grinyer, Mayes and McKiernan's (1988) study of sharpbenders between 1971
and 1979, they record that the chief executive was changed in 65°0 of cases. In
their words he is seen as a major trigger for change; 'he is appointed because he
is expected to be a potent force for change' (Grinyer, Mayes and McKiernan
1988: 54 - 55)
The Managing Executive plays a prominent role in the post-acquisition period
and, although it is beyond the scope of the research to demonstrate that
executive action affects performance outcomes, it is enough to be believe that
they may have significant influence on the acquired company.
2.6.1 Insiders versus Outsiders
The turnaround literature shows clearly that the appointment of a new chief
executive is strongly associated with change ( Slatter, 1984, Bibeault, 1982,
Grinyer, Mayes and McKiernan, 1988, Whittington, 1991). This implies that
there is a significant difference between the incumbent management and new
management in terms of changes that are made to the company.
There is a long running debate about the difference between Insiders and
Outsiders. These labels initially applied to differences between managers
promoted from within a firm (organisational Insiders), and those brought in
from outside (organisational Outsider). Findings at the chief executive level are
quite consistent with organisational Outsiders tending to replace more
subordinates and making more changes than Insiders.
In a widely cited study of school system superintendents, Carlson (1962) found
that organisational Outsiders instituted more organisational changes than
organisational Insiders, whom he described as place bound and long tenured.
Further studies (Grusky, 1960; Helmich, 1971) support this pattern among chief
executive successions in the USA. An important study by Helmich and Brown
(1972) tested Grusky's findings in a major study of 208 companies. They found
that organisational Outsiders made more executive changes than Insiders and
that this pattern persisted even when they controlled for successor type, firm
Proposition 13.: Organisational Outsiders will make more changes
than Organisational Insiders
performance, size, growth and base technology. Helmich's later studies also
support his earlier findings.
Gabarro's study (1987), of senior executives in the US taking charge of
subsidiary companies, has extended this work by showing that there are clear
differences between Industry Outsiders and Industry Insiders in terms of the
scope and speed of changes made to their new company. However, Gabarro has
found that Industry Insiders make more changes more quickly than Industry
Outsiders. In this sense Insiders can be said to take charge more quickly than
Outsiders (Gabarro, 1987: 48). Although at first sight this seems contradictory
with the earlier studies, we should remember that Industry Insiders will include
some organisational Outsiders. Indeed Gabarro argues that most Organisational
Outsiders are in fact Industry Insiders.
The thesis will seek to extend the literature on the Insider Outsider dichotomy
by examining their actions in an acquisition context. Based upon the consistent
findings for other contexts, cited above, we would expect Outsiders to make
more changes than Insiders in a corporate acquisition setting.
Gabarro's (1987) work, focusing upon an industry boundary for distinguishing
between Insiders and Outsiders, has highlighted a major difference with prior
literature which used an organisational distinction. This seems to account for his
findings appearing to differ from previous studies. To establish at which 'level'
of analysis the distinction of Insiders / Outsiders is more closely associated
which post-acquisition change, we shall examine various definitions of the
Insider Outsider dichotomy.
Proposition 14.:The Outsider Insider distinction will be more
pronounced, in terms of the amount of change, for
an organisational rather than an industry
definition.
2.7 The timing of post-acquisition change
The predominance of the Resource-Based View is a reflection of the dramatic
change in the competitive environment of the 1990s, qualifying previous
structural approaches, such as Porter's competitive forces framework. As Stalk,
Evans and Shulman (1992) observe, the 'war of position' has become a 'war of
movement'. Indeed they emphasise the dynamics of behaviour where rapidity is
an important competence.
Most post-acquisition studies have a curiously static quality. Whilst they agree
on the importance of timing, at best they just surface the managerial dilemma of
whether change should take place rapidly or slowly (Searby, 1969, McCann and
Gilkey, 1988, Business International, 1992). Exponents of the rapid approach
argue that there is an expectation of change (Searby, 1969: 10-11) and speed
will minimise disruption. Those arguing for a more cautious approach,
emphasise the value of learning (Mirvis and Marks, 1992) and the costs of
making mistakes: by attempting to change too much too fast, companies often
'shoot themselves in the foot' (Yunker, 1983).
Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991) work which is overtly processual in nature
recognises that 'the timing of implementation is important' (Haspeslagh and
Jemison, 1991: 49-50). They identify a stage setting phase and for their
acquisitions types suggest broad sequences of tasks. For them the issue of
timing appears to be most important for Absorption acquisitions where the
emphasis of change should be upon the timing of moves (Haspeslagh and
Farquhar, 1994: 432). However Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991) treatment of
timing is vague. They do not make it clear if stages overlap, when they start and
for how long they last. To an extent there is some information provided with
each case study but there is no sense of whether this is representative of such
acquisition types in general.
The timing of changes might well be associated with integration design.
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) point out the inherent contradiction of resource
transfer and autonomy and we could conclude that where this is most intense,
namely in Symbiotic acquisitions, change will be difficult and more time
consuming. Where the acquired company's autonomy is less, we would expect
change to occur more rapidly. We might also expect the speed of change to be
linked to the amount of change intended so that high resource transfer would be
positively associated with change.
Proposition 15. :The speed with which change is started will be
most rapid in Absorption acquisitions, then
Holding, Symbiotic and finally Preservation
acquisitions.
Apart from two studies discussed below (Bragado, 1992 and Baden - Fuller and
Boschetti, 1996), there is no attempt to systematically examine the sequence of
change in the post-acquisition period. To assist us in this approach the taking
charge provides valuable insights.
2.7.1 Waves of change
Gabarro's study (1985) of 14 management successions in the US brings the
importance of chief executives in leading change together with a time
dimension. Following on from Kotter's (1982) work, which identifies the
important role of the general manager in bringing about change, Gabarro (1985)
focuses in particular upon what changes the Managing Executive makes. His
analysis shows quite distinct patterns of activity following the appointment of a
new manager. Within the taking charge period, which could range from two, to
two and half years, Gabarro identified three waves of changes. The first major
wave of change occurred after 3 months followed by a lull in activity and then a
further and larger wave of change happening towards the middle of the second
year. Thereafter the amount of change subsided and largely consisted of fine
tuning. His model is shown in figure 2.6
Figure 2.6	 Average number of Organisational* changes per three-month
period following succession
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Source: Gabarro (1987: 16)
Organisational changes are a composite measure of personnel and
	 structural
changes (Gabarro, 1987: 15)
It is worth noting that although Gabarro considers a wide range of variables,
(Gabarro, 1987 Appendix C: 177), he confines his analysis to just structural and
personnel changes". We feel this is a rather partial view and that a more
comprehensive picture of the post-acquisition phase would be of value.
Gabarro has also incorporated some sense of magnitude into his units of change.
For instance he takes the view that a change, in a minor structural unit, counts as
one unit of change, whereas a change in a major structural unit counts as two
units. Such unitisation is not without its difficulties. Nevertheless, Gabarro's
(1987) waves of change provide a useful insight into the patterns of change that
may be apparent in the post-acquisition phase.
Later papers, such as that of Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991) have also
commented that research into executive leadership is static in its treatment of
time. They focus their attention upon the temporal features of an executive's
tenure in a specific assignment; namely the assignment of chief executive. They
also discover 'waves' or 'seasons' of action but their perspective is more long
term and thus provides a context for Gabarro's (1987) work. In essence, they
view the initial succession as a period of organisational reorientation followed
by long periods of incremental change or convergence. In essence, Gabarro's
(1987) observation that nearly all actions taken by managers occur within the
first two and a half years of succession fits into the reorientation period after
14 He feels these can be unitised, aggregated and graphed
Proposition 16. :Patterns of change in the post-acquisition phase
will be similar to those for taking charge.
which the chief executives commitment to his paradigm continues to grow in
strength and any changes are just fine tuning.
The importance of Gabarro's (1987) work is that it has established that there are
clear waves of activity when a chief executive takes charge and this thesis will
seek to establish whether this clear pattern is evident in post-acquisition
management in the UK.
We believe that Gabarro's (1987) work on taking charge will provide useful
insights into the process of taking charge of an acquisition. However we should
recall that Gabarro's (1987) model is universal in that it does not distinguish
between different types of companies whereas we are examining four distinct
types of acquisition integration. We may well find therefore that there are
significant differences between these integration types in terms of the taking
charge process.
It is important to note that there are significant differences between Gabarro's
(1987) study and the acquisition context. Firstly, Gabarro has studied primarily
division presidents with a few functional and general managers in the US.
Although at face value there may be similarities with executives taking charge
of an acquisition, our research is based in the UK, the executives taking charge
may not be the equivalent of division presidents, and most importantly,
Gabarro's executives are taking charge of previously owned subsidiary
companies whereas our executives are managing acquisitions under quite new
conditions. This thesis therefore seeks to extend Gabarro's work into the area of
taking charge of acquisitions rather than providing a critique of the taking
charge process itself.
2.7.2 Speed of change
Whilst the dynamics of change have assumed a new importance, a important
component is the speed of change. As Stalk (1989) observes from his study of
manufacturing cycles: 'Time has become the overarching measurement of
performance'. The effects of time-based advantage are devastating; quite
simply, American companies are losing leadership of technology and
innovation'. It is reasonable to enquire therefore whether change happens
rapidly in an acquisition context as one could see a competitive advantage in
being able to acquire a company and quickly realise added value.
Very little has been written on the speed of change in an acquisition context and
those studies have tended to be isolated case studies which focus upon the
duration of integration rather than when the changes are started. Of those few
articles, one by Bragado (1992), reports the results of a survey by AT Kearney
of 100 top executives throughout Europe. Out of 25 listed items, choosing the
correct integration speed was in the top four success factors and the executives
commented that it was often too fast or too slow. Their findings are interesting
in that nationality is a critical factor in acquisition integration speed, with
acquisition integration in the US and UK being the most rapid. They also
suggest a broad four stage process with indicative timings for each stage
depending upon the compatibility between the two companies. Unfortunately as
with many consultancy papers, little weight can be attributed to these findings as
few details are given in terms of how the different nationalities in their sample
distort timings and their measurement items such as culture. There is no
consideration of how their four stages might overlap and whether these stages
are the same for all nationalities, industries and acquisition types.
Baden - Fuller and Boschetti (1996) use a case study approach to examine
integration speeds for two mergers. Again the focus is upon the duration of
integration for different functions of the businesses rather than any consideration
of when changes were started. As they themselves remark, 'using two case
studies cannot allow researchers the confidence that can be gained from a larger
more comprehensive study' (Baden - Fuller and Boschetti, 1996: 109). From
my own work (Angwin, 1995) there is a preliminary attempt to examine when
changes take place in the post-acquisition phase. This survey of acquisitions in
the UK between 1991 and 1994 reveals a complex picture of change initiation
which takes place very rapidly indeed. This thesis will seek to build upon these
preliminary results and show that relative to Gabarro's work on taking charge of
subsidiaries, taking charge of acquisitions is altogether much more rapid.
Proposition 17. :The speed of taking charge of an acquisition is
greater than for taking charge of subsidiary
companies
Clearly we are concerned with when changes are initiated in the post-acquisition
phase rather than tracking the duration of change. Whilst this would be an
interesting extension to this research, it is worth reviewing a debate on how long
change takes.
We should not forget that we are looking at four distinct types of acquisition
integration and we may well find significant differences between them in terms
of the speed in which changes are initiated.
Contrary to the processualist's view that change must take a long time, there has
been a recent reaction questioning whether all implementation is complicated
and difficult and suggesting that it can indeed take place rapidly. As Eccles puts
it, 'are we prancing through waves or wading through treacle?' (Eccles, 1994:
15). In an acquisition context the Financial Times (23.08.90) quotes the chief
operating officer of Hanson plc as saying, 'Three months after we arrive (in a
newly acquired company) there must be significant changes; after that, newness
is a wasting asset' (Eccles, 1994: 26). Eccles suggests that rapid change will
occur under crisis where there is a clear need for dramatic action. This is not to
deny the difficulty of change but in crisis conditions such as turnarounds, rapid
change is not only feasible but in many cases critical to the organisation's very
survival (S latter, 1984)
Whilst acquired companies often face a less bleak future, they are also often
subject to substantial change and we may draw useful comparisons between the
two activities with changes in the turnaround literature informing our
understanding of change in the post-acquisition phase. It is worth noting that
turnaround studies list a substantial number of factors important in a variety of
situations, and also indicate a clear sense of priority with which changes are
implemented, but there is no sense of the timing of changes. A comparison of
speeds of change between turnarounds and acquisitions is beyond the scope of
this thesis.
2.8 Conclusion
The literature on the post-acquisition phase is largely fragmented. Haspeslagh
and Jemison (1991) however, stand out in their attempt to provide a unifying
framework for understanding the post-acquisition phase. Nevertheless, their
conceptualisation of an acquisition typology has not been tested, and their
processual perspective has tended to understate the actual changes that take
place in the post-acquisition phase.
This thesis will extend Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991) work by applying it to
the population of acquisitions in the UK. We shall do this in Chapter four and
consider whether their concentration upon value creating acquisitions in
particular is warranted. This will provide empirical evidence in support of, or
against, the theory that acquisitions experiencing resource transfer will be more
successful than those which do not. From this examination we shall be able to
comment upon the value of the Resource based view in an acquisition context.
Post acquisition change has tended to be handled in a partial way. We will add
to the literature by adopting a more comprehensive view of post-acquisition
change and shall draw upon the related turnaround literature for suggestions of
important variables to consideration. We shall adopt Haspeslagh and Jemison's
(1991) contingency framework as a useful typology. However we recognise its
weaknesses of being untested and concentrating upon the impediments and
facilitators of change at the expense of actual post-acquisition changes. By
concentrating upon the changes that actually take place in each acquisition type,
we will be able to test the robustness of their post-acquisition typology and so
extend their work. The nature and volume of these changes, by acquisition type,
will be examined in Chapter five, and their timing will be discussed in Chapter
eight.
Acquisitions are an example of substantial strategic change in the acquired
company. The related turnaround literature points to the critical importance of
the managing executive in such situations and this is emphasised in the crisis
literature. By adopting a managing executive focus, we intend to build upon the
well established Insider Outsider debate which suggests significantly different
approaches to handling change. We shall extend this debate, in Chapter seven,
by examining the Insider Outsider dichotomy in a post-acquisition arena.
This thesis follows in the general trend in strategic management by
concentrating upon the implementation and process issues of the post-
acquisition phase. However the majority of work in this area has derived from a
processual school which focuses upon the impediments and facilitators of
change rather than the changes themselves and also assumes that change is
always an immensely complex and protracted process. This view point has
stemmed from work on companies in mature, stable industries. Where
industries are in much faster moving, dynamic and fluid environments, change
is more frequent needs to occur more rapidly. By concentrating upon
acquisitions, we are focusing upon crisis situations with radical change. To an
extent then, this thesis may redress the balance in strategic management towards
researching rapid change.
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3.1 Introduction
This introduction to the methodology and data chapter will show how we have
structured our discussion of our choice of methodology and the issues that arose
in carrying out the field research.
Section 3.2 observes that the dominant methodologies in the acquisition
literature show a certain polarity of approaches between in-depth case studies
and large scale surveys which we attribute to the disciplines from which the
enquiries have originated. In Section 3.3 we suggest that such polarised methods
have limitations and that a strong case has been made in the social sciences for a
hybrid approach to overcome these failings. To the best of our knowledge the
explicit application of a hybrid approach has yet to be found in the field of
acquisitions. Section 3.4 then explains how this method has been
operationalised in terms of a postal survey and complementary interviews.
Section 3.5 shows how the questionnaire was designed and piloted and Section
3.6 discusses the statistical tests used in analysing the return data. The criteria
for selecting interviewees and analysing the transcripts are reviewed in Section
3.7.
Section 3.8 deals with the actual data and puts it into the context of acquisitions
in the UK from 1987 - 1996. There are a number of potentially serious problems
associated with publicly available data which can lead to erroneous perceptions
of actual acquisition activity. These are discussed and lead into a review of the
actual response rate and the issue of non-response bias.
3.2 Methods used in acquisition studies
The literature review has shown that there are a large number of disciplines and
perspectives with bearing upon the acquisition domain. With each of these
disciplines tends to come a preferred methodology, which leads to striking
differences in approach. For instance, performance studies prefer cross-sectional
surveys with large numbers of acquisitions, such as Franks and Harris (1989)
study of 1,445 targets, Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) study of 526 firms. In
comparison, studies wishing to assess the impact of mergers on employees
prefer the use of the in-depth case, such as Mirvis and Marks (1992) examining
just one merger in great detail, or comparing two cases such as Larsson (1990)
on integration, or Buono and Bowditch (1989) on culture clash.
Cross-sectional surveys, although widely used, have been subject to criticism.
Whilst an appropriate means of assessing probabilistic relationships of certain
features over the widest possible population of observations, they are incapable
of dealing with complex, conjunctural causal arguments (Ragin, 1989: 69). This
is certainly apparent in the context of acquisitions, where the complexity of the
phenomena has defied meaningful explanation at the aggregate level. For
instance the debate over whether relatedness has a positive affect on
performance has not been resolved despite many substantial surveys. The result
has been for smaller scale surveys looking at more tightly defined issues in a
contingency approach.
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In-depth case studies have seemed to promise to overcome the limitations of
cross-sectional surveys as they are well suited to identifying invariant patterns in
small sets of cases. They are very sensitive to human agency and social
processes in general (the historical process) whereas the variable approach lends
itself to more structural explanations. Whilst in-depth case studies can capture
the richness of an acquisition and are particularly effective in a longitudinal
context for studying change, they have their own limitations. They remain
highly specific in nature and lack generalisability.
In response to this criticism there has appears to be a move towards the use of
greater numbers of cases (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991, use seven cases) and
for research in general this may be a current driver for the rise in team research.
In addition there have been secondary level studies which amalgamate large
numbers of primary studies to achieve some sort of generalizability or case
synthesis from a rich bank of cases (see Larsson, 1989). Whilst this seems an
excellent idea in principle, these attempts have been largely inhibited by lack of
compatibility between individual case studies. The difficulties of meta-analysis
are fully explored in Larsson' s (1989) case survey of synergy potentials.
To increase the number of cases under scrutiny, compromises have had to be
made. One sacrifice has tended to be the longitudinal comprehensiveness of
research as a series of less demanding cross-sectional approaches over time have
become more evident. Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) may be cited as an
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example of various longitudinal cases by different authors being coalesced and
further case research being conducted by cross-sectional interviewing at
different time periods. Another sacrifice tends to be the concentration on fewer
numbers of subjects within a case thus reducing the richness of the study.
Whilst there are variations on the theme above, until relatively recently, the
majority of studies could be readily placed within the categories of cross-
sectional surveys or in-depth case studies. However with the increasing
appreciation of the complexity of the area under study, there is now a need for
more sophisticated hybrid methods. Indeed, Ragin (1989) observes that it would
now seem a logical development for the combination of these two methods and
cites a number of examples of combined strategiesl.
The case for a hybrid methodology will be examined below but we should
always bear in mind that the method is subservient to the enquiry. 'Methodology
is the slave and not the master of what we do. The big themes are what matter'
(Pettigrew, 1996).
I Ragin (1989) cites Piage's (1975) 'Agrarian Revolution: Social Movement and export
Agriculture in the Underdeveloped World' where interpretive case studies are used to support
the findings of quantitative investigations. Four types of agrarian system are identified and
one case is used to illustrate each type. The cases provide a degree of assurance that the
correlations observed are in some sense real. Ragin (1989) also cites a study by Stephens
(1979) which we review in section 3.3.2 of our text.
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3.3 The case for a hybrid method
Whilst the adoption of a hybrid method appears to be intuitively attractive, we
should first examine the apparent barrier to its adoption. Underlying the strong
fundamental adherence to cross-sectional surveys or in-depth case studies is a
fierce philosophical debate. We will sketch out this debate in the following sub-
section and seek to show that methodology is becoming sufficiently divorced
from its philosophical underpinnings to allow researchers to adopt hybrid
approaches.
3.3.1 The philosophical dimension
At the philosophical level there is a fierce debate about the relative merits of
positivism which has been linked to quantitative method and phenomenology
which has been linked to qualitative methodology.
Essentially positivism is about the scientific method; that the world is external
and objective, that the observer is independent and that science is value-free. In
this positivist paradigm the researcher should focus on the facts, look for
causality and fundamental laws, reduce phenomena to simplest elements,
formulate hypotheses and then test them. The methods used in this paradigm
concentrate on operationalising concepts so they can be measured and taking
large samples. In essence, surveys fit this positivist approach2.
2 This is not to say that all quantitative approaches are positivist
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Phenomenology on the other hand takes the view that 'the world and 'reality' are
not objective and exterior, but that they are socially constructed and given
meaning by people' (Husserl, 1946, in Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe, 1991:
24). The social scientist therefore should not gather facts and measure how often
certain patterns occur, but appreciate the different constructions and meanings
that people place upon their experience. In this phenomenological paradigm
the world is socially constructed, the observer is part of what is observed and
science is driven by human interests. The researcher should focus on meanings,
try to understand what is happening, look at the totality of each situation and
develop ideas through induction from data. The methods used tend towards the
use of multiple methods to establish different views of phenomena and the use
of small samples which can be investigated in-depth or over time.
The purpose of outlining the two philosophies is that at the philosophical level
they are very distinct and examine quite different questions; the positivists or
functionalist paradigm emphasises systematic procedures to search for
regularities in the social world and for causal relationships among the variables
which make up that world. The phenonmenologists or interpretive approach
argues that the social world can only be understood from the perspective of its
participants and that to understand the social world the researcher needs to
obtain first hand knowledge of the subject under investigation (Burrell and
Morgan, 1979).
In the words of Burrell and Morgan (1979), these two paradigms 'reflect
alternative realities and mutually exclusive ways of viewing the world'. This
polarity has resulted in a fierce debate and accounts for many studies adopting
one extreme position or the other.
More recently however, researchers have tended to be less extreme in their use
of method and have tried to combine the two approaches in a hybrid
methodology. This has caused Bryman (1989) amongst others to question the
link between epistemology and method, as methods now appear more
autonomous than was first realised. On this basis it would seem that 'method
does not bring a trail of epistemological presuppositions in their wake' (Bryman,
1989: 253). 'Arguments about epistemological distinctiveness of qualitative and
quantitative research should not be a barrier to the fusion of methods' (Bryman,
1989: 254). A blend of methods offers considerable advantages.
3.3.2 Advocates of a hybrid methodology
During the quantitative qualitative debate, many scholars focused upon the
short comings and advantages of each approach. However it soon became clear
that each paradigm appeared to offer something to the other. The arguments
then tended to move towards convincing purists to adopt elements of 'rival'
methods. For instance Mintzberg (1979) points out the importance of adding a
qualitative dimension to quantitative research as this is more fully able to deal
with the complexities of social research.
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Mintzberg (1979: 587) suggests that 'while systematic data create the foundation
for our theories, it is the anecdotal data that enables us to do the building'. 'We
uncover all kinds of relationships in our "hard" data, but it is only through the
use of this "soft" data that we are able to "explain" them'. Mintzberg calls for
"direct research" which recognises the complexity of organisations. In direct
research the researcher gets out into the field to 'measure many elements in real
organisational terms, supported by anecdote, instead of analysing a pair of
variables in perceptual terms from a distance'. This approach allows the
researcher to uncover additional issues and to understand the processes at work.
Mintzberg cites an interesting example of this happening when a doctoral
student in France entered a French company to document its long range
planning procedures to find the 'right way to plan'. After a short time in the
company he came to realise that planning really served as a tool by which top
management centralised power. This discovery required peripheral vision and
creativity and would not have been uncovered by a variable-oriented approach.
This example illustrates Mintzberg's point that a variable-oriented approach can
be severely deficient as it will tend to miss the issues of intuition and personality
which are 'the very lifeblood of the organisation itself.
Another example of a researcher who came to realise the value of a more
qualitative approach is Piore's (1979) enquiry into the effects of factory floor
manning levels. He started from formal econometric bases intending to infer
quantitative estimates about the parameters of behaviour on the basis of
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individual observations. He developed a detailed questionnaire in which the
answers could be easily coded but, in the process of personally administering
the questionnaire, became aware that the issue he was investigating was merely
a facet of a much more important underlying process. His economic issue of
manning table usage was only a rough guide to factory layout and cost, and
actual manning was arrived at experimentally. Manning table usage was much
more a factor of social interactions and adjustments than economic factors. Piore
therefore used open-ended interviews and participant observation to discover
how economic participants think about the world.
The advances in research that sprang from a mixed methodology gave rise to a
distinct tradition of using multiple methods. This tradition has a number of
names such as convergent methodology, multimethod multitrait, convergent
validation or triangulation (Jick, 1979: 602). This methodology clearly views
qualitative and quantitative methods as complementary and that the mixing of
methods is desirable given the strengths and weaknesses found in single method
designs.
These earlier studies suggest that there is one right approach to a problem and
this thinking is rooted in the idea of the incompatibility of epistemologies. There
were some however who felt that qualitative and quantitative methodologies
could be complementary. For example, in triangulation there is a 'combination
of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon' (Denzin, 1978 in Jick,
1979: 602). The aim is that 'more than one method should be used in the
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validation process to ensure that the variance reflected that of the trait and not of
the method' (lick, 1979: 602). For example the effectiveness of a leader may be
studied by interviewing the leader, observing his behaviour and evaluating
performance records. Through the use of three distinct methods a convergent
picture can be produced. Triangulation can also capture a more holistic and
contextual portrayal of the units under study. The use of multiple measures may
uncover some unique variance which otherwise may have been neglected by
single methods. In this role qualitative methods play an especially prominent
part in shedding light upon quantitative data.
Whilst there are limitations3 with the triangulation method, it is an example of
several methods working together. Harrigan (1983) has also helped to diffuse
the tension that built up over this issue by showing how the debate has clearly
moved away from epistemology towards methodology. She characterises the
qualitative quantitative dimensions as 'fine-grained' and 'coarse grained'
methods existing on the same continuum. By looking just at methods it is easy
for Harrigan (1983) to envisage a 'medium-grained' method which combines the
generalisability of cross-grained methods with the detail of fine grained
methods. However her justification is that neither extreme is adequate for
researching business strategy as the coarse grained studies do not incorporate
intra-industry competitive nuances well and fine grained studies may not be
3 Replication is exceedingly difficult if not impossible with a mixed method package. There is
also the problem of one method being stronger or more appropriate to the task. If each
method is not represented in a significant way then the purpose of triangulation is subverted.
There is also a basic assumption that the weakness in each single method will be
compensated by the counter-balancing strengths of another (Jick, 1979).
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externally valid. In suggesting hybrid methodology, Harrigan (1983) suggests
multiple sites, multiple data sources and intricate sample designs. In her studies
(Harrigan, 1980, 1983), she used industry potentials variables to stratify
industries for field interviews4.
With the distancing of method from epistemology, there has been a proliferation
of methods and many typologies. A recent one by Cresswell (1994) is as
follows;
1. Quantitative
2. Qualitative
3. Two phase design
4. Dominant - less dominant design
5. Mixed method
This typology explicitly acknowledges that there is often a sequence in which
each method might be used and also that the emphasis on each may vary. For
instance in the Dominant - less dominant design we might have the quantitative
testing of a theory followed by a small set of qualitative interviews. The
expectation here is that we can elaborate, enhance or illustrate results by using
another method. Cresswell (1994) gives as an example of this design, a
4 Harrigan believes that this method benefits from generalizability (I assume because she is
interviewing groups of companies within each industry she has selected) and replicability
(she appears to have achieved this at the macro level) although see footnote 3.
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quantitative survey in Africa which tried to correlate the ownership of fridges
with the incidence of infant diarrhoea. No correlation was found but when
interviewing (qualitative) took place, it was discovered that those families
owning fridges used them to make ice to supplement family income and not for
the storage of milk!
There are more promising examples of hybrid methodology where the cross-
sectional survey and detailed cases complement each other rather than expose
each others weakness. Stephens (1979, cited in Ragin, 1989) The transition
from capitalism to socialism' embodies coarse national data analysis and a
detailed case analysis. The distinctive feature here is that this study is more
integrative as he moves back and forth between types of analysis. The statistical
analysis highlights structural issues without showing any concrete mechanism or
human agency whilst the cases give attention to the historical process.
Miles and Huberman (1994) take the idea of two stage models further with
suggestions of several stage models leading to continuous interaction with one
method continuously informing and extending the other.
The complexity of combining strategies in the way Miles and Huberman (1994)
suggests presents formidable problems and one wonders with multiple case
studies whether one can really get away with small numbers. A more radical
concept to overcome some of these problems is provided by Ragin (1989) who
suggests a synthetic strategy based upon Boolean algebra which allows large
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numbers of cases and embodies a strict comparative logic of different
conditions. This is an attractive notion but, for the purposes of the thesis, takes
us away from our main focus.
In summary, hybrid methods have begun to receive widespread acceptance, not
withstanding philosophical 'barriers'. They serve to overcome the traditional
limitations of case based and survey oriented methods by allowing one method
to inform another, discovering paradox or contradiction and extending enquiries.
In particular hybrid methods overcome common method variance and this can
only lead to more rigorously verified research and much 'richer' studies.
3.4 Research Design
3.4.1 A two-phase design
The hybrid methodology is still relatively new in the acquisition field with
researchers still expanding the boundaries of the single method rather than
openly adopting a mix. In particular, the post-acquisition phase has been largely
researched by in-depth case studies which suffer from the criticisms mentioned
above, namely that they are very context specific and non-generalizable.
Mindful of Pettigrew's (1996) warning at the beginning of this chapter, we
should consider the research question we wish to answer. We are predominantly
interested to know what changes take place in acquired companies in the UK
after acquisition. Yin's (1994) recommendation for research questions which
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focus upon 'what' and 'how much' is to adopt the survey method. This will
enable us to form a generalised picture of what changes take place in the post-
acquisition phase of acquisitions in the UK.
A secondary consideration for the research is when the changes are initiated and
the assumption here is that a survey can capture such information adequately.
Interestingly Yin (1994) does not consider 'when' in his recommendations. An
accurate 'clock time' based picture would be best gathered by longitudinal case
based research. There are two problems with this suggestion. The first as
mentioned above is the generalisability of the results from one or two cases5.
Secondly, from a practical point of view, it is virtually impossible to gain access
to an acquired company immediately after acquisition. Indeed most longitudinal
studies tend to take place some time after completion. This can have serious
implications for the depiction of change as we believe the majority of changes
are initiated very rapidly indeed and so not perceived directly. This may mean
that important factors are overlooked and is part of a general problem of
retrospection (see next paragraph). Perhaps for this reason studies to date have
concentrated on the duration of change rather than when it started.
By surveying respondents some time after the event we are clearly collecting
'perceptions of time' rather than 'measured time' which would be possible in a
longitudinal method. Whilst the longitudinal method might be superior in the
5 This problem could be partially tackled by using separate surveys over time.
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isolated case, our primary objective is to establish a picture for post-acquisition
change in general. We therefore felt that on this basis, advantages of the survey
outweigh the benefits of the longitudinal approach. Consensus about the timing
of key changes, although retrospective perceptions, are arguably more
meaningful to and about executives than recorded time°.
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) remark that the nature of knowledge about the
acquisition process is still low on the knowledge tree' and so their questions
were exploratory. This lack of academic cohesion has often been the rationale
for the use of in-depth case studies. We felt that these cases and related
literatures now highlight many issues which would benefit from testing by
survey.
The survey method on its own does have limitations, as pointed out above, in its
inability to take into account human agency. To enrich the findings of our
survey we carried out a number of targeted interviews (of extreme cases) to add
explanation and nuance to our findings. In crude terms the survey will supply
the 'what' and the interviews will supply the 'why'. In Cresswell's (1994)
terms, the survey represents the dominant method with interviews as
supplementary. However this depiction understates the degree of iteration
between the two methods as each serves to inform and reinforce the other.
6 If we adopt the view that executive perceptions of time are unreliable, we must question their
reliability on other issues as well, which would force us towards the observer role with only
our observations as 'true'. Not only would this invalidate a great deal of research but also
would not accord with respondent's 'informed' worlds. In other words, why single out time
as an unreliable variable?
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3.4.2 Use of Key informants
Our focus of attention both for the questionnaire survey and interviews is the
executive who manages the acquired company (hereafter referred to as
'Managing Executive'). As we are adopting a strategic view of change in the
post-acquisition phase and the Managing Executive is responsible for that
change and indeed part of his job is to articulate events to group management
and outside stakeholders, it seems reasonable to focus upon him as a key
informant. In particular, in the case of post-acquisition management, the
Managing Executive occupies a pivotal position between acquirer and acquiree.
One of Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991) main findings is the key importance of
the interface or 'gatekeeper', between acquired and acquiring companies. In
their view this is the key to unlocking value in the acquired company;
'gatekeepers are vital' (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991: 156). In our view the
Managing Executive is 'squarely in the middle' and in a prime position to
observe change to the acquired company. As Schweiger and Walsh (1990)
observe, the contact between merging organisations is greatest at the top.
Key informant research is often seen in strategic management studies, such as
Datta's (1991) survey of senior executives in 173 acquisitions to establish the
impact of organisational differences on post-acquisition performance;
Chatterjee, Lubatkin, Schweiger and Weber's (1992) survey of the top managers
in 198 acquired firms to establish a link between cultural differences between
top executive and shareholder gains; and Very, Lubatkin, Calori and Veiga's
(1997) survey of key informants in 396 recently acquired European companies
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to link relative standing and performance. The advantage of the key informant
approach is that it is an economical approach to gaining 'global data' on an
organisation (Bryman, 1989).
There are limitations and problems with all methods. Clearly we are attempting
to make claims about change in acquired companies and feel that a key
informant approach is appropriate. Nevertheless, others would suggest that this
lacks perspective. Bryman (1989: 49) has looked at the issue of using other
individuals to complement key informants and concludes these claims tend to be
exaggerated as later writers have suggested equivalence of measures for
researchers using 'two approaches to measurement (which) were not designed to
be equivalent' (Bryman, 1989: 49). In particular, Bryman (1989) suggests that
key informants are appropriate for strategic issues 'since it is usually a
company's overt strategy, as formulated by senior executives that is the object
of attention' (Bryman, 1989: 48).
3.5 The questionnaire survey
The main intention of the survey was to examine three main themes in the post-
acquisition phase. These themes were to extend the work of Haspeslagh and
Jemison (1991) into a UK context, to examine whether different types of senior
executive make a difference, and to examine the timing of changes in the taking-
charge process.
The survey consisted of 197 questions contained within 42 multiple questions in
a 12 page document (see Appendix 3.1). The questionnaire was organised into
seven parts:
Section A.	 General information about the respondent's position [8
questions]
Section B.	 Information about the acquired company's pre-acquisition health,
the reasons for the acquisition and perceptions of the success of
the deal. [18 questions]
Section C.	 The relationship between the acquired company and the new
parent in terms of Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991) contingency
framework and Goold and Campbell's (1987) strategic
management styles. [5 questions]
Section D.	 Details about the changes made in the acquired company. These
questions were grouped into six broad functions and a
miscellaneous category. [150 questions]
Section E.	 The Managing Executive's management style in a post-
acquisition context. [7 questions]
Section F.	 The new corporate structure. [5 questions]
Section G.	 The Managing Executive's background and experience.
[4 questions]
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The majority of the questionnaire consisted of enquiring about functional
change (see section 3.5.3 for further discussion). To investigate whether
respondents perceived whether changes had taken place, a series of closed
questions were employed for all change variables. To assess when the change
was perceived to have started, the respondent was then asked to indicate this in
months.
Most of the other questions in the survey, such as assessing the level of resource
transfer, level of autonomy, perceptions of success, relied upon a 5 point Likert
scale. This scale was chosen to give the respondent an opportunity to indicate a
degree of preference. A 5 point scale was chosen rather than a 7 point as the
absolute number of respondents was likely to be quite small and so the extra
level of detail would not be amenable to analysis. Indeed, Oppenheim (1992:
195) suggested that more complex scoring methods possess no advantage. An
uneven number of points was chosen as it was felt that respondents must be
allowed to adopt a neutral stance. With an even number they would be forced
into siding and this could lead to a distortion in results. Unfortunately this did
lead to a minor problem in ascribing our respondents to a specific acquisition
style based upon the Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) contingency framework.
With an autonomy score of three, respondents would lie on the border of two
styles 7 . In terms of locating respondents upon Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991)
7 Fortunately this was much less of an issue for the resource transfer axis as the use of three
variables meant that an exact score of three, no matter how calculated, was unlikely to result
in many cases falling precisely upon the borderline.
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matrix, we initially excluded borderline cases to achieve pure respondents for
each post-acquisition type. As the number of borderline cases is significant, we
then randomly assigned those cases between acquisition types s . There is also an
argument that there may be a positive bias on the autonomy scale 9 . For this
reason, we also aggregated the borderline cases with low autonomy cases for
comparison with high autonomy cases10.
Where the analysis departed from post-acquisition types, and focused upon the
underlying dimensions of the matrix, correlations were carried out with all
cases.
The remaining five questions were open as the enquiry was exploratory in
nature and any suggested responses would have diminished the quality of
answers. The number of open questions was kept to a minimum due to the
difficulties that can, and indeed in one question did, arise with coding.
3.5.1 Self assessment
The strategic management literature is replete with examples of self-
administered questionnaires being used to ascertain the perceptions of key
8 In a small number of instances where there are insufficient pure observations for an
acquisition type, particularly in the Symbiotic category, randomly assigned cases have been
used. This has been noted in the text.
9 I am grateful to Professor Peter Grinyer and Dr. David Faulkner (1998) for this observation.
10 Such incorporation of the mid-point is recommended in Jokoda et al. (1951)
3-150
informants, frequently top management. For instance, in the Strategic
Management Journal alone, there are many articles targeting CEOs such as
Walsh's (1988) study on top management turnover, Norburn's (1989) study on
the chief executive as a breed apart, Datta's (1991) on organisational fit and
acquisition performance, Johnson, Hoskisson and Hitt's (1993) on the
involvement of board's of directors involvement in restructuring, and more
recently Powell and Dent-Micallef (1997) on information technology as
competitive advantage. The prevalence of this method of data gathering gives
credence to its efficiency and value. However, the following constraints / limits
are often raised and ought to be borne in mind in assessing our results.
i) There is a practical issue of whether the questionnaire was filled in by the
intended recipient. Whilst we cannot verify this absolutely, we can say that
every respondent had been telephoned and appeared genuinely interested in the
exercise. There were more personal questions towards the end of the
questionnaire which would have been difficult to complete without the intended
respondent's knowledge, and in all our interviews, representing over quarter of
our respondents, all had clearly filled in the questionnaires themselves. This is
not to rule out that questionnaire could have been completed by an aide, but the
likelihood is small.
ii) As the questionnaire post-dates the acquisition period under consideration,
post-hoc rationalisation" may be a problem in terms of the way in which
executives perceive post-acquisition change. In particular, self perception may
be bolstered12.
iii) There may also be an issue of self-selection in terms of the success of the
acquisition. It may be that executives associated with successful acquisitions are
more likely to respond to questionnaires. Our questionnaire attempted to avoid
this issue by purposely focusing upon post-acquisition changes rather than
success issues. Potential success bias might also be mitigated by successful
executives not feeling the need to fill in questionnaires if they believe they
already master the subject whilst less successful executives may perceive the
need to learn.
iv) There is also the issue of survivor bias both in terms of surviving managing
executives and surviving acquisitions. It may be that where managing
11 The post-hoc rationalisation problem is particularly significant when examining the motives
leading up to acquisition as the subsequent managing executive of the acquired company
may not have been involved. Although 84°0 of our questionnaire respondents were heavily
involved in negotiating the deal, we have down played the data collected by questionnaire on
this issue. In the interviews we have largely avoided the problem by ensuring that
interviewees had been involved in the negotiations. This was the case for 18 out of the 20
interviews.
12 Issues such as post-hoc rationalisation could only be removed by a longitudinal approach
which was deemed to be infeasible for studying a population of acquisitions. In terms of the
bolstering of self perception, other executives might have been surveyed to reduce this
influence. However, we have experimented with sending multiple questionnaires to acquired
companies, but in all cases at most only received one in return. For this reason we felt
targeting the key informant would be the best way forward. A further check upon self
perception might have been supporting in-company documents. However, this again was
perceived as impracticable for a survey.
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executives tended to stay on, they may be more able to answer the questionnaire
than new executives brought in 13 . This might affect the distribution of responses
between acquisition types where incumbent managing executives tend to remain
in post and other acquisition types where new executives are brought in. The
questionnaire however was sent out at least two and a half years after
acquisition, so this issue may actually be muted in effect, as the taking charge
literature (Gabarro, 1987) suggests that the work of taking charge is complete by
this time. In terms of the actual number of acquisitions to survey, a small
percentage of acquisitions were acquired to be terminated and some failed very
some after acquisition. For this reason there will be a degree of survivor bias.
v) A further issue may be the interpretation made by the respondents of the
questions. Whilst the language of the questions has common but loose currency
amongst managers, where formal measures do not exist in organisations, for
instance in terms of 'extent of autonomy', there may be an issue of
interpretation.
3.5.2 Unit of analysis
The units of analysis are the changes that took place in the acquired company
post-acquisition. Clearly there is an issue of what constitutes a change. In terms
of 'what' changes we chose to examine, our items of change were derived from
13 There is also the issue in acquisition studies, of whether the respondent was really aware of
the purpose of the acquisition. In our case, 84 0 0 of respondents had been heavily involved in
acquisition negotiations.
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the post-acquisition literature and the related turnaround and taking-charge
literatures (see section 3.5.2 below).
The survey is about uncovering Managing Executives perceptions of change in
the post-acquisition phase. We are relying upon their perception of whether a
change has taken place and at what point this change began. It should be
emphasised that we are concerned about when change starts and we are not
looking at its duration.
3.5.3 Relating survey questions to themes
The full questionnaire is contained in Appendix 3.1. Rather than review the
questions in the order they appeared in the questionnaire, we shall examine the
questions from the perspective of the three main themes of our research.
3.5.3.1 Theme I:
	
Distribution of acquisition activity and success
To apply and extend Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991: 145) contingency
framework we needed to reconstruct their matrix. This has been achieved by
focusing upon its constituent axes. These are a 'need for organisational
autonomy' axis and a 'need for resource transfer' axis. In the previous chapter
(Chapter 2:10), it has already suggested that the 'need for' concept, or the
operationalisation of a dynamic, is unnecessary and can be omitted as there is a
high degree of coincidence in integration style throughout the acquisition
process for successful acquisitions (Haspeslagh and Farquhar, 1994: 435).
• The Organisational autonomy axis
Datta and Grant (1990) in their study of 129 acquisitions in the US
manufacturing sector, have examined the issue of autonomy measurement and
contrasted 18 items derived from Vancil's (1979) work with respondent's
perception of autonomy, based on one question with a 5 point Likert scale. They
found that Vancil's 18 items of autonomy were highly correlated (1-0.846,
p .001) with the respondent's perception of autonomy (Datta and Grant 1990:
35). Although autonomy may be a multi-dimensional construct, Datta and
Grant's (1990) seems to suggest that, in practice, it is highly correlated and can
be assessed with one question. On this basis we felt comfortable with assessing
the level of autonomy with question 15; 'To what extent do you feel that the
acquired company is autonomous from the parent?'
• The Strategic interdependence axis
The Strategic interdependence concept is based upon the notion of capability
transfer (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991:139-140). Haspeslagh and Jemison
(1991:139-140) operationalise this in terms of four categories; resource sharing,
transfer of functional skills, transfer of general management capability and
combination benefits. We employed the first three of Haspeslagh and Jemison's
four categories as these specifically relate to the concept of capability transfer.
We rejected Haspeslagh and Jemison's fourth category as this does not involve
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capability transfer; 'combination benefits are available automatically as a result
of the combination and are not related to capability transfer' (Haspeslagh and
Jemison, 1991: 141). These benefits would include items such as extra
borrowing capacity and added purchasing power. The fourth category was
therefore excluded as it would not have an impact upon the acquired company in
terms of change and would not add to our enquiry and indeed might show a
greater degree of interdependence than was actually warranted.
We adopted the other three categories in a slightly altered form (see questions
12 - 14) partly to operationalise them in terms of making sense to the respondent
(question 12) and also to home in on the core of Haspeslagh and Jemison's
intention. In question 12 we ask 'To what extent there has been a transfer of
physical assets' which is to enquire after the 'Resource sharing' item which
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991:140) define as 'the combination and
rationalisation of operating assets' 14•
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991:140) second category is the transfer of functional 
skills about which they say the following, 'Skills reside in individuals, groups of
people and their procedures and practices, not in assets. They can be transferred
only as people are moved across organisational boundaries or when information,
knowledge and know-how are shared' (Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991:140). We
14 Asset transfer was used as it was felt managing executives might identify more readily with
this than the concept of resource sharing, and in terms of surfacing the issue of the
'combination and rationalisation of operating assets'. However, whilst asset transfer might
indicate the combination of assets, it does tend to be one way, unlike 'sharing'.
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decided to separate the issues of people transfer and knowledge transfer which
are key to this category and impinge upon their third category.
Their third category is the transfer of general management capability which they
see as 'partly through direct substantive involvement in general management
decisions', or the 'instalment and use of systems, controls, budgets and plans'
(Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991:141). We felt this was also a part of knowledge
transfer and therefore decided to uncover these issues with question 13, 'To
what extent has there been a transfer of knowledge or information' and question
14, 'To what extent has there been a transfer of personnel'.
This adaptation and interpretation changes the grouping of their three measures
but as an aggregate measure of resource transfer, these items, which seek to
home in on the same issues, should lead to similar results.
To create an aggregate measure of resource transfer, or strategic inter-
dependence, we referred to Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) who were very
vague on the issue; 'The strategic interdependence variable was operationalised
as varying in density depending upon whether the main strategic capability
transfer involved 'one of our four items" (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991: 287).
In other words, whilst they recognise that 'any individual acquisition may
involve benefits from several of these sources', 'it is possible, and advisable, to
recognise one type of capability transfer as the dominant source of initial value
creation'(Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991: 141-2). To an extent we feel that
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concentrating upon just one source of benefit is a refinement and for the
purposes of the survey it seems reasonable to suggest that firms exhibiting high
levels of resource transfer on all three items are more interdependent than those
who exhibit high levels on fewer items. Indeed in a later article, Haspeslagh and
Farquhar (1994: 429) deal with this issue by contrasting acquisitions with low
and high densities of interdependence. We therefore decided to aggregate the
scores for each measure and average the result as a 'strong form' of strategic
inter-dependence. We also created a 'weak form' of strategic interdependence
with any one measure exhibiting a high score (see chapter 4.2.1).
By using questions 12 - 14 together with question 15 we can therefore locate our
respondents upon the Haspeslagh and Jemison matrix in weak and strong forms.
This exercise will identify the distribution of acquisitions in the UK within their
typology.
• Success measurement
Measuring success was not a major objective or theme of the questionnaire
survey or this thesis. However we thought it would be interesting to gain overall
perceptions of success for the current thesis and also to lay some foundations for
examining this issue in the future.
Overall perceptions of success are used extensively in the strategic management
and mergers and acquisition literature (Kitching, 1967 and 1974, Dess and
Robinson, 1984, Jemison and Sitkin, 1986, Dess, 1987, Hunt et al., 1986, Hunt,
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1990). Particularly in the mergers and acquisition context, there are significant
difficulties and problems associated with 'objective' measures in measuring
post-acquisition performance (Kitching, 1967, Porter, 1987), as the integration
of accounting systems obscures and distorts the acquired company's figures and
operational changes can be so substantial as to completely alter the nature of the
acquired company (Kitching, 1984: 130). To overcome limitations such as
these, Dess and Robinson (1984) argue for considered management judgement
as a reasonable alternative to 'objective' measurement.
Other than perceptions of overall success we also used items common in the
mergers and acquisition literature such as recovering cost of capital, group
profitability, achieving strategic objectives (Dess and Robinson, 1984), realising
synergies (Kitching, 1967) and achieving integration (Datta, 1991).
The resulting list of 11 items, which is question 9 in our questionnaire,
measured on a 5 point Likert scale, was not intended to become a composite
measure as clearly some items would have more relevance to some acquisitions
than others.
We shall be looking at these perceptual measures of success in terms of the
acquisition integration types and also the constructs of the Haspeslagh and
Jemison framework.
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3.5.3.2 Theme 2:	 Post-acquisition change
Despite the wealth of post-acquisition literature, there is little systematic
coverage of the changes that take place in the post-acquisition period. Table 2.7
in chapter two has shown that the few often rather dated studies which attempt a
comprehensive review of change are still rather patchy. Faced with the problem
of no template to defer to, we adopted a functional approach as most
organisations are so divided and such a format for our questionnaire would
strike a chord with most respondents. It is worth observing that later researchers
in this area have arrived at a similar conclusion (see Baden - Fuller and
Boschetti, 1996: 96).
In terms of the changes to examine within each functional area, we observed in
section 2.5.5 in chapter 2 that the acquisition literature is very fragmented in
nature. As a consequence we have looked further afield for suggestions of
change. In particular we have drawn heavily upon the turnaround literature with
emphasis upon the "Sharpbenders" (1988) study. Appendix 3.2 shows the
questions with their origin as they appeared in their functional groupings in the
questionnaire. The following paragraphs however dis-aggregate those groups
into the Sharpbenders variables referred to above.
• Sharpbenders variables
Section 2.5.5.1 in chapter 2 suggested that there are strong parallels between
acquisitions and turnarounds in terms of an organisational crisis followed by
actions to improve performance. Turnarounds however are companies that will
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fail if drastic remedial action is not taken. Clearly the same cannot be said of all
acquisitions. However, this portrayal of turnarounds was broadened in a study
entitled, `Sharpbenders' (Grinyer, Mayes and McKiernan, 1988), which
reviewed the performance of 1200 of the UK's largest companies in the 1970s
to identify those which had achieved the sharpest improvement in performance.
Having identified such companies, they interviewed a sample of twenty six
companies to uncover explanations for the substantial improvement in
performance. Whilst this study continues to embrace classic turnarounds, it also
includes any company perceived by its management to be under-achieving
although not in any danger of collapse. The emphasis of the Sharpbenders
(Grinyer, Mayes and McKiernan, 1988) study, upon companies achieving 'a
sharp and sustained improvement in performance' (Grinyer, Mayes and
McKieman, 1988: 9), seemed a particularly close parallel with corporate
acquisitions.
The advantage of turnaround studies in general and the Sharpbenders (Grinyer,
Mayes and McKieman, 1988) study in particular is that they offer a more
comprehensive guide of changes that take place in achieving improved
performance during a crisis. The Sharpbenders (Grinyer, Mayes and McKieman,
1988:164-175) study divides the turnaround process into four stages; 1) causes
of relative decline 2) triggers of radical change 3) what the Sharpbenders did
4) characteristics of sustained improved performance. In terms of our enquiry
into changes in the post-acquisition phase, we are concerned with stage three in
the sharpbend process, namely, what the Sharpbenders did to achieve a
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sharpbend. For this stage alone, the Sharpbenders study (Grinyer, Mayes and
McKiernan, 1989: 167-172) cites over 100 items for examination which is too
extensive for our questionnaire especially as we also have other areas for
enquiry. However in the discussion on what steps Sharpbenders took, it quickly
becomes apparent that many items occurred infrequently in their case studies.
As a consequence we have adopted only those items which occurred in 35% or
more cases. The only complicating factor is the inclusion of items with a lower
value where there has been some evidence elsewhere that they might be
important in an acquisition context. Table 3.1 shows the Sharpbenders items and
their location in our questionnaire.
Table 3.1	 Sharpbenders steps to achieve a sharpbend
0 0 of
sharpbends
citing this
factor
Sharpbenders Survey question(s) Nos
(Chapter 4: 63-108)
65
30
20
15
60
40
35
4.1 Changes in management
- change chairman CEO
- change in executive directors
- change marketing director
- change finance director
- new top management is
committed, positive with a bias for
action
- new top management injects new
values, or vision
- new management creates climate
of 'productivity through people'
Was the CEO MD changed?
Appoint new senior executives
Appoint new marketing sales director
Appoint new finance director
Top team is more action oriented
Top team injects new values vision
Communicating with the acquired
company staff
5b,5c
20d
20f
20e
20k
20j
25j
35
30
10
4.2 Changes in organisation
- decentralisation of innovation
and operating decisions
- reduction in head office
- tighten financial controls
- tighten capital expenditure
- introduce corporate planning
(Contained beneath)
(Remove senior executives)
Improve financial control systems
Control expenditure
Change planning system
20g
I7c
17f
23d
17e
17g
17c
17f
55
50
45
50
45
45
60
18c
21c
21c
18d
18e
21d
21h
40
20
15
10
21k
21j
21n
18f
Table 3.1 (contd) Sharpbenders steps to achieve a sharp bend
45
35
35
55
4.3 Strong central financial
control
- cash flow forecasts
- budgetary controls
- capital budgeting system
- tight control of overheads
Develop cash flow forecasts
Broaden scope of annual profit plans
budgeting systems
Improve financial control systems
Control expenditure (all capital and
revenue expenditure needs CEO
approval)
Adopt parent financial reporting
systems
17d
4.4 New product market focus
- evaluate existing strategy
- clo ure
- dive tments
- focu ed strategy
- ti ht control of production costs
- tight control of overheads
• invest in new plant
Review marketing plan
Sale or closure of businesses
Sale or closure of businesses
Focus on a particular market segment
Implement new marketing initiative
Intensive effort to reduce production
costs
Purchase of new equipment
4.5 Improved product quality and
service
- better product design
introduction or improvement of
quality control
- reduce delivery days
- introduction or improvement of
after-sales service
Improve product design
Introduce or improve quality control
system
Improve delivery times
Introduce or improve after-sales
service
20
15
15
20
45
4.6 Improved marketing
analyse and revise distribution
channels
- focus on more profitable
customers
- analyse and revise after-sales
service
- improve marketing information
to management
- get closer to the customer
Improve distribution channels
Focus on particular market segment
Introduce or improve after sales service
Improved and more frequent marketing
information to the CEO
Stress getting closer to the customer
18h
18d
18f
18i
I 8g
Table 3.1 (contd) Sharpbenders steps to achieve a sharp bend
4.7 Cost reduction strategies
- cut overheads
45 - head office staff (Remove senior executives) 20g
30 - reduce production costs Intensive efforts to reduce production
costs
21d
40 - improved morale ?
35 - better production control Investigate inventory controls 21e
30 - better stock control (Stock take) 21g
Adopt parent inventory controls 21f
35 - improved utilisation of capacity Intensive efforts to reduce production
costs
21d
65 - inve t in new plant Purchase new equipment 20h
Adopt new processes 201
4.8 Acquisitions N A N A
4.9 Debt restructuring
35 -	 ale of ubsidiaries Sale or closure of businesses 21c
Sale of equipment 21i
4.10 Windfalls
40 - Cyclical upturn in demand Since the acquisition has the acquired
company benefited from a windfall
beyond your control i.e. cyclical upturn
in demand, Gov. action, demise of a
competitor, change in exchange rates?
10
Number of firms citing at least one item in this category
• Construct reliability and validity
The main dimensions of change l5 have been drawn from the Sharpbenders
(Grinyer, Mayes and McKiernan, 1988) study although we have tended to adopt
only those items which were cited in 35 0 0 or more of Sharpbend cases.
IS The Sharpbenders (Grinyer, Mayes and McKiernan, 1988) study used an extensive item
scale analysis and adjustment of scales to exclude those not significantly, positively
correlated. The analysis was undertaken by statisticians at NEDO.
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In Chapter five, we build a picture of change for each of our acquisition types by
using Sharpbender constructs. For our purposes we should look at each
construct to see if the constituent variables are a reliable measure for the
construct in question. Kline (1993: 10) suggests that 'coefficient alpha is the
best index of internal consistency' and states that 'alphas should never drop
below .7' (Guilford 1956, Nunnally, 1978 cited in Kline, 1993: 10). Table 3.2
shows the alphas for the Sharpbenders constructs.
Table 3.2	 Alphas for Sharpbenders constructs
Sharpbenders Constructs Cronbach Alphas
Changes in management .85
Changes in organisation .65
Strong central financial control .80
New product market focus .85
Improved product market focus .75
Improved marketing .87
Cost reduction strategies .81
Acquisitions N A
Debt restructuring .76
Windfalls N A
Note.	 N A means that this construct used in Sharpbenders is not relevant to our enquiry
It is clear from the above that the items in the changes in organisation construct
give an alpha below .7. For this reason the construct will be dropped from
further analysis. It is also worth noting that this construct does not feature
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prominently in the Sharpbenders study. Whilst some of the other construct
alphas are a little low, they do not break the minimum value.
Looking at each construct there seems to be face validity for the items although
to test this is not necessary as each are derived from underlying hypotheses.
3.5.3.3 Theme 3: Managing Executives and change
Section 2.6 in chapter 2 shows a rich tradition of according differences in
organisational change to whether the Managing Executive is an Insider or an
Outsider. However there appear to be some contradictory findings depending
upon the definition of these categories. To examine these differences in an
acquisition context and to examine the apparent contradictions, we have used
several definitions of Insider and Outsider.
Question 5b asks whether the Managing Executive was in his current role before
the take-over. This establishes if the respondent is an incumbent or new
executive. Question 5c asks the new executives for their previous position which
indicates whether they have been promoted from within the acquired company,
brought in from the parent company or brought in from outside both companies
and from which industry. From this information it is possible to ascertain
Organisational Insiders v. Organisational Outsiders, Industry Insiders v.
Industry Outsiders as well as Incumbent Management v. New Management.
Based on these distinctions we can evaluate the hypotheses that relate to
whether the importance of senior management type makes a difference in terms
of changes made to the acquired company. We can also comment upon whether
there is a difference in the speed with which changes take place.
In this context we will examine changes on a straight forward functional basis.
This will draw upon the Sharpbenders items detailed above but also include
items from Gabarro's (1987) work on 'taking-charge' which are discussed in
more detail in section 3.5.2.5
• Summary of change items by function
Table 3.3 lists questions 17 - 23 of the questionnaire and shows their origin (full
summary in appendix 3.2). It shows the complementary nature of the variables
suggested by the Sharpbenders and Taking charge studies. In addition it gives a
Cronbach alpha statistic to show the reliability of the measure.
Table 3.3	 Questionnaire questions on change (17 - 23)
Function Questionnaire
variables
Sharpbenders
variables
Gabarro
variables
Reliability
(Cronbach
alphas)
Finance
17b V
.76
17c
17d
17e / .(
17f V
17g I I
17h I
Marketing
18b I
.93
18c I
18d I
18e I
18f I
18g I
18h vi
181 i'
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Table 3.3 (contd) Questionnaire questions on change (17 - 23)
Function Questionnaire
variables
Sharpbenders
variables
Gabarro
variables
Reliability
(Cronbach
alphas)
Communications
19b V
.8619c V
19d /
Human
resources
20b V
.93
20c V
20d V V
20e V
20f V
20g V V
20h
20i V
20j V
20k /
201 ../
20m V
20n
20o /
Operations
21b V
.93
(excluding
21j)
21c V /
21d V
21e V
21f V
21g V
management 21h V
21i V
21j V
21k V
211 V
21m
21n V
LT.
22b V
.8422c
22d V
General
23b V
.6623c V
23d V
Unsurprisingly the general category is incoherent and a low Cronbach alpha
score means it will be discarded.
3.5.3.4 Theme 4:	 Timing of changes
To create a picture of when changes are initiated in an acquisition context we
have drawn upon Gabarro's (1987) work, reviewed in Section 2.7.1.1. in
Chapter 2, which graphically demonstrates waves of activity for an executive
taking-charge of a company. His choice of variables has a different emphasis to
the Sharpbenders study and owes much to the organisational behaviour school.
In broad terms Gabarro (1987) focuses upon structural changes in the aggregate,
management systems, and personnel issues with particular attention paid to
communications. Table 3.4 shows how his items have been incorporated into the
questionnaire.
Table 3.4	 Gabarro's Organisational Activities
Gabarro'	 Activit . es
(Appendix C: 177)
Survey Questions Nos
Entry activities
•	 Orientational meetings with direct reports Set up direct reporting 19c
•	 Formal group briefings Communicating with acquired company staff
through formal channels
25k
•	 Tours or site visits Tour factories	 operations of the acquired
compan3
25j
Meetings
•	 Problem focused meetings Set up 1:1 ad hoc problem focused meetings 19d
•	 Schedules formal group meetings Set up extensive formal 1:1 meetings with
employees
19b
•	 Schedules one to one meetings As above 19b, d
Table 3.4 (contd) Gabarro's Organisational Activities
Gabarro's Activities Survey Questions Nos
(Appendix C: 177)
Management systems
•	 Institutes or revises budgeting system Develop cash flow forecasts	 Broaden scope
of annual profit plans	 budget system
17e, g
•	 Institutes or changes Information system Change information system 22d
•	 Institutes or changes control system Improve financial control system I 7c*
•	 Institutes or changes planning system Change planning system 23d
•	 Institutes or changes performance appraisal Change performance appraisal system 20m
•	 Establishes problem focused task forces Set up problem focused task forces 25n
•	 Establishes strategic review Establish strategic review or analysis process 25o
•	 Establishes internal training or development
programs
Implement management development
program
20o
•	 Establishes or alters personnel hiring ways
•	 Institutes changes in compensation system Introduce,change employee incentive scheme 201
Organisational structure
•	 Structural chan,„e 	 involving two or fewer
minor sub unit
Will be an amalgam of; curtailing autonomy
responsibility of a group and structural
changes to functional departments with few
assets
23b,
20b,
18b,
17b
•	 Structural changes involving two or fewer
major sub-units
Will be an amalgam of; sale or closure of
businesses, structural change in
manufacturing operations or I. T.
21c,
21b,
22b
•	 Structural changes of entire organisation Full combination of the above
•	 Creates new organisation sub-unit or
function not previously existing
Create new group 23c
Management personnel changes
•	 Terminates management personnel Remove senior executives 20g
•	 Initiate search for new management person Initiate search for new senior executive 20i
•	 Hire or promotes management person Appoint new senior executive 20d
•	 Reassigns management personnel Reassign management personnel 20c
*We have data for other systems but this is probably the right interpretation
The cross-sectional survey method is limited in its ability to capture longitudinal
data. At best we are capturing perceptions, from one moment in time, of when
change started. These perceptions may be quite different to actual occurrence, or
'clock time' (Whipp, 1995). To minimise this potential distortion we did not
send questionnaires out to acquisitions where more than four years had elapsed.
There is also a more positive side to the issue of 'forgetting' some of the detail
in that the issues important to the executive will assume a sharper focus. In
anticipation of any time bias, we focused our analysis upon a subset of
respondents who experienced a similar recall period.
On the questionnaire each respondent was asked to indicate, after answering
whether an item had been changed, the number of months that had elapsed since
acquisition for the change to have been initiated. This seemed a reasonable time
frame as the taking-charge process is reported to take around two and a half
years (Gabarro, 1987) and there are many anecdotes in the acquisition literature
that describe problems with acquisitions rumbling on for years. With hindsight,
a great deal of change takes place very quickly and many respondents indicated
that changes were happening within days.
In constructing his waves of change, Gabarro (1987: 178) observes that only the
change data relating to structural and personnel changes 16 could be used as 'each
was comparable across cases using a common set of conventions'. With this
16 Reliability scores (Cronbach alphas) for these two constructs are .77 and .82 respectively
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data, Gabarro (1987: 184-7) then computes 'the average number of structural
and personnel changes made per period for the sample and then simply adds
these two figures on a per period basis' to achieve a single summary. To enable
comparison with Gabarro's (1987) findings, we will follow this method.
Gabarro's (1987: 178) explanation for dropping the other areas of data is that
they could not be reduced to a common metric. 'For example, although it was
possible to count changes in information and control systems and the frequency
of introduction of task forces, the extensiveness and impact of these changes
varied greatly across cases' (Gabarro, 1987: 178). Whilst there may be some
merit in this, we are also faced with losing a great deal of important information.
For this reason we have attempted to include all of his areas of enquiry into our
questionnaire.
We try to overcome the problem of ascribing magnitude to change items by
collecting the opinions of a group of executives" with acquisition experience on
the impact 18 and disruptiveness of each item of change. These opinions were
17 40 executives were surveyed by questionnaire. They had a wide range of industry
backgrounds and were attending an executive course at Warwick Business School. 30 had
direct experience of being taken over. 19 of the executives were in general management
positions at the time. Using SPSS v.6 for this and subsequent analysis, responses were
compared on the grounds of acquisition experience and general management experience.
There were significant differences between the groups which had experienced acquisition
and, for later analysis, this group of 30 executives with direct experience of being taken over
was used.
As this thesis seeks to show, there are different types of post-acquisition management and we
should remember that this may affect executive perceptions of changes depending upon
which type of acquisition they experienced.
18 My use of these constructs was very limited in so far as I only intended to see whether the
changes in the original questionnaire were perceived to have a high or low impact or cause
little or substantial disruption. I do not go on to interpret 'impact' or 'disruption' as positive
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collected by survey during Easter 1997. This enabled us to create a more
extensive and robust picture of the timing and magnitude of change.
3.5.4 Coding questions
The majority of questions could be pre coded as they were either closed or
forced choice in nature. There were a limited number of open questions as the
range of responses can often be very large and resistant to coding (Bryman,
1989: 50). However there is no denying that they offer a certain richness which
is appropriate in more exploratory questions. For example, there are a very wide
range of motives for making an acquisition and to the best of this author's
knowledge no complete template is available. To understand the reasons
therefore why an acquisition was made, this type of open question seemed
appropriate.
We did encounter a few problems, as suggested by Bryman, not only in the
range of answers, but also because there is a lot of 'blanket' jargon currently in
use amongst practitioners in this field. For instance, one answer to the question
enquiring after the reason for acquisition, was just 'strategic'. Nevertheless this
limited amount of data has provided useful descriptive background.
or negative. In terms of whether 'impact' or 'disruptiveness' is dependent upon
circumstances, we have chosen to assume, that the acquisition event is one of crisis for the
acquired company and that changes following the acquisition will largely be judged in those
terms. This stance also received some support in subsequent interviews.
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3.5.5 Survey Pilot
Once the survey instrument was constructed, it was circulated amongst
colleagues at Warwick Business School who provided useful technical feedback
in terms of the wording of questions, ordering and potential coding difficulties.
A pilot was then sent out to the Managing Executives of two different types of
acquisition. Whilst there was some useful practical feedback in terms of
clarifying questions, there was little substantive comment.
3.5.6 Problems with surveying corporate acquisitions
There is a general problem in the quality of acquisition reporting. We relied
predominantly upon the industry bible, Acquisitions Monthly, but were aware
that many acquisitions were wrongly reported. For instance a questionnaire was
returned from Clarks Shoes to say that they were proud to remain independent
and weren't aware of a take-over bid. In addition many transactions were
reported which weren't strictly corporate acquisitions - such as capital
restructuring, two stage offers reported as two acquisitions, management buy-
outs and buy-ins and errors from inaccurate press reporting. These inaccuracies
would significantly distort response rates and yet other theses do not mention
them.
One of the main difficulties of studying the acquired company is the extent of
changes that have taken place already. Database information (Key British
Enterprises, Kompass, Hambros Company guide, Andersen's Company guide
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etc) is notoriously unreliable as it is based upon Companies' House returns
which can be several years out of date. Company names, telephone numbers and
addresses change, which causes mail to go astray and in some cases makes
finding the company difficult. Indeed it can be very difficult to establish
whether a company is still in existence.
Identifying the key executive can also be a major problem after the acquisition
has taken place, due to staff turnover and relocation. The databases were very
unreliable (Directory of Directors, Key British Enterprises). We found
companies were very unhelpful in saying to which company executives had
moved. To overcome this problem, it was necessary to telephone nearly every
company, often on several occasions to work out who the Managing Executive
was and where he could be located. In the case of executives who retired, and
there were many instances of this, in no circumstances were home addresses or
contact numbers released. Our only option was to try to pursue them through
their membership of various London Clubs!
For those executives who stayed, some Managing Executives had been
promoted and then regarded the post-acquisition phase as 'history' and of
limited interest. We also found difficulty where current management felt
previous management were more relevant and previous management felt current
management were more relevant.
Telephoning was often the solution, albeit a very time consuming one. However
this was not without its difficulties, particularly if the acquisition was sensitive.
In many cases new owners and their staff would not acknowledge the existence
of the acquired company and could then be very unhelpful. This was particularly
true for American acquirers, who are very quick to remove every trace of
identity of the acquired company with only a remote American address as a
point of contact, and also for those companies taken private, whose new owners
then jealously guarded their privacy.
3.5.7 Problems with postal surveys
There are fundamental problems using postal surveys which should be
considered as they can have significant repercussions.
There are many articles which bemoan the declining response rate of postal
surveys (Goyden, 1988, Kalton, 1983). A recent working paper by Baruch
(1996) concludes that there has been a notable decline in average response rates
over the twenty years 1975 - 1995 reported in articles drawn from a wide range
of journals and that top management studies had lower response rates than other
areas.
Companies are now bombarded with questionnaires and many now have a
policy of refusing to respond as they would have to take on staff to handle the
extra work. Fenton-O'Creevy (1996) suggests that this is the case for 22% of
non-responding top executives 1 ° (cited in Baruch, 1996). Corporate acquisitions
are a glamorous feature of business and so attract a large share of
questionnaires. However acquisitions are also very sensitive issues which raises
concerns over confidentiality and, perhaps more importantly, are times of
enormous work loads where questionnaires are perceived as time wasters. To
achieve satisfactory response rates in acquisition studies is therefore extremely
difficult and eminent researchers such as Datta and Grant (1990) are recording
response rates of 27° o which they considered satisfactory for this subject area
and we are now witnessing publications with response rates as low as 9°0
(McKiernan and Merali, 1995).
There is an issue that surveys capture what the researcher regards as important
rather than what the manager does20 . Although in conceptual terms this survey
is driven by the management theory, much of the literature on mergers and
acquisitions is highly practitioner oriented and written by practising executives.
Many of these concerns are reflected in the questionnaire as well as the previous
direct managerial experience of the author. In addition the use of both a pilot
survey and subsequent interviews, also served to alter the balance towards
practitioner concerns.
19 Fenton-O'Creevy (1996) suggests that 28°0 are too busy, 14°0 think the survey irrelevant,
120 0 of addresses are unavailable, 24°0 didn't say.
20 Underlying this comment are deeper issues: What purpose does the research serves: is it
driven by academic or practitioner priorities? By definition surveys will not capture the
richness and depth of case studies and in generalities, can lose sight of managerial concerns
which are often couched in company and industry specific terms.
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In surveying corporate acquisitions which have taken place over a period of
time, with one survey instrument which is launched at one moment in time,
there is an issue of different time periods which have elapsed between the
acquisition date and questionnaire date. This may have implications for post-hoc
rationalisation (see 3-152) as well as quality of executive memory. This issue is
particularly important where the timing of change has been sought and for this
reason, as described on page 3-171, care has been taken to attempt to control for
elapsed time between questionnaire date and acquisition date.
In addition to the above we experienced the normal problems associated with
surveys, namely misreading of letters, obstructive and protective secretaries and
switchboards and the vagaries of the postal system. In addition we would like to
add that these executives are now doing a very great deal of travelling which
made communication with them difficult and surely intensifies their problems
in handling large paper loads.
A more serious issue is whether the key informant has indeed answered the
questionnaire himself. For reasons given on page 3 - 152 footnote 11, we
believe this cause for concern in this instance is minimal.
3.5.8 Raising the response rate
Aware that surveys are plagued by low response rates, particularly in the area of
acquisitions, we adopted many of the measures suggested by Oppenheim (1992:
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104-5) to encourage response. A particular difficulty in the acquisition field is
the issue of change in ownership so in the vast majority of instances, the
company was telephoned to ensure the appropriate executive was targeted. All
letters were addressed to the respondent personally. To add credibility Professor
Sid Gray kindly allowed the use of his name and title together with my own.
Certainly in a couple of instances replies were forthcoming because of this
action. In addition I attached a sheet detailing my past practical experience in M
& A in merchant banking. This showed seriousness of purpose and a number of
executives were keen to be involved for this reason.
Considerable effort was put into producing a professional questionnaire
document that might 'merit' attention. There is some debate over the length and
complexity of the questionnaire. We felt, in line with Oppenheim (1992: 105),
that if the survey was interesting to the respondent and well produced, these
would be more important factors than length. In hindsight this seems to be
correct as we received many favourable and encouraging comments even from
those who were unable to respond to the questions due to company policy.
Confidentiality of replies was clearly stated and all respondents were promised,
and subsequently received, feedback of preliminary results. A stamp addressed
envelope was enclosed to aid reply and a follow up telephone call was carried
out four to five days after posting.
3.6 Data characteristics
The survey collected data on the acquisition of UK corporates which took place
between April 1991 - March 1994. To see whether the survey period is
representative of acquisition activity in general we looked at the pattern of
corporate acquisition activity in the UK for the ten year period 1987 - 199621.
3.6.1 The context: acquisitions in the UK, 1987 - 96
Acquisitions Monthly, the industry bible, reported for the ten years, 1987 to
1996, a total of 14,118 acquisitions in the UK, with a value of £305.1bn.
A significant proportion of these deals however were MBOs which are beyond
the scope of our enquiry. Figure 3.1 shows the total number of corporate
acquisitions, excluding MB0s, subsidiaries, government owned companies and
those in administration or receivership. In all cases 100 0 0 of the company was
acquired. The resultant acquisitions, totalling 8,449 take-overs, are split into
public and private deals.
21 This time period was chosen as it was necessary to delve beneath aggregate figures, by hand,
which took several months. Although computerised databases exist, Warwick library
resources do not extend to this facility. Other libraries, conscious of the expense of these
databases, will not allow access to visitors. Towards the end of the write up, and through my
own efforts, I was able to gain access to AMDATA.
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With far more private acquisitions than public ones we should take some time to
examine their characteristics.
• Private acquisitions
One of the most striking aspects of private acquisitions is the high percentage for
which we have no data. Over the ten year period 1986 - 1995, no information
was released about bid size for 30.15% of deals.
We cannot assess where these unrecorded values lie but it is probable that the
majority are in fact very small indeed and this is why they have attracted little
reporting attention. Indeed it is likely that the purchasers also regard them as
22 The numbers of private acquisitions for 1996 and probably 1997 are slightly over stated.
Acquisitions Monthly produces a break down of MBOs at each year end. However a number
will always come to light at a later date. The data for 1995 is accurate; 1996 has since
revealed 31 MBOs which are either private acquisitions or divestments; 1997 it is too early
to say.
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rather minor and see no reason to publicise them. In their eyes these deals are
probably just the acquisition of a few bolt on assets. However there are
undoubtedly some cases where the parties are very particular about keeping the
details of the deal secret.
The other striking feature of private acquisitions in the UK are that the vast
majority are in fact very small in bid value, with 50.27% under £5m in value. For
the ten years in question, 96.96% of the number of private deals was less than
£25m in size. The remaining 3.04% of deals however accounted for 59.64° 0 of
all recorded considerations. The distribution of numbers of deals against
consideration is shown below.
Figure 3.2: Value versus number of private acquisitions in the UK (1986 - 1995)
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• Comparing Public and Private deals
Public acquisitions also show a preponderance of smaller deals with very large
deals again greatly affecting the overall picture. Perhaps as one might expect,
public deals, whilst much smaller in number than private deals, account for a very
high portion of total take-over activity by value. Figure 3.3 compares public and
private activity over ten years by value.
Figure 3.3: Corporate acquisitions in the UK by value (1987 - 1996)
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Source: Acquisitions Monthly (7.4.98)
• Acquisitions in the recession
It is interesting to note that the years 1990 to 1994 are marked by a slump in
activity, particularly in value terms. During those years the relative importance of
private acquisitions increases. Indeed there is an interesting piece of research to
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to be done on small and private acquisition activity as, to date, research has
concentrated exclusively upon public acquisitions of a large size.
Our survey years, from 1991 - 1994, are located at a nadir in acquisition activity
with 1,209 deals valued at some £25.9bn being well under half the number and
value of deals of the preceding three year period, and half the number and a fifth
of the value of deals in the following three year period.
This nadir in acquisition activity corresponds with a general recession in the UK
economy. From this point of view we might argue that we are examining
acquisitions during a recession. The characteristics of the survey years will
therefore be fewer deals of an overall smaller value. During this time the split of
acquisition activity in terms of value is broadly equal between public and
private deals. This would differ from a recovery, which we can see in figure 3.3
where the number and size of deals generally increases, and the importance of
public deals in terms of value, relative to private deals, increases dramatically.
One might suggest that by examining acquisitions in a recession we are looking
at the background picture of acquisition activity without the mega-deals of the
boom years. Our willingness to include private as well as public deals is unusual
in the literature but to our mind, better reflects the dominant source of activity
despite the increased difficulties with the availability of data. To concentrate on
large public deals just because this data is readily available does not seem to be
an entirely justifiable route to understanding acquisitions in general.
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By surveying the population of deals we will be examining predominantly small
transactions. However we chose a cut off, of £.8m in bid value, as the quality of
data was beginning to be very poor and we were straying from the notion of
corporate acquisitions towards acquisitions as purely bolt on assets which would
not display a range of acquisition characteristics. Even with a cut off point
however we feel that we will generate a better picture of acquisition activity in
general that the vast majority of studies which exclusively examine large public
acquisitions.
We've examined the 'global' picture as it has received wide publicity and
assumed common currency. However it rests uneasily with my survey of just
232 acquisitions as a total population for a three year period. The substantial
difference is attributable to aggregate data which contains significant
assumptions over what constitutes a corporate acquisition as well as a number of
reporting errors. For reasons discussed above, it has not been possible to
manually go through all 14,118 deals to sift out errors but this has been done for
all transactions recorded for the Survey years.
3.6.2 The survey population
The survey covered acquisitions in the UK between April 1991 - March 1994.
This time frame was selected on the basis of Gabarro's (1987) work which
suggests that the process of taking-charge is accomplished within two to two
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and a half years. In addition it was felt that an increase in the time elapsed
would contribute to a deterioration in the quality of data.
According to AMDATAa, the total number of corporate acquisitions in the UK,
above £8m in bid size, from April 1991 to March 1994, is 1,390 deals. Further
adjustments were made to remove acquisitions that did not fit the focus of this
research into the 1000 0 acquisition of independent UK corporates by corporate
acquirers. As a consequence, the following categories of deal were excluded;
targets with overseas owners, those operating predominantly overseas, targets
which were subsidiaries before the deal, partial acquisitions, asset purchases
such as the purchase of a storage facility or an investment portfolio, targets
purchased by MBO MBI teams or consortium investors, and targets that were
in receivership. From our original population of 1390 acquisitions, we arrived
at an accurate population of 232 corporate acquisitions in the UK from April
1991 to March 1994. The following table gives a break down of the frequency
of reasons for exclusion. In many cases, acquisitions were excluded for several
reasons which means that the total of table 3.5 exceeds the population.
23 AMDATA is Acquisitions Monthly's on-line database
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Table 3.5: Reasons for exclusion of reported deals from the population
Number of deals
Foreign ownership / business 481
Partial acquisition 278
MBO / MBI 167
Receivership 12
Consortium / Entrepreneurial purchaser 9
Targets as subsidiaries 866
Asset purchases 98
3.6.2.1 Response rate
Questionnaires were mailed to the Managing Executives of a population of 232
acquired companies. The initial mailing was followed up by a telephone call and
in total 70 responses were received. This response rate 24 of nearly 30.17 0 0 is
moderate for surveys in general, although it is worth pointing out that this is
30.17°0 of a population rather than a sample.
As we noted in section 3.5.6, survey response rates have been declining for
some time (Goyder 1988) and indeed Kalton (1983) suggests in general a low
figure of 10°0. In addition acquisition surveys generally record lower response
rates due to problems specific to the area. Many of these issues were raised in
section 3.5.6, including the perceived sensitivity of the subject area; data
24 Response rate is defined as the ratio of the number of questionnaires completed for eligible
elements in the sample to the number of eligible elements in the population (adapted from
Kalton 1983: 66)
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confidentiality; lack of executive time due to the pressures of acquisition
integration; the unwillingness to communicate if the acquisition has failed or is
not working out; the departure of the key executive responsible for the
integration and with no contact number; and, in several cases; the complete
disappearance of the business - due to relocation, renaming or failure.
It is worth stating that with our research focusing upon 'life' after acquisition,
there will inevitably be less than 100 0 0 of the acquired population to survey, as
this area experiences many 'corporate deaths' 25 soon after acquisition. One might
argue therefore that our response rate should be adjusted upwards as we are
seeking to study what happens in acquisitions which survive.
3.6.2.2 Non-response bias
With a response rate of around 30.17°0 we have to face the fact that 69.83°0 of
acquisitions did not respond and that there may be non-response bias. In
particular Kalton (1983) remarks that there is evidence that non-response bias is
not evenly spread across the population but is more heavily concentrated in sub-
groups. Clearly this could affect the generalizability of our results to the
population.
25 Corporate deaths are here taken to mean companies which are taken over and closed down.
This does not include companies which are taken over and integrated into the parent so that
they lose their identity.
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Datta and Grant (1991) use t-tests to compare respondents and non-respondents
along the dimension of size of sales and size of bid. We found that both our
population of acquisitions and our responding sample were highly skewed so
that the assumptions of normality were violated and the one sample t-test on the
data as it stands would have been inappropriate. The median scores for both are
shown in tables 3.6 - 3.7. Their similarity gives some comfort regarding non-
response bias.
Table 3.6:	 Responding sample and non-respondents by sales
Acquired firms Mean Standard Error Median
Responding sample £49.92m 7.10 £26.75m
Non-responding firms £71.69m 9.85 £25.18m
Table 3.7:	 Responding sample and non-respondents by bid value
Acquired firms Mean Standard Error Median
Responding sample £41.95m 7.32 £18.80m
Non-responding firms £54.46m 9.41 £16.90m
For a more rigorous approach to this issue we also transformed our data using a
log normal approach and ran t-tests which established that there were no
significant differences between our responding sample and the population. In
addition we examined the data more closely by comparing quintiles for bid
value, target sales and numbers of target employees. On all measures there were
no significant differences. Full results for these tests are contained in appendix
3.3.
However with 68.3% non-respondents we cannot rule out some sort of
systematic bias. One potential area of bias maybe that the questionnaire assumes
a consistent approach to the handling of post-acquisition integration. It may be
that recipients of the questionnaire who adopted different integration styles for
different parts of an acquired multi-divisional businesses may have found it
impossible to provide single answers to questions posed.
Another source of bias may be in the area of success. In terms of overall
success, based upon answers to question 9a in the questionnaire, 82.6° o of
respondents perceived the acquisition to be satisfactorily or very successful
whereas only 14.5°0 felt the acquisition was moderately or not at all
successful 6 • Allowing for success being weakly associated with the amount of
time elapsed after acquisition 27 , we examined acquisitions where two years or
more had elapsed since take-over. 69.2°0 perceived the acquisition as
satisfactorily or very successful, whereas 26.9°0 felt it to be unsatisfactory or not
at all successful. 3.8°0 thought it too early to say. These success rates are still
substantially higher than recorded in the literature reviewed in Chapter two,
where we are led to believe that around half of all acquisitions fail. In part we
may account for this by referring to an earlier point, that some acquisitions cease
26 2.9% thought it too early to say.
27 Significant at the .09 level
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to exist and so the proportion of failed acquisitions will be biased downwards.
Secondly, it is reasonable to expect executives who have presided over
successful acquisitions to be more willing to share their experiences. Certainly
on one occasion, when this researcher was encouraging a reluctant executive to
return his questionnaire, the comment received over the telephone was that
'talking to you is like rubbing salt into an open wound' 28 . Thirdly, there is also a
case for suggesting that acquisitions which are in difficulty are likely to be
putting greater demands upon the executive in question than ones which run
smoothly. For these reasons we might expect our respondents to represent more
successful acquisitions.
There is also an issue of the extent to which the issue of success may be biasing
returns for the type of acquisition. As it is not possible to assess the type of
acquisition until a questionnaire has been returned, we cannot say if this bias is a
real issue. However it might make sense to say that complex acquisitions may
be harder to handle, put greater pressure upon managing executives and present
more opportunities for things to go wrong. In such acquisitions we might expect
there to be fewer responses to the questionnaire.
28 He didn't return his questionnaire!
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3.7 Survey data analysis
The population of corporate acquisitions over £.8m in size in the UK 1991 -
1994 was 232 29 . In survey terms this is a small number and so the questionnaire
was sent to every acquired company (see foot note 19). Our data analysis is of a
responding sample.
This has repercussions in terms of the statistics that can be applied. The purpose
of many statistical techniques is to enable the researcher to draw a probabilistic
inference about the qualities of a population from a representative sample. In
other words, in dealing with large populations, researchers purposely attempt to
create a representative sample to which statistics can be applied to enable
generalisation to that wider population.
In our case, with a small population of 232 acquisitions, this is unnecessary. We
could have looked at some form of stratified or representative sampling but this
might have proved difficult in response terms and, more importantly, as we are
interested in an internal measure (resource transfer), this could not be assessed
externally. This made representative sampling inappropriate. As a result our
29 This is a refined definition of the population taken from the  AMDATA source. One of the
problems of researching acquisitions is not being sure whether they are correctly reported
and the secrecy surrounding some companies makes clarification impossible until some time
has elapsed. In actuality, I identified all the acquisitions, by hand, from Acquisitions Monthly
and sent our 316 questionnaires. Two years later I gained access to the AMDATA database
which had audited the acquisitions of the time period under consideration and concluded that
there were 232. In other words, I had sent out questionnaires to acquisitions which were not
in existence. For this reason they were excluded from our final population number.
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responses are part of the population and so can only make claims in confidence
for that portion, although of course, they are robust and not inferred claims.
3.7.1 Data tests
The analysis of the questionnaire data was carried out on SSPS, release 6.0,
Windows based version. Our data is not normally distributed and so we have
largely relied upon non-parametric tests which do not make assumptions about
the distribution of underlying data. These tests are more conservative than
parametric tests. In the few instances where the data is normally distributed, or
where it has been transformed, we have used parametric tests. In these tests,
with a small, finite population, we could have applied the finite population
correction, but have not done so, preferrin g to err on the side of caution.
For the data we have collected, the most frequently used tests were as follows;
Tests of Independence: Much of the questionnaire data is nominal in form. To
analyse this, cross tabs have been used with the Pearson chi-square
statistic to determine independence. The chi square statistic requires the
minimum expected frequencies of each cell to be five. Whilst some
studies have shown this to be too stringent, we have used Fisher's exact
test which is appropriate when total sample size is small and the
expected values are small (Norusis M. J., 1993: 209). When any
expected cell value in a 2x2 table was less than five we used Fisher's
exact test which calculates exact probabilities. In larger tables we have
ensured that in no cells are the expected frequencies less than one or
more than 20% of the cells are less than five (Kinnear and Gray, 1994:
165).
Significance levels: The 10% level is generally seen as the highest acceptable
percentage for significance. Whilst this may be reasonable, we cannot
completely ignore values lying just above this rather arbitrary level. The
policy adopted here is that statistical significance is only mentioned for
percentages of 10 0 0 and less (following convention), but where there are
consistently lowish percentages to suggest a trend, these are pointed out.
Tests of Association: The Pearson chi-square statistic is not a good measure of
association as it is influenced by sample size and degrees of freedom. A
number of modifications (phi coefficient, coefficient of contingency,
Cramer's V) of the Pearson correlation coefficient exist to overcome
these two problems. It is worth noting that many of our cross tabulations
are 2x2, and in these instances the results of these statistics are the same,
(Norusis M. J., 1993: 206-215) and so just the Pearson chi-squared
statistic is given. Where the dimensions of a cross tabulation are greater
than 2x2, then the modifications mentioned above are referred to.
Test for time distributions: In Chapter seven we try to evaluate whether there
is a difference in the distribution of time for changes to take place. As
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our data is not normally distributed and the sample sizes are small, we
have used a non parametric test, the Mann-Whitney test (also known as
the Wilcoxon test) for two independent samples and its extension the
Kruskal-Wallis one way analysis of variance for three independent
samples. These test the hypotheses that the independent samples come
from populations with the same distributions (Norusis M. J., 1993: 377-
379).
Where on occasion other tests have been used, these are highlighted and
explained in the text.
It is worth pointing out that there were excursions into other methods, such as
factor analysis to see whether there was a pattern amongst the change variables
other than the functional grouping as set out in the questionnaire. Whilst this
tended to show that the functional groupings were robust, which may be due to
the halo effect, Kim and Mueller (1978: 73) threw considerable doubt on using
factor analysis for nominal data. For this reason factor analysis was deemed
inappropriate.
3.8 Interviews: selection and analysis
Once the analysis of the questionnaire was complete and we had a distribution
of cases based upon the Haspeslagh and Jemison matrix, we decided to look for
explanations for the patterns of change we had encountered and therefore
adopted a dual methodology as discussed above. As Silverman (1993: 114)
remarks, interviews 'offer a rich source of data which provides access to how
they account for both their troubles and good fortune'
Silverman (1993: 106) raises the issue of the 'truth' status of interview data. He
points to a dichotomy over whether interview data are a straightforward report
on another reality or merely situated narratives. We have adopted the approach,
expressed by Brown and Sime (1981: 160), that 'an account is neither naive nor
an apology for behaviour, but must be taken as an informed statement by the
person whose experiences are under investigation'. This is not to deny that other
interpretations are possible as the example used by Silverman (1992) of
Baruch's (1982) work shows. Baruch (1982) compares studies of parent
responses to different illnesses in their children. Baruch illustrates how one
researcher uses the interview to get closer to the 'facts' whilst the other
researcher looks at the interviews as a social construction of reality. As
Silverman stresses, Baruch does not see these accounts as competitive.
To gain a clear picture of the main types of acquisition encountered we
interviewed a number of respondents for each of the acquisition types. We
aimed to interview at least six cases per acquisition type. Yin (1994) suggests
that the number of cases is a matter of discretionary, judgmental choice,
depending upon the certainty the researcher requires. He suggests that two or
three cases are sufficient when the issue at hand does not demand an excessive
degree of certainty, and five, six or more if there are subtle differences' (Yin,
1994: 50). This was possible for Holding, Absorption and Preservation
acquisitions which constituted the majority of our respondents. We had just
three symbiotic acquisitions and so interviewed just one case for the sake of
completeness.
In total 20 interviews were carried out. For confidentiality reasons, the identity
of the interviewees are disguised, but the reader may gain a sense of the types of
acquisition from the list in appendix 3.4.
Within each acquisition type there were examples of Organisational Outsiders
and Insiders but the distribution of these categories between acquisition types
was very skewed towards one type of Managing Executive. For instance
Preservation acquisitions consisted of 86° o Insiders 30 and 14° o Outsiders,
30 The terms Insider and Outsider refer to Organisational Insider Outsider. An Organisational
Insider is an incumbent or new executive from within the acquired company. An
Organisational Outsider is a new executive drawn from outside the acquired company.
3-197
Absorption acquisitions consisted of 75% Outsiders and 25% Insiders and
Holding acquisitions consisted of 89% Insiders and 11% Outsiders (see
Diagram 5.1 in chapter 5). To 'sharpen' the picture we interviewed several of
the dominant type of executive and then the deviant case. As Baruch (1982)
suggests, this helps to refine the analysis by illuminating consistent features.
The interviewee was the respondent who had filled in the questionnaire as we
were interested in an explanation for their replies. The interviews were semi-
structured around the main themes of the questionnaire and a copy of the
interview protocol is contained in appendix 3.5. They were conducted in the
respondent's environment, either office or outside work if sensitive, or at the
respondent's home if retired. The average length of interviews was l', hours31.
All interviews were taped32 and fully transcribed at a later date. Crabtree and
Miller (1992) provide a useful framework summarising four main approaches to
data analysis, namely: quasi-statistical; templates; editing and
immersion/crystallisation. Quasi-statistical methods such as content analysis as
espoused in Krippendorf s (1980) text 33 , fit clearly within the quantitative,
logical - positivist tradition, and would seem to complement our survey.
31 A useful practical guide to interviewing was found in King (1994)
32 Tape recording senior executives was not perceived to be a problem and in only one instance
was the recorder turned for a short period due to sensitivity of information. Johnson (1987)
observes that executives are less inhibited the more senior they are and Whittington (1989:
128) suggests that 'Most subjects were little concerned by taping'.
33 Krippendorf advocates a scientific design with the unitising of data followed by various
forms of computational analysis.
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However to adopt this method would have undermined the purpose of our
interviews. We wish to add depth and richness to our survey rather than strip it
away. The purpose of our qualitative interviews is to add meaning and
interpretation to the findings of the survey by focusing upon how Managing
Executives describe and make sense of their acquisition experiences.
Our concern highlights a tension in the qualitative interview field as to whether
analysis should be systematic, to provide rigour for 'academic peer assessment',
which may cause harm by being reductionist, or about 'feel' (Easterby Smith et
al., 1991: 112). We have decided to adopt a form of template analysis which has
similarities with content analysis, in that a number of themes or categories
relevant to the research are used to analyse the text, but there are differences.
The pattern of themes are interpreted qualitatively rather than statistically, and
the themes are revised through exposure to data (King, 1994). In our case the
survey raises the main themes which were originally drawn from supporting
literatures. The themes form an original template to drive the interviews and
their subsequent analysis, but there is a degree of iteration both supporting and
informing the survey results.
3.8.1 Interview reliability and validity
Whilst quantitative research places considerable emphasis upon these issues, the
methods developed cannot be readily applied in qualitative research. However,
as Miles and Huberman (1994) note, 'in traditional terms, the reliability and
validity of qualitatively derived findings can be seriously in doubt'. Despite
increasingly complex qualitative work 'a deep dark question about qualitative
studies remains'. 'The most serious difficulty is that the methods of analysis are
not well formulated (Miles, 1979: 591) and indeed phenomenology has been
described as 'a method without techniques'. Clearly the work by Miles and
Huberman (1994) is just one example of many to attempt to introduce greater
confidence into qualitative conclusions by focusing upon credible and
dependable methods.
Whilst we have acknowledged that our interviewing edges us into the qualitative
domain we can deal with some of the criticism raised above in the following
way. Our aim is to describe and understand how Managing Executives make
sense of their world and this does not require that we strive for objectivity in the
same abstract way of positivists. However we did consider using inter-rater
reliability for the coding of the interview transcripts, such as described in Miles
and Huberman (1994) but decided this was unnecessary since the themes were
largely determined by the questionnaire, and the coding was of a general rather
than detailed level. In other words, the survey provides a robust objective
framework where issues of reliability and validity are central. This provides a
degree of confidence in the structure accorded to the interview data.
A more important issue for the interview data is validation. To validate our
interpretations of our interviews we reverted to key interviewees as well as
colleagues and practitioners to assess the 'rightness' of the interpretation. 'The
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only criterion for the 'rightness' of an interpretation is inter-subjective - that is
to say, that it is right for a group of people who share a similar world' (Reason
and Rowan, 1981: 243 in Knight 1994).
3.9 Conclusion
In this chapter we have suggested that there are advantages in using a hybrid
method for studying acquisitions as one can combine the strengths, in terms of
generalisability of the cross- sectional approach, with the richness offered by in-
depth case studies.
To assess changes made in the post-acquisition phase we used a postal survey
from which we achieved a good level of response. From this responding sample
we are able to make suggestions concerning the pattern of change for the
acquisition population in terms of the type, volume and timing of change. In
conjunction with this data gathering we have also carried out, as befits a
strategic perspective, many key informant interviews. These key informants are
managing executives who take charge of running the newly acquired companies.
Through these interviews we are able to find explanation and nuance for the
survey findings. In practice then, we hope that by combining methods we will
gain a better understanding of the complexity of the post-acquisition phase.
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4.1 Introducf on
In this chapter we will be examining the distribution of acquisition activity in
the UK according to the acquisition typology developed by Haspeslagh and
Jemison (1991). In particular we will look at whether the emphasis placed by
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) upon 'value creating' acquisition styles is
justified in terms of the distribution of our responding sample and whether they
are more 'successful' than 'value capture' acquisitions. These enquiries are
specifically addressed through propositions one and two, which suggest that
'value capture' acquisitions do not deserve to be down played, relative to 'value
creating' acquisitions, in terms of occurrence, and, proposition three, which
suggests that there is no difference in terms of success between 'value creating'
and 'value capturing' acquisitions.
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) characterise 'value creating' acquisitions as
experiencing substantial resource interdependency. In the light of the recent
focus of the resource-based view upon knowledge as the key resource (Nonaka,
1991, Hamel and Prahalad, 1994, Nonalca and Takeuci, 1995) and the
importance of it's transfer (Hedlund, 1994, Spender and Grant, 1996), we shall
also examine, though proposition four, whether the transfer of knowledge in an
acquisition context is associated with perceptions of success.
Finally we examine the individual acquisition types to assess whether there is
any hierarchy in terms of perceived success. This is achieved through
proposition five.
4.2 Distribution of acquisition types in the UK
Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991) acquisition typology places considerable
emphasis upon the importance of 'value creating' acquisitions which they
describe as Symbiotic and Absorption styles. They also acknowledge the
existence of Preservation acquisitions but this 'value capture' perspective is
played down. Chapter 2 section 2.4 observes that Haspeslagh and Jemison
(1991) examined just seven acquisitions which cannot be said to be
representative of acquisition activity in general. In addition, they focused
specifically upon 'strategic acquisitions' which they define as ones where there
was strategic capability transfer in related acquisitions. On this basis we should
be cautious in accepting their emphasis on certain acquisition styles. Indeed, we
have already suggested in chapter 2 section 2.4.1 that there is good reason to
expect that the distribution of our acquisitions will shift emphasis away from
Absorption and Symbiotic acquisition towards Preservation and maybe Holding
acquisitions.
4.2.1 Responding sample distribution
The location of our responding sample cases on the Haspeslagh and Jemison
(1991) contingency framework and our slightly different way of
operationalising the matrix is discussed fully in section 3.5.3.1 in chapter 3. For
the resource interdependency axis the main approach has been to use an average
score of resource transfer for our three transfer variables. This is our base model
throughout the thesis unless otherwise stated. However we have recognised that
resource interdependency could be just the transfer of one resource rather than
all three. We therefore have created a 'weak version' l of the matrix which is
referred to by name when used. In addition we have also created a 'strong form'
which argues that all three variables need to exhibit high levels of transfer for
The reason for the weak and strong forms is discussed in Chapter 3, page 26.
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high interdependency to exist. The distribution of cases 2 is summarised in
Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: Distribution of cases by acquisition type
We were rather surprised by the distribution of the data shown above.
Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991) work concentrates upon Symbiotic,
Absorption and Preservation acquisitions, with a particular emphasis upon
Symbiotic acquisitions, and yet from our data, Symbiotic acquisitions accounted
for just 4.3°0 of all responses. If we then examine where these points actually
fall we find that two out of the three Symbiotic cases are only just within the
2 Actual case locations are shown in Appendix 4.1
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box in question (3.3 on the resource transfer axis). There are therefore very few
clear cases of Symbiotic acquisitions indeed. We would suggest therefore that
the approach adopted by Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991), of concentrating upon
data in the bottom right hand corner of the matrix, is somewhat misplaced, at
least in a UK context. Our finding is that far more activity is concentrated in the
other three types of acquisition. Although our responding sample does appear to
be representative of the population on broad measures of bid value and sales, it
is conceivable that our finding, regarding the distribution of acquisitions, has
resulted from a bias in the responding sample. Sample bias is discussed in
Chapter 3, section 3.6.2.2, but it is worth reiterating that less successful
acquisitions may be less likely to respond. Symbiotic acquisitions in particular
may therefore be prone to under-performance3.
63.7° 0 of all responses can be said to fall cleanly into the four acquisition types.
These responses are shown in Figure 4.2.
3 To establish whether this is indeed the case, we would need to categorise all the acquisitions in
the population, but to achieve this requires disclosure of private information by those
companies. By not returning questionnaires, we do not have access, or a substitute for this
information.
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of pure cases
Autonomy
Low	 High
Note . n 44, th d tr butt n	 1 nificant at the 01 level (Fisher' exact test)
A significant number f case fall n the b rder between acquisition types. This
i particularly true f r the autonomy axis where 28.2° o of all cases had average
autonomy4. In our b qu nt di cu i n of each pure type we also supply
figures which include randomly as igned borderline cases as well as for
accounti g for potential p sitive bias n the autonomy scale5.
4.2.2 Preservation acquisitions
Preservation acquisitions accounted for over half of our 'pure' types 6 and the
observed value was greater than the expected value although only accounting for
4 This methodology problem is discussed in section 3.5 of chapter 3.
5 Where unidirectional relationships are hypothesised across entire scales, all cases are used.
'Excluding borderline cases. If borderline cases are randomly assigned, then Preservation cases
account for 490 0
 of all cases (Matrix significant at the .05 level). Where there is correction
0.7 of the chi-value. Whilst we had expected a significant number of
Preservation acquisitions, as studies such as Datta and Grant (1990), Kitching
(1967) and Hughes (1993) had all acknowledged high levels of unrelated
acquisitions, and it seemed likely that unrelated acquisitions would fall into the
Preservation category, the apparent dominance of Preservation acquisitions is
still noteworthy7.
Section 3.5.3.1 in chapter 3 notes that the strategic interdependence axis can be
operationalised in a weak and strong form depending upon ones view of whether
resource transfer can be determined by high levels of just one aspect or an
amalgam of all three. In both cases Preservation acquisitions remain the
dominant style (60° 0 of cases in the strong form and 46.9% of cases in the weak
form) and in the weak form accounted for 0.84 of the chi-value. On this basis
we can return to our first proposition which suggests that Preservation
acquisitions will be significant in number compared with Absorption and
Symbiotic acquisitions. We can state that this is the case on a pure and adjusted
basis. On a pure basis Preservation acquisitions were the dominant style in this
survey and were present in significantly greater numbers than might be expected
both from Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991) treatment and based upon
for positive autonomy bias, Preservation cases account for 40.6° o of all cases (Matrix
significant at the .07 level).
7 There is an issue here of the position of the borderline cases. If they are randomly assigned,
then Preservation acquisitions continue to dominate numerically although Preservation cases
do not depart significantly from the expect value. However, if one takes the view that
executive self regard will mean that they overstate autonomy, we find a more or less equal
split between Holding and Preservation acquisitions.
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probability. However, this dominance was mitigated if adjustments were made
for possible positive autonomy bias.
The recognition that the Preservation acquisition style is a major feature of
acquisitions in the UK is an important counter-balance to the prevailing
emphasis in the acquisition literature on Absorption and Symbiotic styles. We
shall return to this theme in our summary section.
4.2.3 Holding acquisitions
The next largest category was Holding acquisitions. This accounted for 20.5%
of pure cases 8 . The observed number of cases however was lower than expected
in probability and contributed 1.1 to the chi-value 9. In terms of the weak transfer
model, Holding acquisitions accounted for 16.3% of deals which again was less
than statistically expected, contributing 1.3 to the chi-value.
If we correct for possible autonomy bias, Holding acquisitions account for
similar numbers as Preservation acquisitions with 40.6° o of cases and are no
longer significantly different from expected values.
8 Excluding borderline cases. If borderline cases are randomly assigned, Holding acquisitions
account for 26°0 of all cases (Matrix significant at the .05 level). Where there is correction
for positive autonomy bias, Holding cases account for 40.6% of all cases (Matrix significant
at the .07 level).
9 In a 2x2 cross tabulation, the critical value for chi is 3.84 at the .05 level. A value of 1.1 for
just one cell is therefore noteworthy.
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Even in the pure form, the substantial presence of Holding acquisitions is a very
surprising finding, and in the model adjusted for autonomy bias, Holding
acquisitions rival Preservation ones in significance. This is a particularly
interesting find as this type of acquisition was ignored by Haspeslagh and
Jemison (1991). Whilst they imply that Holding acquisitions are rare, it would
appear that this is not the case. This raises the issue of why these acquisitions
are made and how value is added or captured.
With regard to our second proposition, which suggests that Holding acquisitions
will be a significant portion of take-over activity in the UK, we can say that they
are indeed an important feature, representing a fifth of all activity in our pure
responding sample, and 40.6°0 in our total responding sample.. Explaining this
oversight, Holding acquisitions may have been ignored because they were
thought to be rare or perhaps managerially rather easy. There would appear to be
grounds for the latter point and this issue is discussed in Chapter five.
Holding acquisitions are clearly of greater significance than has been recognised
previously. The importance of this observation will be examined in the
summary section.
4.2.4 Absorption acquisitions
Our other major category of responding cases was Absorption acquisitions with
18.2% of responses' °. This observed number was many more than predicted
contributing a statistically significant 3.1 to the chi-value". Clearly this is an
important acquisition style although in absolute terms, based upon the
acquisition literature, we might have expected even more cases. In the weak
transfer model we found 22.4% of cases; again more than expected statistically,
adding 2.3 to the chi-value.
The acquisition literature together with Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991) work
suggests that Absorption acquisitions are an important acquisition style and this
is born out by our findings.
4.2.5 Symbiotic acquisitions
Our smallest category of acquisitions was the Symbiotic one which accounted
for just 6.8°0 of pure cases 12. This number was significantly less than expected
in probability terms, adding 2.1 to the chi-value. The observed number of cases
was also far less than expected based upon the emphasis of Haspeslagh and
I ° Excluding borderline cases. If borderline cases are randomly assigned, Absorption
acquisitions account for 16°0 of all cases (Matrix significant at the .05 level). Where there is
correction for positive autonomy bias, Absorption cases account for 14.5°0 of all cases
(Matrix significant at the .07 level).
I I Even correcting for autonomy bias, Absorption acquisitions still occur in more instances than
expected and this is statistically significant.
12 Excluding borderline cases. If borderline cases are randomly assigned, Symbiotic acquisitions
account for 90 0 of all cases (Matrix significant at the .05 level). Where there is correction for
positive autonomy bias, Symbiotic cases account for 4.3°0 of all cases (Matrix significant at
the .07 level).
. If we correct for possible autonomy bias
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Jemison's (1991) work. When examined in a weak form model, we arrive at the
same picture with significantly fewer Symbiotic acquisitions than we might
expect based upon probability, although the contribution to the chi-value is
reduced to 1.45. It is not surprising that relatively more acquisitions will become
classed as Symbiotic as the stringency of our resource transfer criteria is relaxed,
but the result is still a less prevalent acquisition style than we have been led to
believe13.
4.2.6 Discussion
The results from the distribution of our responding sample suggest strongly that
Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991) emphasis upon 'value creating' acquisitions at
the expense of Preservation and Holding acquisitions is unjustified. Clearly both
Preservation and Holding styles represent an important portion of acquisition
activity in the UK, whether viewed from our strong or weak models of resource
transfer and whether we examine just pure forms or adjust for potential
autonomy bias. It is also worth noting the lack of Symbiotic acquisitions which
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) suggest as a superior integration style. To an
extent we may be able to draw some generalisations from these findings on the
broad basis of the distribution of 'value creating' and value capturing
acquisitions.
13 In the model adjusting for potential autonomy bias, Symbiotic acquisitions remain fewer in
number than expected.
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It is worth noting that 75% of pure responses exhibited low resource transfer
whilst in our weak transfer model this level was 63.3% 14. We had anticipated,
largely based upon extant literature, that the majority of cases would exhibit a
substantial transfer of resources as this is where value is supposed to be realised.
Our findings show clearly that the majority of acquisitions in our responding
sample are not founded upon substantial resource transfer but rather upon 'value
capture' 15.
This is an important observation on the way in which acquisitions are handled in
the post-acquisition phase and strongly suggests that in the UK the majority of
acquisitions are bolt-on additions. This might be a reflection upon the intentions
behind why such acquisitions are made or indeed a recognition of the difficulties
and complexities of transferring capabilities in the post-acquisition phase. To
resolve this issue, the next section will examine the assumption that acquisitions
experiencing capability transfer will be more associated with post-acquisition
success than acquisition styles which capture value.
14 72.9°0 of our total responding sample
15	 •This observation, in terms of relative importance of acquisitions categories and relative
proportions of value creation (33.3°0) and value capture (66.7°0), also holds true for a sub
sample that examines the weak transfer form for cases where in excess of two years has
elapsed since acquisition.
4.3 Acquisition styles and post-acquisition success16
4.3.1 Value capture versus 'value creating' acquisitions
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) make a strong case for linking capability
transfer with successful acquisitions; 'The true measure of success is the notion
of creating value through acquisition rather than capturing it' (Haspeslagh and
Jemison, 1991). For Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991), 'value creating'
acquisitions are either Absorption or Symbiotic. In section 2.42.2 of chapter 2
we suggest that this automatic prescription of resource transfer leading to
greater success may well be flawed. The act of transferring capabilities may
cause value destruction (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991: 142) and the link
between the transfer of capabilities and success may be more complex and
difficult than Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) suggest (Almeida, 1996,
Szulanski, 1996). In addition there is evidence that non-synergistic acquisitions
are viewed as highly successful (Anslinger and Copeland, 1996) which appears
counter to the argument for resource transfer.
To assess whether acquisitions experiencing 'value creation' are more
successful than 'value capture' acquisitions, we examined four broad perceptual
measures of success; whether the acquisition was a success overall; whether the
cost of capital had been recovered; whether it was successful in terms of group
16 Before we embarked upon looking for associations between acquisition styles and post-
acquisition success, we tested the main pre-acquisition variables, identified in Chapter two,
which are said to be associated with post-acquisition success. Our results, contained in
Appendix 4.2, showed no significant associations, which supports our argument that pre-
acquisition characteristics are poor indicators of post-acquisition success.
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profitability; and whether it had achieved it's strategic objectives. We were
aware that the length of time that had elapsed since acquisition might affect the
perceptions of success. A bivariate correlation analysis between our four broad
perceptual measures and the amount of time elapsed since the acquisition
showed significant positive associations17.
The relationship between elapsed time and perceptions of success was not
linear. We noted a slump in the number of returns received after eighteen
months and an increase in the number of unsuccessful acquisitions ig . This fall in
returns is worth noting as follow up telephone calls, where eighteen months to
two years had elapsed, found Managing Executives less welcoming than at other
times. This may be an indicator of difficulties in the integration becoming
apparent. Although our numbers are rather small, this suggests a time frame in
which all the complexities of a deal unwind and become apparent. It is
interesting to note that Gabarro (1987), whom we shall be referring to in chapter
7, suggests that it takes about two and a half years to fully take charge of a
company.
Mindful of the distortion that time elapsed can cause, Table 4.1 presents the
results of the Mann-Whitney Wilcoxon sum rank test for differences in
17	 •Time elapsed against; Overall success (.08 level); recovering the cost of capital (.01 level);
group profitability (.004); achieved strategic objectives (.06)
18 A third of acquisitions perceived as unsuccessful occurred after two years had elapsed
4-215
perceptions of success between 'value capture' and 'value creation' acquisitions
for all of our responding sample and two sub-samples19.
Table 4.1	 Value creation versus 'value capture' acquisitions
Success variables Chi square
for all respondents
Chi square
for acquisitions
over 18 months
Chi square
for acquisitions
under 18 months
Overall success (q9a) .39 .36 .58
Recovering cost of
capital (q9b)
.91 .20 .18
Group profitability
(q9c)
.74 .25 .84
Achieving strategic
objectives (q9d)
.78 .35 .79
n	 58 n= 58 n=31 n=27
It is clear from Table 4.1 that none of the broad measures of success for the
responding sample associate to a greater extent with 'value creation' than 'value
capture' acquisitions. When we altered the definition of 'value capture /
creation' by adopting weak and strong form models of resource transfer we
again did not find any significant results20. This supports our third proposition
that Absorption and Symbiotic acquisition will not be perceived to be
significantly more successful than acquisitions experiencing low capability
transfer and strongly suggests that the link between resource transfer and
19 We found that correlation between success and the time elapsed were not significant for a
sample consisting of deals under 18 months and for a sample consisting of deals over 18
months.
20 We also ran all the tests omitting acquisitions under 5 0 o of parent sales (Kitching, 1967) and
also controlled for any respondent bias by running the test firstly for just incumbent
respondents then new Managing Executives. No results were significant.
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success is still be demonstrated. In broad terms, success can be achieved equally
between 'value capture' and 'value creation' approaches.
4.3.2 Knowledge transfer and perceptions of success
The resource-based view has made significant claims for the importance of
knowledge as the key source of competitive advantage and attention is focusing
upon its transfer (Spender and Grant, 1996). Whilst we have not found a
significant association between aggregate resource transfer and perceptions of
success, it is possible that any association with knowledge may have been
diluted by other resource transfer items.
Table 4.2 shows the results for the total responding sample and for a sub-sample
of cases where eighteen months or more has elapsed since acquisition.
Table 4.2:	 Knowledge transfer and perceptions of success
Success variables Kendall
correlation
coefficient
Significance
level
(one tailed test)
Overall success (q9a) .2644 .038
Recovering cost of capital (q9b) .2446 .051
Group profitability (q9c) .2051 .083
Achieving strategic objectives (q9d) .3322 .014
n=3 3
The above shows that there is weak evidence to support the notion that
knowledge transfer is significantly associated with perceptions of success.
Where more time has elapsed between the acquisition and the return of the
questionnaire, the associations appear stronger 21 . For instance, in terms of
overall success, for all respondents, 81.3% of those citing low knowledge
transfer said the acquisition was successful and 18.8% said it was unsuccessful,
whereas all of those citing high knowledge transfer said the acquisition was
successful. For respondents in acquisitions over eighteen months old, in terms of
overall success, only 50 0 0 of those citing low knowledge transfer said their
acquisition was successful. However 100 0 0 of those citing high knowledge
transfer said the acquisition was a success.
Whilst one might argue that over time more knowledge will be transferred, it is
worth noting that there is no significant correlation 22
 between knowledge
transfer and the time elapsed between acquisition and questionnaire returns. For
our sub-sample of cases where less  than eighteen months has elapsed, there was
no significant association between the broad perceptions of success and
knowledge transfer23.
21
Success variables Phi value
for all respondents
Phi value
for acquisitions over 18 months
Overall success (q9a) .35 .57
Recovering cost of capital (q9b) .21 .57
Group profitability (q9c) .46 .64
Achieving strategic objectives (q9d) .31 .64
22 Kendall's tau - b was used as the knowledge transfer five point Likert scale is an ordered
category. The correlation of .025 was not significant at .786; n=70
23 (see overleaf)
From these results we can agree with our fourth proposition that knowledge
transfer will be associated with broad perceptions of success. This provides
empirical support for the recent importance ascribed to knowledge and its
transfer in general and specifically contributes to showing the importance of
knowledge transfer in an acquisition context. Furthermore, there is evidence that
knowledge transfer only becomes significantly associated with perceptions of
success after eighteen months24.
It is worth considering why knowledge transfer is significantly associated with
perceptions of post- acquisition success whilst our aggregate resource transfer
items were not. One reason may concern method for, as noted above, we took
extreme values of knowledge transfer, omitting the mid point, and this may have
resulted in a clearer picture. However when selecting our aggregate resources on
a similar basis, this did not appear to be an explanation. We suggest therefore
that the effect of knowledge transfer was diluted by the other resource transfer
items.
In summary we might suggest that the resource transfer axis could be simplified
to knowledge and information transfer as this has clear associations with
Success variables Chi value for acquisitions
under 18 months
Overall success (q9a) .16
Recovering cost of capital (q9b) .59
Group profitability (q9c) 1.0
Achieving strategic objectives (q9d) .61
24	 • •This is a crude estimation based upon examining Mann-Whitney results for six month
intervals. After 24 months the results are consistently significant for all four items.
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success25 and with change26 which is the subject of the next chapter. In addition
it is worth recording that the transfer of knowledge and information is
orthogonal to the autonomy axis.
4.3.3 A hierarchy of acquisition styles by success
So far we have concentrated upon the resource interdependency axis for
associations with perceptions of success. The Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991)
contingency framework also recognises the important role of autonomy in
affecting post-acquisition outcome. A reduction in autonomy of the acquired
company can destroy the core capabilities that have been purchased. On the
other hand, acquired companies that are under-performing may need to be under
firmer control and so lose autonomy. For these reasons, we echo the general
view of Datta and Grant (1990) that acquisitions with higher autonomy are
likely to be perceived as more successful than those with low autonomy.
In section 2.4.2.4 of chapter 2, we suggested that there may be a hierarchy of
success amongst Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991) acquisition styles where high
resource transfer acquisitions with high autonomy are likely to be perceived as
more successful than ones with low autonomy, and low resource transfer
25 Knowledge and information transfer was also significantly associated with six out of the
seven other success variables in question 9.
26 Knowledge and information transfer was significantly correlated with change with an r of
.328 and a two tailed significance of .006; n---69
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acquisitions with high autonomy are likely to be more successful than those
with low autonomy.
Using a Kruskal Wallis 1-way ANOVA for our four acquisition types we looked
for significant differences between them in terms of perceptions of success -
'self et sequentia perceived'. The results for our responding sample are
contained in table 4.3.
Table 4.3:	 Acquisition type against perceptions of success
Success variables Significance level
for all respondents
n
Overall success (q9a) .56 49
Recovering cost of capital (q9b) .87 41
Group profitability (q9c) .73 44
Achieving strategic objectives (q9d) .25 42
Table 4.3 shows that a hierarchy of success amongst the acquisition styles is not
apparent27 . For all the success items in table 4.3 we found that at least three
quarters of respondents in each acquisition type said the acquisition had been
successful.
Mindful of the previous discussion we ran the test again using a definition of
acquisition types based upon autonomy and knowledge/information transfer, but
again without significant results. This suggests that autonomy is not associated
27	 •	 •Sunilar results are achieved if we use the whole responding sample and adjust for positive
autonomy bias.
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with success. Indeed when we tested for this by using a Kendall's tau-b
correlation we found no significant associations with any of our success
variables and the level of autonomy experienced by the acquired company.
Perhaps the result that perceptions of success are not associated with a particular
acquisition style is not so surprising for, as Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) have
suggested, different situations demand different styles. On this basis we should
be wary of recommending any one acquisition style over another based upon
performance outcome.
4.4 Conclusion
Our five propositions set out in Chapter two were aimed at determining whether
Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991) concentration upon 'value creating'
acquisitions was justified in a UK context and whether these 'value creating'
acquisitions were indeed more successful than 'value capture' ones.
We have established that the implied importance of 'value creating' acquisitions
in Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991) work is a distortion of acquisition activity
in general. In the UK we found that 'value capture' acquisitions were dominant,
accounting for 72.9% of our responding sample, and in particular that the
Holding acquisition style, rather than being insignificant, is an important
category of acquisition activity. This suggests that most corporate acquisitions
during this time frame were bolt-on businesses and this finding is supported by
question eight in the questionnaire which asked executives for the main reasons
behind the acquisition. In 47.1% of cases, the acquisition was explicitly
described in terms of just the purchase of assets even though the survey
explicitly concentrated upon corporates and avoided pure asset purchases. For
example, comments included, 'a cheap opportunity to acquire assets', 'a book of
business at a discount to embedded value'.
We also found that 'value creating' acquisitions do not appear to be more
successful than 'value capture' ones. This supports the recent arguments by
Anslinger and Copeland (1996) that non-synergistic acquisition can be very
successful. If we buy in to the attractive notion that 'value creating' acquisitions
should lead to greater value than 'value capture' ones, and our next paragraph
presents some evidence that resource transfers can have a positive effect, then
our result suggests that there could be implementation difficulties with value
creating acquisitions which impair performance.
Whilst resource transfer in itself does not appear to be associated with broad
perceptions of the success of acquisitions, the transfer of knowledge and
information is so associated. This provides empirical support for the importance
of knowledge and information transfer as emphasised by the resource-based
school. It also flags up the issue that other forms of transfer may have a
mitigating effect upon the effect of knowledge and information transfer.
When we looked for a hierarchy of success amongst acquisition styles we were
unable to find such a sequence. Mindful of our observations in terms of
knowledge and information transfer being associated with success we tried re-
framing our acquisition styles by knowledge and information transfer against
autonomy and yet were still unable to ascribe higher levels of success to one
type or another. From this we concluded that the mitigating factor was
autonomy which does not appear to have a strong association with success as
implied in much of the organisational behaviour literature on acquisitions. We
therefore suggest that different acquisition styles are equally likely to succeed
and that they should be chosen according to the type of integration required
rather than any thought that a particular style is more successful.
The next chapter will look inside each acquisition type to see whether there are
significant differences between each in terms of the type and volume of changes
that are made. After characterising each acquisition type, chapter five will
examine the reasons why each acquisition style was adopted.
5.  Change in dominant acquisition types
5.1	 Introduction
5.2 Cameos of acquisition types
5.3 Key dimensions of post-acquisition change
5.4 Acquisition types by key dimensions of change
5.5 Conclusion
5.1 Introduction
In this Chapter we shall identify and systematically examine the main post-
acquisition changes within the acquisition types of our responding sample. This
is intended to address an important limitation in Haspeslagh and Jemison's
(1991) work, where change has been handled in a partial and rather superficial
way. Our comprehensive treatment of change, across all acquisition types, will
enable us to test the robustness of the flaspeslagh and Jemison (1991)
framework. In so doing we hope to develop a more detailed picture of change in
all, rather than a selection, of acquisition types.
In Chapter two we developed a number of propositions relating to post-
acquisition change, propositions 6 to 12, and also observed in table 2.8, that
5-225
they could be grouped around the relationship between change and autonomy
and / or resource transfer. In this chapter, we will look specifically at the issues
of aggregate change against autonomy, and against resource transfer. Thereafter
we will concentrate upon identifying characteristic variations in change between
acquisition types to generate a rounded picture for each'.
To aid us in our task we shall be drawing upon the questionnaire data to provide
statistical evidence of the frequency of change across acquisition types and
interview data to provide a level of understanding and explanation for our
findings.
5.2 Cameos2 of acquisition types
Chapter four suggested 3 that Preservation is the dominant style of acquisition,
with over half of all deals, followed by Holding with 2l°, Absorption with 18° 0
and latterly Symbiotic with 7%4 . To characterise each acquisition type, the
following cameos of post-acquisition change are based upon one highly
involved informant5 in each acquisition. These are not necessarily complete or
i We felt this approach was preferable to an exhaustive treatment of many propositions relating
change to autonomy and or resource transfer which would result in fragmentation.
2 Executive names, titles, and company situations are disguised to protect identity.
3 For deals falling cleanly into categories (n 44)
4 See figure 4.3 in Chapter 4. For the full responding sample with borderline cases equally
allocated, the percentages in each category are 49°0, 26°0, 16°0 and 9 0 0 respectively.
5 Actual examples were used rather than synthetic cases which can lack in 'realness' and seem
contrived. The disadvantage of the real case is that the core elements appropriate to the 'type'
may not always emerge as clearly as the 'ideal' picture.
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impartial accounts but seem to be representative of the other interviews
collected for each acquisition style.
5.2.1 Preservation acquisitions
These are characterised in Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991) framework by low
resource transfer and high autonomy. There is very little change in the post-
acquisition period and the emphasis is upon maintaining the status quo.
Micrometer, in the cameo below, is fairly typical of many Preservation
acquisitions as very few changes are made as a direct result of the take-over. In
particular the core capability remains intact and indeed is defended against
change by the parent. The emphasis is very much to keep things as they are as
they work.
Utility PLC's acquisition of a Micrometer PLC
Micrometer PLC was a very profitable, market leading, precision engineering
company with several hundred employees. It was acquired 6 in 1991 by a major
utility company, Utility PLC, who wished to keep the management. In the
words of Andrews, the Managing Director of Micrometer, 'without
management they were going to be a bit adrift'.
6 Actual bid size has been disguised to protect the identity of the company. Appendix 3.3 gives a
rough indicator of bid categories.
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Post-acquisition there was a down turn in performance and a general malaise in
Micrometer for four months due to uncertainty surrounding new ownership and
an enormous fear of change. Micrometer's staff felt big corporates attitude
would be 'we'll just close it'. 'Everybody expected a big wave of change but it
never happened. Utility PLC didn't have anyone driving it'.
Post-acquisition, Andrews's felt 'Head Office didn't know what their
requirements were!' Apart from insisting that Micrometer adopt their reporting
format within two months, and saying that costs should be reduced, 'they'd no
clear pattern of what they were trying to achieve'. Whilst up-dating Head
Office, Andrews was asked, 'Why do you just bring me problems?' He replied,
`I'm not bringing you problems, I'm telling you what's happening!' Indeed
every business Utility acquired complained, What is the group going to do
about this, and what is the group going to do about that?' to which Andrews
replied 'I've learnt that they're going to do nothing, so you bloody well get on
with it and keep your head down'. 'After-care was non-existent'
Head Office did not drive change in Micrometer except to insist upon control of
capital expenditure, parent financial reporting format, and to suggest cost
reduction. Their managing of Micrometer consisted entirely of monitoring ever-
more stringent budget requirements. In response, Andrews ensured that even
during a difficult market, 'we've managed always to perform'. Achieving
budget kept Head Office at bay and provided the budgets were done in the right
way, flexibility to match budgeted profit could be ensured.
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Keeping a low profile has been a successful course of action. 'At the end of the
day I decided to keep out of the way and let them carry on with the politics up
there and just produce results; there's nothing better than just producing results'.
Indeed Micrometer has consistently performed well post-acquisition. 'If we
perform, we get the investment. If we don't perform, they'll come and dig
around in it and we don't want that'.
Soon after the acquisition Andrews took the initiative to make a few changes
directly relating to the change in ownership. 'Because I had more time to spend
on the business I had more time to identify what needed doing next and to drive
it forward'. The finance director was retired and parent financial reporting
welcomed as an improvement upon the previous system. An executive position
which handled insurance and banking arrangements became superfluous as it
duplicated a function in Head Office.
Andrews made further changes in response to the declining market. The
changes 'weren't necessarily to do with the take-over. We were making changes
because I thought it was appropriate to make changes'. These changes 'would
have happened even if we had stayed private'. 'Most changes are market
driven'.
For Andrews, the worst part of the acquisition was his lack of involvement with
Head Office which spent 'more time looking at things and doing nothing'.
During the post-acquisition phase, Head Office was characterised by rare visits
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and remote decisions. They did not appear to have a sufficient understanding of
what was going on in the companies. Andrews took action because he felt that
if he waited for clear instructions from Head Office, 'I could have still been sat
here'. 'I haven't taken that tack because I believe that having taken the staff into
a deal, I owed it to them to do the best for them'.
Being acquired by Utility PLC has allowed Micrometer to raise its business to
the next level. There has been some limited nurturing as capital investment in
computer systems, although they could have paid for this themselves, and
Andrews has been able to stand back to allow the management standard to rise.
Andrews has been moved up to run a number of European Businesses and there
are now strong moves some five years after the acquisition to realise synergies
with other group companies.
Micrometer does exhibit typical features of Preservation acquisitions in that
there is a generally low level of change and an emphasis upon maintaining core
operations. The main area of change was focusing upon improved financial
reporting. The Managing Executive remains and shows a bias for action
although in the case of Micrometer, there is perhaps more change than typical
due to the market downturn. There is a clear sense of distance from the new
parent, which doesn't really know what to do with them, but also a fear that the
inexperienced parent might decide to take a greater interest and damage the
business. For this reason there is considerable attention to achieving results.
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There has been some limited nurturing from the parent, but this could have been
achieved by Micrometer in its own right.
At the other end of the spectrum, Absorption acquisitions exhibit a great deal of
change as a direct result of being subsumed within the new parent.
5.2.2 Absorption Acquisitions
These are characterised in Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991) framework by high
resource transfer and low autonomy. Packers PLC is a fairly typical absorption
case as they made very substantial change to Edibles PLC. In particular Edibles'
identity was removed and efforts were concentrated on de-duplicating activities
to drive down costs.
Packers PLC acquisition of Edibles PLC
In 1993, Packers PLC purchased Edibles PLC, a medium sized, family
controlled, profitable food manufacturing business, as part of a sector
rationalisation.
Whilst the negotiations had been handled by board members, the integration
was managed by Keaton, finance director of a subsidiary, - 'I had to say, 'Well -
what's going to happen?"
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There was a planning period of 7 - 8 weeks from when the take-over was
agreed. 'We had been able to have a cursory walk around Edible PLC before the
acquisition but we were not allowed to check it out fully. We had a gut feel that
something would be closed but we couldn't be sure which factory'.
'I was then parachuted in and we had a big meeting of managers and pushed out
plans of activity for who's responsible for what'. 'We overlaid a layer of
management on top of their management and effectively we had people working
side by side over that period of time, their people were running the activity but
if we wanted to influence them we did!'. 'We took the view, 'Well, lets give
ourselves a period of time during which, if people don't get on then guys will
leave anyway, but we need to spend five months establishing exactly who the
right people are. We know broadly the structure that we want, but lets create
some interface between the organisations that allows us to start the planning
process'. 'Everybody knew that we were likely to do some rationalisation of
factories, depots and we didn't know enough to go in there day one and
suddenly do things'.
'All the directors including the FD, the company secretary, had all gone except
for one who we made Managing Director of one of the manufacturing
operations' and' the directors of 3 small businesses remained, because we
thought we were going to sell them anyway'. 'We don't want a board of
directors floating around and I think they knew that. It was the operational guys
that we might want to keep'.
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'We managed (Edibles PLC) as a separate activity' for five months and reported
it separately in the management accounts. During that time 'I went through the
process of agreeing budgets in effect for the part of the activity that was going to
be split into each of our separate areas'. Keaton then met with the managers who
had spent two months ghosting the management and asked what they thought
compared with the earlier ball park paper. In one business area 'people said 'its
going to cost us twice as much to build a bloody factory!' - great!' In another
they said 'Oh fine, easy, we'll just integrate it. When can we start?'
'Before the end of the five month period we had already closed down one of
their factories and moved the activity into our factory'. Their factory was
running probably at 60 0 0
 - 70°0 capacity whilst ours, three times the size, was
running at 70 0 0
 capacity. 'You bang the whole thing in and it runs at 100%
capacity. So it just made sense. We incurred a redundancy bill and the wrath of
lots of people and got on and did it'.
'The five months really gave us time to completely get rid of every bit of
identity that was Edibles PLC.' The Head Office was closed during the first five
months. The period also gave them time to work out how to link computer
systems together so that the financial reports could be produced without having
a separate section for Edible PLC and `so everybody understands how it fits
together'.
'We had come up with a way during that 5 months that we understood who the
good people were and who we wanted to keep and also we didn't get the people
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thinking well I'm going to be kicked out and therefore ruin our relationships
with a couple of big customers which could completely destroy the rationale for
doing the acquisition'.
As soon as the 5 month period was up 'a lot of people were banging tables
saying we've got to get costs out'. 'We ought to be able to run this lean and
efficient. We don't have all those people, so we kicked them all out'.
There were some difficulties in removing so many people; 'what we didn't do
was say, well they must be doing something'. As a result a significant problem
resulted in one factory and in terms of tax records 'the linkages from one record
to another has effectively gone because it was within individuals heads' and
those people have gone.
'Where things went wrong is we put it all into Packers PLC and then went, ah
fine, its part of Packers PLC now' 'We sort of stitched the accounting systems
together, put somebody in charge of it and assumed it would work. And yes, it
seemed to be fine for the first couple of months, but we are still, still having
difficulty'. Superficially we put the computers together to make them work.'
What we didn't do was to say, 'well the computers are talking to each other, do
the people? Are the people who are operating the computers talking to each
other? So we fixed the systems but we didn't fix the procedures'.
Keaton 'had to use all my persuasion and charm to get anything done. I was
three grades lower than most people who I was getting to do things'. 'I sat there
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face to face with three general mangers and they're going, 'Who's this idiot
from Head Office'. 'I was sort of shuttling backwards and forwards as a
diplomat rather than as a manager'. Keaton felt he needed a larger full time team
which would have speeded the process and been more comprehensive. 'There
are a number of things lurking around that aren't absolutely critical but are now
causing pains and difficulties because we didn't tie everything off as neatly as
we could have done'.
Despite these problems, overall 'I think all the initial phases went reasonably
smoothly because we understood the business - it was business that was familiar
to us'. We could talk the same language. We could plan it because we knew the
things that would be issues.
Packers PLC's acquisition of Edible PLC is a good example of the Absorption
style. In clear contrast to the Preservation cameo above, the emphasis is upon
considerable change to the acquired company in order to ensure compatibility
with the parent operation. It is interesting to note that next to nothing is
mentioned of customers which shows the inward focus of management on
handling the complexities of internal integration. In addition the effort is
entirely on reducing costs. There is no mention of how value might be created in
the future and an overwhelming sense that once all the cost cutting has
happened then everything from the acquisition has been achieved.
The third main type of acquisition identified is the Holding acquisition where
considerable change was recorded.
5.2.3 Holding acquisitions
These are located in an area of low autonomy and low resource transfer on
Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991) framework. However, they do not characterise
Holding acquisitions except to say that these acquisitions might be traded. We
therefore have little guidance as to what changes we might encounter in this
acquisition style.
The acquisition of Transistor PLC seems representative of Holding acquisitions
as it experiences high levels of change to re-establish a sound footing for the
business. This is achieved whilst remaining distinct from the parent company.
Circuit Board PLC acquisition of Transistor PLC
Transistor PLC, a loss making electronics business, employing a few hundred
people, was acquired in 1992. Its acquirer, Circuit Board PLC, had a subsidiary
with clear overlapping interests.
Post-acquisition, Stanton, Chief Executive of Transistor said 'the chap with
whom I had been negotiating handed me the Circuit Board PLC procedures,
manuals and piles of forms and I said, 'well thank you very much, I was
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expecting something like this. When can we actually have a meeting to discuss
strategy?' He said 'we've got a board meeting coming up in four weeks time,
we'll discuss it then'. 'We never did!'. 'I had just one meeting with Circuit
Board PLC in the month post-acquisition'.
'There was no discussion of strategy which should cover marketing, production,
personnel, financial, I mean the whole gambit. They never discussed with me or
my other co- directors what we wanted out of the deal and what we were
prepared to put in post-acquisition'.' Nobody came to me and said, 'You've
built this thing up over the last 13 years, what do you want out of it?' 'There
was no attempt to motivate the staff. 'It was just 'Carry on". 'People came to
me and said, 'What now?', 'What are they going to do; how can they help us?'
and I said, 'I have no idea - I'm sure it will all become clear' - but it never did'.
'Their financial reporting structure was very good'. It was introduced on day
one. 'They required daily cash orders, sales, report daily and a weekly summary
report P&L. I believe they received far too much information'. 'What was
missing was any reaction to those. The only reaction we got was 'group cash is
tight, delay paying creditors for another two weeks".
The first serious discussion was three months post-acquisition at the September
board meeting. Transistor was not making budget and the divisional director
asked what Stanton was going to do about it. He said 'I ought to sack half the
staff and restructure. He said good idea. Why didn't you do it before and I said I
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don't want to get rid of any assets, until I know what you want to do with them.
He said what we need is to get back on budget! I said the cost of sacking in
money terms is X but more importantly in terms of achieving our strategy it's
XYZ and means putting back our strategy quite severely. What he said is 'I
want profit !"
'When I had the green light to do my pruning exercise I took out the group
finance director and group functions as there is no group and fired the co-
founder of Transistor, which was a horrible thing to do. I put myself in charge
and got rid of half the staff. Sales and marketing were cut - 'I don't think there
was any department that was not touched'. 'I radically cut down the
development programme in order to reduce development expenditure by 25%,
to make people understand that Circuit Board PLC was after profit short term
rather than growth long term'. 'We cut customer and country specific
applications'. 'We are paying for it now in that we have lost our market share
which has quartered'. 'I downgraded director's cars' reduced salaries and cut
perks. 'We all took a knock'. 'In my first year I turned Transistor around'.
Other than financial expertise, parent head quarters supplied little else. 'There
were things that I was expecting them to encourage such as MRP or quality
control systems but none was forthcoming. The main emphasis was on financial
controls'. 'Their technology skills were poor' and 'marketers don't exist in
Circuit Board PLC'. Nevertheless the corporate style and logo were changed.
Liaisons with other Managing directors in the group were not encouraged. 'I
said to the divisional Managing Director, 'You've got a very modern factory
making electronic equipment, why don't I see if they will do our production for
us. And he said 'Well you know, just carry on as you are, you've got your
budgets, there is nothing in the plan for that".
When Stanton took the initiative to try to realise synergies he met considerable
resistance. 'I phoned up one subsidiary (with synergistic possibilities) to say, 'I
think we ought to get together. You and I know each other fairly well; I know
what you're doing and you know what I'm doing but only on a fairly superficial
level. Why don't we get together to see how we can make 2+2 = 5'. He said
'That's not my brief. My brief is to continue with the plan and budget I've got
and stuff you'.
Post-acquisition 'we were left in a complete vacuum. All we did was carry on. I
had a futile role of Managing Director'. 'I was exceedingly frustrated and
mystified that I never had a discussion with any board member of Circuit Board
PLC about the future of the company. 'Most surprisingly to me was no
discussion as to the potential synergy between Transistor and the subsidiary
company'.
After pushing for synergy in the division, Stanton was promoted to Deputy
Chairman of the division but in the process lost direct authority to make
changes. Whilst he could recommend changes to the Managing Directors, they
were profit responsible for their operations and so no synergy happened.
Holding acquisitions are clearly characterised by substantial change carried out
in isolation from the rest of the group. The focus of this hermetic exercise is
upon turning the acquired company around and so great emphasis is placed upon
reducing costs and improving financial strength. This is often achieved at the
expense of 'drawing a line through the Managing Executive's strategy' which
leads to considerable frustration upon his part. Once the budgets are achieved
there is a post-acquisition lull as no further input comes from the parent. This
sense of drifting in a vacuum has a deleterious effect upon the Managing
Executive.
5.2.4 Symbiotic acquisitions
We have very few Symbiotic cases from which to draw a representative one.
The following case is located most clearly within the Symbiotic part of the
contingency matrix.
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) see Symbiotic acquisitions as offering the
greatest potential for gain. They are characterised by high autonomy and high
resource transfer. This state is something of a paradox as these factors can
interact to the detriment of the acquired company.
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The acquisition of Homeland PLC is a good example of a Symbiotic acquisition
as it shows how every effort is made to maintain the core of the acquired
company, whilst de-duplicating and investing to achieve substantial change in
the enlarged group. There is clear attention to carrying out change in a very
sensitive and careful way.
Fortress PLC acquisition of Homeland PLC
Fortress PLC, a food manufacturer, acquired Homeland PLC, of the same
industry, in 1993 during a wave of sector consolidations.
Vaughan, corporate development director of Fortress prior to the bid, was
appointed CEO of the acquisition when the board of Homeland resigned shortly
afterwards. 'With the board leaving, we discovered that they had not been
running the company, but their corporate position in the market place. The good
news for us was there was a level below that who were effectively running the
company and running it very well. We were not going to come in and change
them, we were going to let them be their own masters'. However, 'in press
terms, it had been a hard fought acquisition and the confidence of the
management team was badly shaken. It was very important for us to maintain
the establishment and the morale'. 'If you cannot succeed in giving that
confidence, then you run a very high risk of losing folks'. 'We actually lost only
one senior manager, and he left for personal reasons, which is astounding'.
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Vaughan said he 'was able to develop a spirit, a camaraderie and an approach
that this take-over isn't a bad thing - 'where are the benefits we can get out of it?
Lets not be the wounded hurt little company that's been acquired by this large
bidder because we're prouder than that - lets show how well we can make it
work".
The previous management team 'did not spend money'. 'One of the very first
things changed was, we completely renovated the office block, because it was
the pits - there were literally buckets on the floor to stop water coming in. It was
an investment, a big sign'. Vaughan believes he 'would have spent five times
that looking back, because it was a very, very important signal'. He also instated
a training programme and we actually saw improvement. 'We didn't come down
and say, you will do training in x, y and z. We said, there is a training
programme in place - come and tell us what you want'.
There was clear evidence of engaging staff from both companies to drive
changes forward. 'We were, always, always aware that we should balance the
team across incumbents from the two businesses. It got people closer together
and it showed they were equals in the project and we were at pains to make sure
that a certain number of projects were led from one side of the company and an
equal number from the other'.
In terms of the major changes, 'we fairly quickly separated the sales and
marketing and commercial activities of both companies away from the
production capabilities and resources of both companies. We set up three
divisions; a Homeland sales and marketing division, a Fortress sales and
marketing division, and we took out manufacturing, production, stock holding,
warehousing, from both companies and combined them into a central division
which was our manufacturing and operations division'. 'We decided that the
area where more synergies could be achieved, but could easily be sold to both
management teams, were in the manufacturing and production side'. One of the
Fortress manufacturing plants was closed down and, with a substantial capital
injection, the Homeland plant was able to take on the additional volume.
Vaughan increased the focus of the sales and marketing parts by stopping
Fortress's involvement in the volume business and by transferring those
activities into Homeland. In return, the development potential brands in
Homeland were transferred to Fortress which had considerably more experience
and presence in this area.
'We wanted to give a very strong signal that we were keeping these companies
separate. By transferring the skills and expertise and type of business from one
company to another, which we were saying fitted better in one that the other, we
felt that, although not always the best way to run the business, it was a very
clear demonstration that there were two separate operations here, which gave a
degree of confidence and commitment to the people who were in both
companies'
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The Information technology system at Homeland needed replacement and so the
IT system was re-engineered for both companies. 'It would have been wrong of
us to say that we have an all singing, all dancing IT system and dump it on
Homeland. One sees companies who say, 'well the new company will just run
our systems'. I know we didn't do that. I'm glad we didn't do it and I think we
were smart not to do it. We designed it with both companies in mind. I took the
advice of my (Homeland) management team on what we needed to make it run
and what wouldn't help it run'.
'In year three we started looking seriously at the transfer of people'. 'We've
always been very, very aware that the danger is that the acquiring company - its
all of their guys who get the jobs. Now if anything, if there is a slight imbalance,
its probably in the favour of the acquired company'. 'We acknowledged that
you could be an expert IT person in one company as the other'. It was slightly
more difficult on the sales side, 'but I'm not saying its impossible to transfer
because we have transferred a number of folks'.
'I would judge the deal in terms of continuing development of companies,
continuing profit development, the retention of the right staff, the development
of the business, the retention of the customer base, our efficiency levels, our cost
base. On all those things we have more than achieved'.
This cameo has supported Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991) observation that the
acquired company needs to be treated very carefully to allow the building of
mutual trust and confidence so that substantial changes can be made to both
companies. The emphasis is to avoid de-stabilising the acquired company
through making changes. Every effort is made to maintain the acquired
company's identity and, contrary to the other acquisition types, there are big
signals to show good intentions in terms of investing in assets and conspicuous
efforts to involve acquired employees. For changes to happen, the acquired
company management team needed to buy into the decision and there are
several examples where they influenced the outcome for both companies. The
emphases of change are for mutual benefit between the companies, in particular
where there was duplication of operations such as in the manufacturing and
production side, and for greater specialisation, where they were maintaining the
distinctiveness of each company's identity as in marketing and sales.
Stand
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5.2.5 Cameo Summary
The cameos illustrate that the four acquisition types are quite distinct in nature.
In terms of volume and focus of change, they might be shown as follows;
Figure 5.1 Acquisition type by volume and focus of change
Volume of change
High
	
Low
Cut back to core
[Holding]
Preserve and add to core
[Preservation]
De-duplicate both ends
and eliminate differences
[Integration]
De-duplicate and invest
to enhance differences
[Symbiotic]
This depiction already augments the findings of Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991)
who do not give guidance for Holding acquisitions, and also raises the issue in
Symbiotic acquisitions where we find a clear emphasis upon enhancing
differences whereas Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) suggest that the essence of
such acquisitions is amalgamation.
The next section identifies differences in aggregate levels of change by
acquisition type, and proceeds to show how these differences continue for seven
key dimensions of change.
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5.3 Key dimensions of post-acquisition change
Chapter three highlighted our belief in parallels between the changes that take
place in turnarounds and those that occur in the post-acquisition phase as both
are crisis situations (Slatter, 1984: 13, Eccles, 1993) where there is a wish to
achieve marked improvements in performance.
Sharpbenders (Grinyer, Mayes and McKiernan, 1988), exhibited eight
dimensions relative to control companies which were critical to improved
performance. We suggested that if there were indeed parallels between post-
acquisition management and turnaround management, then we would expect to
find similarities in the changes that took place. Table 5.1 below compares the
key dimensions of change for Sharpbenders with the acquisitions surveyed.
Table 5.1 Key dimensions of change for Sharpbenders
% of firms citing one or more variables in each factor
Sharpbenders °0 difference Acquisitions 0 0 difference
from
controls*
** from
Sharpbenders
1 Major changes in
management
85 55 93 8
2 Stronger financial
controls
80 10 90 10
3 New product market
focus
80 0 83 3
4 Improved quality and
service
55 5 54 a)
5 Improved marketing 75 45 60 (15)
6 Intensive efforts to
reduce production costs
80 50 84 4
7 Reduced debt 50 (30) 50 0
8 Windfalls 85 15 23 (62)
* Contained in Sharpbenders study (Grinyer, Mayes and McKiernan, 1988) ** The acquisition
survey questions for these items are discussed and matched to the Sharpbenders study
in Table 3.2 of Chapter 3.
Source: Sharpbenders (Grinyer, Mayes and McKiernan, 1988), Survey (Angwin, 1995)
5-247
It is clear from table 5.1 that for six out of eight items, acquisitions see the same
or greater levels of change than Sharpbenders. In particular, for most of the
items regarded as critical for Sharpbenders, namely major changes in
management, stronger financial controls and efforts to reduce production costs,
acquisitions show higher scores.
The exceptions are improvements in marketing and windfalls. Acquisitions
make fewer changes in improving marketing than Sharpbenders although more
than their control companies. In terms of windfalls 7, acquisitions experience
substantially fewer than Sharpbenders. This does remove a concern that
windfalls could distort our responses although the Sharpbenders study does
make a case for windfalls having a neutral effect upon their results. As windfalls
do not appear to be a significant factor in our acquisitions, they will not be
discussed further8.
The evidence then seems to suggest that there are indeed strong similarities
between turnarounds and acquisitions in terms of the changes made to improve
performance.
7 Question 10 in the questionnaire
8	 •It Is worth pointing out for our later discussion on Insiders and Outsiders, that only the Insiders
recorded windfalls.
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5.3.1 Key dimensions of change for acquisitions
Having shown the close association between the changes made in Sharpbenders
with those in acquisitions, we can now examine those changes in terms of
different acquisition types. Table 5.2 compares each acquisition type with the
key dimensions of change.
Table 5.2 Key dimensions of change for Acquisitions 1991 - 1994
Key dimensions of
change
%	 of firms citing one or more	 variables in	 these factors
a
Acquisitions Holding Absorption Preservation Symbiotic**
Major changes in
management
93 +* 100	 88
100	 100
89	 100
100
85
67
Stronger financial
controls
90 + 100
New product market
focus
83 + 62
,
67
Improved quality
control
54 + - 67 75
75
15 33
Improved marketing 60	 -*** 56 23 67
Reduce production
costs
84 + 100	 88
89	 75
54 67
Reduce debt 50 +- 8 33
Windfalls 23	 -- 33 0 31 0
* The signs refer to whether the 0 0 of acquisitions stating change in this dimension is greater or
less than for the Sharpbenders study (Grinyer, Mayes and McKiernan, 1988)
** We had very few Symbiotic cases but they have been included for illustrative purposes
*** Still 300o higher than control companies
There are two clear patterns that emerge from table 5.2 which have been
highlighted by the emboldened boundary. These are as follows:
1. Changes across the board
One of the main points that stands out from table 5.2 above is that in all
acquisition types there are stronger financial controls post-acquisition. In other
words, no matter what type of acquisition, stronger financial controls are
imposed by the new parent.
A second generality is that there are also major management changes in all types
of acquisition. Symbiotic shows the least but these figures must be treated with
care as we have very few examples of this acquisition type.
2. Divergent changes
After the general changes remarked upon above, the acquisition types show
marked differences in the volume of changes made. The main divide is between
Absorption and Holding acquisitions, and Preservation and Symbiotic
acquisitions.
It is only to be expected that Preservation acquisitions show the least amount of
change, in keeping with protecting the core activity, whilst Absorption
acquisitions show the greatest amount of change, which reflects the need to
integrate operations across the board. The high levels of change also recorded
for Holding acquisitions is symptomatic of turnaround situations whereas the
lower levels associated with Symbiotic acquisitions is more appropriate where
there is investment and build.
Holding
40%
35. 0 Vol. of change
Absorption Preservation
The following figure gives an indicator of relative volumes of change by
acquisition type. It is an illustration only and assumes that changes can be added
together and also does not consider the magnitude of each item.
Figure 5.2 Aggregate* change by acquisition type
Symbiotic
*Aggregate change is the total number of changes recorded for all acquisitions. Each axis
shows the % of aggregate change by acquisition type
In terms of aggregate change, the differences between the four acquisition types,
as depicted above, using a Kruskal - Wallis 1-way ANOVA, is significant at the
0.008 level, with least change in Preservation acquisitions, then Symbiotic,
Absorption and Holding styles. This gives general support to the proposition that
there are significant differences in the levels of change between the four
acquisition types9.
Using the Mann-Whitney U test for two independent variables, to examine the
significance of differences in levels of aggregate change between each category,
there is evidence that there are significant differences between Absorption and
Preservation acquisitions (significant at the .005 level) 10 , and Holding and
Preservation acquisitions (significant at the .006 level)". There is no significant
difference between the aggregate levels of change recorded for Holding and
Absorption acquisitions (level of .66) 12 . Returning to proposition 6, that there
would be a hierarchy of acquisition types in terms of volume of change which
we suggested would be more influenced by resource interdependency than
autonomy, we can see that autonomy, based upon our pure cases, may well be
the more important influence upon levels of change in the acquired company13.
In these terms we might suggest that higher autonomy means less changes
imposed by HQ whilst higher resource transfer implies more change14.
This significant difference remains after adjusting for positive autonomy bias: significant at
the .02 level.
10 After adjusting for potential positive autonomy bias, result is significant at .009
11 After adjusting for potential positive autonomy bias, result is significant at .028
12 After adjusting for potential positive autonomy bias, result is not significant at .75
13 Using Kendall's tau-b correlation with a one tailed test of significance, correlating aggregate
change directly with these variables results in the following levels of significance: with
Autonomy a negative correlation significant at the .001 level with a r of-.39; with average
Resource transfer a positive significant correlation at the .014 level with a r of .24 n 44.
When adjustments are made for potential positive autonomy bias, using all cases, Autonomy
continues to have a negative correlation at the .008 level with an r of-.22, and average
Resource transfer with a positive correlation at the .001 level with an r of .27.
14 I am grateful to Professor Peter Grinyer for this distinction
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With the above picture in mind, we can now consider the similarities and
differences in the changes that take place between acquisitions types. At first we
will look at the two main areas of similarity between acquisition types and then
examine where the areas of change diverge.
5.3.2 Changes across the board
Table 5.2 above showed two main areas of change which occur across the board
in all acquisition types. These are stronger financial controls and major
management changes.
5.3.2.1 Stronger financial controls
All our acquisitions experienced stronger financial control in terms of providing
fuller financial information and satisfying budgets. All parent companies were
quick to put their financial reporting systems into place and although many
Managing Executives complained about the onerous nature of the reporting
procedures, many begrudgingly acknowledged the procedures were superior to
their own. This is clearly a major method of achieving control of the acquired
company and supports our observation in Chapter two, section 2.5.4.1, that
changes in financial controls are likely to be apparent in all acquisition types.
Beyond the requirement for standardised knowledge, the extent of the financial
controls reflected the acquisition type. For instance, controls for pre-acquisition
financial weakness are unevenly distributed with many changes in Holding
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acquisitions and few in Preservation acquisitions, and we can also see an
inverse relationship between financial control and amount of autonomy enjoyed
by the acquired company.
Table 5.3 shows the percentage of acquisitions citing change for each financial
control item. Due to the small numbers for some of the acquisition types it was
not possible to generate a single cross-tabulation from which to read levels of
significance. We therefore generated two by two matrices for each combination
and report the Fisher's exact tests of significance below. The initial letter of the
contrasting acquisition style is placed against significant differences identified
by an asterisk in the table below.
Table 5.3 Stronger financial controls by acquisition type*
Absorption Holding Preservation Symbiotic
Cash flow forecasts	 (q17e1) 75 0 0*P 75°o	 *P 31 0 o*A &H 33°o
Budgetary controls 	 (q17g1) 86°0 7500 62°0 67°0
(q17c1) 75°0 10000**P 540 o **H 67°0
Capital budgeting system (q170 63 0 0*P 870 o***P 33° o***H 00 o**H
*S **S *A *A
Tight control of overheads (q170 63 0 0*1) 870 0***P 33 0 o***H 00 o**H
*S **S *A *A
Improved quality of information
(q17d) 1000 0*P 89°o 69°o	 *A 100° o
*Percentages in the table are of firms citing this factor
Significance levels: * <.10; **<.05; ***<.01
15 It is i mportant to note that the percentages here are not always the same as in the original
summary diagram (Table 5.1) as a higher percentage of firms will cite just one factor than for
each individual factor
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Whilst financial controls are clearly important for all acquisitions, Absorption
and Holding acquisitions see high levels for all items whereas Preservation and
Symbiotic i6 acquisitions see financial controls in terms of information demands
and improvement in financial controls rather than controlling capital
expenditure or overheads. With this difference in emphasis, we shall further
characterise financial changes, by acquisition type, in section 5.3.3.
5.3.2.2 Major changes in management
93 0 0 of acquisitions cited major management changes post-acquisition.
However Table 5.4 shows that there are variations in the importance of the
items depending upon the type of acquisition. These variations are further
characterised in section 5.3.3.
Table 5.4 Major changes in management*
Absorption Holding Preservation Symbiotic
Appoint new Managing Executive (q5b) 71 0 o **P 44°o 18°o **A 67°o
Change in executive directors
- Reassign	 (q20c) 880 0***P 780 0***P 15 0 o***H&A 3300
- Appoint	 (q20d) 63°o 67°o	 *P 31°o	 *H 3300
- Remove	 (q20g) 88°o **P 89°o **P 39°o **H&A 330o
- Marketing	 Sales	 (q200 13°0 44°0 1560 3300
: Finance	 (q20e) 50 0 0 56°o 23°o 67°o
16 
I shall continue to refer to Symbiotic acquisitions throughout for completeness, but the reader
must bear in mind that we are drawing upon very few Symbiotic cases and so our
observations will not be very robust.
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Table 5.4 (contd) Major changes in management*
Absorption Holding Preservation Symbiotic
New top management is committed,
positive with a bias for action	 (q20k) 57% 56% 23% 33%
New top management injects new values
or vision	 (q20j) 57% 78% **P 31% **H 67%
* Percentage of firms citing this factor
Significance levels: * <.10; **<.05; ***<.01.
P Preservation; A Absorption; H Holding
Note: The table shows the percentage, by acquisition type, of respondents carrying out the
stated action. Where there are significant differences with other acquisition types, the
significance level is indicated by an asterisk and the acquisition type denoted by a letter.
• Changing the Managing Executive
In Chapter two, section 2.5.4.1, we observed that the Managing Executive
would be changed in order to bring about substantial change to a company17.
From this we suggested in proposition 7, that acquisitions experiencing low
change, Preservation type, would be more likely to keep the top executive than
acquisitions experiencing high change, Absorption type. Clearly this is the case
as 71 0 0 of Managing Executives were removed in Absorption acquisitions,
where they were perceived to be a barrier to change, whereas just 18% were
replaced in Preservation acquisitions. This finding was significant at the .05
level and supports the general notion of changing the managing executive to
achieve substantial change in an acquired company.
17 For our responding sample, changing the managing executive is positively associated with
change in the acquisition at the .0006 level.
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However, Holding acquisitions, which also exhibit high levels of change as
shown in figure 5.2, generally retain the Managing Executive. Although we
shall be examining the distribution of Managing Executives in Chapter seven, it
is worth observing that, against our broad theme of change against resource
transfer and against autonomy we find that change in managing executive is
positively associated with the former at the .01 level but not significantly
associated with the latter.
A partial answer to this issue is Grinyer, Mayes and McKiernan (1989)
comment on Sharpbending situations, where there is significant change and
incumbents remain, that incumbents exhibit a committed and positive bias for
action. Certainly in Holding acquisitions we see clear evidence of incumbents
injecting new values and committing to action. Although new managing
executives are positively associated with change, there are clearly examples of
incumbents also involved in high levels of change. We therefore suggest that the
association between new managing executive and increased resource transfer
leads to a different type of change. This question will be further explored in
Chapters seven and eight.
• Changing the management team
Table 5.4 suggests that there are more changes amongst the management team
than amongst Managing Executives 18 . There is variation across acquisition types
with more changes in Absorption and Holding acquisitions than in Preservation
acquisitions although the latter has a surprisingly high figure. This follows the
suggestion based upon figure 5.2 that most changes appear to be a function of
autonomy.
Amongst the management team we anticipated more changes amongst
marketers than finance directors as Sharpbenders see changes in the former as a
healthy sign of improved performance. We observed however, that changes in
finance directors dominated across all acquisition types although at varying
levels. This is rather surprising as only a minority of acquisitions are financially
weak 19 . This is therefore likely to be an indicator of the insistence with which
the parent company imposes its financial controls, removes duplicate offices and
even establishes a corporate spy.
Sharpbenders saw changes amongst marketers as a healthy sign and there is
some support for this notion amongst acquisitions. The lack of change in
18
It is worth noting that Sharpbenders (1990) found a correlation between new CEOs and the
number of new functional directors. We found that whilst there was a strong association
between new CEOs and changes in senior executives, in particular in marketing, this
correlation was not present for changes in finance directors.
19 There was no correlation between pre-acquisition financial health and change in finance
director
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marketers in Preservation acquisitions suggests that they may be perceived as
close to a core competence to be changed at ones peril whereas amongst
Holding acquisitions, where the companies are often weak, marketers are
changed nearly as often as finance directors. In Absorption acquisitions where
there is generally a high level of change in management, marketers see little
change as the acquired companies often have strong market presence and this
needs to be maintained whilst substantial changes take place in the rest of the
operations. Interestingly the interviewees for these acquisitions rarely talked
about marketing but focused upon internal operations. In consequence we
cannot conclude that marketing directors will be changed as often as finance
directors.
Summary of general changes
It is clear that all acquisitions experience high levels of change in terms of
management and financial controls. Whilst there is a generic quality to changes
in some areas of finance, the overall impression is that the emphases of change
within these categories are quite different by acquisition type. We will further
characterise these differences in section 5.3.3.
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5.4 Acquisition types by key dimensions of change
Even in the two areas of major change, where all acquisitions appear to exhibit
similar changes, we have observed that there are differences in emphasis. These
differences are more apparent when the data for each dimension of change is
aggregated at a higher resolution". Figure 5.3 below, shows aggregate change
for each of the seven dimensions identified in section 5.3.1.
Figure 5.3 Seven21 dimensions of post-acquisition change22
Significance levels: *>.10, **>.05, *** >.001
20 See footnote 22
21 These seven dimensions are the appropriate constructs drawn from Sharpbenders. This is
shown in table 2.8, Chapter 2, section 2.5.5.2.
22 There may be a query as to why the percentages seem to differ from table 5.1. In table 5.1
firms were counted as citing an area of change if they mentioned just one or more items in
the area. In figure 5.3 we have aggregated the change items in each dimension and then
calculated the average for firms by acquisition type, adjusting for number of respondents and
number of change items per dimension.
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Figure 5.3 shows significant differences on most of the dimensions and a
generally consistent difference in the level of change by the four acquisition
types, which is consistent with figure 5.223 . This is strong evidence for the robust
nature of Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991) framework on the basis of the
changes made in the post-acquisition period.
The distinctive nature of post-acquisition change in Preservation, Absorption and
Holding acquisitions is explored in the remainder of this section. Symbiotic
acquisitions are not included due to insufficient cases for a robust picture.
5.4.1 Preservation acquisitions
Figure 5.4 Changes in Preservation acquisitions
questionnaire items
23 These differences remain significant for most items when we adjust for potential positive
bias on the autonomy scale. The main effect of the adjustment is to further distinguish
between Preservation acquisitions and the other types. The results for each dimension are:
Reduce debt***, change product market focus**, improve quality, improve marketing**,
reduce production costs*, change management**, improve financial controls.
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Preservation acquisitions see the least amount of change of the three acquisition
types. From Figure 5.4 we can see that the main areas of change are in financial
controls and management, which could be described as taking control actions.
For the other dimensions of change few actions are taken and, in general, change
instigated by the parent is vigorously resisted.
• Improve financial controls
Table 5.3 showed Preservation acquisitions with significantly less change than
Absorption and Holding acquisitions, although there was an emphasis on
gaining financial information (69% citing this item). All acquisitions were
expected to conform with standardising group financial reporting and in many
cases the Managing Executives felt the new formats were an improvement upon
their own. This may help to account for the quite high degree of acceptance.
540 0 of Preservation acquisitions cited control through financial budgets. This is
quite a high figure although the lowest for our four acquisition types and reflects
a preference for acquiring companies to manage predominantly through the
setting of budgetary targets. As Crossman, Managing Director of an acquired
transport company, says, 'the budget is the bible. If we are keeping within
budget, they don't interfere. They say, `go ahead, run your business, you're the
experts, we trust you. When things go wrong, they get heavy'.
Characteristic amongst Preservation Managing Executives was the sense of a
game being played where Head Office expectations could be manipulated and
the acquisition be portrayed in a favourable light. In the words of Andrews,
Managing Director of Micrometer acquired by Utility PLC, 'if you do your
budgets the right way, then you've got a lot of flexibility% Achieving budget
kept Head Office at bay and 'if we perform, we get the investment. There's
nothing better than just producing results'. In addition to building in costs there
was also evidence of 'cocoa tins' or having 'tucked something up our sleeve'.
Although there was pressure from the new parent to bow to more rigorous
controls, there was a strong sense of the acquired company defending itself from
change either by game playing as above or by more rigid stands such as not
accepting budgets to the point of it being a resigning issue. As Fredericks, the
Managing Director of a large acquisition in the communications industry
remarked, VI had accepted what was being demanded then our investments
would have been cut back, our customer service would have been cut back -
everything would have been done for the short term'.
So whilst there was better financial reporting, there was a tension between what
the parent company wanted in terms of target setting and what the Preservation
Managing Executive was prepared to accept. There is little doubt that their
ability to produce results gave them the power to stand up for themselves in
budget negotiations and helped generate trust. As Fredericks says, `We had a
good track record both on our actual performance and on our budgets in the
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past so we were able to say, 'look, we know our business. These numbers are
bizarre, and we rubbished the numbers'.
• Change management
Preservation acquisitions rarely see the removal of the Managing Executive
(18% cited this change - see table 5.4). This has important implications which
will be addressed in Chapter seven. However 39% cited changes in the
management team which, although less than average, is still a sizeable number.
It seems that the acquisition gave the Managing Executive the opportunity to
remove sub-optimal executives or those whose roles were duplicated at Head
Office. In the Micrometer cameo, the acquisition enabled the removal of the
Finance Director who had previously been a significant shareholder and
therefore untouchable. Generally however, the managing team is clearly viewed
as successful and so changes are fewer than in other acquisition types.
There was some sense of new values (q20j) and a greater bias for action (q20k)
post-acquisition although less than for other acquisition types. Several
incumbent Managing Executives complained at how time consuming
negotiating the sale of the company had been and in several cases, where a
number of potential purchasers had been involved, this activity spanned a
considerable period of time. Once the sale was completed there was a sense that
the businesses had drifted a bit and needed to be brought back up to speed.
Andrews, in our Micrometer cameo, described this as a general malaise due to
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the uncertainty surrounding ownership. In addition the Managing Executives
seemed to be optimistic in terms of the support and resources that being part of a
large group might bring.
There is also no doubt that these Managing Executives had plans for changes in
mind for some time. The common image of the aggressive corporate acquirer
together with the general expectation of change raised amongst employees,
shown in our Micrometer cameo, gave the Managing Executive both
opportunity and a smoke screen for change.
• Change product market focus
From figure 5.4 above and from the data analysis contained in appendix 5.1, it is
clear that analysing product market position to uncover the possibilities open for
management action is unlikely to occur in Preservation acquisitions. Only 31%
reviewed their marketing plans as this was something that they felt was already
done well. There were no cut backs in product market focus and this was
significantly different from Holding acquisitions at the .01 level and Absorption
acquisitions at the .05 level. Only 15° o of respondents cited focusing on a
specific market segment and along with other product market items,
Preservation acquisitions were significantly different from other acquisition
types.
The only significant changes in this area, where Preservation acquisitions fell
into line with other acquisition styles were in terms of tightening production
costs, which may be a manifestation of stricter financial controls, and some
investment in new technology.
The impression from this and subsequent interviews is that the Managing
Executives were very comfortable with their markets and these were to be
protected rather than altered.
• Improved quality and service, and improved marketing
Echoing the above, Preservation acquisitions do not alter their approach to
markets and customers and so only 8% to 15% mentioned changes in terms of
improvements to quality and service or marketing. Appendix 5.1 shows that
those differences are significant against other acquisition types. For Preservation
acquisitions, marketing operations are a sacred cow. Indeed Managing
Executives spoke often about protecting customers.
• Intensive efforts to reduce production costs
Whilst Preservation acquisitions see some reduction in production costs,
through improving labour productivity and plant capacity, for other items,
shown in appendix 5.1, there are often significantly fewer changes than either
Holding or Absorption acquisitions.
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The picture is one of incremental streamlining change rather than profound
alterations. The Managing Executives vigorously defended their operations from
parental intrusion. As Fredericks, Chief Executive of an acquired
communications company, remarked, 'my major role throughout was defending
the customers and the business from the owners '.
• Reduction in debt
Preservation acquisitions are financially strong and so it would be surprising to
find a big drive to reduce debt or the sale of assets. Appendix 5.1 shows that in
only 8° o of cases are there vigorous steps to reduce debt and in no cases are
assets sold off. Preservation acquisitions are significantly different from other
acquisitions on these items.
5.4.1.1 Preservation acquisitions summary
Preservation acquisitions witness very few changes as a direct result of
acquisition and this is a statistically significant difference for eighteen of the
twenty three variables examined above. The main changes are in terms of
adopting parental financial reporting, improving controls and a degree of capital
investment. This confirms Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991) observations of the
parent providing financial evaluation and raises the issue of parental nurturing
through investment. Even in Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991) example of BP
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Nutrition's acquisition of Hendrix, where the financial investment came from
Hendrix's own cash generation, most of our Preservation acquisitions also
supplied their own resources for investment which suggests that the idea of
parental nurturing through investment has been over-stated.
One of the key themes of Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991) characterisation of
Preservation acquisitions is the role of a gate-keeper to protect boundaries
between the two companies. Although they do not focus upon the Managing
Executive of the acquired company, we encountered considerable evidence that
he was protecting his business and customers from the new parent: fighting the
corporate immune system'.
However related to this protective spirit was also a negative view of the new
parent who was perceived as adding little value to the acquired business. In the
words of Fredericks, Chief Executive of an acquired communications company,
'the owners contributed absolutely nothing to the business at any stage'. Whilst
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) argue for organisational championing, whereby
the acquired company influences the parent by maintaining good relationships
with corporate staff and demonstrating strong control over their own operations,
we found that these good corporate relationships were rare, influencing Head
Office unlikely and that demonstrating good control of their companies was
essentially to prevent Interference from above.
The gulf between Head Office and Managing Executive was often exacerbated
by the use of consultants. At Micrometer the new parent, Utility PLC, relied
heavily upon the use of consultants which meant that Andrews, Micrometer's
Managing Director, was less involved with decisions at Head Office. This lack
of involvement made him defensive; in his words, 'you make sure you convince
the consultants that (the new idea) didn't apply to you'. For Fredericks, Chief
Executive of an acquired communications company, 'we fought like a dog with
(management consultants) and, fine, we absorbed their methodology and used it
to do what we wanted rather than what they came up with, silly ideas, because
they didn't know the business'.
This defensiveness is rooted in two issues: one, that the Managing Executive is
in charge of a successful business which he intends to protect; and two, that the
parent lacks understanding of the business and has a remote management style.
Most of the Preservation acquisitions highlighted a lack of strategic direction
from Head Office and all agreed that post-acquisition involvement from Head
Office was very limited. Despite the strategies that might have existed, the
Managing Executives took the view that there was a gulf between group strategy
and its implementation. Top management was perceived as divorced from
operational reality. All of them commented that after-care was virtually non-
existent. When on the few occasions Head Office did take an initiative, the lack
of operational understanding resulted in disaster with enormous effort being
consumed, unsuccessfully, trying to solve technical mismatches.
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Lack of understanding and apparent lack of interest from Head Office meant
that Managing Executives viewed any interest in the internal workings of their
businesses as interference and it was duly resisted. From the Managing
Executives point of view it was better to concentrate on producing the results
and not to attract negative attention. Perhaps we can clearly see here the gap
between facing the short term expectations of shareholders and the operational
concerns of the Managing Executive. With this tension, the exchange of
learning between organisations and the influencing of the parent by the acquired
company was rarely evident.
Whilst Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) stress the lack of change in Preservation
acquisitions, this under-states the actual changes that take place. The acquisition
was frequently seen as an opportunity for the Managing Executive to make a
few changes that were difficult beforehand. In particular there was often a
change in senior management and a tightening up of operations. Overall these
changes were incremental and improved the business without transforming it.
In addition, whilst Managing Executives of acquired companies were fiercely
resisting change imposed from the new parent, they were continuously
responding to changes in their environments. In the case of Micrometer there
was some rationalisation in the face of a declining and difficult market.
In conclusion Preservation acquisition see many more changes than hitherto
suggested although we concur with Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) that change
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imposed by the parent is fiercely resisted. We also suggest that although
learning and organisational championing may be desirable, the tensions thrown
up by defending the business and managing short term operating results presents
a significant obstacle to these developments. Finally, parental nurturing through
investment is often more apparent than real which reinforces the notion of a gulf
between the two parties.
Main Preservation themes
• Low overall post-acquisition change
- keep things as they are and preserve the core operations.
- retain the Managing Executive
- defend the business from the parent
• A bias for action to pull the business back into shape
- adopt parental financial reporting system
- streamline management and remove the finance director
- tighten up costs of operations
• Parental nurturing
- although an anticipated benefit, this was limited and rare. Managing
Executives felt it was often paid for out of their own resources.
However examples of capital investment tended to be in information
technology /information systems
Improve financial controls (i)* hange product market focus (i=6)**
Change management (i=8)* Improve quality (i=4)*
Reduce debt (1=3)"'
70%
60%
50%
-Absorption
(n=8)
Reduce production costs (1=9) 	 Improve marketing (i=5)*
5.4.2 Absorption acquisitions
Figure 5.5 Changes in Absorption acquisitions
Financial controls assume a great importance for Absorption acquisitions as it is
through these controls that the acquired company is understood and areas for
cost savings identified. .There is also extensive change in management which may
be understood in terms of removing obstacles to change, or, in the case of
replacing the CEO, to symbolise change, shake the tree, even if he is not seen to
be a major obstacle24 . Whilst these two areas of financial controls and
management change are dominant it is clear that there are numerous changes in
the other dimensions as well.
24 To some extent the CEO provides a scape goat suggesting the past was inadequate
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• Improve financial controls
Absorption acquisitions put a high priority upon expressing the acquired
company through their own financial systems (100% cited improving the quality
of information - see table 5.3). As James, Managing Director of a professional
services firm which acquired a similar business said, 'Until you turn the lights
on, you can't see where you're going'. This helped them target areas for
reducing costs through de-duplication of activity. Budgetary controls were seen
as a vital part of controlling the integration activity and were of major concern at
the outset of the post-acquisition phase. In the case of Packers PLC's
acquisitions of Edibles PLC, Vaughan, the new CEO remarked that the first five
months were spent 'agreeing budgets for the part of the activity that was going
to be split into each of our three areas'. The importance and indeed problem of
focusing on coalescing accounts was shown in the cameo where priority was
given to stitching accounts together and then assuming it would work.
• Change management
Absorption acquisitions saw a great deal of change in the management team
with 88% citing changes in executive directors (see table 5.4). 71% of
respondents said the incumbent Managing Executive was replaced as they were
perceived to be a barrier to change and there was no senior position for them in
the Group. A minority of Incumbents did remain, more by luck than design. As
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Heath, Chief Executive of a professional services firm acquired by a rival, and
one of the few remaining incumbents in Absorption acquisitions remarked, 'if
you're acquiring its natural to put your guy in place'. Where incumbents
remained, they clearly influenced the integration process. This issue of retaining
or removing the Managing Executive will be revisited in more detail in Chapter
seven.
The large number of changes in the management team is largely due to a
number of positions being duplicated. Many Absorption acquisitions are
characterised by a period of joint committees or 'parallel working' where
opposite members of management work beside each other to assess which areas
of the business should be rationalised and indeed how they should rationalise
their own position. In our cameo of Edible PLC's acquisition by Packer's PLC,
the latters managers were superimposed on the formers, with joint responsibility
for determining the rationalisation of their area and which of them would go. In
a large communications acquisition by a competitor, there was an extensive use
of joint committees and in a Utilities acquisition, all executives had equal
opportunity to apply for all the posts in the new integrated company.
The general thrust however tended to be the removal of senior executives and
duplicate functions at Head Office rather than the removal of operations
management. In our cameo of Packers PLC, Keaton, finance director, observed
that they didn't want to keep the board of directors or the finance director. 'The
operational managers were the value and particularly the guys with the
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relationships with major customers'. Consequently it is not surprising to see
that 50% of finance directors were removed whereas Marketing / Sales directors
fared rather better as they generally stayed on.
As table 5.4 shows, just over half of respondents cited a bias for action and new
values. With the turnover in the top management team, this is perhaps not so
surprising as there would be an emphasis upon doing things differently and
every emphasis upon de-duplications, rationalisations and removing the
previous corporate identity of the acquired company.
• Change product market focus
71 0 0 of Absorption acquisitions cited reviewing the marketing plan and it was
clear from the interviews that many of the acquisitions were driven by the wish
to build market share in their own market. Post-acquisition changes were
directed at achieving this aim by concentrating upon tight overhead control to
reduce costs. This was the case for 63 0 o of Absorption acquisitions. 50% cut
back to the profitable core of the acquired business and 57% focused upon a
specific market segment. The general impression is of building market share
whilst driving for cost reduction rather than investment. The main driver of the
cost reduction was the de-duplication of activities and rationalisation of assets.
Appendix 5.2 shows that most items in this dimension showed significant
differences with Preservation acquisitions.
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• Improve quality and service
There is a wish to improve quality and service by reducing delivery days which
is a relatively straight forward activity and reduces costs quickly. 57% of
respondents said they made this change and appendix 5.2 shows this to be
significantly different from Preservation acquisitions at the .05 level. There is
also evidence of improving quality control and introducing after sales service
although these activities are less easy to achieve and often require investment
before benefits show. There is little emphasis upon improving product design,
carried out in just 20 0 0 of cases, which is longer term and a more difficult way
of achieving benefits. The emphasis of these changes is therefore angled at cost
reduction and streamlining rather than improving the product or adding to the
service.
• Improve marketing
Absorption acquisitions see several changes in this area; in particular there is an
improvement in distribution channels, changed in 43% of cases, which may well
be due to rationalisation rather than an improved customer relationship, and an
emphasis upon improving marketing information to the board which occurred in
57% of cases. Appendix 5.2 shows the latter item to be significantly different
from Preservation acquisitions at the .05 level. This betrays an inward looking
perspective to marketing, rather than an outward focus on the customer per se.
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This is the danger that Fredericks, Chief Executive of an acquired
communications company refers to when discussing an integration acquisition,
'its difficult putting businesses together because you've got to spend so much of
your effort facing inwards and so take your eye off the commercial football'.
• Intensive efforts to reduce production costs
As one would expect with Absorption acquisitions, above average numbers25 of
respondents cited change for each item in reducing production costs with the
exception of making investment in new plants. This clearly shows a cut back
and reduction mentality.
Many executives cited the drive for reduced costs to justify the price of the
acquisition. In a very large acquisition of a communications business, Martin, a
Head Office executive said, 'the price we paid required us to justib) that price
through overhead cuts. We had to deliver those overhead cuts and the very first
thing we did, even before the deal was completed, was set up joint committees to
oversee how costs could be reduced between the two organisations'. The
pressure to get costs down was evident in most cases as our cameo of Packers
PLC showed.
25 The average is of all respondents for an item
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With an emphasis upon de-duplicating activities, overhead reductions were
relatively straightforward to achieve. In the Packers PLC cameo, there was a
substantial cut back in Head Office numbers in Edibles PLC. The acquired
company Head Office was not needed in 89%26 of Absorption acquisition cases.
As Lambert, the Managing Executive of a utilities company, remarked, 'it was
obvious that we would only operate with one office and I'm sure somebody
would have told me from on high if I'd said that we needed to keep two Head
Offices going'.
Reducing costs was foremost in the minds of Absorption Managing Executives.
The cameo of Packers PLC clearly shows the attention to reducing costs by de-
duplication and rationalisation of factories. In many cases the rationalisation of
assets was easy to achieve as Lambert at an acquired utility company said,
'some of these decisions came out very easily once you gave them half a
thought, because in one town, they had a depot, we had a depot, I mean its easy
as that - you don't have two depots, you have one'.
Reduction in costs rather than investment was the main driver in Absorption
acquisitions. The main concern was how to extract costs while keeping the
operation running.
26	 •	 •Significantly (.1 level) greater than Preservation acquisitions - see appendix 5.2.
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• Reduction in debt
In 50%27 of cases, Absorption acquisitions made efforts to reduce the costs
associated with making the acquisition by selling off non-essential businesses
(see appendix 5.2). In many cases there was surprise that the assets sold were in
fact worth substantially more than anticipated. In our cameo of Packers PLC,
part of the acquisition included three small businesses making poor returns. The
finance director28
 at Packers PLC, Keaton illustrated the mentalite towards
peripheral assets in saying, 'God knows what we're going to sell these
businesses for. We don't know anything about them. And I think we more than
tripled my estimate in terms of getting that back'. Packers PLC recouped some
20% of the total acquisition cost.
5.4.2.1 Absorption acquisitions summary
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) characterise Absorption acquisitions as true
consolidations of two firms. Critical elements in achieving this end are the
selection of a leader, a management team and the setting up of task forces to
plan and then implement the rationalisation of the businesses. The identity of the
acquired company is quickly removed as the acquired company is subsumed
27 Significantly (.05 level) greater than Preservation acquisitions
28 Keaton is currently the finance director of Packers PLC. At the time of acquisition, he was
sent in to run the newly acquired company Edibles.
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within the parent. Every effort is made to reduce costs and to move towards best
practice. Once this has been achieved, efforts are then directed towards
developing and investing in differences.
Our findings concur with those of Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) although we
can supply rather more detail. Absorption acquisitions are characterised by
substantial post-acquisition change. Rather than just selecting a leader, we found
that 71% of incumbent executives, and 89% of senior executives of the acquired
company were removed. Changing senior management in the acquired company
removed a major impediment to change. In addition there was considerable
emphasis upon removing the identity of the acquired company by changing
logos, corporate names and closing down Head Offices.
To assess which areas were appropriate for change there was often a post-
acquisition planning period during which there was an extensive use of
integration teams, joint committees and parallel working. In essence the two
businesses were run in parallel whilst evaluations were carried out on the
preferred rationalisations of staff and operations. This was clearly a very
sensitive time as every effort was being made to retain key operational staff and
middle management, motivate employees and retain customers whilst assessing
areas for rationalisation. In addition it is important to note the high priority
given at the outset to retaining key customers.
Once the planning period was complete there was substantial change across the
board with the main emphasis being upon the de-duplication of activities. Head
Offices, warehouses and depots, factories and other production facilities, were
rationalised often with substantial job loss. This activity was directly linked to a
pervasive drive to reduce costs and many acquirers had set themselves
aggressive financial targets.
• Imposition of parent systems and structures
In all cases there was a sense of parent systems being imposed upon the
acquired company. In some cases interviewees owned up to a certain degree of
arrogance that their systems were best, the `conquering hero syndrome', and in
several cases the post-acquisition problems encountered were a direct result of
the parent systems being inappropriate for the acquired business. In the case of
the acquisition of Fibres PLC, the acquirer was described by the retained
Managing Director as `selling drops for dollars whereas we were selling big
chunks for a little less than dollars; trying to use their ideas in our warehouses
gave us significant difficulties'. Another example was during the post-
acquisition phase for an acquired professional services firm. A regional structure
was imposed upon an organisation that had previously operated on skill group
lines. As Heath, the Chief Executive of the acquired company remarked, `what
was realised later was that the right approach was the skill group approach and
the regional approach was wrong'. This was an error that caused human
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resources to suffer and 'the business has gone back now to a very much skill
group and organisation based along skill group lines and not regionalised'.
In a few cases there was a clear wish to take on board best practices in the
acquired company. For instance Edibles PLC possessed a superior computer
system to Packers PLC. However it was felt that the it would be far more
expensive and difficult to change Packers PLC than it would to change Edibles
PLC. In general where there were areas of overlap, and despite good intentions,
the acquiring company's approach won through. The example of Heath's
acquired professional services company is a case in point.
The acquired company tended to be perceived as having areas of best practice
where the parent had little or no presence. In the case of the acquired
communications company, all the library resources were concentrated at the
acquired company as 'they had the better department and also had the bigger
library (Martin).
In relation to Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991) observations of rationalisation
and moving to best practice, we tended to find that best practice is very often
what the acquiring company is practising. The exception to this are the few
instances where there is little overlap between the activities of the two
companies. Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991) further suggestion that differences
be developed and investments made appears unlikely. The reason is that the
identity of the acquired company has been erased and it's 'champions' in senior
5-282
management have often departed. Once the rationalisation is completed and cost
reduction activities achieved, the acquisition is very often regarded as history.
One issue that does emerge from the changes discussed above is the
internalisation of management attention. It seems that once customers have been
secured at the outset, all efforts are focused upon de-duplicating activities and
cutting costs. There was little mention of markets and of the future beyond the
cost cutting programme even when completed.
• Problems
With the removal of the incumbent executive and corporate identity, there was a
great fear of change amongst employees. Indeed Absorption acquisitions are
associated with very significant job losses, the problems of which Haspeslagh
and Jemison (1991) understate. The fear of change led to an 'us and them'
culture which could be very obstructive. To an extent this fear of change can be
mitigated by excellent communications, as Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991)
advocate, although it is worth recording that in the case of the acquired utility
company, the hardships in the industry had a strong coalescing effect upon
employees.29
29 Indeed in the US, crises are known to be engineered (c.f. Pettigrew, 1985) by the acquiring
management to achieve this end.
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Our Absorption acquisitions were driven by a strong cost reduction mentalite
and the arrogance of the conqueror was hard to avoid. This led to errors in terms
of sacking large numbers of people whose roles were not familiar to the parent
company. These people often carried important tacit knowledge which was then
lost. This also reveals the important distinction between codified and tacit
knowledge, as in all cases every effort was made to retain records and
documents without recognising that a lot of critical information is stored in
employees rather than on paper. In many cases companies complained that
although they kept all the tax records, the Inland Revenue is now asking
questions about those figures the explanation for which is with ex-employees.
For this reason some have described middle management employees as the
marzipan layer of an acquisition.
Most cases experienced severe disruption costs due to implementation
difficulties. These were normally due to inadequate operational considerations
such as the movement of a major part of a factory only to find difficulties in
selling the site, agreeing the importance of extending and modifying acquired
operations but then finding it costs substantially more than anticipated, closing
down a large regional production operation and encountering very strong union
and local resistance, and a general unwillingness of many employees to relocate
even such small distances as 12 miles. It is worth suggesting that such expensive
operational errors are the result of the acquisition being driven largely by
financial management. As the cameo of the acquisition of Edibles PLC shows,
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there is evidence that acquirers can assume that just by putting financial controls
in place, the integration will be successful.
• Beyond rationalisation
Haspeslagh & Jemison (1991) suggest that once the rationalisation is complete
there is a move to harness the complementarity in the two firms. This is in
marked contrast to the tasks described above of harmonising the two companies
as this involves capitalising upon their differences. The evidence for this is
difficult to find perhaps as so much effort is expended upon harmonising the
two operations. Indeed considerable effort is also put into selling off peripheral
businesses. On our evidence, value is created throughout the rationalisation
process as an end in itself rather than by any attention to harnessing
complementarities.
The main driver of change was to reduce the costs of duplicate operations. Often
this became the overriding objective and it is no surprise therefore that in most
instances Absorption acquisitions appear to be financially driven with
insufficient attention to operational issues. The exceptions to this are; where an
Incumbent Managing Executive remained to defend his operation, and we shall
look at this point further in Chapter seven, and; a utility company which was not
subject to such direct market forces.
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Main Absorption themes
• Remove impediments to change
- remove acquired company identity
- remove acquired management
• Post-acquisition planning and assessment period
- use of integration teams, parallel working, joint committees
- maintain morale whilst building understanding of business
• High levels of change across the board, driven by cost reduction
- de-duplicate activities with substantial job loss
- rationalise assets
- reduce operating costs
- impose parent systems
5-286
Reduce debt (i=3)***
100
80%
Improve financial controls (i • Change product market focus (i=6)—
Change management (i
Reduce production costs (i49)
Improve quality (p4)*
'improve marketing (i=5)*
r"----1 Toldingl
(n=9) i
5.4.3 Holding acquisitions
Figure 5.6 Changes in Holding acquisitions
Holding acquisitions experience the imposition of stringent financial controls to
improve their financial health. Although the incumbent Managing Executive
often remains, there are major changes in the management team. There are
extensive changes in all other areas and the main driver is to cut back to the core
to reduce costs and return the business to a more healthy footing.
• Improve financial controls
Holding acquisitions see the strongest direct financial controls and they are
given the utmost priority. All the acquired companies were financially weak and
so every effort was made to turn the company around by closely monitoring the
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budgets and improving controls. Rowland, Chairman of an acquisition in
industrial services, remarked that 'I wouldn't let any of the controls slip. I
wouldn't tolerate any departure. We don't let that get away'.
Many Managing Executives complained about the stringency and unyielding
nature of parental controls which seemed to have little bearing upon their
business. In the words of a Chief Executive30 of an acquired engineering
consultancy, 'we were constrained by the parent company, not five to make
decisions in the best interests of the company. The parent company imposed
rigid expenditure controls'. The cameo of the Transistor PLC acquisition above
shows how the Managing Executive was forced into making severe changes in
order to meet budget even though this would have damaging consequences for
the business in the medium term.
The short term financial results orientation of parent companies was echoed by
Rowland at an acquired industrial services company; 'the parent company are a
lot more short term. 'Will you please tell us what the profit's going to be?'
Rowland's view was that, 'I don't think you can run a manufacturing business
on a one year basis!'
30 Written reply to question 32; questionnaire 21
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• Change management
Holding acquisitions saw high levels of change in management, shown in table
5.4, although only 44% cited a change in the Managing Executive. This seems
rather unusual as the volume of changes appears to be rather large for the
retention of incumbents. This aspect will be examined in Chapter seven. There
certainly was a change in their perspective as they were forced to move from a
medium strategic horizon to a short term operational focus, an issue we shall re-
visit in Chapter eight.
Amongst management, apart from the Managing Executive, there was a high
level of change with 78% of respondents citing reassignments amongst senior
executives, and 89% saying that some directors had been removed: these results
were significantly different to Preservation acquisitions. The necessary
slimming down of the company involved removing management that might not
have been removable before (see Transistor PLC cameo). The cutting back
process was policed by the new parent and this overcame internal resistance as
well as legitimised the actions of the Managing Executive.
Just over half of finance directors were changed which is not so surprising as
these acquisitions tended to be financially weak and there would be significant
change in the financial procedures31 . There was also a high level of change
31 Using a partial correlation for associations between autonomy and pre-acquisition gearing,
and between autonomy and pre-acquisition cashflow, whilst controlling for resource transfer,
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amongst marketing / sales directors with 44% departing. This may also be
symptomatic of rigorous attempts to improve performance in the market.
There was also a sense of greater bias for action and in particular the
introduction of new values, with 78% of respondents mentioning the importance
of this item32 . The impression is that great efforts are being made to make a
difference to the company and this fits the picture of turnaround situations
where the emphasis is upon improving financial controls, and taking action to
reduce costs.
• New product market focus
Holding acquisitions seem to present an even more extreme picture than
Absorption acquisitions with 89% cutting back to the profitable core and 88%
imposing a tight control on overheads 33 . As Rowland, the Managing Director of
an acquired industrial services company said, 'the rationale for the changes was
of course the company was making losses basically because the overheads and
the management overheads were too big'.
we find highly significant negative correlations of .003, r=-.36, and; .005, r=—.34
respectively. This supports the notion that Holding companies are predominantly in weak
financial health at the time of acquisition.
32 Significantly (.05) greater than Preservation acquisitions - see table 5.4
33	 •	 •Significantly (.01 level) different from Preservation acquisitions - see Appendix 5.3
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Attention is also given to keeping a tight control on production costs. These
activities certainly support the notion of a turnaround. There are only average
amounts of change in terms of analysing market position and well below
average change in focusing upon a specific market segment. This supports the
idea of trying to improve what is already being done rather than adopt a new
product / market direction. This could well be due to a lack of resources and a
retrenchment, rather than build, mentalite.
• Improved quality and service
Around half of Holding acquisitions make significantly more changes than
Preservation acquisitions in terms of reducing delivery days and introducing
after sales service (see Appendix 5.3). There is also effort applied to improving
the product design. Clearly there is some emphasis upon improving quality and
service although attention appears to be on the items which are easier and
quicker to change.
• Improved marketing
Holding acquisitions see greater attempts to improve distribution as this can lead
to rapid improvements in results 34 . Nelson, Chief Executive of an acquired
34 56% of cases showed this. Significantly (.01 level) greater than Preservation acquisitions - see
Appendix 5.3
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financial services company, reflects on this issue; 'we were hit by the crash of
'87 so we were determined that we needed to do something about our
distribution. The only way we could do that was to give up our independence
and become part of a bigger financial group so we could cut costs through
economies of scale and have a secure distribution channel'.
Together with trying to improving distribution channels post-acquisition, there
was also effort to optimise after sales service35 . It is interesting to note however
that there is less attempt to improve marketing information to the board36. This
contradiction may be explained by the fact that the Managing Executive is
trying to defend the marketing effort from the financial rigours imposed by the
new parent company. In the Transistor PLC cameo, Stanton said the most
difficult change was reduction in development and marketing, 'because it was
hitting the future of the company. I found that very hard to explain to people
because I'd always preached sales are critical to pay our salaries but the real
future in the company is what we are ploughing back in from cashflow to
product and market development - and here I was just putting a great line
through my own strategy. The instruction from Circuit Board PLC was get back
to budget'.
35 The average score here is 56%
36 The average score here is 33%
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Generally improving marketing assumed a rather muted role in Holding
acquisitions. The parent company imposed rigid expenditure controls, staffing
policies and marketing initiatives were denied' (Stanton).
• Intensive efforts to reduce production costs
89%37 of Holding acquisitions see cuts in Head Office staff. This is part of the
rationalisation process, justified on the basis of the duplication of function or
sub-optimal performance, and removes barriers to change. Rowland, the
Managing Director of an acquired industrial services company, said 'the plan
was to close down the Head Office which was very expensive and opulent. That
was a fairly major task but not very difficult to do. The company was in fact
making losses - it had had a few cutbacks and they basically got rid of the lower
paid staff and kept a lot of managers - it was very top heavy. So we did have to
remove a lot of top management'.
Over half of Holding acquisitions see efforts to reduce production costs through
better production control, stock and capacity utilisation. Following the large
acquisition of an industrial land usage company, Taylor, a regional manager
remarked that 'the reporting systems are sacrosanct, they've all been brought
in. We 're also bringing in unprecedented performance monitoring systems.
Every single truck, every single system, every single type of container through
37	 •	 •Significantly (.05 level) greater than Preservation acquisitions - see Appendix 5.3
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the accounting procedures can be broken out, can be assessed in their entirety,
on their own. You can pull out any type, any feature of our business to see
where it is losing money. Everything has to be performance monitored.
Everything is very, very accountable. There is accountability for everything and
everybody. We didn't have that before'.
Restructuring was a common factor in Holding acquisitions with a view to
improving the efficiency of the core operation. At an acquired industrial services
company, Rowland said, 'we removed three quarters of the directors as they
were in areas where there were too many divisions and not enough activity. So
we quickly restructured into sales and purchasing rather than product
divisions'. In our cameo of Transistor PLC, in response to not making budget,
Stanton restructured the company and achieved a turnaround within the year.
The questionnaire also suggests that there is investment in new plant to reduce
costs. The interviews certainly point to restructuring to achieve greater
efficiencies which probably includes improving plant but there is little mention
of actual investment in plant.
There is a degree of investment in terms of better training and wage incentives
although this is only just above average. At an acquired industrial services
company, Rowland remarked that 'this is something I set up. They have bonuses
related to the profit of the division which has a monthly charge on it, which is a
percentage of the net assets used in the division. It's made everyone very
conscious of the working capital which is used in the business'.
• Reduction in debt
89%38 of Holding acquisitions sell off subsidiaries to reduce debt and return to a
sound financial footing. Rowland, Managing Director at an acquired industrial
services company said 'there was a division which was selling machines which
no-one really felt was going to fit in very well with the industrial machinery
business and we didn't think it was going to work out so we closed that down'.
The pressure to reduce debts and restore profitability were well illustrated in our
cameo of Transistor PLC, where Stanton's response to Circuit Board PLC's
demands was; 'cut back cut back cut back - but if that's what Circuit Board
PLC wants, profit, I'll give them profit, or reduce losses'. This focus on debt
reduction is in keeping with a general characterisation of Holding acquisitions
as turnarounds.
38 Significantly (.0/ level) greater than Preservation acquisitions - see Appendix 5.3
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5.4.3.1 Holding acquisitions summary
The Managing Executive tended to stay with the Holding acquisition. However
these companies were in poor financial health and, as our opening cameo of
Transistor PLC showed, there was a clear and over riding drive to return them
to robust financial health.
The parent company managed through a stringent application of budgetary
controls. If targets were not met it was up to the Managing Executive to make
changes until they were achieved. Our cameo of Transistor PLC showed all too
clearly how the Managing Executive was pushed into making severe changes to
achieve budget.
There was a clear sense that focusing upon short term results caused the
Managing Executive's perspective to be altered from a medium term strategic
view to a short term operational perspective and this was epitomised by Stanton
at Transistor PLC moving from a Chief Executive role to one of managing
director.
Running weak businesses, which were also subject to often severe cuts,
probably eroded the Managing Executive's voice at group level. They clearly
did not feel valued and this lack of influence was greatly resented. Sacrificing
the long term future of their businesses for short term gain led many Managing
Executives to feel futile and depressed, and one committed suicide.
• Beyond the turnaround
Apart from the immediate changes to return the acquired businesses to a sound
financial footing, there was distinct lack of any further input from the parent
company. At an acquired financial services company, this felt like a post-
acquisition lull (Nelson). The reasons are either the parent company totally
lacked in any expertise other than financial management and therefore were
unable to contribute in terms of information technology, marketing or
operational skills, or the parent's competence was too different to be applied. In
either case there was a generally accepted belief that the parent did not
understand the acquired business.
The result of this situation was that there was no strategic input from the parent
company which left the acquired companies in a vacuum. In addition to this
vacuum, the compartmentalisation of the group impaired inter-group dialogue
and activity. Whilst synergies may have been the reason behind the acquisitions,
the mechanisms to enable these to be realised were just not there.
Main Holding themes
• Retain the Managing Executive
• High levels of change to achieve turnaround in financial health
- Meet budget
- Change senior management
- Restructure divisions
- Rationalise assets
- Cut expenditure - in marketing, R&D
• Change in management perspective from medium to short term
• Beyond the turnaround a post-acquisition lull
- No strategic direction
- Just carry on and meet budget
- No-one driving synergies
5.5 Conclusions
Chapter five has sought to identify the main changes that take place in the post-
acquisition phase of Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991) acquisition types. In so
doing we have extended Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991) work, which treated
change in a partial and somewhat superficial way, and have also been able to
test the robustness of their framework.
At the aggregate level of change we have shown in figure 5.2, evidence to
support our sixth proposition, that there would be a significant difference
between the four acquisition types and a hierarchy of change. However we have
found the order to run from Holding, with the most, through Absorption,
Symbiotic to Preservation39. This tended to suggest that levels of change are
more strongly associated with the level of autonomy experienced by the
acquisition rather than the level of resource transfer. However, it soon became
clear that although this may be the dominant influence, there are important
examples of change being more associated with resource transfer, such as
change in Managing Executive.
39 The acquisition literature suggests a number of other areas of change which have not been
tackled directly in our approach above. Communications is often cited as critical in the post-
acquisition phase and we suggested in proposition eight that effort in this area would be
positively linked with the level of change. This is the case (significant at the .001 level).
Following the conclusion above that there is a hierarchy of change running from Holding,
though Absorption, Symbiotic to Preservation acquisitions, we found, with a Kruskal -Wallis
1-way ANOVA that this hierarchy also exists for changes in communications, particularly
direct reporting and ad-hoc communications. This result was significant at the .02 level.
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As we mentioned in Chapter two, the acquisition literature throws up many
testable propositions of change against resource transfer or autonomy. Examples
of those which might be associated with resource transfer are changes in
information technology40 and personnel policies on appraisals41 , pay and
conditions° and training°. These were all significantly and positively
associated with resource transfer and so support propositions ten and eleven44.
However, as we noted in chapter two, testing the many variables in the
acquisition literature would not lead to coherence. For this reason we adopted
the seven dimensions of change found in the Sharpbenders study (Grinyer,
Mayes and McKiernan, 1988), for a systematic treatment of change in the
different types of acquisitions. Upon testing these we found that, for six of the
seven dimensions, there were significant differences between acquisition types.
Using the Sharpbender dimensions, we systematically characterised each
acquisition type, and, whilst we broadly agree with Haspeslagh and Jemison's
(1991) view of Preservation, Absorption and Symbiotic acquisitions, we have
been able to add considerably to their work by identifying the actual changes
that took place in each situation. We have also managed to emphasise an
40	 •	 •Significant at the .03 level
41	 •	 •Significant at the .02 level
42	 •	 •Significant at the .05 level
43 Significant at the .02 level
44 It is also clear that items such as changes to information technology" are significantly and
negatively associated with autonomy so that whilst we could argue for the relative
importance of either autonomy or resource transfer in terms of association with change, both
appear to have an important effect. As a result many items, such as change in information
technology and changes in compensation and benefits", mentioned in proposition thirteen,
do discriminate between the four acquisition types.
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important and hitherto neglected acquisition type, the Holding acquisition, and
depict the main elements of change associated with it.
In addition to the survey based data, we have added, from our interviews,
explanation and nuance from the managing executives, regarding reasons for
certain changes and for the adoption of a particular acquisition style. We
gleaned a clear sense of preserving core capabilities and defending the acquired
company from the parent in the Preservation acquisition, a complete loss of
identity and coherence for the acquired company in Absorption acquisitions
where the companies are truly integrated, and a sense of despair and pain in the
Holding acquisitions which experience turnarounds. In the same order the levels
of change increased with Holding acquisitions seeing the most as every effort
was made to stem losses, through to Preservation acquisitions making the least
in order to keep a winning formula. We cannot be confident of the position of
Symbiotic acquisitions on all the changes we have covered although the
summary figure 5.2 shows that they exhibit more changes than Preservation
acquisitions and fewer than Holding or Absorption acquisitions. In Symbiotic
acquisitions there was a greater sense of investment, and trying to do things
differently45.
45 To gain statistical verification of the 'difference' of Symbiotic acquisitions from the other
types, we included its borderline cases and tested all variables discussed above. We only had
sufficient observations for 13 variables to run the chi-squared test, and of these 11 were
significant at the .02 level.
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It is worth appending to this section an observation that we have made
considerable use of Sharpbender variables in order to focus upon steps which
might be taken to achieve a radically improved performance. The distinct and
robust nature of our acquisition types viewed through the lens of the
Sharpbenders variables suggests that, rather than a homogenous phenomenon,
there may well be different types of Sharpbender.
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Motivations for each acquisition style
	
6.1	 Introduction
	
6.2	 Motives for each acquisition style
	
6.3	 Dominant style of bolt-on acquisitions
	
6.4	 Conclusions
6.1 Introduction
Chapter five has shown that there are clear observable differences in post-
acquisition styles. In this Chapter we shall search for the motivations that led to
these different styles and also be mindful of our discussion in Chapter two
which suggested that there are significant difficulties in associating pre-
acquisition motives with post-acquisition styles of management. In addition we
shall also consider further the distribution of post-acquisition types shown in
Chapter four and see if there may be explanation in the motivations for these
acquisitions.
6.2 Motives for each acquisition style
The following section examines the motivations behind each acquisition type to
uncover why they were managed in specific ways.
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6.2.1 Holding Acquisitions
The importance' of Holding acquisitions is a significant finding. However it is
difficult to understand why there are so many of this type of acquisition. In what
ways can they add value to the group? Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) suggest
Holding acquisitions are held to be traded. There was no evidence to support
this from our Managing Executives. We also thought that perhaps this was a
temporary condition, a post-acquisition lull, which would pass. However for
four of the nine Holding acquisitions, between two and three years had already
elapsed.
We asked each of the Managing Executives in this acquisition type, why they
had been acquired and how value would be created. The motives were generally
clear in terms of related diversification rather than any notion of being 'traded'.
In this sense it is surprising that the acquired companies subsequently
experienced a loss of autonomy and a lack of resource transfer.
In all cases there was a clear evidence that the main issue was the parent
company being far more concerned with establishing control, particularly
financial control, rather than offering strategic direction or operational guidance.
1 Over 20% of pure cases: 36.2% of all cases after adjusting for potential autonomy bias
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Circuit Board PLC acquisition of Transistor PLC
Stanton the CEO of Transistor felt the rationale for the acquisition was
ostensibly to realise some synergies with a small division but felt that the real
reason for the parent company was to appease the City as they had a reputation
of growing through acquisition and had just lost a deal. Following acquisition,
apart from adopting parent financial controls, there was no further discussion or
attempts to create value between the two companies; 'I was extremely frustrated
and mystified that I never had a discussion with any Board member of Circuit
Board PLC and no discussion as to potential synergy'.
When Stanton was asked what the purpose of having his company acquired as a
Holding acquisition, his response was, 'I don't know. What I did put to the
board of Circuit Board was, 'Are you a holding company or an operating
company?' And they said we are certainly not a holding company, we're an
operating company. I said, 'Well what then do you see as group resources that
help the operation?, and they said finance. But I said, 'Finance is to me a way
of, you know, if you were a Holding company, I would expect that answer'.
Stanton goes on to enquire after a range of resources and services that an
operating company provides, only to be told to shut up! The point is that there is
a clear gap between executing the deal and subsequent acquisition management.
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From our interview data and the questionnaire we can suggest the following as
important considerations in Holding acquisitions:
• Financially weak
In most2 cases, Holding companies were financially weak prior to acquisition.
The acquirer concentrated upon tight financial controls to turn the situation
around. In the case the acquired industrial services company, Rowland, its
Managing Director said, 'we know that they're going to be making losses - this
is the right time to make the bid. Lets see if we can buy it and patch it up'. There
may also be a sense of the acquired company being held separately to avoid
contaminating the group. In the words of Nelson, Managing Director at an
acquired financial services company, 'we were kept at arms length from the rest
of the business'. This may also be an appropriate explanation for Transistor
PLC. It would appear that apart from just returning the acquired business to a
sound financial footing, there was little if any consideration how any further
value could be created. Indeed, whilst the financial appraisal appeared sound,
there was only the flimsiest of commercial understandings.
2 75% had medium to poor pre-acquisition financial health: (50% had moderately high or very
high gearing with a further 25% being average, 44.4% had moderately weak or very weak
cashflow with a further 22.2% being average).
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• Lack of commercial understanding
Four out of the six interviews we conducted with Managing Executives of
Holding acquisitions showed them as very demoralised. They felt that the new
parents did not understand their business. Stanton, at Transistor PLC, remarked
there was 'a lack of understanding (of) what they bought and why they bought
it'. Nelson, Managing Director at an acquired financial services company,
commented that 'the most important aspect is the lack of understanding of
anything about an acquired financial services company within the parent group,
virtually at any level. There was a lack of understanding of what we were about,
there was a lack of understanding about what we could add to the business. We
were treated like nothing at the time'.
The lack of understanding by Head Office meant that hoped for synergies were
generally more apparent than real. In the case of an acquired financial services
company with a very profitable business, but not core to the parent group, only
now, six years after the acquisition, are there attempts to realise synergies.
The apparent lack of understanding from Head Office was often due to an
absence of expertise other than financial directors. There appeared to be no one
capable of driving the acquisitions forward except in terms of imposing
financial targets. So whilst there may have been notions of realising synergies,
the strategic horizon was just to ensure the financial soundness of the acquired
company. In terms of the changes made therefore we see a substantial change in
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financial items and some managerial changes. Thereafter there is a general lull
in change reflecting a lack of direction.
• Voiceless Managing Executives
The Managing Executives were also powerless to bring about synergies due to
the stringency of the financial reporting system which literally discouraged them
from working together and removed their ability to think and act strategically.
This was often a source of considerable friction with the incumbent
management who felt they have lost their raison d'être. They had been pushed
back from a strategic role into an operating capacity and had lost their voice at
Head Office.
• Creating value
In Holding acquisitions, value was realised by turning the company around.
There may have been intentions to realise synergies but there was no mechanism
or person responsible for achieving this aim. For this reason value is captured
and there is little evidence of value creation due to a lack of depth in
commercial understanding at Head Office, onerous financial controls and a
weak Managing Executive voice.
One reason for the relative importance of Holding acquisitions in our survey
may be that the recession offered many opportunities for purchasing under-
6-308
performing companies. In addition it is certainly the case for some of our
respondents that such companies were the only ones they could afford to
purchase.
• Conclusion
In essence the reasons for Holding acquisitions are weakness in finance, which
justifies the parent imposing stringent financial controls and keeping the
acquisition separate from the group to avoid contamination. As a result they
may have found it difficult to attract parental attention in terms of their
significance and also in terms of their performance. Holding acquisitions were
also often in related but different business areas which may not have been fully
understood by the parent company.
The financial controls used to reverse the poor quality of the business generally
caused the acquisition to lose strategic direction in striving to satisfy short term
targets. This demoralised the Managing Executive and sometimes caused
considerable damage to the business. The post-acquisition lull, following the
wave of financial constraints, is typical of Holding acquisitions with reduced
room for strategic manoeuvre. Managing Executives were retained for their
knowledge of the markets and the business, but its weakness probably meant
little bargaining power with Head Office to enable post-acquisition synergies.
In terms of Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991) work, they do not provide us with
much direction concerning Holding acquisitions apart from saying that they
might be traded. In terms of their acquisition rationales of domain-
strengthening, domain exploration and domain extension (Haspeslagh and
Jemison 1991: 32-34), we find that our Holding cases fall into all these
categories. However the commonality appears to be one of making a turnaround
possibly because there were few alternative acquisitions available.
6.2.2 Preservation Acquisitions
Preservation acquisitions accounted for over half of our pure cases 3 and is a
major acquisition style. The following cameo suggests why Micrometer PLC
was treated as a Preservation acquisition.
Utility PLC acquisition of Micrometer PLC
In Andrews's view, the reason for the acquisition was that Utility PLC wanted
to diversify from being a regulated business. There was some opportunism, as
Utility PLC was under threat of re-nationalisation, 'they had to have things
outside the regulated business'.
334% of all cases when adjusted for potential autonomy bias
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Their policy was very much a matter of acquiring related companies to set up a
new division. 'We were involved in their industry and so were a good company
to acquire. We were a leader in our field and they were only looking for
leaders'. 'They had a lot of capital to spend and hadn't integrated backwards so
far into the process at that stage'.
Utility PLC used a Preservation style of acquisition management as Micrometer
was a strong performer and a market leader. They kept the management as they
had been doing well and because they didn't know the business. 'Particularly if
you're buying a business you don't know, then if everybody walks away, then
what have you got?'
There is a question mark over whether they could have adopted any other style,
'because they didn't have anybody with industrial ability, they didn't actually
get to grips with the industrial companies they'd taken over'. 'There was no
clear pattern of what they were trying to achieve. I could have sat around
waiting for instructions and still be there'. 'There was no synergy here because
it wasn't their area, and it's difficult to create because people don't want to
break down barriers; their Bailiwicks'.
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991: 154) suggest that the main reason for
Preservation acquisition is domain-exploration - a move 'into new businesses
which require new capability bases' (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991: 34). These
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domain-exploration acquisitions can be about acquiring a capability, a platform
for further expansion or a business position. We have certainly found
similarities in our data, but several acquisitions were Preservation in nature
because differences between the companies had been underestimated. Our
interview and questionnaire data suggests the following:
• Diversification
61% of Preservation acquisitions are diversifications from the parent activity
and of these 7% were unrelated. Whilst superficially synergies are apparent in
the related diversifications, post-acquisition they are far more elusive. Four out
of the six Managing Executives interviewed complained that the parent
company did not understand their business and the rationale for the acquisition
was dubious.
• Opportunistic buy
Fredericks comments on the opportunistic nature of these purchases based upon
intuitive feel of the market. 'Its fine to say you decide a strategy and then go
about implementing it. Its not been my experience. We were bought in an
opportunistic way. You can never say this is an opportunistic buy. You've got to
have a rationale. You're paying their fees, (management consultants) will come
up with a sensible rationale whether one exists or not'
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• Nobody to drive forwards synergies
None of the Preservation acquisitions seemed to be intended to just stand alone
as there were many expectations of realising synergies. However, even where
the acquired company was seen as a platform upon which to build, the synergies
did not materialise. This may be due to a lack of expertise at Head Office and
the absence of anyone who understood the businesses to drive through changes.
'When you actually try to implement it, the skills aren't there. Everything you
came to make a decision on, no-one had any experience to make the decision
and everything becomes, well, we'd better try and do it, so everything becomes
an R&D exercise instead of a build' (Fredericks). The Managing Executives
also pointed to the lack of incentives for them to work together and indeed there
was a strong defensiveness of territories.
• Strong performers
Preservation acquisitions are strong performers and showed significantly4
lower gearing and higher cashflows before acquisition than other acquisition
types. They were often market leaders and continued to generate good results
post-acquisition. This gave the Managing Executive considerable power over
4
.02 and .01 levels respectively
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the running of his company. You can spit in their eye' (Fredericks). This
strength allows the Managing Executive to resist change to his operations.
• Conclusion
The main reason for Preservation acquisitions is that they produce excellent
results and parent companies do not wish to impair this performance. Whilst
some Preservation acquisitions were clearly an attempt to diversify out of an
industry, such as Utility PLC's acquisition of Micrometer, there is also a strong
sense of the differences between the businesses being greater than hitherto
realised. The new parents realise that they are not the experts and the acquired
company's Managing Executive defends the business against intrusions. For
these reasons the acquired company retains substantial autonomy and is not
`contaminated' 5 by the transfer of resources.
The surprise with this type of acquisition is its prevalence as these companies
remain on a stand-alone basis and there appears to be little value created
whereas the Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) suggests that value can be created
through realising synergies.
The preference for Preservation acquisitions suggests that companies would
rather buy well performing businesses than perhaps embarking upon the difficult
5 One might draw a parallel with the 'gift ethic' in that whilst there may be good intentions
behind the gift, there are overtones of being in debt.
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process of integration. In a few cases there may be an intention to use the
acquisition as a platform for further acquisitions but, maybe due to senior
management changes in the parent, such long term plans rarely materialise. At
best one might say that an opportunity has been acquired, the characteristics of
which may change over time. For this reason the acquisition often remains
stand-alone whilst circumstances change and whilst good performance continues
there is little reason to add to the company or to sell it on.
6.2.3 Absorption acquisitions
Absorption acquisitions are an important part of acquisition activity. The
following cameo shows the reasons why Edibles PLC was treated as an
Absorption acquisition.
Packers PLC acquisition of Edibles PLC
The acquisition of Edible PLC was part of the rationalisation of the sector. 'If
everybody continued running their own businesses, they would all by now not
be profitable. Whereas if one organisation started to take them over, then there
was an ability to rationalise things. It simply enabled you to close things down,
whereas if you sat there all on your own, your factory would suddenly be half
full, your distribution and depots would be half full'.
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Edibles PLC had been investing in the technology to keep up with the evolving
market but couldn't afford to invest any further. 'They were saying 'Oh God, we
can't raise any more funds here. We don't know what to do', but at the same
time they didn't want to sell it because it was a family business'. Packers PLC
bought them so they could continue rationalisation by taking out a nuisance
smaller player in the main market and achieve a dominant position in a
subsidiary market.
Keaton knew there would be rationalisation but time was needed at the outset to
ascertain precisely where the rationalisation would occur. For example 'we
knew we were going to close a factory. What we didn't know, until we had time
to get into the factory and understand it, was whether they had a really good
asset, a really good workforce. Then it may be better to close one of our
factories'. Keaton felt it all went 'reasonably smoothly because we understood
the business - it was a business familiar to us. We could talk the same language.
We could plan it because we knew the things that would be issues'.
Edibles PLC was treated as an Absorption acquisition because a great deal of
change was required in terms of rationalising its activities. The only question in
the post-acquisition period was to assess the extent of the integration based upon
a closer examination of Edibles PLC.
To gain economies, Edible PLC's activities were split up amongst parts of
Packers PLC and its identity dissolved. By moving production to different sites
these economies were achieved. In this sense Edibles PLC had its autonomy and
identity removed and its assets, personnel and knowledge were widely spread
within Packers PLC.
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991: 152) argue that many Absorption acquisitions
will be domain strengthening because the benefits expected from the acquisition
often revolve around achieving greater economies of scale'. We agree with this
point of view as our main reasons from our interviews shows;
• The same industry
Absorption acquisitions occur where the businesses are in the same industry and
where the acquirer feels themselves to be experts. 88% of Absorption cases were
in the same market and/or product areas. This gives a sense of certainty about
the widespread changes the parent company undertakes. 'We know the business.
The business is my business. They did exactly what we did(James)
• Economies of scale
In all interviews with Managing Executives there was a strong sense that
substantial economies could be achieved by combining the two companies and
rationalising operations. In all interviews there was a clear aim to achieve cost
reductions above all else.
• Substantial change is required
De-duplication and rationalisation require substantial change so that the
acquired company ultimately dissolves into the parent group.
Industry restructuring pressures account for many of our Absorption style
acquisitions and the companies in question were often direct competitors who
were beginning to damage each others profitability as separate organisations but
together could be highly profitable. All but one of our cases were in mature,
static or declining markets. In addition Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) suggest
that domain extension acquisitions could use an Absorption approach where an
additional product line is acquired. We also found examples of this approach.
6.2.4 Symbiotic acquisitions
Despite Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991) claims for the importance of
Symbiotic acquisitions, we found very few examples in our survey.
Nevertheless, it was clear from our single case this approach had significant
benefits. The following suggests why the acquisition of Homeland was handled
as a Symbiotic acquisition.
Fortress PLC acquisition of Homeland PLC
In the first instance the acquisition was handled with great care. 'We did not
want to unsettle the company and we don't want to come in with big heavy
boots because we don't fully understand it, and we wanted the acquired
company to continue successfully'.
'We wanted at an early stage, but not too early stage, to integrate the two
companies and use the best resource in each company, but its 'use the best
resource in each company to keep them semi-independent, rather than use the
best resource in each company to pull them together'. The reason for preserving
the differences between the two companies is 'in my view, dictated by the
market-place. From the outside we are two companies that may be seen as not
dissimilar. In actual fact, when you get into the details of what we do in the
market-place, what our position is within the industry, we are very, very
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different. Homeland's main expertise, skill and resource is in development,
marketing and selling of own label, buyers own brand, customer supply
products, but the bottom line is that the Homeland company are really operating
with, not so much with our own brands, but more in terms of cost engineering,
specification engineering for customers around the world; be that own label or
something very special. Homeland are also involved more in the general trading
area and are more entrepreneurial than a standard branded company. We did not
want to lose the distinctiveness. We had competencies in each company that are
not the same. I would not put the team at Homeland into a market to develop a
brand because they are not marketing people, they're not PR people, they're not
sales people. Likewise, I would not try to get the Fortress folks to go and try and
develop a new own label range, because the competencies are quite different'.
'So it became clear from the outset that both companies were different, were
separate and had a clear market focus and objective on what they should be
doing, but at the same time, behind that, we were transferring production /
manufacturing into central'.
Homeland was acquired as part of the rationalisation of an industry. However,
whilst consolidation in the industry prompted de-duplication of facilities in
Homeland and Fortress, such as closing one plant and expanding another, it is
very clear that the distinctive quality of this acquisition is the deliberate effort to
maintain and enhance differences between the two companies in terms of
product association, marketing and sales. An important element of this process
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was the transfer of personnel, know-how and product design between the two
companies to crystallise the differences.
Maintaining differences was critical to the success of this acquisition. Great
importance was attached to preserving the characteristics and competencies of
Homeland. This was achieved by significant and highly visible investments and
great pains were taken to treat the acquired staff on equal terms with parent staff
so that a partnership atmosphere emerged. Instilling confidence in the acquired
company was seen as paramount, and changes, other than the initial
investments, were subservient to achieving this objective.
The creation of a camaraderie and at least equal involvement of Homeland
employees in task forces, fostered a positive outlook towards change so that
major changes could take place. This enabled significant transfers of resources
between the two companies in terms of employees, products and know-how.
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) suggest that in Symbiotic acquisitions, the
acquired company is protected from uncontrolled interventions and that the
quality of the interface team is key. They suggest that Symbiotic acquisitions
move from preserving the acquired company or a state of co-existence to full
amalgamation. Whilst we are only examining one case, we do find that there are
strenuous efforts to preserve the acquired company upon acquisition and the
extensive use of teams and task forces. We shall examine more closely the
timing of changes in Chapter eight, but will comment upon an apparent
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difference in characterisation of Symbiotic acquisitions. Haspeslagh and
Jemison (1991: 149) suggest that 'to succeed in truly amalgamating the
organisations symbiotically, each firm must take on the original qualities of the
other'. In our case, where nearly four years has elapsed between acquisition date
and interview, it is clear that maintaining the differences between the two
companies in terms of product and market remains of critical importance and is
unlikely to change.
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) are very vague about changes that might occur
in a Symbiotic acquisition apart from commenting upon the setting up of a
gatekeeping structure and a gradual move towards integration through
regrouping individuals and some new investment. Based upon the Homeland
case, we can suggest that preserving differences are crucial and indeed
transferring resources seem to be vital to enhance those differences. We can also
see the key role of investment, such as refurbishing the office block, in allowing
this acquisition style to operate in terms of generating a partnership atmosphere.
Indeed it is worth noting that Symbiotic acquisitions are significantly more
associated with investment than other acquisition types.
There were substantial transfers between the two companies as products
personnel and know-how were polarised to give maximum differences at the
front end of operations. At the back end there was plant rationalisation for
economies of scale and a homogenous information technology system was
installed.
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Change clearly takes on an iterative quality in our Symbiotic acquisition with
joint teams and equal input. In the words of Vaughan, 'we were alive enough to
the dynamics of the situation. We changed a number of things as we went
along'.
6.3 Dominant style of bolt-on acquisitions
Whilst we have observed distinct acquisition rationales and integration styles,
we recorded in Chapter four, that there is a dominance of value capture6 over
value creating acquisitions. The former exhibit low levels of aggregate resource
transfer which suggests most corporate acquisitions during this time frame were
managed as parcels of assets and bolted onto existing businesses.
Pre-acquisition reasons for adopting a bolt on approach include risk aversion in
terms of post-acquisition management or attempts to pick up bargains during a
recession. One might suggest that during crises, such as the recession, executive
time horizons contract and perspectives become more short term. The concern is
for immediate benefits though ownership rather than managing for long term
potential which may not be realised and indeed may even have a sting in its tail
in terms of internal disruption.
6 72.9% of all our respondents
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Holding acquisitions
Weakness
* may contaminate group
* Managing Executive's lack
of influence
Parent * lack of understanding
* lack of non financial expertise
* no one to drive synergies
Onerous financial controls
* repress management initiatives
to realise synergies
Preservation acquisitions
Strength
* can resist change from
parent and group
Parent * lack of understanding
* lack of non financial expertise
* no one to drive synergies
Financial controls
* repress management initiatives
to realise synergies
A further explanation is that pre-acquisition intentions were to realise synergies
but the post-acquisition implementation was a great deal more difficult than
anticipated. Many Managing Executives of acquired companies agreed with this
view and indeed many said the deal had been sold on realising synergies. Figure
6.1 below suggests some reasons for the lack of success in this area with
Holding and Preservation acquisitions.
Figure 6.1	 Obstacles to realising synergies
Figure 6.1 suggests that synergies are not being realised because the parent is
trying to manage through financial controls and there is no other expertise to
drive implementation forward. Managing Executives of the acquired companies
believed that a distant financial hand was in control, setting abstract financial
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standards but divorced from operations. In addition the use of precisely targeted
financial controls resulted in the compartmentalising of the acquired company
from the rest of the group. This was a strong disincentive to attempt to work
with other Managing Executives. The process of financial control then, can
easily thwart the well intentioned aims of realising synergies.
These observations relate to a period of several years after the acquisition. On
further discussions with the Managing Executives it is only after a much longer
period of time that there are real attempts to realise synergies which supports the
notion that post-acquisition management is far more difficult to achieve than is
commonly supposed. Most post-acquisition plans focus upon pay-back periods
with much shorter time scales than the seven or eight year time frame suggested
above. In many cases the renewed drive for synergy only resulted when there
was a change in senior management at group level 7 which tends to suggest that
a different skill set is required at senior level, perhaps moving from deal doer to
post-acquisition implementor and value creator.
In the case of an acquired financial services company, it took a new group Chief
Executive to make changes some five years after the original acquisition. 'He 's
got his feet under the table now. He's decided he fed up with people in the
acquired company doing their own thing and he wants to lay down some
guidance at last, where it fits into the group' (Nelson, 'Holding acquisition').
7 Clearly such changes cannot be ascribed to the original post-acquisition management.
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In the case of Micrometer PLC, a new Chief Executive to Utility PLC was
appointed three years after acquisition and six months later he appointed
somebody new to run the division. As Andrews, the Chief Executive of
Micrometer puts it, 'he talked to everybody and said what's happening about
synergy? Since then we've managed to get some synergy going and I've actually
stepped up a role to run a number of companies, so I've actually been able to
start trying to do some of the things I think they should have been doing'
(Andrews, 'Preservation acquisition').
Interestingly enough many of the Managing Executives took the view that the
new management who were now striving for synergies would not have made the
original purchase. At an acquired financial services company, the Chief
Executive, Nelson remarked that, 'I think if he'd been around they wouldn't
have done it because what he's done is identifi) their core business, and an
acquired financial services company's business is not core at all to the group'
(Nelson). In the case of the acquisition of Transistor PLC, the new divisional
executive's opening comments were 'I never wanted to buy you in the first
place. Don't know why we bought you; can you tell me?'
This appears to support the idea that actual post-acquisition management aiming
to achieve synergies was far more difficult and elusive than realised by the
acquirer. It may also support the notion for a different approach to the
acquisition by group management once it has been brought on board. This
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appears to be a clear case where implementation serves to thwart strategy as
plan.
Whilst we feel that there is merit in the argument raised above that more
synergies were expected than realised which resulted in more acquisitions with
low resource transfer than perhaps intended, we are still faced with a large
number of low transfer acquisitions. Real benefits in these situations, are one-off
immediate gains such as increasing group size and market presence. This would
fit with the prevailing trend towards short-termism, where there is little thought
for creating and growing value. Why engage in the messy and uncertain
business of integration when you can buy an instant advantage? Indeed this line
of argument supports the assertion that companies are increasingly purchasing
businesses as parcels of capabilities/ resources rather than developing their own
as the outcome is certain in the short term and can be achieved rapidly.
If, as we suggest that this is an important trend in acquisitions, then it does raise
the question of why such an important development has been overlooked in the
acquisition literature and given such scant regard by Haspeslagh and Jemison
(1991). We may well suggest that this finding does not support the managerial
tradition in business schools. By reducing acquisitions to a commodity-like
status, there is perceived to be little to be managed as such, as assets are bought
and sold rather than developed.
6.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we examined the reasons behind the use of each acquisition style.
It is clear that there are considerable differences in rationale for each. However
we also note that Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991) explanations, in terms of
domain strengthening, extension and exploration, do not sit easily with the
integration framework. For instance Holding acquisitions could be any of the
three domain possibilities. This suggests that their domain classifications are
insufficient prescriptors of post-acquisition management and that the link
between pre-acquisition strategy and post-acquisition implementation requires
further work.
We also recognised the predominance of 'bolt-on' acquisitions and suggested
that this may reflect a recognition of the difficulties of post-acquisition
management. There may well be a change in the way in which acquisitions are
perceived, as ways of purchasing parcels of capabilities to be used for instant
advantage and then sold, rather than embark on the difficult and risky business
of integration and development.
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7.1 Introduction
The role of top management in the acquired company is seen as a critical factor
in post-acquisition management (Kitching, 1967, Schweiger, Ivancevich and
Power, 1987, McCann and Gilkey, 1988, Siehl and Smith, 1990, Cannella and
Hambrick, 1993). In particular top management crucially re-establishes strategic
leadership (Shrivastava, 1986) after the disruption of acquisition. However there
is a question over whether the incumbent Managing Executive or a new
executive should manage the newly acquired company. Incumbents can be
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perceived as either the 'standard bearer of the old culture' (Mirvis and Marks,
1992: 270), which an acquirer may value highly, or as 'hindrance to effective
integration' (Mirvis and Marks, 1992: 270), where an acquirer wishes to make
substantial alterations. The new executive on the other hand can be seen as a
force for change.
There is considerable evidence to show that there is a high turnover in senior
management of acquired companies. Chapter three noted that Hayes (1969)
reported 58% of incumbents had left their companies within five years of the
acquisition and Hambrick and Cannella (1993), broadening the debate by
looking at turnover in the top team, found 67% of all acquired senior executives
had left within four years. For our responding sample, Section 5.3 in Chapter
five has shown that there is also a high level of change in the management team
and in Managing Executives', even though less time has generally elapsed than
for the studies cited above.
The apposite question is whether changing the incumbent executive leads to
different outcomes. Do incumbents or new Managing Executives do things
differently? In tackling this issue, the turnaround literature makes strong claims
for the use of new executives to make a difference and, crucially, break the
mould of previous operating patterns (Grinyer, Mayes and McKiernan, 1988). In
particular the turnaround literature focuses upon the use of new Managing
1 51.5% of our cases saw a change in the Managing Executive of the acquired company
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Executives drawn from outside the company to achieve radical change
(Whittington, 1993: 122). This finding is supported by a stream of literature
upon the relative merits of the use of Insiders and Outsiders, which argues that
the latter make far more changes than the former (Helmich and Brown, 1972).
In this chapter we intend to extend the Insider / Outsider debate into the
acquisition arena, where it may provide valuable insight in terms of linking
managing executive type to levels of post-acquisition change. On this basis we
shall set out to address proposition thirteen which suggests that Organisational
Outsiders will make more changes than Organisational Insiders in a post-
acquisition context.
Gabarro's (1987) work on taking charge of companies in the USA has
broadened the Insider / Outsider debate by choosing to define these categories
based upon an industry distinction rather than an organisational one. As his
results apparently contradicted the prevailing wisdom of the levels of change
associated with Insiders and Outsiders, we will examine different definitions of
Insider and Outsider to assess which definition of the dichotomy has most
strength in a post-acquisition context and also to shed light upon Gabarro's
apparently contradictory findings. This enquiry will be addressed through
proposition fourteen which suggests that the Insider /Outsider distinction at the
organisational boundary will be more clearly apparent, in terms of the level of
post-acquisition change, than at the Industry level.
The distribution of change in the Managing Executive was shown, in Section
5.3 in Chapter five, to be unevenly distributed across acquisition types. In this
chapter we will seek to extend Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991) work by
examining whether a Managing Executive type can be associated with an
acquisition style. Clearly there is evidence to suggest that we may find such
links as the previous chapter has suggested wide variation in the levels of
change by acquisition type and the turnaround literature strongly suggests
higher levels of change are associated with Outsiders.
Whilst Chapter four has already shown that a successful outcome to acquisitions
cannot be ascribed to particular styles, we will return to the issue of success in
terms of the use of Insiders and Outsiders in different contexts. If the links
between Managing Executive type, levels and nature of change are evident, and
there are appropriate levels and types of change for each acquisition style, then
we may conclude that the use of a Managing Executive type may be more
successful for one acquisition style than another.
7.2 Insiders versus Outsiders
Before we set about examining whether there are significant differences
between Insiders and Outsiders in terms of the level of change associated with
each in the post-acquisition phase, we should be aware that there are different
7-332
definitions of these terms. The traditional Insider / Outsider literature, embodied
in studies such as Carlson (1962), Helmich (1971), Helmich and Brown (1972),
set the boundary for this dichotomy at the organisation level. This is echoed in
the turnaround literature (Slatter, 1984, Grinyer, Mayes and McKiernan, 1988,
Whittington, 1993). Later work by Gabarro (1987) has adopted a different
definition by concentrating upon an industry divide with Insider defined as
having five or more years of experience in the industry of the new assignment
(Gabarro, 1987: 38). As a consequence we shall label Insiders / Outsiders as
'Organisational' when drawn from within or outside the acquired company and
'Industry' where the new executive is drawn from the same or different industry.
7.2.1 Broad characteristics
Our responding sample consisted of 61.4% Organisational Insiders (43 cases)
and 31.4% Organisational Outsiders (23 cases) with 5.7% of respondents not
identifying their position. In terms of new executives drawn from the same or
different industries, 66.7% came from the same industry (22 cases2) and 33.3%
came from different industries (11 cases). These distinctions are shown in figure
7.1 below.
2 This excludes incumbents as we later test differences between new Industry Insiders /
Outsiders
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Figure 7.1 Responding sample: Organisational and Industry Insiders/Outsiders
Organisational
Managers from different
industries
= 11 cases
Outsiders
Managers from the same
industry as the acquired
business = 12 cases
Organisational
Incumbents
= 33 cases
Insiders
New managers drawn from
within the acquired business
= 10 cases
Organisational
Outsiders
23 cases
Organisational
Insiders
43 cases
Different industry	 Same industry*
11 cases	 22 cases
*excluding incumbents
7.2.2 Organisational Insiders / Outsiders and aggregate change
The Organisational Insider / Outsider literature shows consistent findings that
Organisational Outsiders make more organisational changes than Organisational
Insiders (Grusky, 1960, Carlson, 1962, Helmich, 1971, Helmich and Brown,
1972). The turnaround literature also provides significant support for this
argument by observing that the appointment of a new chief executive is very
often crucial in bringing about change (Grinyer, Mayes and McKiernan, 1988:
54, Whittington, 1993: 122). These observations led to proposition thirteen, that
in the post-acquisition context, we would expect Organisational Outsiders to
make more changes than Organisational Insiders.
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We were concerned to avoid any bias that might result from the amount of time
that had elapsed between the date of acquisition and questionnaire return, as our
Kendall tau-b and Spearman correlation coefficients had shown that the amounts
of change recorded in acquisitions was significantly and positively associated
with elapsed time. A Mann-Whitney U test-Wilcoxon rank sum test (see
appendix 7.1), of time elapsed between acquisition date and questionnaire return
by Organisational Insider / Outsider, returned a two tailed result of 0.86. This
suggests no significant difference between Organisational Insiders / Outsiders
based upon the amount of time elapsed between acquisition and questionnaire
return.
We used a Mann-Whitney U - Wilcoxon rank sum test, shown in table 7.1, to
compare the level of aggregate change by Organisational Insider and Outsider.
Table 7.1	 Aggregate change by Organisational Insiders / Outsiders
Mann-Whitney U - Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test
Mean Rank	 Cases
	
44.96
	
23	 Outsider
	
27.37
	
43	 Insider
66	 Total
Corrected for ties
Z	 1-Tailed P
231.0	 1034.0	 -3.5477	 .0002
Table 7.1 shows strong support for proposition thirteen, with a result significant
at the .0002 level, that Organisational Outsiders make significantly more
changes than Organisational Insiders. This finding fits observations in the
Organisational Insider / Outsider and turnaround literatures. Before discussing
this finding we shall examine other definitions of Insider / Outsider.
7.2.3 Industry Insiders / Outsiders and aggregate change
Gabarro's (1987) work, on executives taking charge of subsidiary companies in
the USA, focused upon the distinction between new executives drawn from the
same industry as the assignment and those drawn from outside the industry. He
concluded that 'Industry Insiders made more changes earlier than Industry
Outsiders' 3 and goes on to say that 'the number of changes made by Industry
Insiders was greater not only in the Taking-Hold stage but throughout the entire
taking-charge process' (Gabarro, 1987: 48). Whilst the suggestion that Insiders
make more changes than Outsiders appears to contradict the observations made
above, the focus upon new executives and an industry boundary for the
dichotomy may be the reason for such results.
To unravel the apparent contradiction between Gabarro's (1987) findings and
those of prior research into Insiders and Outsiders, we shall first examine
Gabarro's definition of Insider / Outsider and test against aggregate change and
3 We shall be looking at the timing of changes separately in chapter 7
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against his chosen change variables. We will then seek to explain away
Gabarro's (1987) apparent difference with prior research, from an acquisition
perspective, and also draw conclusions about proposition fourteen which seeks
to establish whether the Insider / Outsider dichotomy is more pronounced in
terms of change, at the organisational or industry level.
For our responding sample, we have 33 cases of new Managing Executives of
which 22 are drawn from the same industry and 11 from different industries.
Using a Mann-Whitney U test for two independent samples, our questionnaire
survey data strongly suggests a difference, with a P value of 0.08, between
Industry Outsiders and Industry Insiders, with the former making many more
changes than the latter. Table 7.2 shows our results.
Table 7.2	 Aggregate change by Industry Insiders / Outsiders
Mann-Whitney U - Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test
Mean Rank	 Cases
	
14.98
	 22	 Same industry
	
21.05
	 11	 Other industry
--
33	 Total
Exact	 Corrected for ties
2-Tailed P	 Z	 2-Tailed P
76.5	 231.5	 .0894	 -1.7020	 .0888
For aggregate change in the post-acquisition phase, many more are carried out
by new Managing Executives drawn from outside the industry of the acquired
company than by new Managing Executives drawn from the same industry.
However in our group of new managing executives drawn from the same
industry we are also including new managing executives which have been
drawn from the acquired company.
Gabarro (1987) examines just those executives drawn from outside the company
receiving the new executive and then distinguishes between those from the same
industry and those from other industries. If we look at our industry distinction
again, but in terms of the new executives being drawn solely from outside the
acquired company, we can see in table 7.3 that the two tailed t-test for equal
variances is .18 which is not significant.
Table 7.3	 Aggregate change by Industry Insiders / Outsiders (excluding
new executives from the target company)
95%
Variances	 t-value df 2-Tail Sig SE of Diff CI for Diff
Equal
	
-1.36	 20	 .188	 4.822	 (-16.627, 3.493)
Same industry n = 12 mean = 30.8 SD = 12.525 SE = 3.61
Other industry n = 10 mean = 37.4 SD = 9.489 SE = 3.00
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 1.783 P= .197
This result suggests that amongst new executives drawn from outside the
acquired company there is no significant difference in terms of the amount of
aggregate change associated with executives from the same industry and those
drawn from different industries. This is somewhat at odds with Gabarro's (1987)
conclusion, that executives drawn from the same industry will make more
changes than executives drawn from different industries. The difference in our
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results may be due to examining change at the aggregate level whilst Gabarro
(1987) chose to look at just structural and personnel changes, which to our mind
is but a small subset of change.
If we adopt Gabarro's (1987) variables based upon structural and personnel
changes we find that there is evidence to support his case. The Mann-Whitney U
- Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test in table 7.4 shows that significantly more
changes are made in structural and personnel variables by new executives drawn
from the same industry than by those executives coming from other industries.
Table 7.4	 Change in Gabarro's (1987) Structural and Personnel variables
by new Industry Insiders and Outsiders.
Mean Rank Cases
	
18.48
	
20	 Same ind
	
11.50	 11	 Other ind
31	 Total
Exact	 Corrected for ties
W	 2-Tailed P	 Z	 2-Tailed P
60.5	 126.5	 .0396	 -2.0513	 .0402
This evidence is at odds with table 7.3 which shows no significant difference
between Industry Insiders and Outsiders in terms of aggregate change, and if
one examines the means in table 7.3, if anything, Industry Outsiders make more
changes than Industry Insiders.
The issue clearly is one of whether Gabarro's (1987) variables can be said to be
representative of change in general. It is clear from his work that he believes that
there are other significant areas of change such as change in control systems and
entry activities but these were excluded from his results as he felt they did not
have a common metric (Gabarro, 1987: 176-178). The exclusion is then more
for reasons of method than the phenomena under study.
From this discussion we shall bear in mind that although Industry Insiders make
more changes than Industry Outsiders in terms of structural and personnel
changes, the broad picture is that at the industry level for aggregate change there
is little distinction between these management categories.
For aggregate change, it would appear that the distinction between Insider and
Outsider is most pronounced at the organisational level. Table 7.5 shows the
means and standard deviations of Insiders and Outsiders as determined by these
organisation and industry (including new managing executives drawn from
within the acquired company) levels of distinction.
Orientational meetings, briefings, visits
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Table 7.5	 Insiders, Outsiders and aggregate change compared by level of
analysis
Value Label	 Mean Std Dev SE  Cases
For Entire Population (missing cases=5.7%) 24.96	 14.24	 66
Organisational Outsider 	 33.43	 11.37	 2.37	 23
Organisational Insider	 20.44	 13.64	 2.08	 43
Levene's test	 F = 1.376 p = .245
	
t-test for equal variances = .000
Variable Value Label 	 Mean Std Dev. SE Cases
For Entire Population (missing =53%)	 31.00	 12.30	 33
Industry Insider	 28.22	 12.81	 2.73	 22
Industry Outsider	 36.54	 9.43	 2.84	 11
Levene's test	 F = 3.107 p = .088	 t-test for equal variances = .066
Proposition fourteen is therefore supported as it would seem that the
organisational distinction of Insider and Outsider is more apparent in terms of
aggregate change than the industry distinction.
We should also note that a further dichotomy worthy of examination is between
the incumbent executive and new executives. We also found this to be a very
significant distinction in terms of aggregate volume of change and for change at
the functional level. We might suggest that there may be a gradient of change
from the incumbent executive moving outwards from the organisation to the
most distant Outsider. Using a Kruskal-Wallis 1-Way Anova, testing
management type against aggregate change, table 7.6 shows there is some merit
in this suggestion.
Table 7.6	 Aggregate change by executive type
Mean Rank Cases
	
24.88	 32	 Incumbent
	
32.95	 10	 New org Insider
	
40.71	 12	 Same industry
	
50.50	 9	 Related industry
	
38.25	 2	 Unrelated industry5
--
	
65	 Total
Chi-Square	 D.F. Significance
15.7676
	
4	 .0033
Corrected for ties
Chi-Square D.F. Significance
15.7835	 4	 .0033
It is interesting to note that whilst there does indeed appear to be a gradient of
change, this does not continue for new executives brought in from unrelated
industries. This may be a reflection of the new executive from unrelated
industries having little knowledge of the acquired business and therefore an
unwillingness to engage in substantial change.
We also ran the above test for Gabarro's (1987) change criteria and found the
mirror image of the above, significant at the .015 level, with incumbents and
new Organisational Insiders making most changes in these areas and Industry
Outsiders making least. This tends to suggest that Gabarro (1987) has focused
upon change issues which are more closely associated with Organisational
Insiders in any case and this is the reason why his 'gradient' of change appears
to be running in a different direction to our findings for aggregate change. It is
this concentration on two sub-sets of change which has resulted in the apparent
contradiction with the general observations in the literature that Outsiders make
5 To ensure this value isn't unduly distorting the result, the test was re-run with four variables
and was significant at the .01 level.
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more changes than Insiders. In surfacing this contradiction which is more
apparent than real, we can suggest that there is room for further research upon
the types of change associated with the hierarchy of executives outlined above.
At the aggregate level, there is a hierarchy of change running from the
incumbent to the Outsider which we show in figure 7.2. The horizontal axis,
which is termed 'remoteness', is intended to describe the distance in relatedness
terms of the business from which the managing executive was last involved
compared with the business of the acquired company.
Figure 7.2	 A hierarchy of change
A
Amount
of
Change
0-
Remoteness
In our earlier table 7.3 we observed that there did not appear to be any
significant difference between Industry Insiders and Outsiders by aggregate
change. However from the Kruskal-Wallis 1-way anova in table 7.6 and figure
7.2 above, we can see that new executives drawn from unrelated industries are
moderating the effect of new executives from related industries. Whilst re-
running the tests shows an increased level of significance, the overall picture for
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aggregate change is one of a more marked dichotomy between Organisational
Insiders / Outsiders than at the industry level. For the remainder of the thesis we
shall remain with the Organisational Insider / Outsider distinction.
Drawing upon the interview data6 to give some explanation for the significant
difference in the levels of changes associated with Organisational Insiders /
Outsiders we frequently encountered the question of whether, under the new
ownership, the Managing Executive of the newly acquired company should
wield an axe or a scalpel. Often the Outsider has a mandate for change, it is the
basis upon which he has been brought in and, as a new broom, needs to be seen
to take charge. In other words there is an expectation of change both from above
and below. The Outsider is also not tied to personal allegiances in the acquired
company and is less restricted in his ability to take action. As Derby, the new
chief executive of a medium sized acquisition in the medical sector says, 'as an
Outsider you can stand back and see things, often clearer, in a visionary
strategic sense. You have the advantage of being totally objective, without
personal allegiances'.
When the Outsider makes changes, this is often on a much greater scale than the
Insider. Martin, a director of the acquiring company in charge of integrating a
very large communications acquisition, described the changes in the following
way; 'the acquired company was a bit stuck in its methods of working and
6 See Appendix 3.4
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practices. We went through there like a knife through hot butter. I think we felt
the changes were pretty substantial and it needed a new person to implement
that. New blood to implement that. And if the management had just stayed the
same, although they bought into the changes, I think they would have found it
very difficult when push came to shove, to actually do it'.
By keeping the Insider, the acquirers are generally looking for less change.
Insider Andrews, chief executive of an acquired small precision engineering
company, says that 'they (the acquirer) didn't interfere with the business. They
just let me run the company'. Blackman, an Insider and managing director of an
acquired packaging manufacturing business, explained the lack of change as
'there wasn't that much to change 'cause it (the acquired business) was very
successful and even now it's still going along the same track. There was nothing
for them to do, so they (the new parent) were quite happy'.
For Insiders, the budget was a bible and provided targets were met they were
left to carry on as they thought fit with minimal parental interference. As
Crossman, Insider and chief executive of medium sized acquisition in the
transport industry, puts it, 'If we're keeping within budget or exceeding budget,
they (the parent company) don't interfere - you have considerable autonomy'.
However the lack of change associated with Insiders was also a result of them
fiercely guarding their independence. In the words of Fredericks, Insider and
chief executive of a large acquisition in the communications sector, 'I have
found my major role throughout was defending the business from the owners'.
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7.3 Organisational Insiders / Outsider and functional change
So far we have examined the Organisational Insider / Outsider distinction from
the perspective of aggregate change. Gabarro's (1987) focus upon certain types
of change suggests that we need to see whether this distinction is maintained in
different areas of change and whether it is more pronounced in some areas than
others.
Figure 7.3	 A comparison of the mean number of changes by function for
Organisational Insiders / Outsiders
Key:	 Number of change variables in brackets by function
Fin. = Finance (7), Comms. = Communications (3), Mkt. = Marketing (8),
HR = Human Resources (14), Ops = Operations (13), IT = Information tedmology(3)
Outsiders = 23, Insiders = 43
Figure 7.3 shows a clear difference between the mean number of changes by
function associated with Organisational Insiders and Outsiders. The results of
testing for differences in the distribution of change, for each function, using a
Mann-Whitney U - Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test, are shown in table 7.7.
Table 7.7	 A comparison of the distribution of change by function for
Organisational Insiders / Outsiders
Functional area 1-tailed level of
significance
Explanation
Finance .001
Marketing .004
Communications .0005 Outsiders make more
Human resources .0004 changes than Insiders
Operations .005
Information technology .002
Table 7.7 offers strong evidence for the pervasiveness of the distinction,
between Organisational Insider / Outsider, based on the aggregate number of
changes for each functional area. When we examined each function in more
detail we concluded that this distinction remained robust although there were
different emphases of change by Insider / Outsider. These results are contained
in Appendix 7.2.
The difference in emphasis between Insiders and Outsiders within functional
areas is illustrated in table 7.8, where we suggest areas of change significantly
associated with Outsiders.
Table 7.8	 Main themes of change associated with Outsiders
.	 Themes Variable Outsiders
making
changes
Sig. level
re
Insiders
Al Changing the Remove senior executives (q20g) 90.9% .01
acquired New senior executives (q20d) ' 77.3% .02
management Reassign management (q20c) 77.3% .001
BI Establishing Improving financial controls(q17c) 82.6% .001
control Control expenditure (q170 73.9% .004
Inventory controls (q21e) 65.0% .03
Stock take (q21g) 57.9% .001
Improve quality control (21j) 45.0% ,	 .03
CI Accessing and Improved marketing information to the CEO (18i) 67.0% .006
improving Set up direct reporting (q19c)
	 ,
76.2% .003
information Change information system (q22d) 65.2% .04
DI Putting parent Adopt parent financial reporting(q17d) 91.3% .11
systems in place Adopt parent pay and conditions(q20n) 67.7% .004
Adopt parent inventory controls (q21f) 45.0% .03
Adopt parent information systems (q22c) 52.2% .10
E1 Making major Change to the finance dept. (q17b) 82.6% .04
structural changes Change to the marketing dept. (q18b) 81.0% .02
Change to manufacturing operations (q21b) 55.0% .02
Change to Information Technology dept. (q22b) 73.9% .0001
Fl Refocusing Review marketing plan (q18c) 81.0% .01
marketing Focus marketing on a segment (q18d) 67.0% .0007
New marketing initiative (q18e)
,
76.2% .009
GI Expansion and New marketing initiative (q18e) 76.2% .009
investment Adopt new processes (q211) 44.4% .04
initiatives Invest in research (21m) 43.8% .01
HI Reinforcing Change employee incentives (q201) 68.2% .09
change Change performance appraisal (q20m) 68.2% .0003
Adopt parent pay and conditions(q20n) 66.7% .004
The questionnaire survey shows that Outsiders are significantly more associated
with change than Insiders and this is supported by top teams, where Outsiders
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are present, being more action oriented in 76.2% of cases (significant difference
with Insiders at the .003 level) and injecting new values in 81% of cases
(significant difference with Insiders at the .002 level). This echoes the findings
in the Sharpbenders (1988) study which noted that with new CEOs came new
functional directors and more changes7.
Important areas of change associated with Outsiders are changes in the
management of the acquired company (Theme A). This is probably to remove
obstacles to change and to signal new directions.
Outsiders are clearly much more associated with establishing and improving
controls (Theme B). This is a vital part of taking charge of the business and also
an exercise in looking for improvements in terms of efficiency and cost
reduction. Linked to this is the issue of accessing information and establishing
information pathways (Theme C). This is essential for the new Managing
Executive to get to grips with the business. It is noticeable however that the
information and communications which are cited as most important are formal
structures rather than informal ones which might be linked to more tacit
knowledge. Although the formal approach gets to grips with the acquired
business, there is a question to what extent it really accesses the core values of
the acquisition.
7 The new functional directors may have been brought in to increase the rate of change or build
supportive coalition (Grinyer, 1998 - personal correspondence).
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Associated with Outsiders is the putting in place of parent procedures and
systems (Theme D). This is not so surprising as the Outsider is very much the
new parent's man and likely to be their champion. However it is clear from the
significance levels that Insiders are also subject to many of these changes, such
as in the finance area.
Outsiders not only make more changes than Insiders but it also appears that they
make more major changes (Theme E).There is a natural grouping of changes as
structural changes which are clearly more associated with Outsiders. We will
examine this issue of magnitude of changes in the next section.
Marketing appears to have a special importance amongst the functions (Theme
F). Where the changes are about refocussing or expanding marketing activities,
then an Outsider is often present. The Insiders clearly defend and protect the
marketing function.
Outsiders also appear to be associated with expansion and investment to a
greater extent than Insiders (Theme G). Although these results are significantly
different from Insiders, the percentage of Outsiders so involved is rather less
than half.
Finally Outsiders appear to reinforce changes by altering employee appraisal in
particular but also the incentive system (Theme H).
7.4 Insiders / Outsiders and the impact of change
In the above discussion there are suggestions that whilst Outsiders make more
changes than Insiders in the post-acquisition phase, they might also be
associated with more radical change. To assess whether this is the case, we shall
look for associations between those items which are strongly associated with
Outsiders rather than Insiders and correlate them against managerial perceptions
of the impact these changes would have. We would expect a degree of
correlation between areas of change perceived to have high impact and the
actions of Outsiders which are significantly different to Insiders. Insiders are
more likely to wish to maintain the status quo and in so doing, focus upon
incremental changes whereas Outsiders are interested in making a considerable
difference to the organisation and will focus upon changes having a substantial
impact.
To establish the impact that changing the items in the questionnaire survey
would have in an organisation, we surveyed a group of 40 executives 8, asking
8 Warwick executive MBAs, Easter 1997
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them to rank the change items on a scale of 1 for low impact to 5 for high
impact. Taking the average of these scores we then ranked the items and then
proceeded to correlate them with the changes significantly more important to
Outsiders than Insiders. To achieve this correlation we used Kendall's rank
order correlation coefficient 9, adjusting for ties, as it is appropriate for this
ordinal data. The results, reported on a functional basis, are contained in table
7.9
Table 7.9
	 Impactl° and significance of change, associated with Outsiders
Function* Correlation Significance level
Finance .45 .15
Marketing .83 .04
Communications .50 .48
Human resources .78 .05
Operations management .29 .24
Information technology .33 .60
* items within the function were ranked in order of highest significance level
Table 7.9 shows a rather mixed picture of association between changes ranked
by average assessed general impact and changes significantly associated with
Outsiders. In the finance area there is a modest correlation at .45 but this is not
significant. In marketing however there is a strong correlation between impact
9 This test has 91% power of Spearman (Cohen and Holliday, 1982: 160). It has less stringent
assumptions on distribution.
10 Average assessed general impact
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of change and association with changes specific to Outsiders. This result is
significant at the .04 level and supports the notion above that substantive
changes in marketing are strongly associated with Outsiders. Similarly in the
human resources area we find a high correlation between the impact of changes
and changes associated with Outsiders which is significant at the .05 level. In
areas such as operations management and information technology there is low
correlation with low significance. We might conclude therefore that the
significant difference between Outsiders and Insiders is in terms of changes
made in the marketing and human resource areas in particular, with a weak echo
of this in the finance area. In the operations management area this pattern is not
evident and may be due in part to the fact that there is less distinction between
Insiders and Outsiders in terms of the amount of change that takes place in this
area and that changes in operations do not appear to be regarded as having such
a significant impact upon the organisation.
We also examined the impact of changes against a ranking of changes based
upon those carried out by the largest numbers of Outsiders. The results from this
are contained in table 7.10.
Table 7.10	 Impact' I and frequency of change by Outsiders
Function* Correlation Significance level
Finance .66 .08
Marketing .59 .13
Communications .81 .22
Human resources .88 .006
Operations management .49 .66
Information technology .33 .60
* items within the function were ranked in order of highest level of citation by Outsiders
Table 7.10 shows there are some strong correlations between the changes most
often cited by Outsiders and the level of average assessed general impact they
might have on the acquired company. However these correlations are not always
significant. For instance there is a modest correlation between those changes in
the marketing area frequently associated with Outsiders and the impact they
have on the acquired company but the significance level is just .13. For the
finance function the modest correlation of .66 is significant at the .08 level and
in the human resources area the high correlation is significant at the .006 level.
Correlations in the operations and information technology area were low and not
significant.
The notion that Outsiders are more highly associated with high impact changes
is probably too sweeping a generalisation. The tables above do give some
Average assessed general impact
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support to the proposition but it is clear that it has more force in some areas than
others. In particular the areas of marketing, human resources and finance appear
to show that Outsiders will be associated with high impact changes, whilst this
is not the case in areas such as operations management and information
technology.
When we ranked the items of change in terms of greatest to least impact and
examined the top half of the ranks 12 we discovered that this included 100% of
our marketing items, 50% of human resource items and 42% of finance items.
Only a third of Operation Management items and Information technology items
were included in the top half of the ranks. This does suggest, albeit rather
crudely, that changes in marketing, human resources and finance tend to be
perceived as having more impact on an organisation and these are the areas on
which Outsiders focus their attention. There may also be a case that these
changes are somewhat easier to make than those in operations management or
information technology. To assess this issue, we ranked the means and standard
deviations of each functional area based on ease of change.
12 Due to the number of ties in the ranking of changes by impact, it was felt that to look at a
smaller portion than 50% would be unhelpful.
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Table 7.11	 Ease of making changes by function.
.	 Function Mean Standard Deviation Standard Error
Communications i=3 2.30 .52 .30
Marketing i=8 2.85 .42 .14
Human resources i= 14 3.07 .42 .11
Finance i=7 3.18 .52 .19
Operations management i=13 3.29 .65 .18
Information technology i=3 3.40 .26 .15
Note:	 I= Easy to change, 5 = Difficult to change
i = Questionnaire items
Whilst we should be cautious of these results as the number of items for each
function is small, there is a pattern that suggests that changes in marketing,
human resources and finance are perceived to be somewhat simpler than in
operations management and information technology. This maybe due to the
innate qualities of the operations management and information technology areas,
or, in an acquisition context, these areas might be much less transparent upon
take-over.
From the above then we may conclude that Outsiders make many more changes
than Insiders and whilst these changes are in all functions, there is a greater
concentration on changing marketing, human resources and finance. These areas
also have been rated as areas which will have the greatest impact upon a
business and to some extent it appears that changes in these areas are somewhat
easier to carry out than in other functions.
7.5 Insiders / Outsiders by acquisition type
The previous discussion has supported the view of Insider and Outsiders being
differently associated with change in a post-acquisition context. On this basis
we should expect Insiders and Outsiders to be differently distributed between
acquisition styles. The previous chapter has shown for instance how
Preservation styles are strongly associated with low post-acquisition change and
Absorption acquisitions are associated with high levels of change, and we might
therefore expect Insiders to dominate the former and Outsiders to dominate the
latter. It is unclear however which executive type will be associated with
Holding and Symbiotic acquisitions.
Figure 7.4 overleaf shows the distribution of our responding sample upon
Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991) contingency framework.
Figure 7.4
	 Organisational Insiders / Outsiders by acquisition type
1.0-1A
1.5- 1.9
2.0 -2.4
2.5 -2.9
Resource
3.0
Transfer*
1.0 2.0
Autonomy
5.03.0	 4.0
Holding 1,I,I
0,0,0,
0,0
0,0,0
1,1,0
1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,
0,0
1,1,1,1
Preservation
1,1,0
0 1,1,0,0
3.1 -3.4
3.5 -3.9
4.0 -4.4
4.5 -5.0
I,0
Absorption
0
I,0
0
Symbiotic
0,0
0,0
* 3 respondents failed to identify their position
Matrix co-ordinates are contained in Appendix for Chapter 6
Note: 'I' refers to Insider. '0' refers to Outsider
A visual inspection of the data above shows clearly that there are concentrations
of Managing Executive type. A cross-tabulation of Insiders against Outsiders
by post-acquisition type is significant at the .004 leve1 13 . Table 7.12 below
summarises the proportions of Insider and Outsiders for each of the acquisition
integration types.
13 This test has been run for differences between Holding, Preservation and Absorption boxes.
There are too few observations for Symbiotic acquisitions to be included. If all borderline
cases are randomly assigned between the four acquisition types, the significance level
recorded is .01.
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Table 7.12	 Organisational Insiders / Outsiders by acquisition type
Acquisition type Number of cases Total in box
Holding Insiders	 = 89% 8
Outsiders = 11% I 9
Absorption Insiders = 25% 2
Outsiders = 75% 6 8
Preservation Insiders	 = 86% 19
Outsiders = 14% 3 22
Symbiotic Insiders	 = 33% 1
Outsiders = 66% 2 3
Total cases* 42
* Unallocated borderline cases 	 = 25
Missing values	 = 3
It is clear from the above that Insiders dominate in Holding and Preservation
acquisitions whilst Outsiders are the majority in Absorption and Symbiotic
acquisitions 14 . Whilst one might expect a preponderance of Insiders in
Preservation acquisitions, as these acquisitions by definition show fewer
changes, it is somewhat surprising to find a majority of Insiders in Holding
acquisitions where, with low autonomy, one might expect significant change.
Clearly then there is not a straight forward relationship between autonomy and
Managing Executive type. Appendix 7.3 shows the variable effect of autonomy
on Managing Executive type.
14 When we adjust for potential positive autonomy bias, the effect is to subdue these results but
not remove the emphases observed.
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Clearly this is not the whole picture and the resource transfer axis of the
contingency framework affects the distribution of Insiders and Outsiders. A
visual inspection of figure 7.4 suggests that resource transfer is positively
associated with the presence of Outsiders and negatively associated with
Insiders. These associations are significant at the .01 level for each of our
resource transfer items (see Appendix 7.3). It would seem from this that whilst
the relationship between resource transfer and executive type is consistent,
autonomy does not behave quite so predictably15.
Explanation for the positive association of resource transfer with the presence of
Outsiders included the 'conquering army' syndrome, where everything the
acquired company stands for is seen as outmoded and to be replaced with
superior parent systems. In the words of James, the new Outsider of an acquired
professional services company, 'We were pretty successful and had a winning
formula. We knew we were doing it right and that everybody else did it wrong,
so we just imposed our culture totally on the target. We knew the business. Their
business was our business. We were just going to get in and swallow it and
absorb it. It does focus the mind and you haven't got to have a debate about
which computer system is best - you just go in and shut theirs down and transfer
your own'.
15 Appendix 7.4 looks more closely at the effect of autonomy for all the key variables and
concludes that with medium autonomy there are some unusual characteristics
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At the other end of the extreme where there was low resource transfer,
Organisational Insiders were remarking upon a lack of direction from the parent.
It seems that low resource transfer is linked with a lack of knowledge about the
acquired business. In our cameo, Insider, Stanton commented upon a lack of
understanding of what had been purchased. For this reason there is little
resource transfer and no change in the Managing Executive for 'if they left, what
would be left? (Insider, Andrews). Another Insider, Fredericks, Managing
Executive of a large communications company, expressed many Insider's
sentiment about resource transfers from the new parent: The owners contribute
absolutely nothing to the business at any stage'.
This foregoing discussion now allows us to make sense of the distribution of
Insiders and Outsiders in the Holding and Symbiotic acquisition categories.
Holding acquisitions exhibit low autonomy and low resource transfer. Low
autonomy does not have a significant effect upon the executive type but low
resource transfer is associated with the retention of Insiders and so we find
Insiders predominating in Holding acquisitions16.
For Symbiotic acquisitions with high autonomy and high resource transfer we
might expect Insiders to remain as they show some association with high
autonomy although high resource transfer suggests the presence of Outsiders.
16 There may be an element here of original intentions to fix and sell the company quickly.
However, these Holding companies had been in existence for a while and this maybe exposes
the difficulties between intentions and post-acquisition reality.
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With just three cases, we cannot draw strong conclusions and can just remark
that there are two Outsiders and one Insider. This finding is however a little
surprising as the idea behind Symbiotic acquisitions is the transfer of resources
whilst maintaining the boundary of the acquired company. Indeed Haspeslagh
and Jemison (1991) characterise Symbiotic acquisitions as preserving the
acquired company's capabilities and allowing them to take the initiative in terms
of any transfers. For this reason we would really not expect Outsiders, and
removing the Insider must give concern that this acquisition form may not be
fully realised.
In general it appears that resource transfer is a dominant determinant of whether
Insiders or Outsiders are present. The distribution of managing executive types
then seems to fit rather well with Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991) distinction
of value creating and value capture acquisitions where the former are associated
with Outsiders and the latter with Insiders.
7.6 Acquisition styles, Insiders / Outsiders and change
The previous section has suggested that Insiders and Outsiders are associated
respectively with value capture and value creating acquisitions. However, there
is something of a contradiction as section 6.2 showed Outsiders to be associated
with more change than Insiders. There is an argument to be made that allocation
of Outsiders to Symbiotic acquisitions and Insiders to Holding acquisitions is
the wrong way around17.
Whilst earlier sections have shown that the level of change associated with
Outsiders is at a significantly higher level than Insiders in all acquisition types,
Insiders show a greater range of association with change. This is illustrated in
table 7.13 which shows that, despite the low numbers of cases in many
categories, there is greater variation in the levels of change associated with
Insiders by acquisition type than Outsiders who appear to achieve similar levels
of change regardless of acquisition type. The Kruskal-Wallis tests in table 7.13
therefore show associations 18 between Insiders and acquisition types, whereas
Outsiders do not.
Table 7.13	 Insiders, aggregate change and acquisition typel9
Mean Rank	 Cases
	
24.69	 8	 Holding
	
18.75	 4	 Absorption
	
12.81	 18	 Preservation
	
19.33	 3	 Symbiotic
33	 Total
Corrected for ties
Chi-Square D.F. Significance	 Chi-Square	 D.F. Significance
8.7491
	 3	 .0328	 8.7609	 3	 .0326
17 There is some support for this notion as we examined perceptions of success by Insiders and
Outsiders of the acquisition types and found Outsiders are most successful where there are
high levels of change and Insiders where there are lower levels.
18 Whilst the significance level for Insiders shows a significant value of .0326, the numbers of
cases is too low for this to be any more than indicative.
19 Due to small numbers, all borderline cases have been randomly assigned to acquisition types
upon which they border.
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Table 7.13 (contd) - Outsiders, aggregate change and acquisition type
Mean Rank
	
Cases
	
5.00	 1	 Holding
	
8.29	 7	 Absorption
	
8.25	 4	 Preservation
	
10.00	 4	 Symbiotic
16	 Total
Corrected for ties
Chi-Square	 D.F. Significance Chi-Square	 D.F.	 Significance
.9627	 3	 .8103	 .9655	 3	 .8096
The high levels of change associated with Outsiders in all acquisition types
suggests that there is merit in the notion that they have a mandate for change
and indeed that there are expectations for change. This is well captured in the
remarks of Insider Andrews, managing director of an acquired precision
engineering firm, who said, `day one everybody expects change and they're
bewildered if it's absent'. In addition Outsiders are not encumbered by the
burden of the acquired company's past history. In the words of Outsider Derby,
chief executive of an acquired medical company, a Preservation acquisition,
`you've got the advantage (over an Insider) of being totally objective and you
haven't got personal allegiances which I think is underestimated in business. As
a newcomer you don't have that emotional burden'.
Insiders on the other hand would seem to be more sensitive to different
acquisition styles. In well performing businesses they are in a sufficiently
powerful position to resist change and yet in turnaround situations are able to
carry out sweeping alterations. As we showed in our cameo, Stanton
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restructured and turned around his electronics business inside a year. The
evidence suggests that Insiders are not shy of taking tough decisions although
they are more sensitive and protective of the core capabilities of the acquired
company.
7.7 Conclusion
There is a robust difference between Insiders and Outsiders, in terms of their
association with levels of change in a post-acquisition context. We found this
difference to be present at both the aggregate and functional level for an
organisational distinction. This confirmed proposition thirteen that
Organisational Outsiders make more changes than Organisational Insiders. We
therefore concord with the earlier observations of the Insider / Outsider debate,
and extend this stream of literature into the acquisition arena.
We also examined the Insider / Outsider distinction at the industry level, Our
findings, that there was little difference in aggregate change between Industry
Insiders Outsiders, differ from Gabarro l s (1987) work, which suggested
industry Insiders make more changes than Industry Outsiders, We concluded
grails as entirely the result of choice of measures as we were able to observe his
findings lo) opting his two sub-sets or change We remain unonvintyed
7 U/5
however that these two sub-sets of measures are comprehensive indicators of
change.
Reviewing the distinction between Insiders and Outsiders from an industry and
organisational level, we agreed, with proposition fourteen, that the
organisational distinction was more robust.
In terms of functional change we observed that there was a difference in
emphasis in terms of which areas were targeted for change by Insiders /
Outsiders. On balance we found that Outsiders tended to change those areas
which were perceived to have high impact and were easier to change, such as in
finance and marketing. More difficult areas, such as operations management
and information technology, where the impact might take longer to occur, were
less associated with Outsiders.
Changes closely associated with Outsiders were, taking charge by changing the
acquired company's management, putting controls in place and accessing and
improving formal information flows; putting parent systems in place; making
structural changes, refocusing marketing, expanding and investing in activities
and reinforcing change.
Having established differences between Outsiders and Insiders we moved from
a unitary view of acquisitions to the contingency approach of Haspeslagh and
Jemison (1991). A limitation of their work is to overlook the role of the
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managing executive of the acquired company. In seeking to relate Insiders and
Outsiders to acquisition types, we found that resource transfer was a more
important determinant of managing executive type than autonomy. This allowed
us to associate Insiders with value capture acquisitions and Outsiders with value
creating acquisitions. However this also appeared to raise a contradiction as
autonomy is more associated with level of change than resource transfer and the
Insider / Outsider distinction is apparent based upon levels of change. In other
words we found Insiders, who are generally associated with lower levels of
change, in Holding acquisitions previously characterised as turnarounds and
experiencing high levels of change. Outsiders on the other hand, who are
associated with high levels of change, were in Symbiotic acquisitions where
change is generally perceived to quite low. We therefore wondered if the
allocation of Insiders / Outsiders was optimal and examined the association
between executive type and levels of change across acquisition types.
Although Outsiders make more changes than Insiders, the levels of change
associated with them remained similar despite different acquisition types
whereas Insiders displayed significantly different levels of change. Outsiders
then, seemed less sensitive than Insiders to acquisition types. They are more
focused upon the business of taking charge and making relatively easy, high
impact changes to match the expectations of stakeholders. Insiders however,
have a much greater range of possibilities due to their knowledge of how the
business operates and their embededness in the acquired company. They can act
as defender and protector as well as stringent cost cutter. They have the means
to bring about change, or indeed impede it, at their finger tips.
Levels of change are associated with the extent of autonomy in the acquired
company. However, although Outsiders are clearly linked with high levels of
change and Insiders with fewer changes, their association with acquisition type
appears to be more a function of resource transfer. This suggests that for
Holding and Symbiotic acquisitions the allocation of Outsiders and Insiders is
the wrong way around. In other words, autonomy should be an important
determinant of executive type, rather than resource transfer. This line of
reasoning receives some support from Wensely and Angwin (1995), that
executives are reasonably comfortable in managing resource transfer but find
setting autonomy levels rather difficult. It would seem then that the autonomy
dimension is rather more complex than commonly acknowledged.
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8.1 Introduction
An important question for those managing acquisitions is whether change in the
post-acquisition phase should be initiated quickly or slowly (Business
International, 1992). Should newly acquired companies be approached
cautiously or in a `gung-ho' manner? A more cautious approach may help
learning (Mirvis and Marks, 1992), but could feed the dangers of prolonged
uncertainty, whereas a rapid approach may minimise the damage of loss in
confidence although could result in companies 'shooting themselves in the foot'
(Yunker, 1983) by widespread disruption.
Despite the importance of this issue, most post-acquisition studies have tended
to have a rather inert quality and those that do recognise the importance of the
timing of implementation, such as Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991) work, are
very vague about when moves take place.
Mindful of this observation, in this chapter we will examine the issue of the
timing of changes in the post-acquisition phase. We shall then try to combine
these observations with the findings of earlier chapters to create an integrated
picture of post-acquisition change in the UK.
To inform our discussion on the timing of changes in the post-acquisition phase,
we shall draw upon Gabarro's (1987) work, which identifies clear waves of
change when new managing executives take charge of subsidiary companies in
the US. In extending Gabarro's (1987) work into the acquisition field, we will
examine, through proposition sixteen, whether there are similarities in the
patterns of change in both situations.
We shall also consider whether the taking charge process progresses at similar
rates. In proposition seventeen, we suggest that the taking charge process will be
more rapid in a post-acquisition situation than in taking control of a subsidiary
company.
In Chapter seven, we examined the patterns of change, in terms of the volume of
changes made, associated with the use of Insider and Outsider managing
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executives and concluded there were significant differences at the organisational
level. GabaiTo (1987) has also observed differences between Insiders and
Outsiders in terms of the speed with which change is initiated. In this Chapter
we shall re-visit the issue of Insiders and Outsiders, but in terms of the speed
with which changes are initiated, to see whether Gabarro's observation of
significant differences is maintained.
Throughout this thesis we have been testing Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991)
contingency framework to see whether their suggested typology is robust. In
terms of the volume of changes initiated, Chapter five found significant
differences between the four acquisition styles. In this Chapter we shall re-visit
the contingency framework to see whether the suggested typology is robust in
terms of the speed with which changes are carried out in each acquisition style.
In Chapter two we argued that there should be a hierarchy amongst the four
acquisition types, based upon the speed with which changes started, and this
hierarchy would be determined more by level of autonomy than level of
resource transfer. We suggested, in proposition fifteen, that the hierarchy would
run from Absorption acquisitions being the fastest, through Holding, Symbiotic
and finally Preservation.
In conclusion to the Chapter, we shall couple our observations on the speed of
change with the results from Chapter five, on the volume of change, to enable us
to take a view on the severity of the change for each acquisition style. From
3	 6	 9	 12	 15	 18	 21	 24	 27	 30
Months after acquisition
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these patterns we will suggest that quite different managerial approaches to each
acquisition type are warranted.
8.2 Patterns of post-acquisition change
One of the major findings of the survey was that immediately after acquisition, a
large number of changes are started in the acquired company. This is illustrated
in the following figure which shows the levels of aggregate l
 change since the
acquisition took place for all our respondents. We anticipated some time bias in
our responding sample and have therefore also shown the pattern of starting
points for aggregate change in acquisitions where at least one year and two and a
half years2
 had passed since take-over.
Figure 8.1: Post acquisition aggregate change
	All deals (n=70)
	-Deals cver 1 yr (n=48)
Deals cwer 25 years
(n=18) 
1 Aggregate change is the total number of changes recorded for all change items (questions 17
- 22 in the questionnaire), for all cases, against the amount of time elapsed between the
acquisition date and when the change was started.
2 The taking charge process takes up to two and a half years (Gabarro 1987)
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The patterns of aggregate change shown in figure 8.1 suggest similarity despite
time elapsed between deal and questionnaire return. In particular the most
noteworthy feature is the enormous amount of change recorded at the outset of
the post-acquisition period. Forty percent of change was started in the first
month under new ownership and eighty three percent of all changes were begun
within the first six months3.
By the end of the first year, when there was a renewed burst of activity, the vast
majority of changes had been initiated with 94% of all changes having started
for all our responding sample4.
The second year of ownership shows more changes being started but at a much
reduced level to the first year. There is a noticeable lull in the final quarter of
that year and then a third mild resurgence in activity at the two year mark.
The main area where our sub-samples diverge is around and after the two year
mark. This is not surprising as more time has elapsed for these acquisitions to
initiate new changes. However even in acquisitions where two and a half years
have elapsed, we still see a very similar pattern to our total sample. This
suggests that changes in the post-acquisition phase are initiated very rapidly
indeed, with a major wave at the outset. Although the questionnaire asked for
3 81% (acquisitions over 1 year), 78% (acquisitions over 2.5 years)
4 92% (acquisitions over 1 year), 87% (acquisitions over 2,5 years)
8 373
-All deals (n=70)
-Deets over 3 years (n=7)
50%
45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
the start time of changes to be given in months, many respondents annotated
their questionnaires saying 'change started on day one! ' .
It is worth examining acquisitions where more than three years have elapsed to
gain a little more perspective upon the 'tail' end of change initiation. For our
acquisitions where more than three years has elapsed' we have just seven cases'
which is likely to mean a greater volatility in their pattern. Figure 8.2 compares
acquisitions over three years with our full responding sample.
Figure 8.2	 Post acquisition aggregate change
3	 6	 9	 12	 15	 18	 21	 24	 27	 30	 33	 36
Months after acquisition
As expected there is greater volatility with our three year sub-sample which
exaggerates many of the features commented on above. In particular respondents
recall an even greater amount of change started at the outset of the
5 The average time elapsed for our sub sample of acquisitions over three years is 43 months (3
years 7 months)
6 There is no apparent bias towards a particular acquisition type but small n prevents testing
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post-acquisition phase and a more marked peak at six months. They see a lull in
activity after nine months and then two further peaks at twelve and twenty four
months. There also appears to be a modest rise at thirty six months. With just
seven cases we can only point out this sub sample perceives changes in the post-
acquisition phase as very marked at the outset with rapidly diminishing waves
through the first year
To an extent changes may be grouped as executives 'round' their perceptions.
However the surge in activity which they identify at the two year mark does
appear to be noteworthy and they clearly perceive a 'second' wave of activity at
the mid point of the first year followed by a later surge at the two year point.
In our interviews, executives remarked frequently upon the high level of change
at the outset of acquisition. Reasons for this included, 'you must act quickly' and
'be seen to be taking control'. There is a clear feeling that taking charge means
seizing the initiative and 'profiting from the merger vacuum period in which
people expect changes' (Bragado, 1992: 27).
There are clear parallels here with taking charge of turnaround situations, the
conventional wisdom of which is described by Khandwalla ( 1995: 163) as
'shocking the system'. 'You must get everyone's attention. You've got to make
everyone in the organisation, from the man who sweeps the floors to your
immediate staff, understand that you mean business' (Bibeault, 1982: 152).
'Speed of action is essential' (Slatter, 1984: 130) and 'vigorous action was
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necessary to achieve a change' (Grinyer, Mayes and McKiernan, 1988: 105).
These explanations for substantial and immediate change in turnarounds clearly
resonate with the immediate wave of change we have identified for the
beginning of the post acquisition phase.
8.3 Taking charge waves of change
The preceding figures have shown waves of change in the post-acquisition
phase. To gain further insight into these waves, we discussed in Chapter two,
the work by Gabarro (1987) on executives taking charge of companies in the
US. Over a period of two, to two and a half years, Gabarro (1987) identifies
three quite distinct waves of change which we felt might also be evident in the
post-acquisition period.
In proposition sixteen, we suggested that the patterns of change uncovered in the
post-acquisition phase will be similar to those observed by Gabarro (1987). In
representing the patterns of change in the post-acquisition situation, and
comparing them with the waves observed by Gabarro (1987), we will also be
able to comment upon proposition seventeen, that there may be a difference in
the speed of taking control of both situations.
To aid comparisons, we have examined Gabarro's (1987) variables in isolation
from our other questionnaire items, adopted his common metric (Gabarro, 1987
appendix C: 183), and applied this to acquisitions over two years old. Appendix
8.1 shows how we have matched Gabarro's items and adopted his time array
technique for personnel and structural changes.
The combined result of our organisational waves of change are set against
Gabarro's (1987) in figure 8.3.
Figure 8.3	 Comparison of Organisational waves of change
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Cases over two years (n=26)
It is clear that there are waves of change in a post-acquisition context although
they have quite a different pattern to those observed by Gabarro (1987). The
extent of the disparity is clear. Even when we used the same items as Gabarro,
applied his common metric and used his time array process, clear differences
emerged. In particular, at the outset there is a tremendous difference in the level
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of activity experienced in acquisitions'as opposed to taking charge of subsidiary
companies 7 . After this substantial wave of change at the outset, acquisitions see
a rapid decline in the level of change started whilst Gabarro's companies
experience their most major wave of change. In both sets of companies there is a
further reduced wave of change, and indeed acquisitions appear to experience a
fourth and even smaller wave of change before tailing off towards the end of the
second year. One might suggest that, rather like earthquakes, the severity of the
first wave of change amongst acquisitions leads to a greater number of after-
shocks than for taking charge of subsidiary companies.
Proposition sixteen suggested that the patterns of change in a post-acquisition
situation would be similar to those in taking charge of subsidiary companies.
Our evidence does point to waves of change in the post-acquisition phase, but
the timing and magnitude of these waves is quite different from those observed
by Gabarro (1987).
We do need to be cautious in this observation as there are important differences
between the two studies. Gabarro's (1987) data is based upon taking charge of
companies in the US, whilst we are examining acquisitions in the UK. There are
also important method differences in that Gabarro (1987) uses four longitudinal
and ten historical case studies whereas we are employing a cross-sectional
7 To match Gabarro's (1987) study we chose to assume zero change on the acquisition date (a
grouping choice by Gabarro), although our respondents made it very clear they made many
changes on day one. In addition we might venture that if there had been high levels of change
amongst Gabarro's companies at the beginning of the taking charge period, he would have
reflected this in his graphs.
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survey. The longitudinal case studies in particular enable him not only to record
the real time of change but also to capture repeated changes. Our survey
approach is far more limited in this regard and reflects our wish to find when
changes started rather than their duration or repetition.
Gabarro's (1987) capture of repeated change means that he has recorded a
higher average number of changes on average for his cases and this is why in
figure 8.3 we felt that to compare volume of change would be misleading 8 . We
must also be mindful that capturing longitudinal data may give greater emphasis
to repeat changes that occur later in the period under study. Our cross sectional
approach may therefore be understating the levels of change later in the post-
acquisition phase. Against this we must set the sorts of change under
consideration. It is clear with Gabarro's (1987: 177) data that the more major
Organisational changes do not recur often (unlike personnel changes). We have
also targeted specific areas of change which in Gabarro's system will pick up
some repetitions 9 . For personnel changes we will be understating the number of
changes in Gabarro's (1987) terms.
Despite the reservations made above, it would seem that change amongst
acquisitions does appear to be more intense than in Gabarro's (1987) companies.
8 For our 25 cases there were 121 observations of the timing of change for Gabarro's
Organisational changes. In the survey respondents provided timings of change for 60% of the
changes they recorded. We suggest therefore that there are about 194 changes for 25 cases:
an average of 7.7 changes per company. Gabarro's (1987: 16) graph suggests an average of
25 changes for each of his subsidiaries.
9 For Gabarro a repetition of changes in sub-units could be picked up in our survey by recording
a change in the finance function at one time and then the HR function at another time.
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With such a marked wave of activity at the outset of the post-acquisition phase,
we suggest that there is more than just a 'taking hold process at work but also a
'reshaping' stage. In general terms there appears to be little time for immersion
in the business to consider how to engage in re-shaping. The later waves seem
more reminiscent of 'consolidation' and 'refinement' 10 There would appear to
be far more urgency involved in taking charge of an acquisition than a
subsidiary company. In this sense, we feel we can agree with proposition
seventeen, which suggested that the changes associated with taking charge of
acquisitions would be initiated more rapidly than for executives taking control
of subsidiary companies.
Reasons for the greater intensity of change in a post-acquisition context, may
well be a reflection of the depth of crisis associated with a company being taken
over. There would appear to be considerable pressure upon executives to act and
assume control, both from the new parent wishing to discover what it has
bought and wanting to bed the acquisition down, as well as from the acquired
workforce who want to know where they stand and 'the new rules of the game'.
Unlike taking charge of a subsidiary, the situation in an acquisition is altogether
more extreme with a far greater unknown on all sides.
I ° We have not gone into a detailed comparison between the waves of change as the method
and contextual differences may be causing significant distortion.
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8.4 Insiders / Outsiders and the timing of change
Gabarro (1987) also examines the differences in the patterns of change by
managing executive type. In particular he observes that Industry Insiders make
more changes more rapidly than Industry Outsiders. This adds to an extensive
literature regarding the differences between Insiders and Outsiders by focusing
upon an Industry rather than Organisational distinction for Insiders / Outsiders
and, most importantly, adds an explicit time component.
Superficially Gabarro's (1987) work appears to contradict the established
Insider / Outsider literature in suggesting that Insiders make more changes more
rapidly than Insiders. Regarding volume of change, prior work had strongly
argued that Outsiders make more changes. In our discussion in Chapter seven
we resolved this issue by using different definitions for Insiders / Outsiders, at
the Industry or Organisational level, and also suggested Gabarro's (1987) choice
of variables gave only a partial view of change and were most closely associated
with Insiders rather than Outsiders. Clearly in considering the speed with which
change is implemented we should bear these observations in mind.
Gabano's (1987) explanation for Industry Insiders acting more rapidly than
Industry Outsiders is that the former bring a more directly relevant experience
which enables more rapid learning and action, 'particularly during the taking
hold stage' (Gabarro, 1987: 48). For Industry Outsiders, in the words of one of
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Gabarro's (1987: 49 - 50) interviewees, 'a lot of his instincts are off and it will
take him a while to really understand what this is about'.
To the best of this author's knowledge there are no other studies in the
acquisition literature that examines the issue of Insiders / Outsiders and the
timing of changes, and, as remarked earlier, the broader work on Insiders and
Outsiders has tended to look at the magnitude of change rather than its timing.
However the related turnaround literature argues for the impact of Outsiders and
suggests that if there is a need for radical change, then a new managing
executive is critical (Slatter, 1984, Grinyer, Mayes and McKiernan, 1988).
There seems to be an assumption in the turnaround literature that Outsiders will
move more rapidly and decisively than Insiders although, to the best of this
author's knowledge, there has been no explicit testing of the issue of managing
executive type and change initiation over time in turnarounds.
8.4.1 Organisational Insiders / Outsiders and aggregate change
We shall begin our examination of Insiders and Outsiders, in terms of the speed
with which changes are started, by firstly looking at aggregate change. To avoid
possible distortion caused by the amount of time elapsed since deal completion,
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we shall examine a sub-sample of respondents where between one and two
years" had passed since acquisition date and questionnaire retum12.
Figure 8.4 shows the distribution of change by Insider / Outsider for our sub-
sample of acquisitions between one and two years old.
Figure 8.4	 Timing of changes by Organisational Insiders / Outsiders in
acquisitions 12mths - 24mths old.
3
	
6
	
9	 12	 15	 18
	
21
	
24
Months after acquisition
Insiders make a lot of their changes very rapidly while Outsiders have a more
sustained approach in the first year. Whilst Gabarro's (1987) observations related
to an Industry distinction, we find that Insiders are quicker off the mark than
Outsiders. Although the latter clearly start with a high level of change, there is
also a second wave of major change at around the six month period
11 We would have liked to have broadened this sub-sample to the two or even three year mark
but the differences between time elapsed between deal and questionnaire return for the two
parties became significant.
12 The Levene test for equality of variances shows no significant differences between Insiders /
Outsiders by elapsed time (see appendix 8.2)
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-Outsiders (n=5)
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followed by a further lesser wave at the year end. This does seem to resonate
with Gabarro's (1987) generic pattern of two important waves of change
although for Outsiders Gabarro (1987:49) observes that the second wave of
change is more substantial than the first.
Clearly this representation gives us a good insight to the beginning of the post-
acquisition period but is less informative as we move into the second year. To
provide greater detail on this issue, figure 8.5 shows the differences between
Insiders and Outsiders in acquisitions where at least thirty three months have
elapsed. This choice of cut-off date has been determined by removing time bias,
but of course this has been at the expense of having to use fewer cases".
Figure 8.5
	 Timing of change by Insider / Outsider for acquisitions over 33
months old
3	 6	 9	 12	 15 18 21	 24 27 30 33 36
Months after acquisition
13 The Levene and t-tests show no significant difference between Insiders / Outsiders beyond
this date by elapsed time (see appendix 8.3)
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For the first year we find a similar pattern to that commented upon above.
However it is evident that, from the end of the first year, the Insider is
periodically involved in further waves of change whereas the Outsider is far less
active at initiating change than at the outset. We might suggest therefore that
Insiders are more rapid than Outsiders at the beginning of the post-acquisition
phases in terms of initiating change and then the impetus falls away quickly.
However there are clearly -periodic bouts of change-which continue throughout
the post-acquisition phase. Outsiders on the other hand make proportionately
fewer changes early on but show high levels of activity for the first six months.
Thereafter, whilst there are other waves of change they are very subdued.
If we now incorporate the volume of change with the timing of change the
following picture emerges.
Figure 8.6	 Timing and volume of change by Insiders / Outsiders for
acquisitions 12 - 24 months old
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From figure 8.6 we can observe that Insiders move with considerable speed in
the first instance, and with a high level of change, but this soon falls away. The
Outsider however sees a high sustained level of change initiation in the first
year. Thereafter the absolute levels of activity are low.
8.4.2 Organisational Insiders /Outsiders and functional change
The speed with which Insiders make changes is born out at the functional level.
To test for differences we examined the mean time of changes by using a two
independent samples t-test to look for other variations in the distributions
(Cohen and Holliday 1982). Table 8.1 shows the results for the speed with
which change in functional areas by Organisational Insiders / Outsiders. The
first column of results shows the percentage of items where Organisational
Insiders acted more rapidly than Organisational Outsiders and the second shows
the percentages of statistically significant differences by functional area.
Table 8.1:
	
Organisational Insiders / Outsiders by speed of starting change
Functional area % of items where Insiders
acted more rapidly than
Outsiders
% of change items
where a significant
difference*
Finance	 (1=7) 85.7% 14.2%
Marketing	 (1=8) 100% 37.5%
Communications	 (i=3) 100% 0.0%
Human resources (1=14) 78.6% 21.4%
Operations	 (1=13) 100% 69.2%
I.T.	 (i=3) 100% 0.0%
Note: i = number of variables	 *Significant is set at the .10 level and less
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Table 8.1 suggests that there is weak but consistent support for the proposition
that Organisational Insiders initiate changes more rapidly than Organisational
Outsiders. For 94% of the change items in the questionnaire, Organisational
Insiders started changes more rapidly than Organisational Outsiders although
this was only statistically significant for 33% of items.
Organisational Insiders move more rapidly in initiating change as a result of
being in situ with a up and running mechanism for action. It is noticeable from
table 8.1 that Insiders' rapidity is more marked in operations than other
functional areas. In Chapter seven we argued that this was a complex area,
difficult to change and also one with less perceived impact. For these reasons
Insiders were more likely to stand out from Outsiders who would target easier
areas which had a greater immediate impact upon an acquisition. The areas of
finance and human resources in table 8.1 show much lower percentages of items
where Insiders act more rapidly. We shall return to the issue of impact and ease
of change after we have examined other types of Insiders /Outsiders.
8.4.3 Industry Insiders / Outsiders and aggregate change
Examining other distinctions for Insiders and Outsiders, using a Kruskal Wallis-
one way ANOVA, we believe there may be a sequence with incumbents
making changes fastest followed by new Organisational Insiders and then
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Organisational Outsiders. Thereafter in the sequence, when we look at just
Organisational Outsiders, the picture is less distinct (see figure 8.7).
Figure 8.7
	 Differences in speed of making changes by management type
(acquisitions 12 - 36 months)
Mean Rank Cases
	
6.83	 6	 New organisational Insider
	
13.42	 6	 Same industry
	
13.42	 8	 Related industry
	
4.00	 2	 Unrelated industry
20	 Total
Corrected for ties
Chi-Square	 D.F. Significance Chi-Square D.F. Significance
7.6357	 3	 .0542	 7.6645	 3	 .0535
Although executives coming from the same Industry appear to start changes
more rapidly in all areas than those from related industries, executives from
unrelated industries disrupted the sequence as they were more rapid than
executives from the same and related industries'''. This is illustrated in the
Mann-Whitney U - Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test in figure 8.8 below.
Figure 8.8	 Comparison of Industry Outsiders from unrelated and related
industries in terms of aggregate change and elapsed time
(Acquisitions over 1 yr)
Mean Rank Cases
	
6.25	 8	 Related Industry
	
2.50	 2	 Unrelated Industry
10	 Total
Exact
	 Corrected for ties
U	 W 2-Tailed P
	 Z 2-Tailed P
2.0	 5.0	 .1778	 -1.5667
	 .1172
14 The Levene and t-tests show no significant difference between Industry Outsiders from
unrelated and related industries, for acquisitions over I year, by elapsed time (see appendix
8.4)
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Whilst the result of the Mann-Whitney test is .11, we feel there is a case for
taking note of this result as a number of tests showed the pattern of the Outsider
coming from an unrelated industry often moving more rapidly than those from
related and the same industries. In particular, the distinction between Outsiders
from unrelated industries and those from related industries was most marked in
the area of financial changes (significant at the .03 level) 15
 and in the area of
human resource issues (significant at the .06 level)16.
Whilst we agree with Gabarro that for his measures, Industry Insiders move
more rapidly than Industry Outsiders, we feel this conceals important variations.
In particular, the Outsider coming from unrelated industry appears to move
more rapidly than Outsiders from related and the same industries and this
difference was significant for changes in the finance and human resources area.
8.4.4 Explanations for differences in timing between Organisational
Insiders/Outsiders
Reasons for Organisational Insiders starting changes more rapidly than
Organisational Outsiders are that the former are far more familiar with their
companies whereas the latter need time to build a picture. In the words of
15 Putting financial controls in place, adopting parent's financial reporting system, making
structural changes
16 Changing performance appraisal schemes, introducing employee incentive schemes,
implementing management development programmes. Top team was perceived as more
action oriented and injecting new values.
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Outsider, Derby, managing director of an acquisition in the medical sector, 'as a
newcomer, you have the disadvantage of not quite knowing how that bit works'.
Finance director and Outsider, Keaton, of a medium sized acquisition in food
manufacturing, says, 'we broadly knew what to do but not enough to go in there
and do it on day one'. Indeed in some cases the Outsider was not informed of
his new appointment until a day or so before the acquisition happened! This
may be born out by the clear difference in speed in terms of changing internal
operations. Several Outsiders also echoed the sentiment of managing director
and Outsider, Lambert, 'we went into the acquisition with an open mind'.
Insiders were also able to start upon change more quickly as they had plans for
the changes well before the acquisition was finalised. In one instance a CEO
wanted to remove the finance director as he was perceived to be poor. However
as a substantial shareholder he was difficult to remove. This situation altered
with a change in control. In speaking of the acquisition of his precision
engineering company, managing director and Insider, Andrews, said 'it helps to
be able to pin redundancy decisions upon the acquiring company's personnel
department in Head Office'. There is also an argument that the Organisational
Insider does not take his eye off the commercial football to the same extent as
an Outsider who has to learn about the business. On this basis the
Organisational Insider may be more responsive to changes in the market. There
is also the issue that negotiating a deal does absorb a great deal of senior
management time so that the retained Insider often feels once the deal is
completed that he has to get back into the saddle. The business had suffered
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from me being out of involvement (whilst) I tried to sell it. I had to get re-
involved. Because I had more time to spend on the business I was able to
identib) what needed doing next and to drive it forward, which I had not
sufficient time to do in the past' (Andrews).
Finally the Organisational Insider already has a working network, such as
observed by Kotter (1982) as vital for implementing agendas, which is a
mechanism for bringing about change. The Organisational Outsider needs time
to construct such a system. Although the next quotation is more about which
managers to remove or keep, it gives a flavour of the in-built delay in action as
well as the need to create some sort of interface. Finance director and Outsider,
Keaton, speaking of their acquisition in the food manufacturing sector,
remarked, 'we need to spend five months establishing exactly who the right
people are. We know broadly the structure that we want, but lets create some
interface between the organisations that allows us to start the planning
process'.
8.4.5 Insiders / Outsiders and the impact of change
Whilst discussing why new executives made the changes they did and trying to
uncover the reasons for the order in which change was carried out, a number of
Outsiders suggested that they chose changes which had a high impact and were,
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in the words of Insider, Heath, chief executive of an acquired professional
services business, 'easier to put in place'. In Chapter seven we saw that there
was some evidence to support this observation in the case of Outsiders with
regard to the areas of finance, marketing and human resources and we might
reasonably expect them to start higher impact changes earlier than those with
less impact. Insiders on the other hand are unlikely to think in those terms and
so we would not expect such an association.
To see whether there was any association between the timing of the changes
made and their impact, we examined the rankings of all change items against the
rankings of their timings by Organisational Insider / Outsider for acquisitions
where two to three years had elapsed. Using Kendall's rank order correlation
and correcting for ties (Cohen & Holliday, 1982: 158-161) we ranked changes
by impact and timing for both Outsiders and Insiders. For both Insiders and
Outsiders we found low correlations" between the impact of the changes made
and timing. This is insufficient to say Outsiders prioritise change in terms of
impact.
However when we examine the ease with which changes occur, we find that
both Insiders and Outsiders show associations between the timing of change and
the ease with which changes are made. Insiders showed a 0.623 correlation
between ease of change and timing whereas Outsiders showed a 0.649
17 0.255 and 0.342 respectively
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correlation. Whilst these are just modest correlations it would seem that in the
context of the timing of post-acquisitions change, ease of change is more of a
priority than impact of change. This could well be bound up in the issues of
'being seen to be doing something' and also 'expectations of change'.
In the next section we shall turn to the timing of changes by acquisition type.
We should bear in mind the general observations that Organisational Insiders
make changes more rapidly than Organisational Outsiders. Insiders activity then
reduces quickly. Outsiders however may initiate changes more slowly than
Insiders but see much higher levels of change starts later in the post-acquisition
period.
8.5 The pattern of change amongst acquisition types
Chapter five showed significant differences between acquisition types based
upon the volume and nature of changes made. In this section we shall examine
the different patterns of change over time by acquisition type. First we shall
look for a hierarchy amongst acquisition types based upon the speed with which
changes are initiated and secondly characterise the patterns of change for each
acquisition type.
8.5.1 Comparing speed of change
Hypothesis fifteen suggested that there would be an order amongst acquisition
types based upon the speed with which change started. We suggested that higher
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Resource
Transfer
resource transfer and lower autonomy would be associated with more rapid
change and so the likely order for speed of change would be Absorption
acquisitions followed by Holding, Symbiotic and then Preservation acquisitions.
However, we established earlier in this Chapter, that Organisational Insiders
initiate changes more rapidly than Organisational Outsiders. As we can see from
figure 8.9, the hierarchy of change reflects the executive type with changes
occurring more rapidly in Holding followed by Preservation, Absorption and
Symbiotic acquisitions'8.
Figure 8.9	 Timing and volume of change by acquisition type l9 (12 mths +)
Autonomy 
Low	 High
Low
High
15%
10%
Average change per deal =21 75
15%
10%
Average change per deal =158
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.--,
1	 3	 6	 9	 12	 /5	 18	 21	 24	 V	 33	 33	 38
Symbiotic
Note:	 Flolding (n= 8, 174 changes); Preservation (n=8, 127 changes); Absorption (n =6, 122 changes);
Symbiotic (n=4, 77 changes)
18 This hierarchy receives some support from a Kruslcal -Wallis 1-Way ANOVA for differences
in the average timing of change between our four acquisition types. The result was
significant at the .06 level (see Appendix 8.5)
19 Further distributions were created for each acquisition type with more elapsed time, but
showed little variation in pattern.
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8.5.2 Characterising patterns of change by acquisition type
Figure 8.9 shows clear differences in the patterns of change by acquisition type
and we will characterise these in this section. We have sought to uncover
sequences of change for each acquisition type, in terms of functional and cross-
functional categories, but due to small numbers, most of this analysis is
insufficiently robust for reporting . We therefore downplay its significance and
merely offer a few observations where there is support from our interviewees.
8.5.2.1 Holding acquisitions
Chapter five characterised Holding acquisitions as turnarounds with very high
volumes of change. Figure 8.9 shows most of this activity to be concentrated at
the outset of the post-acquisition period with 62% of all change being initiated
within the first month. We examined the data for a sequence of functional or
cross functional change but were unable to find one as change was compressed
into a tight time frame. The rapidity and focus of change is well illustrated by
our cameo of Stanton, who remarked that 'I had been thinking about it for
months and I had got a blueprint already in place and I just pressed the button'.
The focus upon preventing further organisational deterioration is described by
Taylor, managing director of an industrial land usage firm, as 'stabilising the
workforce, stopping capital expenditure, stopping financial misuse, putting
immediate controls on the finances and putting in place the parent required
financial systems'.
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Speed of action is clearly vital to reverse their poor financial health and can be
across the board. In the words of Nelson, chief executive of an acquired
financial services company, `have a clear idea and do it. You'll get lots wrong,
but that doesn't actually matter. People want clarity'.
Following the burst of immediate change, executives commented on a loss of
strategic direction and momentum. This is illustrated by figure 8.9 which shows
a marked subsidence in change towards the third month, plateau at six months
and then a further decline towards the end of the year. Thereafter there is only
minor activity. As Stanton, of our cameo in Chapter five, remarked, `we were
left in a complete vacuum. All we did was carry on'.
Holding acquisitions then can be characterised as experiencing intense focused
change, almost 'kill or cure' in nature, followed by a sense of operating in a
void.
8.5.2.2 Preservation acquisitions
Chapter five characterised Preservation acquisitions as experiencing relatively
low levels of change. Whilst the term Preservation suggests standing still we
found that these acquisitions saw their altered circumstances as an opportunity
for change.
Figure 8.9 shows most change occurs at the outset of the acquisition. For those
acquisitions over one year old, 37% of all new changes occurred in the first
month with the level declining to a nadir by the ninth month of the first year.
New changes then continue at a low but sustained rate into the second year and
beyond.
Change in Preservation acquisitions then seems to be quite rapid at the outset.
Insiders dominated these acquisitions and, as commented in section 8.4, are
associated with more rapid change. Our interviewees characterised this as
having been away from their business whilst negotiating the deal. In the words
of Crossman, Chief Executive of an acquired transport company, 'it take's your
eye off the ball'. The flurry of activity is getting back into the saddle. As
Andrews, managing director of an acquired precision engineering business,
says, 'I had to get re-involved'. More than one executive said, 'I freely admit we
did them (changes) as quickly as we could as we knew what had to be done and
I knew I could blame them on the (new parent)'.
There is a cross functional sequence in Preservation acquisitions of financial
changes followed by management adjustments and then operational changes. As
Blackman, managing director of an acquired package manufacturing business
said, 'we started having to get into their budgeting sequence and we had to
change all our accounting methods. We had to do that more or less straight
away'. Management adjustments were also perceived as vital. Eccleston, a
director in charge of acquiring a large communications acquisition, said, 'It was
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critical to us that all key managers knew exactly what we were doing, otherwise
you end up losing staff morale will plummet'.
Investment in operations is a later change which has to be earned. In the words
of Crossman, managing director of an acquired transport business, `(the parent)
recognises that (they're) going to have to invest but in order to just ib) that
investment we have to have the profitability to just ifir it'.
Apart from the observation that re-establishing control happens rapidly and
operational changes come later, the level of change and its timing becomes
attenuated and it is difficult to discern a pattern. The reason is that Preservation
acquisitions are far more focused upon their own markets than 'accommodating'
the new parent, against whom they often defend their business. In many cases,
direction from the new parent, other than in terms of financial reporting, was not
forthcoming and led to complaints. Consequently the changes made were more
specific to each business rather than generic to Preservation acquisitions.
One might also argue that the long tail to the changes is a reflection of the
difficulties faced in changing a successful company in a way suggested by the
parent but which might be perceived to be harmful. Derby, managing director of
an acquired medical company, and a rare Outsider in this context, shows how
changes in Preservation acquisitions might be initiated well after the acquisition
date. 'Consultants have got to be in the top one percent of intelligence - they're
deeply suspicious - ultra conservative - it took them twenty years to accept
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penicillin. They're powerful and can wreak change. I had to work very slowly
and very sensitively'.
8.5.2.3 Absorption acquisitions
Chapter five showed that Absorption acquisitions are characterised by
considerable and wide sweeping change. Figure 8.9 shows that they are
characterised by a burst of change at the outset, followed by a lull in activity
during which there is an important planning phase, and then a wave of intense
change. Thereafter there are clear diminishing subsequent peaks of activity at
the one year mark and after eighteen months.
In explaining the broad picture of change, Keaton, in our cameo of an acquired
food manufacturing business, says, 'we had six months of causing difficulties,
six months of realising them and six months of putting them right'. Commenting
upon the wave of change at the one year mark, Martin, a director of the new
parent of a large communications company says, 'At the end of the first year
there was a taking stock of how well we had done, and a further rationalisation
which was not in the plan and was completed in a further six months'. For
Lambert, managing director of an acquired utilities company, these subsequent
waves were viewed as follows, 'after twelve months is a period of refinement
and getting things done'.
With such marked waves, Gabarro's (1987) work lends explanation and insight.
The immediate wave can be said to be taking hold of the acquired company
followed by an immersion stage or planning stage. When this is complete, there
is a major restructuring phase around six months. A consolidation phase then
begins with a further subsidiary wave of change following near the year end.
Gabarro (1987) suggests a refinement stage of little change whereas we see a
further wave of change at eighteen months followed by refinement. Gabarro's
(1987) model appears to have some merit in the Absorption acquisition context
although our phases seem to be more closely grouped and perhaps more marked.
The taking charge activities in the first burst of change focus on
communications, imposing financial controls, senior executive change and the
removal of corporate identity. Whilst this is taking place, the planning and
consultation process is set up.
The importance of communications is vital to allow the acquired company to
continue to operate effectively whilst task forces investigate areas for
integration. Effective communications are needed to prevent the rumour mill
from operating and the loss of the best staff The fears of employees are well
described by Outsider James, managing director of a professional services
acquisition, 'after every deal I have always met the staff and the things they
always ask are, 'what's the name of the company going to be?, when are you
changing the name of the company?, are you changing my commission plan?,
are you changing my remuneration package?, and will I still have the same
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manager? - their world is in turmoil, they're all down to the bottom layer of
Maslow, 'how do I feed my family? '. James's advice is 'don't bullshit them.
Don't commit to things you are not sure about. Be honest and open and be
available'. The other side of the coin is as Keaton, finance director of an
acquired food manufacturing business, remarks, `we didn't want people
thinking, 'well I'm going to be booted out' and then ruin our relationships with
a couple of large supermarkets'. The high importance given to communications
is well illustrated by Heath, chief executive of a professional services firm
acquisition, 'I visited every single office of both companies throughout this
country in a three day period and spoke to as many staff as they could get in. As
soon as it was done, I got to all the overseas offices as well. It was a major
exercise'.
Imposing financial controls is seen as the way to take control, establish a
common language, and seek out duplicate costs. In Absorption acquisitions,
finance teams are the 'shock troops' of acquisition. As Martin, in charge of a
very large acquisition in the communications sector, says, 'our accounting
personnel went in there straight away'.
Whilst the initial burst of change subsides, considerable effort is put into
planning the integration using joint task forces. This lull is explained by Keaton,
Outsider and finance director, who says, `we didn't know enough to go in there
day one and suddenly do things'. Outsider Lambert, managing director of an
acquired utility company describes a planning phase of two months, 'in about
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six to eight weeks we had blitzed it and worked out how we were going to
operate the new district'.
Following the completion of the plan, there was broad change on many fronts,
executed at speed. As Martin says, 'once the plans were complete, we incurred a
redundancy bill and the wrath of lots of people and got on and did it'.
Subsequent waves of activity tended to be remedial in nature resulting from the
major planned restructuring wave of change.
8.5.2.4 Symbiotic acquisitions
Chapter five showed how Symbiotic acquisitions are difficult to manage and not
necessarily characterised by a great deal of change. The emphasis was one of
building through investment and mutual development and we suggest that this
can be a more time consuming process than the acquisition styles discussed
above.
Figure 8.9 shows the timing of changes in Symbiotic acquisitions 20 . These are
clearly very different to other acquisitions with a relatively low level of activity
at the outset of the post-acquisition phase. In the words of Vaughan, managing
director of a large acquisition in the food manufacturing sector, 'we did say at
the outset that we were not going to come in and make wholesale changes'. He
20 With just three 'pure' Symbiotic cases we have included six borderline cases. After
removing cases under one year we have four cases.
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explained this by saying 'there was a reluctance to change too much in what
was a successful operation' and he didn't want it unsettled. Vaughan makes the
contrast with other acquisition styles particularly well when describing an
exchange with the then incumbent chief executive who said shortly after
acquisition, ' well I suppose you've got a blueprint and within a week everything
will have changed? '. Vaughan said, 'We found this bizarre because we said, `no
- we're not as presumptuous as to act like that because we don't know your
company', and he said, 'well I can tell you, if we had acquired you 21, within a
week we'd know exactly what we'd be doing and it would have all changed',
and we thought, there are two ways of doing it and its not the way we're going
to do it'.
The issue of not wanting to disrupt the acquired company is clearly of
paramount concern in this acquisition. As a result, in the words of Vaughan,
changes went further down our calendar based on that judgement'. Figure 8.9
shows that for Symbiotic acquisitions, the emphasis of intended change is more
delayed than for other acquisition types. There is a marked peak at the one year
point followed by a slump and then a resurgence towards the end of the second
year.
This pattern of the timing of change seems to fit with the notion that change
here is rather more incremental than in other acquisition types. There is no great
21 Its worth noting that two years earlier, the acquired company did have aspirations to acquire
the new parent.
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wall of change but rather an iterative form of interaction. As Vaughan
remarked, 'we were alive to the dynamics of the situation. We actually changed
a number of things as we went along'. 'Rather than great directional changes, it
was something that we felt could be done in the first year that we put off until
the second year'. Vaughan also suggest that the scale of change was also
affected in the same way. This interaction meant longer time scales than for
other acquisitions and 'those changes are still in progress (over four years on)'.
In addition the iterative nature of the change process allowed changes to be
handled sequentially.
Vaughan has still has further changes in mind but feels that through the iterative
process, 'the future will not be presented as changes because we have two
different companies; I think they will just be taken as changes within the group'.
8.6 Integrating acquisition types
In terms of volume and speed of change we have seen that the four acquisition
styles possess distinct differences. Holding acquisitions see very rapid and high
levels of change, as befits a turnaround situation, which quickly die away.
Absorption acquisitions also see high levels of change but there is delay caused
by the need to plan. There is then a major wave followed by remedial after-
shocks. Preservation acquisitions see immediate but low levels of change which
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then rumble on, whereas Symbiotic acquisitions also with lower levels of
change, see a delayed sequence over a longer time frame.
A way of summarising these differences is by juxtaposing volume by timing of
change from which we can characterise each acquisition style.
Figure 8.10 Characterising change by acquisition type
Volume of change
High
	
Low
Holding
Focused change
Preservation
Piecemeal change
Absorption
Complex change
Symbiotic
Sequential change
Preservation acquisitions see low levels of change which are piecemeal in nature
and contained within the acquired company. The changes are aimed at
improving what is already being done and there is an aversion to doing things
differently. In the eyes of the managing executives, the changes are not
perceived as changes at all, but simply differences in the way things are done.
Indeed, most of our interviewees said that the new parent did not specify any
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direction and so they continued to find their own way, reacting to changes in
their markets.
Holding acquisitions are also about doing the same things better and acting
rapidly, although the scale of change is substantial. Time is short, requiring
concerted action, but there is a limit to resources which severely constrains the
scope of action in the acquired company. Often held in hermetic isolation, to
avoid contaminating the parent group, Holding acquisitions focus upon a
number of key changes. These are acted upon very rapidly, in an attempt to
restore the business to good health and also win the confidence of the new
parent.
Absorption acquisitions also see high levels of change, but these are not carried
out immediately. There are substantial interdependencies between the
organisations to be managed and this requires a complex approach necessitating
careful planning and the use of task forces to accommodate the higher
information needs. Everything must be changed rapidly but all the parts affect
each other. Here the emphasis can be said to be doing things differently and
there is a mutual interaction between the newly acquired company and its
parent. On completion of an Absorption acquisition, both organisations will
have changed, unlike the Holding or Preservation acquisitions, which will be
still clearly identifiable.
Symbiotic acquisitions also see longer time scales for change and it is important
to consider dependencies between and within several components. These
connections are explicitly recognised and managed sequentially. Change
therefore focuses upon specific components in turn. There is an explicit
interaction between the new parent and the acquired company in carrying out
changes which occur in both organisations. Although these changes take place
over a long period of time, the outcome is for fundamental change in both
organisations.
In summary, we can see four distinct managerial challenges in these acquisition
styles. These challenges revolve around the speed with which change should
take place, the amount of change needed, and the level of interaction with the
new parent company.
8.6.1 Revolutionary or evolutionary change
We have argued above that there are four distinct types of post-acquisition
change although in chapter two of the thesis we observed that the organisational
behaviour school tends to regard change as either revolutionary or evolutionary
(Romanelli and Tushman, 1994). This dichotomy seems well suited to our
horizontal axis in figure 8.10. Romanelli and Tushman's (1994) discussion of
punctuated equilibrium examines twenty five minicomputer firms over a three
year period, and depicts revolutionary change as disruptive of established
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activity patterns. This seems consistent with Holding acquisitions as
turnarounds, where there needs to be fundamental change to ensure the survival
of the company, and Absorption acquisitions where the acquired company is
dismembered and swallowed by the new parent. In particular Romanelli and
Tushman (1994: 1144) identify poor performance and the succession of chief
executives as key forces to stimulate fundamental organisational transformation
We would agree that Holding and Absorption acquisitions frequently exhibit
poor performance and the latter often change their chief executives. However it
would seem that Holding acquisitions tend not to change their chief executives.
Romanelli and Tushman (1994) also suggest that organisations had
overwhelmingly accomplished fundamental transformations within two years
Although we have focused upon the start of changes, figure 8.9 shows clearly
that the vast majority of new changes had been initiated in Holding and
Absorption acquisition well before the two year mark.
Evolutionary change on the other hand is characterised by a series of small
changes which do not produce revolutionary change. In particular managers are
said to resist change as they try to maintain complex networks (Romanelli and
Tushman, 1994). This description seems to fit well with Preservation
acquisitions where there are relatively low levels of change and managing
executives who are clearly resisting, successfully, parental interference in their
businesses. Symbiotic acquisitions also see relatively low levels of change and
there is a clear wish for an incremental approach. The interesting contradiction
is that this approach of small changes over a longer period, according to
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Tuslunan and Romanelli (1994: 1159), will not lead to fundamental
transformation and they cite other studies by Miller and Friesen (1984) and
Virany, Tushman and Romanelli (1992) which argue that 'when transformation
occurs, revolutionary change confers a performance benefit' (Romanelli and
Tushman, 1994: 1161). This raises the question of whether Symbiotic
acquisitions can create value and from the evidence we have presented above,
this would seem to be the case.
Our characterisations of four post-acquisition types suggests strongly that the
change may not easily be reduced to just one dimension of revolutionary and
evolutionary change. We can see that using two dimensions of change, volume
and timing, leads to quite different patterns of change for our four acquisition
types. In addition, it would appear that there is a contradiction between
Tushman and Romanelli's (1994) assertion that small changes over a long
period will not lead to fundamental transformation, whereas Symbiotic
acquisitions aim to create value through gradual changes over a long period
which will result in fundamental transformation, and their assertion that
revolutionary changes will lead to fundamental transformation whereas Holding
acquisitions see substantial change but essentially are doing the same things
better.
8.7 Conclusion
We opened the Chapter by asking whether managers should initiate change in a
newly acquired company in a cautious, piecemeal way or in a more `gung-ho'
manner. Prior studies in the area have a curiously static quality or, at best, are
very vague on this issue. By drawing upon the work of Gabarro (1987), we were
able to find a mechanism for examining the speed of change in acquisitions and,
in conjunction with Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991) work, were able to show
that different acquisition styles exhibit very different profiles in terms of the
speed with which change is initiated. Bringing this together with the results of
Chapter five, which show a marked variation in the volume of change by
acquisition type, we can see that the work of taking charge, for each acquisition
type, is substantially different. The initial dichotomy therefore, of making
changes quickly or slowly, or indeed, making many changes or few, can be
resolved by the contingency framework which shows that each element in these
dichotomies is appropriate in different circumstances.
We also believe that, just in the same way that the picture of change as fast or
slow, or many changes or few, is too simple for the post-acquisition phase, the
prevailing view in the organisational behaviour school, that change is either
revolutionary or evolutionary, misses important nuances. As we show in figure
8.10, within the revolutionary and evolutionary categories there can be quite
different outcomes so that the 'severity' of the change does not determine the
extent to which there is fundamental transformation.
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9. Conclusion 
9.1 Introduction
Many corporate acquisitions fail to live up to their expectations, and there is
dissatisfaction with the explanatory power of pre-acquisition variables.
Researchers now focus upon the post-acquisition phase as the key to making
acquisitions work (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991, Deiser, 1994). This resonates
with developments in the Strategic Management literature, where attention is
now directed at implementation issues as major moderators of organisational
performance. Currently however, the post-acquisition literature is largely
fragmented, partial in nature and lacking in coherence.
9.2 Aims of the thesis
This thesis focuses upon the post-acquisition phase and, in so doing, is
consistent with the current trend in Strategic Management. It sets out to
contribute to our understanding of this period by providing a systematic
examination of post-acquisition change in the United Kingdom. This fills a gap
in the literature as there are no generic studies to date, giving a comprehensive
coverage of actual post-acquisition changes across a population of acquisitions.
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In particular, the thesis focuses upon which changes took place in acquired
companies after acquisition, the magnitude of those changes and their timing.
This enabled us to establish whether a contingency approach to post-acquisition
management could be supported and, from this position, to extend this typology
by detailed characterisation of each acquisition type. We also anticipated that
this would contribute to the debate upon whether change needs to occur slowly,
as advocated by Processualists, or whether there are circumstances where
change takes place rapidly.
Part of the characterisation of each acquisition style involved looking at the way
in which different types of Managing Executive took charge of acquisitions for,
in times of crises, their role becomes critical. Based upon a substantial literature
on the differences between Insiders and Outsiders, we expected to find
significant differences in the ways different executive types handled post-
acquisition change. Consequently we also expected to find clear associations
between executive types and particular acquisition styles. From these
observations we aimed to form a view upon which type of executive would be
more successful in a particular acquisition context.
In terms of the different types of acquisition, there is an implicit view in
Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991) study, that acquisitions experiencing high
levels of resource transfer will be more successful than acquisitions that stand
alone. For this reason they concentrate upon certain acquisition types at the
expense of others. Their view stems from the Resource-Based view of the firm,
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the dominant paradigm in Strategic Management in the 1990s (Collis and
Montgomery, 1995, McKiernan, 1996), which suggests that value can only be
created by the transfer of resources between firms, to create new complex assets
or build upon those already present, so enhancing competitive advantage. This
thesis examined the empirical data for evidence to support the theory of a clear
link between resource transfer and perceptions of success.
9.3 Method and data
The method employed in the thesis can be described as hybrid. Its virtues were
providing a cross-sectional view of the acquisition population, a comprehensive
perspective hitherto lacking in the post-acquisition literature, and adding depth
and richness to survey results by using key respondent interviews. We surveyed
the population of corporate acquisitions in the UK between March 1991 - April
1994 and achieved a good response rate of 30%. This data enabled us to
categorise acquisitions and, by using change variables drawn from related
literatures, allowed us to test the soundness of the classification. As a coherent
picture of change patterns emerged for each acquisition type, we carried out
twenty in-depth interviews with key respondents, to gather explanation and
further nuance for these findings.
9.4 Results
The following table summarise the propositions and their results.
Table 9.1	 Thesis propositions and results
No. Proposition Results Page(s)
1 Compared with Haspeslagh and
Jemison's Absorption and Symbiotic
integration styles, Preservation
Acquisitions will account for a
significant number of acquisitions in
the UK.
Preservation acquisitions accounted for
54.5% of pure replies (49% if neutral
cases randomly assigned). This was
higher than the expected value although
only 0.7 of the chi squared value
4-207-208
2 Compared with Haspeslagh and
Jemison's Absorption, Symbiotic and
Preservation styles, Holding
Acquisitions will represent a
significant portion of take-over
activity in the UK.
Holding acquisitions accounted for
20.5% of pure replies (26% if neutral
cases randomly assigned). This was
lower than the expected value
contributing 1.1 to the chi squared
value
4-207, 209
3 Absorption and Symbiotic
acquisitions will not be perceived to
be significantly more successful than
acquisitions experiencing low
capability transfer.
There was no significant difference in
perceptions of success between
acquisition types based upon capability
transfer.
4-216
4 Knowledge transfer will be associated
with perceptions of acquisition
success
There were significant associations
between knowledge transfer and our
four measures of success.
4-217-219
5 There will be an order to Haspeslagh
and Jemison's acquisition types, in
terms of perceived success, from
Symbiotic as most successful,
through Absorption, Preservation to
Holding.
There was no hierarchy of success
between acquisition types
4-220-222
6 The level of aggregate change will
increase from Preservation
acquisitions, through Holding,
Symbiotic to Absorption acquisitions.
There was a significant difference
between acquisition types at the .008
level. This was largely explained by a
negative correlation with autonomy: r=-
.39, sig. .001
5-251
Table 9.1 (contd) Thesis propositions and results
No. Proposition Results Page(s)
7 Preservation acquisitions will retain
more senior executives than
Absorption acquisitions
82% of Preservation acquisitions
retained their managing executive
whereas only 29% were retained in
Absorption acquisitions : significant at
the .05 level. Changes amongst
marketers and finance executives
showed no significant difference
between these acquisition types.
5-255-257
8 Changes in communication will be
positively associated with the level of
change in the acquired company
Changes in communications were
positively associated with the level of
change in the acquired company:
significant at the .001 level.
5-299
footnote 39
10 Absorption and Symbiotic
acquisitions will exhibit more change
in information systems/information
technology than Holding and
Preservation acquisitions.
Changes in information systems and
information technology were positively
associated with resource transfer:
significant at the .03 level
5-300
11 Absorption and Symbiotic
acquisitions will exhibit more change
in personnel policies than Holding
and Preservation acquisitions.
Change in personnel policies on
appraisals was positively associated
•with resource transfer: 	 at the
.02 level
5-300
12 Different acquisition types will
exhibit significant differences in
changes to compensation and
benefits.
Change in personnel policies on pay
and conditions was positively
associated with resource transfer:
significant at the .05 level.
5-300
13 Organisational Outsiders will make
more changes than Organisational
Insiders
Organisational Outsiders make more
changes than Organisational Insiders:
significant at the .0002 level.
7-335-336
14 The Outsider! Insider distinction will
be more pronounced, in terms of the
amount of change, for an
organisational rather than an industry
definition.
The organisational distinction of Insider
/ Outsider is more apparent than the
industry distinction.
7-340-341
15 The speed with which change is
started will be most rapid in
Absorption acquisitions, then
Holding, Symbiotic and finally
Preservation acquisitions.
Changes are most rapid in Holding,
then Preservation, Absorption and
Symbiotic acquisitions. Significant at
the .06 level.
8-394
footnote 18
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Table 9.1 (contd) Thesis propositions and results
No. Proposition Results Page(s)
16 Patterns of change in the post-
acquisition phase will be similar to
those for taking charge
There are waves of change in
acquisitions but the timing and
magnitude is different to taking charge
8-376-380
17 The speed of taking charge of an
acquisition is greater than for taking
charge of subsidiary companies
Taking charge of an acquisition appears
to be more rapid than for taking charge
of subsidiary companies.
8-376-380
Note: Proposition 9, that informal communications will be positively associated with change in acquired companies,
was suggested as an interesting proposition but not dealt with on the grounds of being peripheral to the thesis.
This thesis shows that there is strong evidence to support a contingency
framework of post-acquisition styles. By using change variables, we were able
to examine the axes of the framework as well as test for differences between the
individual acquisition styles.
In terms of the axes of the contingency framework, we found a clear negative
correlation between autonomy and aggregate change, and a positive, although
less strong association with resource transfer'. From the way in which change is
associated with the axes of the contingency framework, we might infer that
autonomy is linked to imposed change from head office whereas resource
transfer reflects implied change.
It is clear that the general recommendations in the acquisition literature about the use of
communications in relation to the level of change is appropriate, as shown in proposition eight
with communications being negatively associated with autonomy and positively with resource
transfer. Examples of other changes positively associated with the transfer of resources are
shown by propositions ten through twelve.
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The axes of the contingency matrix affected change in a broadly consistent
manner, and were orthogonal over the full scales. However appendix 7.4
showed that whilst autonomy behaved consistently where there was low
resource transfer, there were a few anomalies with medium levels of resource
transfer. Whilst these anomalies were insufficient to make a case for additional
acquisition types, it is worth observing that autonomy would appear to be a
rather more complex dimension than is often acknowledged and would repay
further research attention.
Examining the Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991) acquisition styles, in
proposition six, we found that there was a significant difference between them
in terms of aggregate change. At a greater level of detail, using seven constructs
for change from the Sharpbenders' (Grinyer, Mayes and McKiernan, 1988)
study, a hierarchy was evident with Holding acquisitions showing the most
change, followed by Absorption, Symbiotic and finally Preservation.
Having satisfied ourselves that the contingency framework (Haspeslagh and
Jemison 1991) was robust, we broadly agreed with Haspeslagh and Jemison's
(1991) observations regarding the facilitating and inhibiting conditions present
in Preservation, Absorption and Symbiotic acquisitions. However, we wanted to
extend their work by looking at actual changes in each acquisition type as well
as provide detail on their ignored category of Holding acquisitions. In this
regard, we have been able to provide considerably more depth for all four
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acquisition types, in quantitative terms, and been able to draw upon our
interviews to provide explanations and nuances for changes which took place.
We also examined the speed and pattern with which change started in the post-
acquisition phase and looked for distinct waves of activity such as those
observed by Gabarro's (1991) work on executives taking charge of American
subsidiary companies. Through proposition 17 we found that taking charge of
an acquisition appeared to occur more rapidly than for Gabarro's (1991)
executives, and, whilst we also observed waves of change, the timing and
magnitude were strikingly different. We also found, through proposition 15 that
there were significant differences between the four acquisition types in terms of
the speed with which change started. These findings serve to extend Gabarro's
work into the acquisition arena as well as providing further evidence for the
distinctiveness of each of the four acquisition types.
A dominant view in the Organisational Behaviour literature is that change can
be dichotomised into revolutionary and evolutionary change (Romanelli and
Tushman, 1994). Our four acquisition types could also be dichotomised with
Holding and Absorption acquisitions as crises associated with revolutionary,
discontinuous change, whilst Preservation and Symbiotic acquisitions saw more
gradual, evolutionary, incremental change. However, this did not seem to us to
capture fully important differences within those categories. Holding acquisitions
experienced turnaround but remained self-contained companies, whereas
Absorption acquisitions were dismembered and completely subsumed within the
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acquirer. Clearly both experienced a crisis, but in one case the result was doing
the same thing but more efficiently or better, whilst in the other case, the
acquired company was completely changed and so doing different things. On
the other side of the dichotomy, Preservation acquisitions experience piecemeal
incremental change but with the formula remaining unaltered, whereas
Symbiotic acquisitions saw long term investment leading to substantial change.
In both cases, evolutionary change, but the former does not truly evolve,
whereas the latter sees transformation and becomes more than the sum of the
parts. These important differences are not adequately reflected in the simple
duality of evolutionary and revolutionary change.
The Managing Executive has a key role in the post-acquisition phase. However
there is disagreement over whether the incumbent should stay or go. We found
through proposition seven, that there were significant differences between the
acquisition styles and the retention or removal of the managing executives,
although it would seem that the picture for other top executives is rather more
complex.
By adopting an Insider / Outsider distinction for managing executives, we were
able to extend a well established stream of literature into the post-acquisition
arena. Our data provided evidence that the distinction, in terms of volume of
post-acquisition change, was robust at the organisational level, proposition 13,
with organisational Insiders making fewer changes than organisational
Outsiders.
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We also examined Gabarro's (1987) observation that Industry Insiders made
more changes than Industry Outsiders. Upon examining his distinction,
proposition 14, we concluded that, with his variables, we could agree with his
findings. However we felt these variables were partial in nature. By using a
more comprehensive range of change items, we did not find a significant
difference between Insiders and Outsiders at the industry level.
Although in general terms we found significant differences between
Organisational Insider / Outsiders, in terms of the volumes of change associated
with each, we also found evidence of differences between them in terms of types
of changes. Outsiders made changes which had a high perceived impact and
were relatively easy to do. Their approach to change remained remarkably
similar across all acquisition types. Clearly they were focused upon the business
of taking charge and making relatively easy, high impact changes to match
external stakeholder expectations.
In contrast, Insiders were associated with a much greater variation in the levels
and nature of change. They clearly had a broader range of possibilities open to
them, due to their knowledge of the business, their greater flexibility in resisting
change or, carrying out the most severe alterations when necessary. Insiders
were less associated with easy and high impact changes and more associated
with difficult operational changes.
With these differences established between organisational Insiders and
Outsiders we were able to find strong associations between each type and the
post-acquisition styles of the contingency matrix.
In terms of the success of each acquisition type, we came to some interesting
conclusions. The contingency framework was based upon the Resource-Based
view of the firm which suggested successful acquisitions would tend to be those
which exhibited high resource transfer. On this basis we expected to find the
majority of acquisitions to be "value creating" and expected them to be
significantly more successful than stand alone, or "value capture" purchases.
Our empirical evidence, however, contradicted this picture. In terms of the
distribution of acquisitions, we suggest Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991) focus
upon 'value creating' acquisitions is a distortion of acquisition activity, as in
the UK we found 'value capture' acquisitions to be dominant (proposition 1). In
particular the Holding style, which they had dismissed, was an important
acquisition type (proposition 2). We also found Symbiotic acquisitions, upon
which Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) focused their attention, to be under-
represented.
When we tested the typology against several perceptual measures of success,
proposition 5, we found no significant differences. This suggests that non-
synergistic acquisitions can be as successful as synergistic ones, proposition 3,
which accords with a recent study by Anslinger and Copeland (1996). This
evidence is clearly contrary to the Resource-Based argument.
Whilst we could not find performance differences between acquisition types, by
resource transfer, we did find a correlation in testing proposition 4, between the
transfer of knowledge / information and some perceptions of success. This
suggests, that whilst some elements of resource transfer may be linked to
performance, there is a cost associated with higher resource transfer which can
erode the value of the deal. On this basis one might argue that higher potential
gains are linked to greater complexity and risk. It is conceivable that this
observation can explain the low levels of recorded Symbiotic acquisitions either
in terms of acquirers avoiding this style due to higher risk for uncertain gains, or
because Managing Executives involved in such acquisitions are struggling with
much more complex issues than their counter parts and have no time for filling
in questionnaires. Either way, we can say that implementation remains a critical
issue in realising full value in the post-acquisition phase. By appearing to
disrupt the predicted relationship between resource transfer and value creation,
we can observe that there is a clear gap between theory and practice. To close
this gap, we now need to move from an organisational focus to a managerial
one, to consider how strategy works in practice.
9.5 Limitations of the research
The thesis attempts to give a representative picture of post-acquisition change
for the acquisition population in the UK. Our findings should be read with a
number of methodological reservations borne in mind.
The survey is limited in terms of response rate which, whilst good for the field,
still leaves room for non-response bias. There is also an issue of focusing upon
surviving acquisitions which may distort our findings for acquisitions in
general. As we have concentrated upon acquisitions in a specific time period,
between 1991 and 1994, we may not be examining a representative sample of all
acquisition activity. We have also chosen to look at just acquisitions in the UK
and this could mean a country bias.
Our survey has focused upon a key respondent which, although the Managing
Executive view and perhaps appropriate for perceptions of success, is not a full
reflection of the board of directors, and other employees, which may be valuable
when examining change within the company.
Postal questionnaires present a number of difficulties. We cannot be sure that
the Managing Executive filled in the questionnaire despite the evidence that our
interviewees, who represented a substantial portion of questionnaire respondents
had done so.
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There may be an element of self selection as it is reasonable to expect Managing
executives to be more willing to share their experiences where acquisitions have
gone well 2 and the percentage of respondents citing successful acquisition was
above the generally reported levels of acquisition success. There could also be
some self selection 3
 in that some executives stayed on and might be more likely
to respond to a questionnaire than a new executive. By sending out
questionnaires after two and a half years had elapsed we hoped to minimise this
issue.
The postal questionnaire was sent out at one point in time whereas the
acquisitions occurred over a range of years. This may mean a variety of contexts
as well as having implications for differences in the recall quality of Managing
Executives. In particular there are likely to be post-hoc rationalisations as well
as some bolstering of self perception. Although we guarded against different
time periods between questionnaire and acquisition dates, by selecting sub-
samples for analysis, this was not always possible due to small numbers, and
even with sub-samples the issue of time span is still present in reduced form.
2 The converse of this argument is that acquisitions that are in difficulty or are very complex are
also more likely to absorb significant amounts of executive time and make them less receptive
to filling out questionnaires. I lowever, by allowing two and half years to elapse between
questionnaire and acquisition, we hoped to minimise this issue.
3 As well as survivor bias
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The interviews help to mitigate some of the limitations above, but still suffer
from being focused upon the key respondent, being at one point in time and
being retrospective.
Although it was never a major intention to focus upon acquisition performance,
a limitation of the research might be perceived to be a limited set of
performance measures.
A further limitation has been the treatment of information from respondents
selecting the mid-point on the autonomy axis of the contingency framework. In
its pure form, this represents information loss. To compensate, efforts were
made to overcome the problem where possible by uni-directional analysis across
scales as well as the random assignment of borderline cases within the typology.
9.6 Suggestions for future research
This study of acquisition in the UK could be extended in several ways to add
further substance to our findings. An improved longitudinal appreciation of
post-acquisition change in our acquisitions would be achieved by re-releasing
the survey to examine the issue of survivor bias. From this we could see whether
those acquisitions that have now failed can be related to recorded changes.
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The survey could be re-issued on a different set of acquisitions to see whether
our findings are consistent across two time periods. The current survey was
clearly within a downturn in acquisitions activity and the results could be
different during a boom.
The survey could be extended to European and/or cross-border acquisitions to
assess whether there are different national emphases upon acquisition styles
and/or differences between domestic transactions and cross-border ones.
To explain the lack of support for the Resource-Based perspective, we could
examine more closely the reasons why there appears to be a performance
correlation between the transfer of knowledge and acquisition performance, and
yet we could not find a similar relationship with resource transfer in general.
This would allow us to concentrate upon the mechanism of resource transfer and
the creation of complex assets in an acquisition context. It would seem there are
significant difficulties in achieving these aims. In broad terms this may lead to
an exploration of the gap between theory and practice. To make head way, we
could draw upon the issue of strategy as practice (Whittington, 1996) to see how
post-acquisition strategy 'evolves' through managerial levels. This form of
enquiry would best be handled by a more longitudinal approach.
Acquisitions are an important part of corporate life. They are a key means of
corporate renewal and transformation. The full significance of acquisitions in
this role, and their relative effectiveness, needs further comparative
investigation with other forms of corporate regeneration.
For our population of acquisitions, there is substantial evidence to suggest that
change occurs rapidly in the post-acquisition phase. Figure 7.1 shows that
around 80% of changes made are started within the first six months of the post-
acquisition phase. We can also sense from the interview data that there is an
urgency in taking charge or re-establishing control. We are reminded of one of
our quotations from a Hanson executive, that 'newness is a wasting asset'. The
post-acquisition period would therefore seem to provide support for the
revisionist perspective of Eccles (1993, 1994), that change does not need
'decades' to occur.
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Appendix for Chapter 3 
Appendix 3.1	 Questionnaire and covering letter
Warwick Business School,
University of Warwick,
Coventry
Tel. (01203) 524541
[date]
Dear [name],
Managing Acquisitions in the UK
I am pleased to inform you about a major research project at Warwick Business
School which seeks to understand the different ways in which key executives
manage and integrate acquisitions. Further information about the project and the
principal researcher, Mr Duncan Angwin, is given in a note attached to this
letter.
In essence, the aim of the research is to explore the background, experience and
actions of the CEO/MD of the acquired company after it has been acquired. In
this connection, your name has arisen as the relevant key executive and I would
therefore be most grateful if you could spare some time to complete the attached
questionnaire.
The number of key executives involved in managing acquisitions is relatively
small and this means that your response is of great importance to the research
and will receive close attention. Any information you give will be treated in the
strictest confidence. The results of the survey will be published only in
aggregate form and an advance copy will be sent to you once the analysis is
complete.
If you are not the appropriate person for this questionnaire, I would be grateful
if you would either pass this letter and enclosures on to the executive
responsible, or let us know whom we should contact.
In case you have any problems, Mr Duncan Angwin will telephone you in the
next few days to answer your queries. Thank you in advance for your assistance.
Yours sincerely,
Professor Sidney J. Gray
Appendix 3:1
For how many years were
you in this position before
the take-over?
	 yrs
CWere you in this role before'
the take-over?
YES/NO\..	
Ifyes
tf noIf yes
All information
given in the
questionnaire will
be treated in
strictest
confidence
Managing acquisitions in the UK: 
Key executive survey
A. General information
1. What is your company / division name? 	
2. What is the acquired company's / division's name, if different from above?
3. What date was the company acquired? 	 mth 	 year.
4. What is your full name and title? 	
5. The following diagram asks questions about the executive in charge of the
acquired company. As this executive has a variety of titles, he is
described as 'The effective CEO/MD' and is one who is able to make key
decisions	 affecting the acquired company.
(please delete as appropriate)
C
..4re you the effective*CEOMID of the acquired company?
YES/NO
	(Please pass this form
to the relevant person
'What was your position before
the take-over?
	 Title 	
Company	
Industry	
Years in this position 	 Yrs
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B. About the acquired company
6. In your view, how strong was the acquired company's cash flow
immediately prior to acquisition (relative to the industry sector)?
Very strong	 Moderately	 Average	 Moderately	 Very weak
strong	 weak
7. In your view, how highly geared  was the acquired company (relative to
the	 industry sector) immediately prior to acquisition?
Very low	 Moderately	 Average	 Moderately high
	
Very high
low
8. In your view, what were the main reasons for the acquisition?
9. In your view, to what extent has the acquisition been successful on the
following grounds;
Criteria Very
successful
Satisfactorily
successful
Moderately
successful
Not at all
successful
Too early
to say or
N/A
Overall success
Recovering the cost of
capital
Group profitability
Achieving strategic
objectives
Technological synergies
Operational integration
Cultural integration
I.T. integration
Gaining market share
Increasing sales volume
New product
development
Others (please specify)
Appendix 3: 3
B. About the acquired company (contd)
10. Since the acquisition, has the acquired company benefited from a
windfall beyond your control i.e. cyclical upturn in demand, government
action, demise of a competitor, change in exchange rates? 
	Yes / No
Please specify 	
11. To what extent were you involved in the negotiations that led to the take-
over of the company?	 (please tick appropriate box)
Heavily
involved in all
aspects of the
deal
Involved in the
operational aspects of
the take-over but not
involved in some wider
issues
An infrequent
'consultancy' type role
advising the negotiating
team on specific aspects
when asked
No
involvement
C. About the relationship between the acquired company and its parent
12. To what extent has there been a transfer of physical assets (plant
machinery etc.) between the parent and acquired companies?
(please tick an appropriate box)
Very Low	 Quite Low	 Medium	 Quite High	 Very High
13. To what extent has there been a transfer of knowledge and information
between the parent and acquired companies?
(please tick an appropriate box)
Very Low	 Quite Low	 Medium	 Quite High	 Very High
14. To what extent has there been a transfer of personnel between the parent
and acquired companies?
(please tick an appropriate box)
Very Low	 Quite Low	 Medium	 Quite High	 Very High
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C. Relationship between acquired co. and parent (contd)
15. . To what extent do you feel that the acquired company is autonomous
from the parent?
(please tick an appropriate box)
Very Low
Autonomy
Quite Low s
Autonomy
Moderately
Autonomous
Quite Highly
Autonomous
Very Highly
Autonomous
16. Strategy consultants suggest that there are three main strategic
management styles. Which of the following best characterises the
strategic management style of the parent group?
Strategic Management Style Tick one box
only
Strategic Planning
- companies focusing on a few core businesses. The centre
actively participates in formulating strategies with
business units and often initiates strategic thrusts amongst
interrelated businesses.
Financial Control
- strategic decisions are delegated to profit responsible
business unit managers. The centre's role is to agree and
monitor demanding, short term financial targets for the
business
Strategic Control
- a strong commitment to decentralisation and an emphasis on
control against demanding targets for the business. Often
there are extensive strategic planning systems and
processes through which the centre reviews, monitors and
challenges business level strategies.
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D. About chan • es ou have made to the ac i uired corn an since
acquisition 
17.	 Have you made any changes in the finance area? Yes / No
If 'No' please proceed to question 18. If 'Yes' please indicate which
specific changes were made and when they were started
Specific change Was a
change
made?
How many months
after acquisition was
the change started?
Structural change to the finance
department
Yes / No
Improve financial control systems Yes / No
Adopt parent financial reporting
system
Yes / No
Develop cash flow forecasts Yes / No
Control expenditure (all capital and
revenue expenditure needs CEO
approval)	 •
Yes / No
Broaden scope of annual profit plans /
budgeting systems
Yes / No
Vigorous steps to reduce debt Yes / No
Others (please specify)
18.	 Have you made any changes in the marketing area? Yes / No
If 'No' please proceed to question 19. If 'Yes' please indicate changes
and when started
Specific change Was a
change
made?
How many months
after acquisition was
the change started?
Structural change to the marketing /
sales operation
Yes / No
Review marketing plan Yes / No
Focus on particular market segment Yes / No
Implement new marketing initiative Yes / No
Introduce or improve after sales
service
Yes / No
Stress getting closer to the customer Yes / No
Improve distribution channels Yes / No
Improved and more frequent
marketing info, to the CEO
Yes / No
Others (please specify) Yes / No
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D. Changes made since acquisition (contd)
19.	 Have you made any changes in the Communications area? Yes / No
If 'No' please proceed to question 20. If 'Yes' please indicate changes
and when started
Specific change Was a
change
made?
How many months
after acquisition was
the change started?
Set up extensive formal 1:1 meetings
with employees
Yes / No
Set up direct reporting Yes / No
Set up 1: 1 ad hoc problem focused
meetings with employees
Yes / No
Others (please specify) Yes / No
20.	 Have you made any changes in the Human Resources area? Yes / No
If 'No' please proceed to question 21. If 'Yes' please indicate changes
and when started
Specific change Was a
change
made?
How many months
after acquisition was
the change started?
Structural change to the personnel
department
Yes / No
Reassign management personnel Yes / No
Appoint new senior executive(s) Yes / No
Appoint new finance director Yes / No
Appoint new marketing / sales director Yes / No
Remove senior executive(s) Yes / No
Create new positions Yes / No
Initiate search for new senior
executive
Yes / No
Top team injects new values/vision Yes / No
Top team is more action oriented Yes / No
Introduce or change employee
incentive scheme
Yes / No
Change performance appraisal system Yes / No
Adopt parent company pay and
conditions structure
Yes / No
Implement management development
programme
Yes / No
Others (please specify)
Appendix 3: 7
D. Changes made since acquisition (contd)
21. Have you made any changes in the Operations Management area? Yes/No
If 'No' please proceed to question 22. If 'Yes' please indicate changes
and when started
Specific change Was a
change
made?
How many months
after acquisition was
the change started?
Structural change to the manufacturing
operation
Yes / No
Sale or closure of businesses Yes / No
Intensive effort to reduce production
costs
Yes / No
Investigate inventory controls Yes / No
Adopt parent inventory controls Yes / No
Stock take Yes / No
Purchase of new equipment Yes / No
Sale of equipment Yes / No
Introduce or improve quality control
system
Yes / No
Improve product design Yes / No
Adopt new processes Yes / No
Invest in Research Yes / No
Improve delivery times Yes / No
Others (please specify)
22. Have you made any changes in the Information Technology area? Yes / No
If 'No' please proceed to question 23. If 'Yes' please indicate changes
and when started
Specific change Was a
change
made?
How many months
after acquisition was
the change started?
Structural change to the IT department Yes / No
Adopt parent systems Yes / No
Change information system Yes / No
Others (please specify)
Appendix 3: 8
D. Changes made since acquisition (contd)
23.	 Have you made any other changes to the acquired company that have not
been mentioned above? 	 Yes / No
If 'No' please proceed to question 24. If 'Yes' please indicate changes
and when started.
Specific change Was a
change
made?
How many months
after acquisition was
the change started?
Curtail autonomy / responsibility of a
group (please specify
	 )
Yes / No
Create new group (please specify
	 )
Yes / No
Change planning system Yes / No
Others (please specify) Yes / No
24.	 Please indicate the time order in which functional changes were begun.
Functional area Order (lst,2nd
etc.)
Functional area Order (1st, 2nd
etc.)
Finance Marketing
Human Resources Communications
Information
Technology
Operations
Management
Other (please specify:
	 )
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D. Changes made since acquisition (contd)
25.	 Outside of specific functional areas, please indicate the importance of
other actions you have taken since acquisition.
(Score insignificant  actions with a '1' and very significant  actions with a '59
Actions taken Rating
Insignificant
significant
Very N/
A
Establishing / re-establishing, and
communicating, your credibility with
stakeholders in the acquired company:
....Banks /financiers 1	 2	 3 4 5 n/a
....Suppliers 1	 2	 3 4 5 n/a
....Unions 1	 2	 3 4 5 n/a
....Customers 1	 2	 3 4 5 n/a
....The press 1	 2	 3 4 5 n/a
....Others (please specify 	 ) 1	 2	 3 4 5 n/a
Visits to customers, distributors to gain
feedback on the acquired company's
performance
1	 2	 3 4 5 n/a
Tour factories / operations of the acquired
company
1	 2	 3 4 5 n/a
Spending time meeting, and familiarising
yourself, with staff in the acquired company
(to get a feel for the business)
1	 2	 3 4 5 n/a
Communicating with the acquired company
staff through formal channels i.e. notices, news
letters etc.
1	 2	 3 4 5 n/a
Communicating directly with the Board of the
parent group
1	 2	 3 4 5 n/a
Communicating with other parts of the parent
group
1	 2	 3 4 5 n/a
Set up problem focused task forces 1	 2	 3 4 5 n/a
Establish strategic review or analysis process 1	 2	 3 4 5 n/a
Encourage buying and selling between
acquired company and its parent
1	 2	 3 4 5 n/a
Engage consultants 1	 2	 3 4 5 n/a
Other (please specify) 1	 2	 3 4 5 n/a
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Within the parent group	 Yes / No
Within the same industry 	 Yes / No
Outside the industry	 Yes / No
No adjustment Little adjustment Moderate
adjustment
Considerable
adjustment
D,Chan es nw_gILailcewuisition (contd)
26. If you have introduced new managers to the company, were they well
known to you before their
appointment? 	 Yes / No
27. If new managers have been appointed, from which area have they come?
E. About your management style
28. Given the environment in which you work, do you feel that, to get things
done, you have to be assertive and override other people's points of
view?
Strongly agree	 Mostly agree	 Mostly disagree	 Strongly disagree
29. Given the environment in which you work, do you feel you have to take
into account most people's views in the acquired company for major
changes you make?
Strongly agree	 Mostly agree	 Mostly disagree	 Strongly disagree
30. To what extent do you feel that you need to adjust your decisions to
reflect the internal politics of the acquired company?
31. Do you feel that there is a change in your management style in the post
acquisition period as compared with normal times ?
	Yes / No
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E. About your management style (contd)
32. If 'YES' to question 31, in what ways is your management style in the
post acquisition period different to normal times? 	
33. What aspects of your management style do you think are most important
in a post acquisition situation?
F. About your corporate structure
34.	 Who is your immediate boss?
Name 	 Title 	 Company 	
35. Who is the most senior person reporting to you?
Name 	 Title 	 Company 	
36. Are you located at Head Office or at the acquired company?
HO / Acquired co.
37. In terms of seeking approval from your superior / Board for changes you
make to the acquired company, how do you define what type of.
decisions require higher authority? (or at what point does your authority
end?) 	
38. Is a team of head office executives being used in the main for the
integration of this acquisition? 	 Yes /No
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G. About your background and experience
39.	 Please list the main organisational functions in which you have had
• direct experience. (please include time spent in other organisations)
	
Functional area Company/Group Industry Time
	 Title(i.e. finance, marketing etc.)	 (Years)
40. Please list your professional qualifications and degrees
41. Have you managed acquisitions before? 
	 Yes / No
42. If 'Yes', how many acquisitions have you managed?
	
H. Do you have any further comments?
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Please return this form in the envelope provided to:
Duncan Angwin
Fellow, Marketing & Strategic Management Group,
Warwick Business School,
University of Warwick
COVENTRY CV4 7AL
Appendix 3:14
Appendix 3.2	 Change variable origin
The following shows the questions as they appear in the questionnaire on a
function by function basis. Against each is the source of the question from the
Turnaround literature and Gabarro's work on taking charge.
Question 17 Changes in the finance area
Question Turnaround Gabarro
literature (p177)
Structural change to the
finance department
•	 Organisation
structure
Improve financial control
systems
•	 Grinyer, Mayes &
McKiernan (3.3.1
p168)
•	 Slatter
•	 Management
systems
Adopt parent financial
reporting system
•	 Grinyer, Mayes &
McKiernan (3.3.1
p169)
•	 Slatter
•	 Management
systems
Develop cash flow forecasts •	 Grinyer, Mayes &
McKieman
(3.3.1a p168)
•	 Slatter
•	 Management
systems
Control expenditure (all
capital and revenue
expenditure needs CEO
approval)
•	 Grinyer, Mayes &
McKiernan
(3.3.1e p168)
•	 Slatter
•	 Management
systems
Broaden scope of annual
profit plans / budgeting
systems
•	 Grinyer, Mayes &
McKiernan
(3.3.1b p168)
•	 Slatter
•	 Management
systems
Vigorous steps to reduce
debt
Grinyer, Mayes &
McKieman (3.3.1
p168, 3.9 p171)
•	 Slatter
•	 Management
systems
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Question 18 Changes in the marketing area
Question Turnaround Gabarro
. literature (p177)
Structural change to the
marketing / sales operation
•	 Organisation
structure (p177)
Review marketing plan •	 Grinyer, Mayes &
McKieman (3.4.1
p168)
•	 Slatter
•	 Management
systems (p177)
Focus on particular market
segment
• Grinyer, Mayes &
McKiernan (3.4.4
p169)
• Slatter
Implement new marketing
initiative
• Grinyer, Mayes &
McKiernan (3.4.5
p169)
• Slatter
Introduce or improve after
sales service
• Grinyer. Mayes &
McKiernan (3.5.3
p169)
Stress getting closer to the
customer
• Grinyer, Mayes &
McKiernan
(3.6.11 p170)
• Peters &
Waterman
Improve distribution
channels
• Grinyer, Mayes &
McKiernan (3.6.4
p169, 3.7.4 p170)
• Slatter
• Organisation
structure (p177)
Improved and more
frequent marketing info, to
the CEO
• Grinyer, Mayes &
McKieman (3.6.9
p170)
• Management
systems (p177)
Question 19 Changes in the Communications area
Question Turnaround Gabarro
literature (p177)
Set up extensive formal 1:1
meetings with employees
•	 Meetings
Set up direct reporting Entry activity
Set up 1: 1 ad hoc problem
focused meetings with
employees
•	 (Grinyer, Mayes
& McKieman
(3.7.6 p170))
•	 Meetings
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Question 20 Changes in the Human Resources area
Gabarro
(p177)
Question Turnaround
literature
• Organisation
structure
•
Structural change to the
personnel department
Reassign management
personnel
• Grinyer, Mayes &
McKiernan (3.1.2
p168)
• Slatter
• Management
personnel
Appoint new senior
executive(s)
• Grinyer, Mayes &
McKiernan (3.1.2
p168)
• Slatter
• Management
personnel
Appoint new finance
director
• Grinyer, Mayes &
McKiernan (3.1.2
p168)
• Slatter
• Management
personnel
Appoint new marketing /
sales director
• Grinyer, Mayes &
McKiernan (3.1.2
p168)
• Slatter
• Management
personnel
Remove senior executive(s) • Grinyer, Mayes &
McKiernan
(3.1.1a p168)
• Slatter
• Management
personnel
Create new positions
• Management
personnel
Initiate search for new
senior executive
Top team injects new
values/vision
• Grinyer, Mayes &
McKieman (3.1.4
p168)
• Peters &
Waterman
Top team is more action
oriented
• Grinyer, Mayes &
McKieman (3.1.4
p168)
• Peters &
Waterman
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Introduce or change
employee incentive scheme
•	 Grinyer, Mayes &
McKiernan
(3.11.4 p172)
•	 Management
systems (p177)
Change performance
appraisal system
•	 Management
systems (p177)
Adopt parent company pay
and conditions structure
•	 Management
systems (p177)
Implement management
development programme
•	 Grinyer, Mayes &
McKiernan
(3.7.5a p170)
•	 Management
systems (p177)
Question 21 Changes in the Operations Management
Question Turnaround Gabarro
literature (p177)
Structural change to the
manufacturing operation
•	 Organisation
structure
Sale or closure of
businesses
•	 Grinyer, Mayes &
McKiernan (3.4.2
p168)
•	 Peters &
Waterman
•	 Organisation
structure
Intensive effort to reduce
production costs
•	 Grinyer, Mayes &
McKiernan (3.7.5
p170)
•	 Slatter
Investigate inventory
controls
•	 Grinyer, Mayes &
McKiernan
(3.6.10 p170,
3.7.3c p170)
•	 Slatter
•	 Management
systems
Adopt parent inventory
controls
•	 Grinyer, Mayes &
McKiernan
(3.7.5c p170)
•	 Slatter
•	 Management
systems
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Stock take • Grinyer, Mayes &
McKiernan
(3.6.10 p170,
3.7.3c p170)
• Slatter
Purchase of new equipment • Grinyer, Mayes &
McKiernan (3.4.8
p169, 3.7.5f
p170)
• Slatter
Sale of equipment • Grinyer, Mayes &
McKiernan (3.9.1
p171)
• Slatter
Introduce or improve
quality control system
• Grinyer, Mayes &
McKiernan (3.5.1
p 169)
• Management
systems
Improve product design • Grinyer, Mayes &
McKiernan (3.5.1
p 169)
Adopt new processes • Grinyer, Mayes &
McKiernan (3.4.8
p169)
• Slatter
Invest in Research
Improve delivery times • Grinyer, Mayes &
McKiernan (3.5.2
p169)
Question 22 Changes in the Information Technology
Question Turnaround Gabarro
literature (p177)
Structural change to the IT
department
•	 Organisation
structure
Adopt parent systems •	 Management
systems
Change information system •	 Management
systems
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Question 23 Other changes to the acquired company that have not been
mentioned above
•	 Question Turnaround Gabarro
literature (p177)
Curtail autonomy /
responsibility of a group
Create new group •	 Organisation
structure
Change planning system •	 Grinyer, Mayes &
McKiernan (3.2.5
p168)
•	 Management
systems
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Appendix 3.3 Testing for non-response bias
Comparison of population and sample means
• Transformed* data for responding sample and population
by sales and bid value
Sample mean Population mean Sample standard
error
t
Sales 3.248 3.387 .155 -0.896
Bid value 3.068 3.152 .138 -0.608
Degrees of freedom = 65
* Log-normal
The critical value for t with sixty degrees of freedom is 1.671 at the .05 level.
We can therefore conclude that there is no significant difference between our
sample and the population in aggregate terms of the distribution of sales and bid
value.
Comparison of population and sample quintiles
• Target sales
Population
cases
Value Expected
number of cases
for sample
Observed
number for
sample
Chi-
squared
value
0% -20% £11.0m 13.2 15 0.136
21% - 40% £19.6m 13.2 12 0.090
41% - 60% £40.0m 13.2 15 0.136
61% - 80% £101.0m 13.2 15 0.136
81% - 100% £2.3bn 13.2 9 1.336
n = 66 1.834
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4 degrees of freedom. Chi-squared value for .05 level = 9.49 ...sample is not
significantly different from the population.
• Numbers of employees
Population
cases
Value Expected
number of cases
for sample
Observed
number for
sample
Chi-
squared
value
0% -20% 0 - 128 11.8 16 1.494
21% - 40% 129 - 345 11.8 16 1.494
41% - 60% 346 - 660 11.8 13 0.102
61% - 80% 661 - 1,600 11.8 10 0.152
81% - 100% _ 1,601 - 75,000 _ 11.8 4 5.156
n = 59 8.397
4 degrees of freedom. Chi-squared value for .05 level = 9.49 ...sample is not
significantly different from the population.
• Bid value
Population
cases
Value Expected
number of cases
for sample
Observed
number for
sample
Chi-
squared
value
0% -20% £0 - £10.5m 13.6 20 3.011
21% - 40% £10.6m - £14.25m 13.6 9 1.555
41% - 60% £14.3m - £40.0m 13.6 11 0.497
61% - 80% £40.1m - £101.0m 13.6 13 0.026
81% - 100% £101.1m - £2.3bn 13.6 15 0.144
n = 68 5.233
4 degrees of freedom. Chi-squared value for .05 level = 9.49 ...sample is not
significantly different from the population.
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Appendix 3.4 Interviewees
In the interests of confidentiality, the identity of the interviewees and their
companies have been disguised. An indicator of the size of the deals can be
gained from the following scheme, based upon final bid price: Small deals are
from am to £25m, medium deals from £26m to £100m, large deals from
£101m to £500m, and very large deals from £501m to £4bn. There is also an
indication of the length of time that has elapsed between questionnaire return
and interview so that the reader can gain a perception of 'how much water has
passed under the bridge'. There is no indication of when questionnaires were
returned or when interviews were conducted, to protect the identity of the
interviewees.
Acquisition Deal Sector Time Managing Executive
type size elapsed executive type
alias
1 Preservation Small Precision engineering 3 years + Andrews I
2 46 Small Packaging
manufacturing
1 year Blackman I
3 64 Med. Transport 1 year Crossman I
4 44 Med. Medical 1 year Derby 0
5 46 Large Communication 1 year Eccleston 0
6 46 Large Communication 2 years + Fredricks I
7 Absorption Small Composite
manufacture
1 year Garner I
8 64 Small Professional services 2 years + Heath I
9 GC Small Professional services 2 years + James 0
1 0 66 Medi. Food manufacturing 1 years + Keaton 0
11 64 Med. Utilities 1 years + Lambert 0
12 44 V.
large
Communications 1 year Martin 0
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13 Holding Small Financial services 1 year Neslon I
14 64 Small Engineering 2 years + Orton I
15. 66 Small Property services 3 years + Price I
16 66 Small Industrial service 3 years + Rowland 0
17 66 Small Electronics 3 years + Stanton I
18 64 Large Industrial land usage 4 years + Taylor I
19
	 Symbiotic Large Food manufacture	 4 years + Vaughan	 0
20
	 Central*	 Small Engineering	 2 years + Williams	 0
* This interview was carried out on request but fell between acquisition types
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Appendix 3.5 Interview protocol and post interview
summary
Interview Protocol
1.	 Background
• Background to myself and the project
• Confirm details of the acquisition: nature of the business,
consideration, turnover, profits and number of employees at the time,
relative size
• Managing executive: role in the negotiations, in running the acquired
company
• Purpose of the acquisition from both sides
2.	 Post-acquisition - changes
• What were the most important issues and why? - examples?
• What things went well? - examples?
• What things went badly? - examples?
• What changes were difficult? - examples?
• What changes were easy? - examples?
• Were there phases of change? Which changes had greater priority? -
Why this order? Why are some things omitted or less important? Is
speed an indicator of importance? examples?
• During the post-acquisition phase, was there a change in the way in
which the acquired company was perceived / managed by the new
parent?
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3.	 Post-acquisition - type
• Discuss classification i.e. interviewee seems to be discussing Holding
acquisitions, why this type?
• Discuss change patterns shown in the survey results.
4.	 Post - acquisition - Insider / Outsider
• In most acquisitions of [this type], incumbents usually [stay / go].
What is your explanation for this in your own context?
5.	 Post-acquisition - Success
• How would you rate the success of this acquisition? - what measures
are indicators for you?
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Post interview summary
Contact Summary form 
	Contact type:	 Interviewee:
	
Visit:	 Company:
	
Phone:	 Interview date:
1. What were the main issues or themes that struck you in this contact?
2. Summarise the information collected (or not collected) on each of the
target questions
3. Anything else that struck you as interesting, illuminating or important?
4. What new questions do you have for the next interview (or to be
followed up with this interviewee?)
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Appendix for Chapter 4
Appendix 4.1 Responding sample actual case locations on
the Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991)
contingency framework
1.0
Autonomy
2.0
	 3.0
	 4.0 5.0
1.0- 1.4 5, 21, 45 51, 63 10, 46, 50, 56 19, 42, 48, 60
1.5- 1.9 59 15,24,55 32, 41 39
Holding Preservation
2.0 -2.4 18,26,44 17 4, 30, 34, 8, 12, 22, 25, 33, 20, 38
37, 43, 54,
62, 69
36, 40, 52, 53,
68
2.5 -2.9 14 7, 35, 70 28
Resource _
3.0 47 29, 66	 6, 11, 16,31
Transfer
3.1 -3.4 27, 65 23 57, 64
3.5 -3.9
Absorption 61 67 Symbiotic
4.0 - 4.4 3, 9 58
4.5 -5.0 2, 13 49
Adapted from Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991)
Note: One case is missing due to a missed question in the reply, n=69
* Resource transfer as an average of the three dimensions. The rather strange axis, with 3.0
standing upon its own, is to show that a number of cases cannot be ascribed to one of the four
acquisition types.
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Appendix 4.2	 Pre-acquisition factors as determinants of
post-acquisition success
• Hostile versus Friendly acquisitions against 'Overall success'
Mean Rank	 Cases
	
33.09
	 62 Agreed
	
39.88
	
4 Hostile
66 Total
Exact	 Corrected for ties
U	 W 2-Tailed P	 Z 2-Tailed P
98.5	 159.5	 .5077	 -.7449	 .4563
• Hostile versus Friendly acquisitions against 'Recovering cost of capital'
Mean Rank	 Cases
62 Agreed
41.13	 4 Hostile
66 Total
Exact	 Corrected for ties
U	 W 2-Tailed P	 Z 2-Tailed P
93.5	 164.5	 .4272	 -.8453	 .3979
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Hostile versus Friendly acquisitions against 'Group profitability'
Mean Rank	 Cases
	
32.18
	
61 Agreed
	
45.50
	
4 Hostile
65 Total
Exact	 Corrected for ties
U	 W 2-Tailed P	 Z 2-Tailed P
72.0	 182.0	 .1838	 -1.4468	 .1480
• Hostile versus Friendly acquisitions against 'Achieving strategic objectives'
Mean Rank	 Cases
	
32.41	 61 Agreed
	
34.33	 3 Hostile
64 Total
Exact	 Corrected for ties
U	 W 2-Tailed P
	
Z 2-Tailed P
86.0	 103.0	 .8812	 -.1866	 .8520
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• Sales ratio against success variables
Overall
success
Recovering
cost of
capital
-.3158
N ( 23)
Sig .067
	
.2091	 .4893
	
N ( 23)	 N ( 69)
	
Sig .200	 Sig .000
Group	 .0049	 .6641	 .6461
	
profitability N ( 23)	 N ( 68)	 N ( 68)
	
Sig .977
	 Sig .000
	
Sig .000
	
Achieving	 .1041	 .4483	 .3658	 .3626
	
strategic	 N ( 21)	 N ( 67)	 N ( 67)	 N ( 66)
	
objectives	 Sig .556	 Sig .000	 Sig .000	 Sig .001
Sales ratio	 Overall	 Recovering
	 Group
success	 cost of capital profitability
• Sales ratio by acquisition type
Mean Rank Cases
	
9.80	 5 Holding acquisitions
	
4.33	 3 Absorption acquisitions
	
8.50	 2 Preservation acquisitions
	
9.50	 6 Symbiotic acquisitions
16 Total
Corrected for ties
Chi-Square D.F. Significance Chi-Square 	 D.F. Significance
2.9353	 3	 .4017	 2.9353	 3	 .4017
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• Pre-acquisition Gearing and Cashflow against post-acquisition success
Pre-acq	 .3469
gearing	 N ( 69)
Sig .000
Overall .2654 -.0238
success N ( 69) N	 ( 68)
Sig .010 Sig .820
Recovering .2667 .0193 .4893
cost of N ( 69) N ( 68) N ( 69)
capital Sig .007 Sig .847 Sig .000
Group
	 .3250 -.0049 .6641 .6461
profitability	 N	 ( 68) N ( 67) N ( 68) N	 ( 68)
Sig .001 Sig .962 Sig .000 Sig .000
Achieving .1850 -.0205 .4483 .3658	 .3626
strategic N ( 67) N	 ( 66) N ( 67) N	 ( 67) N	 ( 66)
objectives Sig .072 Sig .844 Sig .000 Sig .000	 Sig .001
Pre - acq Pre-acq Overall Recovering	 Group
cashflow gearing success cost of capital	 profit
• Pre-acquisition cash flow by acquisition type
Mean Rank Cases
	
29.63	 12 Holding acquisitions
	
29.13	 8 Absorption acquisitions
	
17.82
	 14 Preservation acquisitions
	
22.31	 13 Symbiotic acquisitions
47 Total
Corrected for ties
Chi-Square D.F. Significance Chi-Square D.F. Significance
6.1781
	
3	 .1033	 6.4896	 3	 .0901
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• Pre-acquisition gearing by acquisition type
Mean Rank	 Cases
	
25.88	 12 Holding acquisitions
	
30.31	 8 Absorption acquisitions
	
18.36	 14 Preservation acquisitions
	
22.58
	
12 Symbiotic acquisitions
46 Total
Corrected for ties
Chi-Square D.F. Significance Chi-Square D.F. Significance
4.5477
	 3	 .2081	 4.8886	 3	 .1801
Note
The significance levels for these results are less marked when controlling for
elapsed time by examining acquisitions where one to three years have elapsed.
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Appendix for Chapter 7
Appendix 7.1
	
Time between acquisition and questionnaire
return by organisational Insider / Outsider
Mean Rank Cases
	
32.93
	
23	 Outsider
	
33.80	 43	 Insider
66	 Total
Corrected for ties
Z	 2-Tailed P
481.5	 757.5	 -.1750	 .8611
Appendix 7.2	 Organisational Insiders / Outsiders by
functional change
1)	 Change in the finance area
Organisational Outsiders are significantly more associated with change than Organisational
Insiders in five out of seven items.
Table 1 Changes in the Finance area (Q17) by Organisational Insider / Outsider
Variable Test Sig Explanation
Structural change to the finance
department
Cross tabs
chi squared
.04 82.6% of Outsiders are associated with
change:
	
9% of Insiders are not• 
Improve financial control systems c, .01 82.6% of Outsiders are associated with
change: 48.8% of Insiders are not
Adopt parent financial reporting
system
,c
.11 (91.3% of Outsiders are associated
with change: 27.9% of Insiders are not)
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Develop cash flow forecasts " .002 73.9% of Outsiders are associated with
change: 65% of Insiders are not
Control expenditure (all capital and
revenue expenditure needs CEO
approval)
,c
.004 73.9% of Outsiders are associated with
change: 63.4% of Insiders are not
Broaden scope of annual profit plans /
budgeting systems
"
.10 81.8% of Outsiders are associated with
change: 38.1% of Insiders are not
Vigorous steps to reduce debt ,, .48 38.1% of Outsiders are associated with
change: 70.7% of Insiders are not.
n = 66
Outsiders appear to be more prominent in terms of establishing and improving financial
controls, controlling expenditure and developing cashflow forecasts. These actions seem
consistent with Datta and Guthrie's (1994) study which associates Outsiders with companies
with reduced profitability. This also accords with the turnaround literature that associates
Outsiders with turnarounds (Whittington, 1993: 122) and sees early actions as being the
development of cash-flow forecasts, controlling expenditure (Slatter, 1984: 130-132) and
stronger financial controls (Grinyer, Mayes and McKiernan, 1989: 78)
The weaker associations are where parent financial reporting is adopted and where there are
attempts to reduce debt. The former is unsurprising as nearly 80% of all acquisitions in our
responding sample adopted parent financial reporting and, as we argued in the previous chapter,
this occurs almost regardless of the type of acquisition. The lack of a significant association
between Outsiders and reducing the level of debt seems to contradict the suggestion that
Outsiders are associated with financially weaker firms where we might expected to see attempts
to reduce debt. However when we examined associations between Outsiders / Insiders and the
characteristics of the acquired company at the time of acquisition (see table 2), using a Mann-
Whitney U - Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test, we discovered that there was a strong association
between Outsiders and weak cashflows in the acquired company but no significant association
between Outsiders and acquired company gearing.
Table 2	 Acquired company's cash flow before acquisition
by Insider / Outsider
Mean Rank	 Cases
	
40.43	 23	 Outsider
	
29.79
	
43	 Insider
66	 Total
Corrected for ties
Z	 2-Tailed P
335.0
	 930.0	 -2.2051	 .0274
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Acquired company's gearing before acquisition
by Insider / Outsider
Mean Rank Cases
	
37.37	 23	 Outsider
	
30.61	 42	 Insider
65	 Total
Corrected for ties
2-Tailed P
382.5	 859.5	 -1.4322
	 .1521
Whilst we might intuitively expect Outsiders to be associated with reduction in gearing as they
are linked with financially weaker firms, the turnaround literature remarks that debt reduction is
not a distinguishing characteristic in itself and indeed in the Sharpbenders study the control
companies exhibited higher levels of debt reduction than the Sharpbenders themselves (Grinyer,
Mayes and McKiernan, 1989: 98).
Chapter 5 showed that acquired companies are subject to high levels of change across the board
in the finance area and that changes are generally imposed with little regard for acquisition
characteristics. However, the above shows that despite the high levels of change, the
organisational Insider / Outsider dichotomy still prevails for most items and there is a link
between the items in which there are more changes by Outsiders than Insiders and the financial
strength of the acquired company. In particular the items of most significance are very similar to
those identified in the turnaround literature as necessary to achieve a marked improvement in
the performance of a company.
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2)	 Changes in the marketing area
Table 3 shows that the pattern of organisational Outsiders being associated with more change
than organisational Insiders continues to hold true for all variables used in the marketing area,
and is significant for seven out of eight items.
Table 3 Changes in the Marketing area (QI8) by organisational Insider / Outsider
Variable Test Sig Explanation
Structural change to the
marketing / sales operation
Cross tabs
chi squared
.02 81.0% of Outsiders are associated with change:
48.8% of Insiders are not.
Review marketing plan LC .01 81.0% of Outsiders are associated with change:
51.2% of Insiders are not
Focus on particular market
segment
LC
.0007 66.7% of Outsiders are associated with change:
76.7% of Insiders are not
Implement new marketing
initiative
CC
.009 76.2% of Outsiders are associated with change:
58.1% of Insiders are not
Introduce or improve after
sales service
LL
.12 (50.0% of Outsiders are associated with change:
69.8% of Insiders are not)
Stress getting closer to the
customer
44
.01 65.0% of Outsiders are associated with change:
67.4% of Insiders are not
Improve distribution channels CC .01 57.9% of Outsiders are associated with change:
75.6% of Insiders are not
Improved and more frequent
marketing info, to the CEO
CC
.006 66.7% of Outsiders are associated with change:
69.0% of Insiders are not
n 64
It is clear from table 3 that Outsiders are associated with major structural changes to the
marketing / sales operations and with substantial reorientation in marketing effort. 81% of
Outsiders reviewed the marketing plan, made substantial changes to marketing and sales
operations and reviewed marketing plans. 76.2 % of Outsiders implemented a new marketing
initiative and 66.7% focused upon a particular market segment. In all these areas the amount of
change associated with Outsiders was significantly greater than for Insiders. This difference was
greatest in those actives which involved either a diminution or expansion in marketing / sales. In
focusing upon a particular marketing segment the difference between Outsider and Insiders was
at the .0007 level with 66.7% of Outsiders making changes whilst 76.7% of Insiders did not.
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Other significant differences included getting closer to the customer and improving distribution
channels. Outsiders also showed significantly higher associations with improving the flow of
marketing information to the top. This is perhaps not surprising as they are taking on a business
that is largely unknown and they need to understand it as quickly as possible.
We would argue that marketing is closely bound with the Managing Executive's strategic role
and vision. For marketing to be substantially altered is to doubt the Managing Executive. For
this reason, Insiders are unlikely to make substantial changes to marketing and sales and where
these are required we night expect Outsiders to be present.
3)	 Changes in the communications area
Table 4 shows again that Outsiders are significantly more associated with change than Insiders.
Table 4 Changes in the Communications area (Q19) by organisational Insider/Outsider
Variable Test Sig Explanation
Set up extensive formal 1:1
meetings with employees
Cross tabs
chi squared
.01 42.9% of Outsiders are associated with
change:• 85.7% of Insiders are not
-
Set up direct reporting 4 4 .003 76.2% of Outsiders are associated with
change: 62.8% of Insiders are not
Set up 1: I ad hoc problem
focused meetings with
employees
CC
.003 61.9% of Outsiders are associated with
change: 	 2% of Insiders are not•	 -
ii 64
Outsiders tend to focus more upon setting up direct reporting than ad-hoc problem focused
meetings or extensive formal meetings. The direct reporting tends to emphasise the notion that
Outsiders are attempting to achieve a rapid understanding and perhaps accountability of the
business. Ad-hoc meetings also seem important although Kotter (1982) would suggest that these
informal meetings should be significantly more important in terms of establishing control and
understanding of a business.
The other feature of the table is the lack of changes carried out by Insiders. This is slightly
surprising as the acquisition literature is replete with advice upon the importance of good
communications after an acquisition. However it may well be that Insiders feel they already
have optimal communications channels which need no further alteration.
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4)	 Changes in the Human Resources area
The Insider / Outsider difference is significant for ten out of fourteen items in table 5.
Table 5 Changes in the Human resources area (Q20) by organisational Insider / Outsider
Variable Test Sig Explanation
Structural change to the
personnel department
Cross tabs
chi squared
.17 (40.9% of Outsiders are associated with change:
75.6% of Insiders are not)
Reassign management
personnel
CI
.001 77.3% of Outsiders are associated with change:
64.3% of Insiders are not
Appoint new senior
executive(s)
CC
.02 77.3% of Outsiders are associated with change:
51.2% of Insiders are not
Appoint new finance director IC .16 (54.5% of Outsiders are associated with change:
63.4% of Insiders are not )
Appoint new marketing /
sales director
LI
.05 55.0% of Outsiders are associated with change:
70.7% of Insiders are not
Remove senior executive(s) " .01 90.9% of Outsiders are associated with change:
39.0% of Insiders are not
Create new positions CI .41 (52.4% of Outsiders are associated with change:
58.5% of Insiders are not)
Initiate search for new senior
executive
It
.90 (23.8% of Outsiders are associated with change:
77.5% of Insiders are not)
Top team injects new
values/vision
CC
.002 81.0% of Outsiders are associated with change:
60.0% of Insiders are not
Top team is more action
oriented
II
.003 76.2% of Outsiders are associated with change:
63.4% of Insiders are not
Introduce or change employee
incentive scheme
"
.09 68.2% of Outsiders are associated with change:
53.7% of Insiders are not
Change performance
appraisal system
IL
.0003 68.2°o of Outsiders are associated with change:
78.0% of Insiders are not
Adopt parent company pay
and conditions structure
IC
.004 66.7% of Outsiders are associated with change:
70.7% of Insiders are not
Implement management
development programme
IC
.02 59.1% of Outsiders are associated with change:
70.7% of Insiders are not
n - 64
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As one might expect, the appointment of an Outsider is also associated with the removal of
senior executives, the reassignment of management personnel and the appointment of new
executives. Whilst Outsiders are more associated with changing the marketing and finance
directors, this occurs in only some 50% of cases which suggests that the changes in senior
executives is more widespread than these two offices.
Outsiders are associated with new values and vision and a greater sense of action. This concords
with the picture of Outsiders being associated with greater levels of change. Reinforcing these
changes are alterations to the performance appraisal system in particular as well as the employee
incentive scheme. Whilst this is often a move to synchronise with the parent systems, it is an
important indicator of the new values of the acquired company. This is often reinforced by the
implementation of a management development programme.
Insiders are reluctant to make major changes in core values. In particular in the section on
changes in marketing we suggested the close association between the Incumbent and the
marketing function and so it is perhaps not surprising that here we find that 70.7% of Insiders
do not change their marketing directors although it seems that in 61% of cases they do remove
senior directors. The other area of little change, with 70% - 78% of Insiders saying they do not
make changes, is the area of employee incentives, performance appraisal and management
development programmes as it already re-enforces the current set of core values.
5)	 Changes in the Operations Management area
In eight out of thirteen areas Outsiders show a stronger association with change than Insiders in
the Operation Management area. Table 6 shows that this pattern is also present for most of the
non-significant items although it would seem that in the Operations Management context the
distinction between Insider and Outsider is less marked.
Table 6 Changes in the Operations Management area (Q21) by organisational Insider /
Outsider
Variable Test Sig Explanation
Structural change to the
manufacturing operation
Cross tabs
chi squared
.02 55.0% of Outsiders are associated with change:
74.4% of Insiders are not
Sale or closure of businesses c, .45 (43.5% of Outsiders are associated with change:
65.9% of Insiders are not )
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Intensive effort to reduce
production costs
CC
.42 (57.1% of Outsiders are associated with change:
53.7% of Insiders are not )
Investigate inventory controls CC .03 65.0% of Outsiders are associated with change:
64.0% of Insiders are not
Adopt parent inventory
controls
,,
.03 45.0% of Outsiders are associated with change:
81.0% of Insiders are not
Stock take CC .001 57.9% of Outsiders are associated with change:
82.9% of Insiders are not
Purchase of new equipment LL
. 1 1 (54.5% of Outsiders are associated with change:
65.9% of Insiders are not)
Sale of equipment I< .71 (18.2% of Outsiders are associated with change:
85.4% of Insiders are not)
Introduce or improve quality
control system
,4
.03 45.0% of Outsiders are associated with changes:
80.5% of Insiders are not
Improve product design CC .88 (25.0% of Outsiders are associated with
changes: 73.2% of Insiders are not)
Adopt new processes Ct .04 44.4% of Outsiders are associated with change:
80.5% of Insiders are not
Invest in Research " .01 43.8% of Outsiders are associated with change:
85.4% of Insiders are not
Improve delivery times CC .01 50.0% of Outsiders are associated with change:
80.5% of Insiders are not
n - 64
The main areas of significant difference between Insiders and Outsiders, where a majority of
Outsider make changes, is in terms of investigating inventory controls, with 65% of Outsiders
citing change, stock taking, with 57.9% of Outsiders citing change, and structural changes to
the manufacturing operation with 55% of Outsiders citing change. Essentially this is about
uncovering what has actually been purchased and taking control. There is also a willingness to
make substantial changes to the operations which Insiders are clearly loathed to do with 74.4%
saying they do not make changes.
In terms of improving controls Outsiders are also associated with introducing or improving the
quality control system and in 45% of cases the parent inventory control system is adopted. All
of the control items show Outsiders making many more changes than Insides which is
significant at the .03 level.
Associated with better controls is the effort to reduce production costs and 57.1% of Outsiders
make considerable efforts in this area. However this is not a statistically significant difference
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from Insiders who appear to be equally likely to reduce costs and trim operations. It is
noticeable that in terms of selling or closing businesses, reducing production costs, and selling
equipment, there was no significant difference between Insiders and Outsiders.
Outsiders also seem to be associated with investment as 44.4% adopted new processes which
was significantly greater than for Insiders at the .04 level, and in terms of investing in research
with 43.8% of Outsiders making changes which was significantly different from Insiders where
85.4% did not make changes; significant at the .01 level.
It would seem that Outsiders are more associated with focusing upon improved controls, major
changes to the operation and investment. However there was no significant difference in terms
of attempting to drive costs down through sale of assets.
6)	 Changes in the Information technology area
Table 7 shows a clear association between Outsiders and change in the area of information
technology. 73.9% of Outsiders make structural changes to the Information technology
department whereas 75.6 0 o of Insiders do not. Outsiders are also more associated with change in
Information Systems than Insiders and although the difference is maintained for the introduction
of parent systems, the magnitude is reduced.
Table 7 Changes in the Information technology area (Q20) by organisational Insider!
Outsider
Variable Test Sig Explanation
Structural change to the IT
department
Cross tabs
chi squared
.0001 73.9% of Outsiders are associated with change:
75.6% of Insiders are not
Adopt parent systems " .10 52.2% of Outsiders are associated with chan bcre.•
68.3°0 of Insiders are not
Change information system t4 .04 •65.2% of Outsiders are associated with chan ut,e .
61.0% of Insiders are not
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Appendix 7.3	 Organisational Insiders / Outsiders by
autonomy and resource transfer
• Autonomy
Table 8 below shows the results of a Mann Whitney U-Wilcoxon rank sum test for association
between level of autonomy and the Insider /Outsider dichotomy.
Table 8 Acquisition autonomy v. organisational Insider / Outsider
Mean Rank
	 Cases
	
28.39	 23	 Outsider
	
36.23	 43	 Insider
66	 Total
Corrected for ties
Z	 2-Tailed P
377.0	 653.0	 -1.6306	 .1030
We can see that there is a significant relationship between level of autonomy and the presence
of an Insider or Outsider. This appears to fit with the view that acquired companies with
considerable autonomy will be performing well' and therefore retain their Insiders, whilst
acquired companies with low autonomy might exhibit poor performance and therefore lose their
Insiders. This provides some support for Hayes and Hoag's (1974) top management observation
that turnover is negatively associated with autonomy. We examined this issue further by using a
cross-tabulation procedure, shown in table 9, which did not yield a significant association.
However we can see that the area of most significance is where there is high autonomy, as there
are higher numbers of Insiders than expected and lower numbers of Outsiders. Where there is
low autonomy, we find higher numbers of Outsiders and lower numbers of Insiders than
expected by probability although this does not contribute substantially to the chi squared value.
Autonomy is significantly and negatively associated with pre-acquisition cashflow (.002 level)
and gearing (.003 level) although the correlation is low at -.035
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Table 9 Autonomy by Insider / Outsider
AUTONOMY	 Page 1 of 1
Count
Exp Val
Row Pct
INSOUT97
Low
1
Medium
2
High
3
Row
Total
1.00 8 7 8 23
Outsider 7.0 5.9 10.1 34 .8%
34.8% 30.4% 34.8%
2.00 12 10 21 43
Insider 13.0 11.1 18.9 65.2%
27.9% 23.3% 48.8%
	
Column	 20	 17
	 29	 66
	
Total	 30.3%	 25.8%
	
43 .9%
	 100.0%
Chi-Square	 Value	 DF	 Significance
Pearson	 1.20725 2	 .54683
Likelihood Ratio	 1.22105 2	 .54306
Mantel-Haenszel test for	 .89317	 1	 .34462
linear association
Minimum Expected Frequency - 5.924
Approximate
Statistic	 Significance
Phi	 .13525	 .54683 *1
*1 Pearson chi-square probability
Number of Missing Observations: 4
• Resource transfer
Table 10 shows the constituents of the resource transfer axis against Management type. The chi-
squared values shows very significant associations between resource transfer and Managing
Executive type.
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Table 10	 Organisational Insiders / Outsiders against resource transfers
Variable Test Sig. Explanation
Information
transfer
Chi-squared
cross tab
.01 Outsiders are associated in 73.9% of cases with high
information transfer: Insiders show an even
distribution from high to low transfer
Asset
transfer
Li
.01 In 32.5% of cases Outsiders are associated with high
asset transfer: Insiders are associated with low asset
transfer in 86.0% of cases.
Personnel
transfer
Li
.01 In 36.9% of cases Outsiders are associated with high
personnel transfer: Insiders are associated with low
personnel transfer in 82.5% of cases.
The areas contributing most to the chi squared values for each item of resource transfer are: at
the high level of personnel transfer where higher than expected levels of personnel transfer are
associated with Outsiders and lower than expected transfers are associated with Insiders: at all
levels of transfer of knowledge but in particular at the low level where lower than expected
figures are associated with Outsiders and higher than expected are associated with Insiders: and
at the high level of transfer of assets where higher than expected asset transfer is associated with
Outsiders and lower than expected transfer is associated with Insiders. This is convincing
evidence that there is a positive association between Outsiders and resource transfer and a
negative association between Insiders and resource transfer. The positive association is
particularly marked in terms of the transfer of knowledge and information.
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Appendix 7.4	 Insiders / Outsiders, key issues and autonomy
The thesis has shown that there are significant differences between the four acquisitions types of
Haspeslagh and Jemison 's (1991) framework. However Appendix 7.3 shows that the
relationship between insiders / outsiders and autonomy is complex. This appendix therefore
considers autonomy against the other key issues of the thesis to see if other distinct acquisition
styles exist. Using the three point autonomy scale of appendix 7.3, we tested whether the new
boxes created in the resulting 3x2 matrix, namely box 2 and box 5 differed significantly from
other boxes.
Box 2 comparison with other boxes on key issues
Box 2 Issue Box 1 Box 3 Box 4 Box 5 Box 6
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean
Si. error Si. error Si. error Si. error Si. error Si. error
Sig. level Sig. level Sig. level Sig. level Sig. level
Success measures
1.75 Overall success X X X
.21 
2.33 Recovering the cost of X X X
.31 capital 
2.15 Group profitability X X X
.29 
2.15 Achieving strategic X 1.55 X
.19 objectives .17
.02
23.23 Aggregate change X X X X X
4.12
Seven dimensions of
change
.66 Reduce debt 1.85 X 1.40 X X
.22 .40 .26
.01 .04
2.45 Change product market X X X X
.56 focus
.90 Improve quality X X X X
.34 
1.66 Improve marketing X X X X
.79 
3.40 Reduce production costs X X X X
.76 
4.08 Change management X X X 7.5 X
.77 .50
.007
2.92 Improve financial 5.00 X X 5.75 X
.60 controls .57 .25
.03 .001
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Pre-acquisition
financial health
2.92 Cashflow X X X X X
.43 
2.53 Gearing X X X X X
.38
1.61 Insider / Outsider X X X X X
.14
The table shows that there are few significant differences between box 2 and the other boxes.
Out of a total of 75 boxes, just 6 boxes show significant differences. This represents 8% of the
total and, as these differences are fairly evenly spread, we would expect much of this result to
be explained by chance. In two significant instances the standard errors of the mean suggest that
there is some overlap' in the samples. Overall, there would appear to be insufficient grounds to
regard this box separately.
Box 5 comparison with other boxes on key issues
Box 5 Issue Box 1 Box 2 Box 3 Box 4 Box 6
Mean
St. error
Mean
Si. error
Signiticanc
e level
Mean
St. error
Significanc
e level
Mean
Si. error
Significanc
e level
Mean
Si. error
Signiticanc
e level
Mean
St. error
Significanc
e level
Success measures
2.00 Overall success X X X X X
.31
2.20 Recovering the cost X X X X X
.58 of capital
2.00 Group profitability X X X X X
.54
2.40 Achieving strategic X X 1.55 X X
.40 objectives .17
.04
31.00 Aggregate change X X 16.74 X X
5.21 2. 7
.05
Seven dimensions
of change
1.00 Reduce debt X X X X X
.54
3.50 Change product X X X X X
1.04 market focus
1.00 Improve quality X X X X X
.40
2.80 Improve marketing X X .77 X X
.86 .23
.004
2 This has been established as two standard errors from the mean.
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5.00
1.08
Reduce production
costs
X X 2.23
.53
.04
X X
7.50 Change X 4.08 2.65 X X
.50 management .77 .64
.007 .001
5.75 Improve financial X 2.92 2.86 X X
.25 controls .60 .46
.001 .000
Pre-acquisition
financial health
3.20 Cashflow X X X X X
.91
2.60 Gearing X X X X X
.98
1.60 Insider/Outsider X X X X X
.24
There are a number of significant differences with box 3, although three of these differences
shows overlapping standard errors. Otherwise there are insufficient differences to suggest that
box 5 should be regarded as a special case.
Overall, it would seem that the cases on the mid-point of the autonomy axis are generally
consistent with our earlier analysis. Certainly box 2 behaves as one would expect in autonomy
being a linear scale. However, box five is not entirely consistent, exhibiting some anomalous
behaviour. This suggests that whilst autonomy behaves predictably with low levels of resource
transfer, in some instances, where there is medium autonomy, there are some unusual
characteristics. For this reason, we may conclude that the autonomy dimension is rather more
complex than is often acknowledged and calls for further research attention.
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Appendix 8.2	 Levene test for equality of variances and
t - tests
• Insiders/Outsiders by time between acquisition and questionnaire return (acquisitions 12 -
24 months)
Number
Variable	 of Cases Mean	 SD	 SE of Mean
Months
Outsider 13 15.8115 4.009 1.112
Insider 12 15.3681 3.619 1.045
Mean Difference = .4434
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= .791 P= .383
t-test for Equality of Means	 95%
Variances t-value df 2-Tail Sig SE of Diff CI for Diff
Equal .29 23 .775 1.532 (-2.727, 3.614)
Unequal .29 22.99 .774 1.526 (-2.714, 3.600)
Appendix 8.3	 Levene test for equality of variances and
t- tests
• Insiders/Outsiders by time between acquisition and questionnaire return (acquisitions of
33+ months)
Number
Variable of Cases Mean	 SD
	 SE of Mean
Months
Outsider 5 39.7582 5.178 2.316
Insider 7 38.1146 7.082 2.677
Mean Difference = 1.6436
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F = .023 P= .882
Appendix 8: 2
t-test for Equality of Means 	 95%
Variances t-value df 2-Tail Sig SE of Diff CI for Diff
Equal .44 10 .670 3.741 (-6.694, 9.981)
Unequal .46 9.97 .652 3.539 (-6.245, 9.532)
Appendix 8.4	 Comparison of Industry Outsiders
• Outsiders from unrelated and related industries in terms of aggregate change (Acquisitions
over 1 yr)
Number
Variable	 of Cases	 Mean	 SD
	
SE of Mean
Related Industry	 8 26.7500 13.382 4.731
Unrelated Industry	 2 25.0000 9.899 7.000
Mean Difference = 1.7500
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 1.938 P= .201
t-test for Equality of Means
	 95%
Variances t-value df 2-Tail Sig SE of Diff Cl for Diff
Equal .17 8 .869 10.276 (-21.952, 25.452)
Unequal .21 2.06 .855 8.449 (-34.603, 38.103)
Appendix 8: 3
Appendix 8.5 Time differences between acquisition types (12
- 36 months')
Mean Rank Cases
	
6.50	 6	 Holding
	
14.11	 9	 Preservation
	
16.14	 7	 Absorption
	
18.00	 '.4	 Symbiotic
26	 Total
Corrected for ties
Chi-Square	 D.F. Significance Chi-Square	 D.F. Significance
7.3035	 3	 .0628	 7.3035	 3	 .0628
Upon further testing we find that the differnce in the average timing of change
between Holding and Symbiotic acquisitions, is robust as it is present at the
aggregate and functional level. The relationship between other acquisition types
is less clear.
I There is no significant difference between acquisition type and time elapsed for these
acquisitions.
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